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THE
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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL

OF

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NUMBER I

PEACE MOVEMENT IN EUROPE.

A FEW years ago it would have been an easy task to give an account of the peace movement in Europe, at least so far as its outward manifestations were concerned. Although there had been peace congresses held at more or less frequent intervals in Brussels, London, Frankfort, Paris, or Geneva, and some of them, notably that of Paris, held in 1849, with Victor Hugo as president, awakened an echo throughout the civilized world. Nevertheless, these enemies of war and bloodshed seemed to have little influence. Outside of the "Peace Society," so nobly directed by Henry Richards, and the Société Française des amis de la Paix, now known as the Société Française pour l'arbitrage entre nations, of which I had the honor to be one of the founders, in April, 1867, and which was then called Ligue Internationale et Permanent de la Paix, and the Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberté, founded shortly afterward by Lemonnier, with headquarters in Switzerland, there seemed to be no openly expressed manifestations of a desire for peace except on the part of a few isolated individuals. Moreover, philosophers, statesmen, and men of affairs, even if they sometimes paid homage to the noble intentions of those people who dared to talk of peace and good will among nations as among individuals, and a public as well as a private code of morals, scarcely concealed their pity for these visionary reformers, as they were regarded, and never ceased to remind them upon every possible occasion that war always has

existed and always will exist. A terrible evil, as some admitted, yet a necessary one. A struggle fruitful in results and beneficial to the world, said others, one which develops character and affords an outlet for human energy, and without which, to quote Field Marshal von Moltke, "nations would stagnate in the mud of the grossest materialism." Times have indeed changed. It would be hard to find nowadays among statesmen, members of parliament, or even in the army itself, men imprudent or impudent enough to wish to have ascribed to themselves the sentiments expressed by von Moltke, Bismarck, or Joseph de Maistre.

In every country there are soldiers who are ready to pour out their blood for their country, but if need should arise it would be seen that they are not the only ones who would courageously meet the sufferings and dangers which they could not avoid. "If we should ever be so unfortunate as to have another war," said Jules Simon once in my presence, "you would find that it is the friends of peace who make the best soldiers, but I hope we may never have occasion to put them to the test." Soldiers like Captain Tracasse, belligerents thirsting for blood, foolhardy persons ready to jeopardize the safety of their country upon the slightest provocation and who see nothing more noble than a glorious field of battle, scarcely exist any more, or, if they exist, they no longer dare to avow their sentiments openly. The opinion of the great majority of our people was expressed by Canrobert, the last of the marshals of France, when he wrote to the Interparliamentary Association, assembled at London in 1890, "You are quite right in laboring to put a stop to war. I know from experience that it is wretched business. Do not engage in it." And there are still others. Every day we see old army officers enrolling themselves in the army of peace, among whom more than one has, like artillery captain Gaston Moch, left his career to enjoy again the free use of voice and pen. Even in such newspapers as the *France Militaire*, or *l'Avenir Militaire*, to speak only of those of my own country, there is open revolt against the frightful progress which is being made in the art of destroying, and nothing but curses are bestowed upon those killing-

machines which tend to make war of nothing but a repetition, on a large scale, of the wholesale butchery carried on in the stock-yards of Chicago; while, on the other hand, the labors of the champions of international arbitration are not only treated with politeness and respect, but are even seriously discussed in the columns of these newspapers. Thus it is no easy matter to give an outline, even though extremely imperfect, of what is being done in this direction, and to measure more or less approximately the ground gained by the propaganda of peace during the last two or three years only.

In the first place, a most striking and significant fact is the ever-increasing rapidity with which these societies for the promotion of peace have sprung up. The Peace Society was not the only organization of this kind in England, but it was the only important one for a long time. Today it has the satisfaction of seeing numerous societies which have sprung up in imitation of it, first among which stands the International Arbitration and Peace Association, under the direction of a man who has a truly international reputation, Mr. Hodgson Pratt; the International Arbitration League, of which Mr. Randall Cremer is the leading spirit; the Women's Peace Association, to which Mrs. Henry Richards has devoted herself, thus continuing the work of the man whose name she bears; and many others, sustained by the zeal and generosity of such women as Miss Peackover and Miss Ellen Robinson.

In France we no longer have merely the *Société Française pour l'arbitrage*, which includes such men as Jules Simon; Berthelot, the present Minister of Foreign Affairs; Trarieux, former Minister of Justice; Charles Richet, the eminent physiologist; d'Arsonval, the successor of Claude Bernard and of Brown-Séquard; Armand Gautier, Professor of Chemistry in the Medical College and member of the Institute; Baron Courcel, Ambassador to England; Arthur Desjardins, attorney-general in the Court of Appeals and member of the Institute; DeFoville, Master of the Mint, and member of the Institute; Lyon Caen, professor in the Law School and member of the Institute; Henry

Monod, director of public charities and many others. At the side of this society, others have sprung up, such as the *Familistère* of Guise, of Abbeville and of Ponthieu; of Clermont-Ferrand, and of Creuse, under the direction of the abbé Pichot; and different women's societies, either exclusively French, or united with similar societies, in England, Switzerland or Germany.

Italy, oppressed as it is by its military system, is a perfect hotbed for anti-military societies. They exist in Sicily, Naples, Rome, Genoa, Parma, Venice, Turin, Sienna, Perugia, and even in the smaller towns. The most important and influential society, however, is the Lombard Union for the Promotion of Peace which is directed with extraordinary talent and devotion by the able and fearless Theodore Moneta, editor-in-chief of that great popular newspaper, *Il Secolo*.

Belgium and Holland have their own societies which are daily increasing in numbers and influence.

The Scandinavian countries, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, have been, so to speak, entirely won over to the cause of peace and arbitration. In the latter country alone, a petition, started by M. Frédéricck Bajer, received within a few weeks more than two hundred thousand signatures.

It would be possible to extend this list indefinitely, if I were to pass in review all the countries of Europe from Portugal to Greece, not omitting Roumania and the neighboring countries. But especial mention must be made of the work which has been lately accomplished in all of central Europe, in Prussia, Austria and Hungary. Not more than two or three years ago there was only one peace society in Germany, namely, that of Frankfort, which in its isolation led a feeble and precarious existence. Today there are at least thirty, the most important being that of Berlin, all of which keep up constant communication with each other for their mutual encouragement. It is at Berlin that the most important of the peace organs, "*Die Waffen Nieder*," is published under the direction of the Baroness Suttner, who has gained a world-wide reputation through the novel bearing that title, and who is sustained by the coöperation of some of the

most eminent and popular writers. At Vienna, near which she resides, the celebrated baroness has founded a Peace Society in which figure some great names and personages of high rank, and this is far from being the only society of this kind in Austria. In Hungary, finally, where the Interparliamentary Association is to meet this year, a peace society recently held, under the direction of the national poet Jokai, an inaugural meeting with ceremonies which rendered it, in itself, a great event.

It is needless to say that all these societies have organs of their own, more or less widely circulated; newspapers, pamphlets reviews; that they hold meetings listen to speeches, and so far as their resources permit, send out tracts and programmes in considerable numbers. Thus, if I may be excused for mentioning myself in this connection, the French Arbitration Society has published in succession three of my recent speeches, "The Peace Question," "The Future of Europe," "The Firearms of the Future." And so great is the contagion of noble ideas that eighteen months ago I was honored with an invitation to preside at the Catholic Club of Paris and to deliver an opening address, the occasion being the delivery of a speech before the club by a young and talented lawyer, M. Desclozeaux. And quite recently, in January of the present year, I was called upon to deliver a lecture on the subject of peace, before the four hundred young girls of one of the upper elementary schools of Paris, with the full authority and sanction of the Superintendent of Elementary Instruction, M. Buisson. Previous to this, at the distribution of prizes in one of the great lycées of Paris, at which I had the honor to preside, the professor who delivered the customary address, which is always submitted beforehand to the authorities, made a very open allusion to the "peace crusades" as the grandest and most noble work of the age. Such an allusion could not possibly have been made a few years ago.

At the same time the language and tone of the newspapers in every country have been greatly modified. Formerly they affected to be unaware of our existence and passed over in silence facts of the greatest importance. The great debate of July 8,

1873, in which Henry Richard, by an admirable speech, prevailed upon the House of Commons to vote an address to the Queen in favor of arbitration, was not even mentioned on the continent even by those papers which pretend to be best informed as to current events. Now all the important proceedings of the peace societies, the motions of the members of different parliaments, the congresses, the speeches, are announced and discussed, sometimes guardedly, and sometimes with explicit approval. Upon the slightest disturbance, appeal is made to arbitration as an unfailing resource. This has been well illustrated, as both Americans and Europeans know, during the recent troubles in regard to Venezuela, Transvaal and Armenia, which in spite of their gravity have not destroyed public confidence in arbitration.

Every year lengthens the list of arbitrations brought to a successful issue, thus confirming the faith of the apostles and preachers of the gospel of arbitration and overcoming and disarming the objections of the incredulous. Moreover the press of all countries and languages, influenced by the progress of ideas and the need of satisfying the ever increasing demands of the public, is beginning to play an important part in the study of international questions and may thus be called, in the fullest sense of the term, cosmopolitan.

The number of books relating to this subject is considerable. I might mention "Conflicts and Disorders of Modern Society" by the Russian Novicow, Vice-President of the International Institute of Sociology, and the "Benefits of War," a piece of grim satire, by the same author. Also a work on "War," by the learned doctor Letourneau; "The Neutrals," by Captain Godchot, an officer of the Zouaves; "The War of 1870-71 by M. Chuguet, Professor in the College du France, a simple but conscientious report, which by its impartiality has done more than the most violent anathemas to awaken detestation for the bloody deeds of war. Besides this there are the admirable volumes of that Alsatian who is known only by his pseudonym *Heimweh*, "Home Sickness;" those of Ernest Lavisse, which one

might suppose to have been written by the same pen; of Admiral Réveillère, of the Marines, an exceptionally energetic and patriotic writer; lastly, the writings of Gaston Moch mentioned above, who long before he felt it safe to sign his own name to his books, used the expressive pseudonym, Patriens, and and many others whom there is not space to mention.

A number of periodicals might be mentioned. The *Revue* which is devoted to politics and literature; the *Revue Bleue*, and sometimes a scientific journal, *Revue Rose*, contain articles of great value on arbitration, on the disbanding of armies and on contemporary events, thus accustoming their readers to direct their attention to problems formerly too much neglected. There is the "Paix par le Droit," which began as a modest little paper, published at long intervals by a society of young people, and which has gradually become a monthly magazine of considerable importance. There is *l'Europe Nouvelle*, in which are carefully collected, together with unedited works, all writings which bear upon that grievous wound, opened by the sword in 1870, in the bosom of France, and which cannot be healed except by repudiating the sword and the works of the sword. At Berne, that neutral center, there are beginning to group themselves, like the savory pulp about the stone, all the best and most fruitful aspirations of the chosen ones of Europe, there is published the *Conférence Interparlementaire* and the *Correspondance du Bureau International de la Paix*. In this case a simple mention will not suffice, and those of my readers who are best informed in regard to these institutions will most readily give me permission to spend a few moments in explaining their value and importance.

I have spoken of peace societies, and how rapidly they have multiplied; but I have not spoken of their international meetings.

It is generally known, I suppose, that every year, since 1889, in one city or another on either continent, for in 1893 such a meeting was held in Chicago, peace congresses are held, in which are assembled members or delegates from all the peace societies in the world. In Paris, in 1889, not less than a hundred representatives were present. But not everyone knows

the importance which has from year to year been attached to these pacific assemblies and the power of the permanent institution which has grown out of them. The congress of 1889, at Paris, and that of 1890, at London, held their sittings in the town halls, which in itself was something. That of 1891, at Rome, however, held its first meeting in the capitol, where it was officially received by the syndic of the Eternal City, with befitting pomp. That of 1892, at Berne, was presided over by the most esteemed and popular man in all Switzerland, Louis Bouchonnet, formerly at the head of the government of the Confederation, and now Minister of Justice. At Antwerp, in 1896, the congress was received by the Burgomaster in the Town Hall and a delegation of the members had the honor to be presented to the king. This was a good deal, but by no means enough. From one year to another the bonds which united the different societies were apt to become relaxed. Unforeseen circumstances, demanding immediate action, arose sometimes in these intervals, for which no provision had been made. The peace party, in spite of its occasional grand demonstrations, was not an organic, living body. It is only since the establishment of a legally incorporated International Bureau in Switzerland, under the direction of a council elected annually, that the different peace societies have become united in an organic whole, and this bureau, being as it is, a center of information and activity, is the heart and brain of the whole movement in both the old world and the new. It has accomplished for international peace and justice that which has been done in other departments by international postal and telegraph bureaus, and by international copyright laws. By this means all the different publications on this subject are collected, news is recorded, information obtained, doubtful or obscure questions explained, propositions forwarded and opinions received. Thus it is coming to be, under the efficient direction of its indefatigable general secretary, M. Elie Ducommun, the living soul of the great body of peacemakers all over the world. It is an institution already powerful and destined to be recognized as a public benefit, not only by

the Swiss law, but by the official consecration of the "ensemble" of nations which, as in the case of the Helvetian and Norwegian confederacies, will not be slow in lending their support and aid. Even as I write these lines, a call has been issued by the International Bureau at Berne to all the peace societies of Europe, to assemble on the same day, February 22, and vote a unanimous resolution, as has been done already by the English House of Commons and the French Chamber of Deputies, requesting all the governments of the world to adopt arbitration as a means of settling difficulties. Can we not see here, as M. Gaston Moch has already said in the *Indépendance Belge*, the beginning of the mobilization of the army of peace. In an article in the *Siècle* I have said that M. Moch goes still farther. In support of this international manifestation he would have chambers of commerce, all industrial and labor organizations, all charitable societies, in short, all corporate bodies interested in maintaining the present state of tranquillity, unite in a vote, which, while leaving perfect liberty in everything else, should bind them to work for that international peace and goodwill which is the wish of every human heart.

That which has been done by the peace societies to insure the regular performance of their functions and the propagation of their ideas, and to provide some means of action in the intervals between their congresses has been accomplished no less happily by the Interparliamentary Union. It is generally known, I suppose, what this union is, to which I have alluded and whose monthly bulletin, "*La Conférence Interparlementaire*," I have already mentioned. It is the annual assembly of the members of all the parliaments which in their respective countries, sustain the cause of justice and international union, which was decided upon at Paris, October 30, 1888; inaugurated June 30, the following year, during the Exposition, and continued by the side of the Peace Congresses, at London, Berne, Rome, the Hague, Brussels, and this coming year, at Buda-Pesth. It is an important assembly, not only on account of the number but also the character of the members, among whom are the presidents or vice-presidents of several legislative assem-

blies of Europe, and also because some of these societies, as for example, the Norwegian "Great Council," *Storting*, have undertaken to defray the expenses of their delegates. From year to year these assemblies have assumed a more solemn and imposing character. Held at first in a hotel parlor, they have been convened in the capitol of Rome and presided over by the president of the Chamber of Deputies, and at Berne in the Federal Palace where they were received by M. Numa Droz, the present Minister of Foreign Affairs and twice President of the Confederation, at the Hague, and at Brussels in the Senate Chamber, with the approval and coöperation of the ministers and even of the President of the Council. In the intervals between the sessions of this Interparliamentary Union, composed of the most select of the national representatives, it is represented by a delegation of fifteen members presided over by Dr. Gobat, and it is charged to watch the political horizon in the name of the Union. I have often shown the importance of this organization, which, it goes without saying, does not exist for the purpose of limiting the independence of any nation or to set itself above the parliaments to which its members belong. It is indeed a higher parliament, but one which possesses its influence through the weight and character of its members themselves and which exerts a moral authority at least, which must be taken into account.

Enough has certainly been said to give even the most incredulous an idea of the rapidity with which the peace movement has developed in Europe, especially of late. I am far, however, from having pointed out all the indications. If I were to do this with the least degree of completeness, I should have to write a whole volume instead of a magazine article.

I have said nothing of the Peace Sunday instituted in England, that from every pulpit whose minister espouses this cause there may be heard on the same day, the same vows and the same prayers. Nor of the Congress of Religions at Chicago, which, though not held in Europe, has just published for European readers, a detailed report of its proceedings which shows

the representatives of all the great religions united in repudiating war and demanding arbitration. Neither have I mentioned the Centennial of the Institute of France which M. Jules Simon has publicly called in the Sorbonne itself, the real Peace Congress, and which M. Sully Prudhomme in his poem recited at the Theatre Français by Monnet Sully, saluted in the name of Peace.

Nor have I mentioned the Brussels meeting of the International Association for the Codification and Reform of International Law; nor, indeed, of an assembly of quite a different character, that which gathered at the Kiel Canal. A ceremony ostensibly military and well calculated to call forth a groan of astonishment, if one did not consider that the frightful power of the marine monsters assembled there, really tends to the maintenance of peace, and that it is a strange spectacle indeed to see hundreds of ships of war, brought together like tamed lions, and ready, to use the words of Admiral Réveillère, to disavow war and lower their flags in unison at the feet of industry and commerce.

In spite of all the different interests which seek to put obstacles in its way, the movement is irresistible. It betrays itself everywhere, even if it does not proclaim itself openly. The *Journal des Débats*, referring to the meetings of the Anglo-French Association, invoked the aid of women, as Jules Simon had done long ago, and remarked their influence in the peace societies. The Times, on occasion of an Academy Reception, imputes to Napoleon, as his greatest crime, that of having turned the intellects of the age from the path upon which they had entered, and of having thus retarded by a century at least, that thing most desirable above all others, peace by arbitration. Newspapers of the most different shades of political opinion, *L'Elair*, *le Figaro*, *le Matin*, contain articles on this subject, different in aim sometimes and under different signatures, but all showing the great interest which is being taken in international arbitration and in those who are laboring to promote it. The international character of the undertaking becomes more evident from day to day in examining the contents of numerous important periodicals. Besides those published in France, the

Review of Reviews contains articles contributed by Baroness Suttner and by myself. Also the *International Magazine*, which publishes extracts from the most progressive writers in every country and thus accustoms its readers to look beyond the boundaries of their own country and to open their hearts and minds to those ideas by which other branches of the human race are influenced. Besides these there are two other magazines, *l'Etranger*, whose purpose is indicated by its title and *Cosmopolis*, containing articles in three languages and elegantly gotten up by a house accustomed to succeed in all its undertakings, that of *Arm and Colin*.

In both of these reviews, as well as in the *Revue Féministe*, which has just been established, the propaganda of peace and the study of questions connected with arbitration, already occupy a considerable place. The second number of *Cosmopolis* contained at least three articles upon that subject, one by Jules Simon, in French, one in English and one in German. Tell me if this is not a sign of the times.

As for myself, I have labored unceasingly in this cause for thirty years, and in spite of temporary defeats and mortifications, I have never despaired of ultimate success. In the midst of the most terrible commotions I have never ceased to ask Heaven that I may see peace and hope return to earth by means of arbitration. And now I believe I have a right to declare, as Jean Dicard has so admirably done in the *Figaro* of the 12th of September last, that the horizon is brightening; deeds have spoken louder than words; the public mind is awakening to the necessity of arbitration. Nothing now remains for those who have fought in its behalf but a little more perseverance and hope in order to overcome the prejudices and hatreds of the old political parties. As Gaston Moch said in his "appeal," February 5, "it is time to say openly to the partisans of that policy that the reign of violence is over and the universal conscience demands the rule of justice."

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THE REVERSAL OF MALTHUS.

EX-SENATOR INGALLS, in a recent review, says : " It is a curious fact that with increasing population, creating increased demands, all products of the field and farm have diminished in value, and that with the exhaustion of the public domain farming lands have become more and more unsaleable."

The Ex-Senator has always been recognized by friends and foes alike as a man of keen perceptions. He does not attempt to account for the condition he describes farther than to hint a belief that "it is intimately though mysteriously connected with the financial system that has been developed in the last twenty years." This belief he advances with the hesitation that becomes a thoughtful man when considering conditions altogether anomalous in extent and character. He shows the sincerity of the doubt which affects his mind as to its being merely local in its nature, by adverting to the fact that "England, France, Germany and Spain are all suffering from the same general paralysis."

It is probable that not a single reflective mind in the whole country has failed to note the facts stated in this interview; a great majority have arrived at similar, if not identical, conclusions in regard to them. The currency and the tariff are generally held responsible, in the public mind, for the greater part of the evils which affect our economic conditions. Because of this a remedy is almost universally sought in tariff amendment or currency re-adjustment. So strong is the former sentiment that the friends of Mr. McKinley have with unanimity dubbed him the "advance agent of prosperity," considering his views upon the efficacy of a protective tariff a restorative for all the ills with which the social body is now affected.

Two other considerable classes regard our present condition as concerned primarily with legislation affecting the currency;

one insisting that the evil is because we have too much silver, and the other, that we have not enough. Both favor the policy of eradicating the paper legal-tender notes of the government, — one in the hope that necessity will compel the restoration of silver to parity with gold in order to secure a sufficient circulating medium; the other trusting by such course to make gold the only form of legal-tender currency. From these variant beliefs have resulted numerous plans of remedy, all pivoting on some special view as to what individual defect of currency or tariff legislation is chargeable with present conditions.

Reference is made to these things, not to controvert any remedial theory nor to propose a new one, but merely to show the universal recognition of new, and in some respects unprecedented conditions. The belief that these result from defective revenue legislation proceeds upon the assumption that the causes are local, and the theory that they arise from "the financial system which has been developed during the past twenty years" makes them the consequence of financial methods rather than of general social and economic relations.

Without questioning the conclusion that both these forces were potent in precipitating the prevailing depression, the purpose of this article is to point out certain facts which tend to show the causes to have been universal rather than particular, and that these conditions are the outcome of social, industrial and economic relations rather than of financial methods.

The steady and remarkable decline in the value of farm lands and products in the United States, offers the first and most reliable suggestion of a cause which cannot possibly be the result either of revenue legislation or financial methods. Farm products are the necessities of life. Their consumption, in the main, varies with the number of consumers. It does not depend to any great degree upon their social or pecuniary conditions. There is no general lack of food, clothing, or sufficient shelter in any part of the world. Everywhere there is enough and almost everywhere a visible surplus. The only deficiency is on the part of those who have not the means of obtaining their

share of the general abundance. In other words, there is no lack of supply, but only of individual power to obtain a share of such supply. Even this element is not important enough to constitute any great factor in economic speculation. If all the people in the world who are known or supposed not to have enough and proper food, clothing or shelter were fully supplied with these necessities, there would hardly be an appreciable diminution of the existing store.

As a consequence, we are facing for the first time in the world's history this condition: The world is able to produce, and actually does produce, more food than is needed to meet the requirements of the population of the globe. More wheat, corn, rice, meat and other staple food-products are raised every year than can possibly be consumed. One-fourth of the arable lands of the United States might be abandoned and the world still have enough. The immediate issue of this condition is the fall in prices of farm-products and a necessary result of this fall in the price of farm products is a declension in farm values.

A hundred years ago Malthus put forth the theory, which has been almost universally accepted as a fundamental axiom of political economy from that time to the present, that the sum total of human labor applicable to the productive capacity of the earth is insufficient to supply the material needs of its population. In other words, he formulated the theory that population increases in a *geometrical* ratio, while the world's capacity to supply them increased only in an *arithmetical* ratio. The terms in which this doctrine was propounded are fanciful in the extreme and their author only contended that they were approximately true—that population increased more rapidly than the capacity to supply their wants. Today we are facing a situation which seems to be an exact converse of the premises on which this hypothesis was based—one apparently establishing the fact that the world's labor, applied to and supplementing the natural capacity of the earth, has already produced more than enough of life's necessities to supply the actual popula-

lion of the globe, and moreover that this condition is likely to prove continuing.

A scientific survey of the food-producing capacity of the earth, even with little if any enhancement of the present supply of labor, makes it evident that the present supply might be largely increased, possibly doubled, within the scope of existing lives. Startling though the thought may be, the statement depends for its verification on a few simple and universally conceded facts. We know now that the most productive portions of the earth's surface are as yet practically undeveloped. It is asserted by the highest authorities that the tropical regions of Africa and South America alone could supply food sufficient for the whole world. At present only an insignificant amount of what is actually consumed is derived from these regions.

The productive capacity of the agricultural laborer has been increased five, probably ten times, since the days of Malthus, by improved mechanical appliances, by the discovery of new methods of cultivation and the use of better fertilizers. Taken altogether, it seems beyond question that one-tenth of the labor required to supply the world's demands for food one hundred years ago would easily meet an equivalent demand today.

The use of steam and electricity in transportation, which has reduced in an equal or greater ratio the amount of labor required for handling and marketing the products of the soil, has in effect enhanced available production by preventing waste, and has reduced consumption by substituting non-consuming motors for the innumerable hosts of draft animals formerly an essential feature of transportation.

The effect of decrease of consuming labor is especially noticeable in this matter. It is easily demonstrable that the food-consuming capacity of the force needed to move the crops of the great West to the seaboard by existing instrumentalities, including the labor necessary to mine the coal, make and keep in order the railways, and manufacture the machinery, is not one-twentieth, probably not one fiftieth, of that which would have been required under the conditions prevailing a century ago. It has been

estimated that after the land was cleared and ready for cultivation, in the early part of the present century, it demanded the labor of at least one man to supply the wants of ten draft animals. Even this estimate is open to criticism, as below rather than above the average. Accepting it as sufficiently correct, however, it makes evident what a large contingent of the labor-force now applied to the production of human food-products would have been diverted into another channel by the continuance of old methods.

Science and invention have greatly increased the supply of force both by the prevention of waste of perishable crops, and by the utilization of natural and artificial products in place of purely agricultural ones, since the days of Malthus. One of the best illustrations of this is the substitution of mineral for animal and vegetable oils for illuminating and lubricating purposes. Animal and vegetable fats being practically excluded from these fields of utility, by the discovery of petroleum, after a time became most serious competitors in the provinces of legitimate agricultural production. "Oleomargarine" and "filled cheese" are familiar instances of this. Within a few years the city of Chicago produced more tons of "artificial" butter than any state of the Union could show of the genuine article. "Filled cheese" has destroyed the foreign market, which was formerly so good, for the American dairy product, and so reduced the price of the unadulterated article as to make its manufacture quite unprofitable.

The canning and "cold storage" of products which were until within a very recent period so perishable as to enter into the consumption only during brief periods of each year, and over limited areas, have transformed them into considerable ingredients of the world's supply of staple necessities. Vegetables, fruits, and fish have thus come into direct competition with grains and meats, thereby still farther increasing the disparity between the demand and supply of agricultural foods. In this way the unused surplus of agricultural products and their equivalents is year by year swelled, to the manifest disadvantage of the producer, and to

the apparent enhancement of the world's productive capacity. The introduction of tropical fruits and cereals, which now enter largely into the world's supply, may also be added to this accumulation.

What is true of agricultural production is also true, perhaps to even a greater extent, of mechanical production of all kinds, with the exception of those things composed chiefly of wood, the growing scarcity of which tends to keep them at a cost relatively equal to what it was before the introduction of labor-saving and non-consuming machinery. Of iron, steel, brick, tile, cements and all materials used in building except wood, the world's labor-force, applied by improved methods, is sufficient to much more than meet the world's consumption, and might easily be extended to an unknown limit without appreciable increase of labor. The same is true of the manufacture of clothing and the yield of all substances that enter into it. Improved machinery has made it possible to produce in five years more cloth stuffs than the world can reasonably consume in ten, without drawing on the labor of any other field of employment.

There are other influences, tending toward the same superfluity in the things of earth. Some of these are of a social and political character, and on that account have received less consideration than they deserve. Chief among them is the breaking down of those traditions of society which up to the middle of the present century restrained large elements of the population of all great commercial nations from personally engaging in productive labor. Feudalism, slavery and caste, until within a very recent period, restrained a notable proportion of civilized humanity from engaging in business competition with each other. The "gentleman," whether his right to the distinction came from legal rank or inherited sentiment, could not openly engage in the universal scramble for gain. The professions, the trade of war and the field of politics, were the only occupations open to him. Until a generation ago, even in our own country, only domestic service, teaching and a narrow fringe of commercial employment was open to women. They were shut out, not by

law but by tradition, from all other avenues of profit. When the door was opened woman became a competitor in all the fields of lighter activity and, the result being lower average wages, many of the consumers thus superseded were forced to join the ranks of producers. In this manner the volume of productive labor has been vastly swelled, both in numbers and in the capacity of each individual, since Malthus formulated his theory. The best estimates make the population of the globe hardly greater by one-half than it was at that time. All things considered it is well within the general view to say that the capacity of the earth to produce the commodities of life has simultaneously increased tenfold. If iron, meat-products, cereals and textile materials be taken as the standard of determination, the gain is unquestionably much greater.

All economic and political theories based on the hypothesis that universal overproduction of necessities is impossible must therefore of necessity fail. As soon as free institutions, general intelligence, science and invention, began to stimulate causative energies, it was a certain thing that the time would come when the world's possible production would exceed the world's possible demand. That time seems to have arrived.

On this theory alone can the fact be believed that like conditions prevail throughout the whole civilized world—from Australia to the Levant. Previous conditions, tariff changes and currency complications have no doubt contributed to make the culminating effects more severely felt here than in other countries, but there can be small doubt that the disease is universal, though some of its symptoms have before been produced by local causes. These are now contributory rather than fundamental. It is not strange that farm lands and farm yields, as well as all manufactured articles are, "unprecedentedly low" in the United States, "despite the exhaustion of the public domain" and "increase of population." We simply happen to live at a time when new conditions have reached their climacteric. Their consequences may be modified by governmental action; but they cannot be permanently avoided nor long averted

thereby, because the forces of which they are the effect are constantly increasing in potency.

In Malthus' time the great economic problem was to find food to fill the mouths of the hungry. His solution of it was simple but not profound. He knew nothing of the resources of science nor of the powers of invention as economic factors. He simply assumed that the capacity to produce was a known quantity of the problem, because he saw that nature *plus* human effort was capable of producing only a certain amount. Convinced that this amount was distinctly and increasingly less than the sum of human needs, or rather assuming it without anything like a thorough and exhaustive examination of the facts, he addressed himself to the other branch of the subject and considered how consumption might be lessened. There did not seem to be hope of reducing the individual ration which, with the poor of the time at least, was not capable of much reduction. So he formulated that other feature of his philosophy which has been so extravagantly praised and so absurdly denounced, to wit: the means by which population may be restricted. Given a continually increasing deficit of food production, he sought to avoid its consequences by restricting the natural demand through legislative action and moral restraint. The problem we face to-day is a curious converse of that he set himself to solve. It is the prospect of a steadily growing surplus of production, with its naturally depressing effects on prices and inevitable over-supply of labor. As he assumed that the supply could not be augmented so as to meet the growing disparity with the demand, we may now assume that there can be no immediate extension of demand likely to materially lessen the present inequality between production and consumption.

What then is to be done? The only logical answer is, to restrict production.

Two methods have been suggested for effecting this: First, that of the trade-unionists, who seek to secure the result by limiting the hours of productive labor. Second, that of the socialistic theorists, who seek to limit the area of productive

labor by increasing the area of non-productive labor, as applied to the construction of roads and other public works. It is probable that both these methods will be employed in the solution of the problem. But, as Malthus counted legislative and governmental restriction on the natural tendency of the human family to increase in numbers a matter of secondary importance, relying more on the moral and ethical obligations to improve the common lot that rest with individuals, so in the solution of our problem, so far as it may be solvable by human effort, the chief hope lies in a modification, if not a general reversal, of existing tendencies.

Profit is the keynote of modern civilization, especially in the United States. The acquisition simply of wealth, not of comfort, reputation nor opportunity for display, is the general incentive. The struggle is not for enough, but for accumulation without regard to its use, save as the instrument for farther accumulation. Little is done for lasting improvement. A very small proportion of our wealthy men, for instance, have country homes which they regard with pride as family seats. Nearly all that is done by the individual is for immediate profit or present ostentation. The farmer, the merchant, the manufacturer, the speculator—all consider immediate profit the thing to be sought in any investment. The home-place, as a sentiment, is rapidly dying out of our life, because, for a generation at least, there has been nothing to encourage it. When he cannot make it pay six per cent. on its value without his personal attention, the man of wealth sells the family mansion and its accompanying acres without any regard to memories which attach to it. The farmer builds and plants only with regard to his present interest and convenience. On account of this tendency, the volume of labor employed for permanent improvement and beautifying of homes and estates in this country is amazingly small. We take from the soil, the forest, the home and the farm, whatever will tend to present profit—paying back none of it in the erection of home-centers, the planting of forests, the prevention of waste or the establishment of permanent improvements, for the profit and delight of future generations.

It may be truly said that, with few exceptions, pride of home, of family, of ancestral honor and hopeful anticipation of regard by posterity, except as the founder and preserver of a fortune, has been eradicated as a silly, unprofitable and unpractical sentiment. If it can be restored or re-awakened, it will bring employment to thousands and eventually millions of the best class of agricultural laborers. The permanent beautifying of homes and country estates, and the preservation of woods, is not only a debt we owe to the future but one we owe to the past as well. We have been spendthrift robbers, who have filched jewels from nature's bosom, and for her flowers and fruits, her shady hillsides and bosky dells have returned only aridness and brambles, decay, neglect and desolation. In paying back this debt, we shall give employment to a constantly increasing volume of labor, which will thereby be diverted to the manifest advantage of all from the field of immediate production.

In all candor it must be admitted that there is little if any indication that such a tendency will prevail. Nothing in our American life shows the existence of belief that the individual owes anything to family, vicinage or country, in the way of permanent betterment of the material environment. There are a few "show places" here and there. Suburbs are built up with amazing rapidity and, in some cases, with substantial beauty. But they are mainly the work of corporate "improvement companies," and made to rent, to be sold, and re-sold. They are houses, habitations, some of them brides' nests, but few of them homes, having anything of the flavor and sacredness of individual care and effort bestowed for the sake of making them family shrines consecrated to happiness.

It would be difficult to predict, however, the effects of a long continued epoch of low profits. Next to his worship of wealth the intelligent American loves his country and the good opinion of his fellows. A man who would be utterly unable to forego the temptation of twenty, ten or even six per cent. interest, finding it difficult to obtain three, and having already more than enough, might find an investment in present comfort, the perma-

ment location of the home, the establishment of the family center, the esteem of the present and the grateful remembrance of posterity, more attractive than slow and tedious accretion. It is possible that the American farmer, forced to be content with small and uncertain profits in the present, might be willing to invest more of his time and labor on the chance of future betterment; that towns and villages, seeing the futility of large expenditure in "booms," might grow to appreciate small investments in permanently improving what they have, in comfort-bringing social clubs and arbor societies.

Of such things one must of necessity speak with doubt. The changes which must come are so radical, antagonistic to the present, that no man can forecast the results. Two things may be safely predicted; first, that the increase of the unemployed will be very great; and second, that when the cost of farm lands is sufficiently reduced to render hopeless such profit on capital as we have come to expect, the number of those who will turn from salaried occupations to the cultivation of the soil, because of the certain assurance which agriculture offers of obtaining at least a support—that is, the satisfaction of physical necessities,—will be very great. Farming will be pursued not as at present, chiefly for sale of the surplus, but mainly to secure a living, an existence.

In nearly all lines of manufacture, the necessity of restricting the collective output has already become clearly apparent. The continuation of conditions similar to those of the past four years will immensely reduce the volume of high-priced salaried labor. Superintendence, accounting, sales and all expenses of this class, will be cut down. The army of middle men will be reduced and those thus thrown out of employment must either join the ranks of wage-laborers or unite with them to develop coöperative or profit-sharing industries—not from sentiment but from necessity. In like manner the number of those who live by traffic in money, sharing the profit of invested capital, will become less. All these things and many other changes must result if the conditions that have been outlined are, as they would seem to be, universal, and the inevitable result of a

continuing and increasing excess of material wealth. Commerce will still increase in volume, but speculation will be restricted from lack of opportunity and scarcity of victims.

The exercise of collective power to secure opportunity for profitable production will become more and more imperative. The capacity for overproduction in all lines of industry still exists with regard to the world's limit for consumption; its restricted application has not yet become universal. Not every country can supply all its own wants. The struggle of the immediate future will be between nations, to secure the chance to interchange their surplus in a manner most advantageous to their own producers. Unrestricted "free-trade" would result in subjecting the labor of each country to the competition of all the others. Restricted areas and nationalities whose needs are complementary of each other must combine together for mutual advantage. Mr. Blaine's beautiful dream of reciprocal relations between the United States and the Central and South American Republics was unquestionably born of a half-unconscious perception of what the new conditions will demand. Mr. Chamberlain's masterly argument for the commercial and industrial consolidation of the British Empire originates in his clear appreciation of this overwhelming necessity; the interests of all parts of the Empire, for the first time in her history perhaps, require free-trade with the colonies and strict protection against all outside competitors. Holding more than half the undeveloped resources of the globe, and aided by her unparalleled resources of accumulated capital, Great Britain will for a time at least, protect herself from the effects of the general overproduction.

Protection for the home-market, more intimate commercial alliance with nations whose needs are complementary in character with ours, restriction of production, the diversion of labor to fields of employment not immediately productive and which minister to the public and personal enjoyment rather than material gain, likewise offer to us the natural and reasonable methods of adjusting our own industrial relations to these new inevitable conditions.

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THE SWISS AND THEIR POLITICS.¹

I WAS in Switzerland about three months, and I was more than ever impressed with the importance of the position of that country in the making of Europe. The soil of Europe has in large part been ground out of the "raw material" of the mountains of Switzerland. The glaciers that remain are mere toys when compared with those which have been.

Before I left home I read in one of the essays of Emerson expressions on the folly of traveling to gain information, on the part of a man who was so fortunate as to possess a soul. I gathered from Emerson that he found in that transcendental soul of his all, and more than all, that he could gain by change of position. Such has not been my experience. I thought I understood glaciers and glacial action before I saw one, and when I first saw them I was quite ready to felicitate myself upon the accuracy of my mental picture. The first that we visited we were expected to come within a stone's throw of, and pay our respects by looking down upon it from a cliff, and it seemed to me that this was all that was needed. Yet somehow I was seized with a desire to actually touch it. I disregarded the formal restraints and went to the point where the moving stone and ice are in contact with the immovable mountain. I followed along the morain to the end of the ice. I lay down upon the stones and looked under the ice. I got onto the ice and looked down to the bottom through holes that had been burnt through by bowlders. It was thus that I got an idea of the working of the glacier such as I suppose a mere transcendental soul never gets. He thinks he has it; but the chances are he is mistaken. Since seeing the grist of the present little ice

¹This paper was written as a private letter to a member of the faculty of Iowa College. With the author's consent the letter is here reproduced without changes, except the omission of personal references.

mills I have not been able to get away from its effect. In Geneva our house stood on some hundreds of feet of the grindings of an ice mill that amounted to something. It was a body of ice some two hundred miles in length. It had a width varying from ten to a hundred miles. At Geneva this river of ice was squeezed in between mighty pillars, having on the one side Mount Blanc as the highest sentinel, and the Jural Mountains on the other. One result was the plowing out of a hole in the earth which is now occupied by the waters of Lake Geneva. Another result was the reduction of stones broken off from the mountains in pieces as big as houses into pebbles such as boys throw at birds. These pebbles are now exposed, hundreds of feet in depth, on the banks of the Rhone and the Arve. And all the way from Geneva to Paris I observed that what they call the soil is composed in large part of these same pebbles. The mill may have "ground slow" but it did not "grind fine" as did the mills which made for us the soil of Iowa.

As in Switzerland one may see in miniature the making of the soil of Europe, so likewise one may see in miniature the history of Europe. Each one of the twenty-two cantons has a special and peculiar history, which in most cases goes back to the beginning of modern history. In these cantons you have a little Germany, a little Italy, and a little France. Three races and three languages have been kept separate and distinct, yet by the action and inter-action of internal and external forces the three have been compacted into one nation with an *esprit de corps* scarcely equaled by any nation on earth.

It seems to me that any observer from the New World must be struck with the difference in spirit, tone, and method which comes from the mere fact of indigenous civilization. In America we have the case of a transplanted civilization under circumstances most favorable. We do not half appreciate the amount of humbug we get rid of by simply going away from it. Yet there are losses as well. In a new country there is a difficulty in taking anything seriously. We know that out in the Rockies even the graveyard is a sort of standing joke. So one

of the things that has impressed me most in Switzerland is the deep seriousness of their sentimental patriotism. In America we think we do well if we spend a part of one day in the celebration of our Independence. And those whom we call our more serious people are inclined to the opinion that even so much is a waste of time. During the two months of my stay in Geneva, six days and six nights, that is, one-tenth of the entire time, was devoted to patriotic celebration, and that too not on the part of the light and frivolous members of society, but of the most serious members of the community. In 1602, on the night of the 12th of December, a poor washerwoman who lived on the wall of the city was making soup when she discovered some soldiers of the Duke of Savoy in the act of scaling the wall. She hurled her soup upon them and raised the alarm, and the city was successfully defended. This gave rise to the three days' Festival of the Escalade, beginning December 11. For days preceding the date there began to appear in the shop windows soup kettles done in chocolate and wood and all sorts of material bearing the date "1602." Shop windows were filled with masks of all imaginable shapes. Costumes were displayed, some of them very elegant and expensive, others cheap and fantastic. On the evening of the eleventh I went to the Circus, where with about eight thousand other people I sat for three hours in a freezing atmosphere witnessing patriotic performances. I paid 60 cents for my seat, and I think it was an average price. Leading citizens of Geneva took part in the exercises, which consisted in short addresses, songs, marches, dances, while some of it resembled an Iowa College "winter gym." In one scene certain Austrians appeared and strutted up and down the stage in full armor. An equal number of Frenchmen also appeared in shining array. A little later the Swiss came in, whose stalwart muscles were covered only by natural skin and armed only by real war clubs. All performed together *à la* Indian clubs. By a strange coincidence the Austrians and French were surrounded by the Swiss, thrown upon their backs, their arms

wrested from them, and they demurely marched out under the yoke.

Another exercise well represented the spirit of the occasion. First, three athletes appeared, and one on the shoulders of the other two held aloft a card having on one side in large characters the date, 1291, and on the other the word "Alliance." The three men were the original cantons of the confederation of 1291. Next appeared five other athletes, and the eight threw themselves into a ladder displaying a new card with the same word and the date, 1352. Then five more men appeared and with the aid of parallel ropes the thirteen lifted a man toward the roof with the charmed word and the date, 1513. Then five more, and the eighteen lifted a man above the supporting cable with the card and the date 1798. Finally the whole twenty-two lifted a man to the apex of the roof waving aloft "Alliance" and the date 1813. Then was brought in on a platform borne by four of these same stalwarts a lady of Geneva who had consented to pose as Switzerland. The four tenderly bore her up, and the eighteen took their positions around her in the four historic and expressive groups. As these lifted their strong right arms in the attitude of defense the assembled thousands held their breath till "Switzerland" and her defenders passed from the arena, and then they broke forth in loud applause.

You should remember that Geneva only holds about 80,000 people, and while these thousands were paying their respects to Switzerland in the cold Circus many more thousands were assiduously doing their patriotism in the streets. The street performances are about the same during the three nights. When our Geneva friends learned that I intended to spend the second evening in the streets and take my wife and daughter with me, they felt it their duty to forewarn us. They had learned from past experience that English and American ladies do not like to have masked strangers speak to them and greet them as dear and familiar friends; they do not like to be enclosed in a circle of dancing peasants. Our friends gave us to understand that the Genevese do these things because

they feel that it is their duty as patriots. If the English and Americans do not like it they should keep themselves away from the main streets of the city during the three nights of the Escalade. Notwithstanding the friendly warning we spent several hours of the 12th along the main streets in the thickest crowds. And here again I must dissent from Emerson's transcendentalism and express the opinion that it is absolutely impossible to understand the Escalade without experiencing it. I do not profess to understand it, yet I know enough to be well assured that I could not put into words the things we experienced without conveying an erroneous impression as to its spirit and temper.

On the third day, having seen a notice in the paper that the bones of the victims of the defense of the city in 1602 were to be moved to a more honored spot, my wife and I presented ourselves at the appointed place. We were not however permitted to enter the church till the ceremony was over. When we read the account in the paper we felt that we had been attempting to commit sacrilege. No one was permitted to be present except a few chosen and necessary officers and certain representatives of the families of the deceased. I mention this as expressive of the deep seriousness of the patriotism of the people.

Geneva was the last child to be adopted into the family of states. This took place on December 31, 1813. This glad fact is recognized by the citizens assembling at midnight in front of the cathedral of St. Peter. But the space only holds about 20,000 and the other 60,000 are crowded out. My wife and I went early and got a position on the steps of an adjoining building overlooking the crowd. All the space was occupied an hour before the end of the year. The crowd waited a full half hour in the darkness and part of the time in the rain. The instant it began to rain enough umbrellas were whisked out to cover the space. They all expected rain. For a half hour there were patriot songs led by a choir, and when the bell tolled the end of the year the entire crowd fell to kissing each other and the ceremony was at an end. There was nothing about the performance which in the American sense could be considered attractive.

There was a bit of fireworks at the end, in which a star and the date of the new year shone out in brilliant colors. The three days of festivity at the beginning of the year are given over to sports and traffic kept up during all the hours of night and day.

One other significant festival was observed through all Switzerland. On the 11th of January teachers and pupils united in doing honor to their distinguished leader, Pestalozzi, on the occasion of his 150th birthday. It was Pestalozzi who taught the art of making play a serious business. The Swiss were the first subjects of his instruction and they seem to have caught the point a little in advance of the rest of the world.

I was told more than once not to go to Geneva to learn the spirit of the Swiss, that Geneva is more French than Swiss, that the Genevese were wanting in loyalty to the Swiss nation. Speaking simply from my own impressions I should say that if this is true of the Genevese the loyalty of the other cantons must be something terrific.

Another thing that interested me very much in Geneva—and so far as I could learn this is characteristic throughout Switzerland—was the marked respect shown for the private opinion of the individual voter. During my first two Sundays in Geneva I attended important elections. The first was on the *Referendum* to accept or reject an act of the national legislature reorganizing the military forces in the direction of greater centralization. The second was a triennial election to choose a central legislature. I had learned from the local papers that in the case of both of these elections there was unusual public interest. I had also attended elections in England and America. On election day both in England and America we expect every citizen to do his duty, and we mean as one part of that duty not only that he should vote early but that he should spend the rest of the day in the effort to induce his friends to vote, and to vote the right ticket. We mention with special honor the names of our conservative ministers of the gospel who thus attend to the duties of election day. When I entered the large hall which contained the Genevese voters, I expected

to see evidences that the good citizens were doing their duty. But I learned to my surprise that what we especially mean by electioneering is a thing almost unknown among the Swiss. The crowds about the voting places were quietly talking about the weather, about their families, about the exposition. There was no reason why they should talk about the election, because it was considered entirely improper to try to persuade a citizen to vote a certain way. The citizen thus addressed would feel insulted. Two rival candidates would meet by chance in the crowd. For personal reasons they would naturally allude to the election. In a perfectly frank and straightforward way they would discuss their prospects. As there was no electioneering anywhere there was no motive for lying about the probable result of the election. A would say to his rival, "I expect you to be elected by 900 majority." B would reply, "I don't think so; I expect a close vote with almost even chances." It will not do to apply this conversation to the election which I attended. It is my recollection of the report of a conversation at another election. At the election which I attended the system of proportional representation was followed, and strictly speaking there were no rival candidates. I report the conversation simply to show the spirit which seemed everywhere to prevail.

In 1865 there occurred an election in Geneva in which there must have prevailed a different spirit, because at the close of the election the members of the conservative party, who were victorious at that election, undertook to give expression to their feelings by marching through the streets. The procession was attacked by the Radicals; deadly weapons were used and fifteen men were killed. This one event seems to have thrown the Genevese into a pensive state of mind from which they have never recovered. My escort to the first election alluded to it in such a way as to give me the impression that it occurred only a few years ago. Thoughtful people became convinced that unless something were done to break the force of party violence and give to the people the real management of their affairs,

democratic government was an impossibility. At that time John Stuart Mill and Mr. Hare were advocating proportional representation as one means of escape from the dominance of party factions. A few citizens of Geneva became convinced that proportional representation along with the *referendum* and popular initiative in legislation was just the thing they needed to complete their democratic system of government. So in 1868, three years after the bloody riot, a society was organized to advocate the adoption of proportional representation. Professor Wuarin of the chair of sociology in the Geneva University has been a prominent factor in this propaganda, and he told me many interesting things about it. It was a good illustration of the "faith as a grain of mustard seed which removes mountains."

There were only a half dozen or so who could be got to take any active interest in the subject. According to Professor Wuarin's account a large proportion of the real work was done by a citizen of Geneva who makes a living by selling ribbons. For a quarter of a century this little society labored with no apparent success. Three years ago in the little Italian canton of Ticino the Catholics and Protestants were ready to cut each other's throats over a political quarrel, and they were induced to accept proportional representation as a means of deliverance. Two cantons followed and the promoters of the reform are well assured that all the cantons will adopt it in the near future. I do not write this to give you any information as to the nature or the merits of proportional representation. It has been well written up in our American magazines. I allude to it for the special purpose of illustrating my observation of the marked respect which the Swiss show for the private opinion of the voter. Here is a little society which has spent a quarter of a century in persuading a nation to adopt a radical change in political methods. Men do not do a thing like that who are not in dead earnest about it. After twenty-six years a canton had been induced to go so far as to submit the question of the adoption of proportional representation to a vote of the people. How do you suppose that little group of men who had for so many years been

giving time and money and strength to the cause would spend that election day? I asked Professor Wuarin squarely whether at such an election he and his friends would not single out voters whom they might reasonably hope to influence and try to persuade them to vote their ticket. As I remember his reply; it was: "No, we would not do that for fear of injuring our cause. It is assumed that before election day each voter has his mind made up. It is counted an impertinence to seek to disturb him or to change his conclusion. They seem to actually assume that the other fellow is also a patriot and should be left free to act upon his own convictions.

In my transcendental view of Switzerland I had the impression that democracy in that land was old, that it was somehow indigenous to the soil and oozed out of the rocks. I have been led to make important modifications of that view. In some of the communes and cantons there exists that which is very old and which it is natural to describe as democratic. There were communal lands, communal pastures and forests. There were assemblies of all the freemen to attend to matters of common concern. Certainly this fulfills the ordinary definition of democracy, yet it may fairly be doubted whether our concept of this ancient Alpine democracy is not entirely misleading. We unconsciously take into our definition of democracy the idea of conscious free social action. It may well be questioned whether these early mountain democrats were possessed of any such consciousness; whether they were not rather victims of democratic habits. By farming together, fighting together and herding together on equal terms they could live. By acting in any other way they would die. These regions at no time have been cursed with a surplus of the means of living. Their democratic ways and the so-called democratic virtues were the only obvious means of subsistence. All this, of course, is more theory. But there can be no doubt of the fact that when these same mountain Swiss were led to take a part in government outside of the ancient beaten track they manifested no special predilection for democracy. Government in the cantons drifted into the hands of the few. As early

as 1513 there was a sort of confederacy of thirteen cantons. But this confederacy was not a government, certainly it was not a democratic government. The thirteen were prevented from breaking up into warring states from the fact that they held the greater part of the land outside their own borders which now composes Switzerland as subject territory. The subject territory was governed in a way altogether anti-democratic. The French Revolution loosened the joints of despotism in Switzerland as it did in the rest of Europe. It was not until Switzerland was conquered by France and organized as a Helvetic province that all of the cantons were placed in relations of equality with reference to each other. It was outside pressure on the part of the monarchies of Europe that forced the thirteen despotic cantons to a position of equality when Switzerland became independent in 1813. But the old aristocratic governments remained. The revolutions of 1830 stirred the democratic impulses in Switzerland, but it was not until the period of European revolution in 1846 and 1848 that a really democratic constitution was adopted in Switzerland. Of course I knew these historic facts before I went to Switzerland, but I had failed to be duly impressed with the newness of Swiss democracy. I believe that we cannot be too prompt in reaching the understanding that what we now recognize as democracy is something absolutely new on the face of the earth. The name and the thing democracy were a byword and a scandal to many of our revolutionary fathers. In Switzerland the men still live who have witnessed a short and sudden change from a close oligarchy or aristocracy to democracy. These men know when and how the change was made. With us the ideas of Jefferson have filtered into our minds so gradually and imperceptibly as to delude us into the notion that all true patriots have always been democrats.

The party in Switzerland which represents the ruling class of 1848 is now called the Democratic party. It has in it the bankers, merchants, and men of conservative tendencies. Yet this party has initiated and carried into effect legislation which in America would be stigmatized as communistic. Some, if not

all, of the original promoters of proportional representation are conservatives in politics. The man who led the conservatives to victory at the time of the riot in 1865 is a banker. He was afterwards made President of the Confederation. As a member of the government of the canton and of the Confederacy he was the author and the promoter of the various reforms in taxation. These reforms all had for their object the taxation of the few rich people for the benefit of the middle classes and the poor. There is the progressive income tax, which exempts small incomes, rests lightly on medium incomes, and is very heavy upon large incomes. And then the progressive feature is worked into all forms of taxation. Property owners are divided into five or six classes, according to the value of their property. Those owning little property are taxed at low rate. This rate is progressively raised, and it becomes quite high for the most wealthy. There is also a death tax, or a tax on estates of the deceased, which has the progressive feature. You will find these systems explained in the consular reports from Switzerland. But you will fail to get the real point if you are not careful to bear in mind that it takes but little money in Switzerland to constitute a rich man. The rate of taxation ceases to progress, because there are no rich men higher up. To apply the principle to America we should have to write dollars in place of francs in the lower scale, double the dollars for the higher scale, and then create new classes for the wealthier Americans.

This Swiss system of laying heavy burdens on the few for the benefit of the many is not only law; it is law thoroughly and rigidly executed. The laws seem to have been made by the rich men themselves with the definite intention of doing the things named in the law. The laws have been made with the idea of permanence. There is no thought of a mere temporary expedient to overcome a temporary difficulty. These rich men who have taken the lead in fastening heavy burdens on themselves and upon their children seem to really believe that the thing which they have done is just and right. When I have

tried to explain to some of them that such measures in America were regarded as socialistic or communistic in their tendency they have thrown their heads back and indulged in a loud horselaugh. The idea that the bankers and merchants and manufacturers of Switzerland should be accused of communism seemed to them supremely ridiculous. As the wealthy Swiss look upon the men of their own class they are convinced that they are better able to pay taxes than are the men of less ample fortunes. It seems to them perfectly natural and right that their superior ability should be duly recognized in the system of direct taxation. It would be difficult to make Americans believe this; but it would be more difficult to cause the Swiss to understand our American plutocracy. The wealthy Swiss, who thirty years ago determined to establish a system of taxation such as I have described, had had actual experience of two radically different kinds of government. Until 1848 they and their class had ruled Switzerland for three hundred years. Then there was a decade or two during which this class fared badly at the elections. The cynic, of course, is sure to say that they took the Democratic name and bound heavy burdens upon themselves for mere prudential reasons to avoid a worse fate, and the cynic may be correct as to the matter of ancient history; but thirty years of this sort of acting has important consequences. At any rate there can be no doubt that now the wealthy classes in Switzerland accept as just and right the paying of a higher rate of taxation than the less wealthy.

I met a lawyer in Geneva who had lived in New York City, who has a brother now practicing law in New York. A large part of the business of this lawyer is for Americans. He has for twenty years been the attorney for the American Consul at Geneva, and has been the attorney for Americans having business interests in Geneva. His position has been such as to enable him to make comparisons between the two countries. He expressed the utmost astonishment at the dominance of the money power in America. He said it was incomprehensible to him how a country founded by such men

as George Washington should ever come to be so completely ruled by money. He gave vent to these expressions before he knew anything about my sentiments. When he found that I too had some fears about the power of money in American politics he seemed surprised and pleased. He hoped that these dangers might be effectively brought before the people and the lawmakers in America, so that free institutions might be preserved in the Great Republic.

I have been surprised at the cool and matter-of-fact way in which the Swiss, through their governmental agencies, assume control of industrial operations which Americans regard as belonging to private enterprise. The Swiss were among the first to adopt the government telegraph. This suited them so well that when the telephone had fully demonstrated its usefulness, without any special debate or fuss about the matter, they made the telephone an integral part of the postal-telegraphic system. For about \$9 one has the use of a telephone for a year, with connections in all parts of the city and country. They have a parcels post which corresponds to our express business. It cost me 5 cents to send by mail my manuscript on the English Government from one end of Switzerland to the other. For a like service in the United States mail I think I have paid 75 cents. It is only recently that measures have been adopted looking to the government ownership of all the railways of Switzerland, and I have been completely dumfounded at the apparent lack of interest in the subject. There is no debate, no newspaper discussion. You introduce the subject to an intelligent, patriotic citizen who ought to be profoundly stirred by such a revolutionary measure; and he would show that he was fully aware of the fact that in a few years the government would own the railways, while yet there seemed to him nothing in the event worthy of special remark. The government has recently taken charge of the manufacture and sale of matches. I think the government monopoly of the sale of alcoholic drinks has excited more debate. But the point of interest has been the suppression of drunkenness rather than

the industrial effects. There is now a measure before the national legislature for establishing a national bank, and this is causing some newspaper discussion. All these are enterprises of the national government.

In the cantons and in the cities there are movements of a similar character. Various cantons and communes have in recent years assumed the burden of burying the dead. They give to all, rich and poor, the same sort of a burial, which is simple and inexpensive. They permit inequalities in life, but are equal in death. The government burial is not usually made compulsory, but our Consul General reports that where it has been adopted it becomes practically universal.

While I was in Geneva the city gained possession of the lighting plant of an outlying district which had previously been in the hands of a company. In my former letter I told you that wherever there was a new building there were smokestacks near, but in Geneva I saw much new building and almost an entire absence of smokestacks. A few years ago the city began to utilize the power of the Rhone river, which comes out of the lake in a mighty torrent. They needed the water of the lake in their streets and houses, and they made the river pump the water. The watch industry was languishing on account of competition with the machine-made watch in America and elsewhere. The city corporation developed a system for distributing power to the local manufacturers through the pressure of water pumped from the Rhone by the Rhone. This gave a great stimulus to many industries, and more and more power was demanded. When experience had demonstrated the economy of electricity as an agency for lighting and for the distribution of power the city gained possession of all electrical appliances and attached them to their mill on the Rhone. By all these demands the power of the river as developed within the city limits was exhausted, and the demand for power to be used in manufacture was rapidly increasing. To meet the new demand the city government secured a site four miles down the river, where they have constructed a dam of stone which

appears as permanent as Niagara Falls, and where they get an immense head of water. This new mill is now nearing completion. From it power will be distributed by electricity and sold to small manufacturers in the city and suburbs. On my return to the city from my visit to the new mill I rode with a manufacturer from Zurich. He said that their company bought power from a private company and that they paid \$3 for power which costs the Genevese manufacturer only \$2.

Thus you see that the building of new houses and the absence of smokestacks are satisfactorily accounted for. But as before stated the surprising thing about the matter is the cool and matter-of-fact way in which the government enters upon these various industrial undertakings. A few days before I left Geneva the city government voted to build at once twelve tenement houses to be owned and operated by the city. It was understood that this was only the beginning of an enterprise which admitted of infinite expansion. Yet it excited no more comment than would the announcement of a vote to build a schoolhouse. If the people did not like it they could have demanded the *referendum* and have stopped it. Yet, so far as I know, no one thought of such a thing.

From one end of Switzerland to the other there does not seem to be any son of Jay Gould who is ready to stand up and announce in an oracular manner that he believes the interference of the government in their industrial undertaking tends to promote socialism. There is probably no part of Europe where the socialists are having so hard a time as in Switzerland. I found no one in Switzerland who expressed any sympathy for socialism except a Zurich chemist who while a student in Berlin had enjoyed the personal acquaintance of the Socialist Bebel. All the other Swiss with whom I conversed on the topic either knew nothing about it or were opposed to it. The subject seemed to bore them. The idea that the utilizing of the power of the Rhone by the city government for the equal advantage of all the citizens tended to promote socialism seemed to the Genevese utterly ridiculous. They have no intention of surrendering their

individualism. They manifest not the least fear that by some hocus-pocus they will be inveigled into the doing of something by means of their governmental agencies which will interfere with their individual interests. This seems the more remarkable to an American when we remember that the Swiss have no constitutional checks, in the American sense. They have no courts which stand ready at every turn to act as a special providence to prevent the people from embarking in dangerous enterprises. The Swiss know that if they wanted to adopt a communistic form of government they could do so at any moment. There are, however, convinced socialists in Switzerland, and while their doctrines are neither feared nor approved, yet the socialists themselves are treated with the respect due to ordinary patriotic citizens. They are elected to office and admitted to a share in the government.

There is nothing which seems so completely to take the spirit out of a socialist as to treat him as a gentleman and a Christian. What with the socialistic legislation which bankers and manufacturers have inaugurated, and with the kindly treatment on the part of the voters and the general lack of interest in their peculiar teachings, the case of the socialist is indeed pitiable. To avoid extinction some of the Swiss socialists have proposed radical changes in the socialistic doctrine and the methods of action. I have before me an account of a meeting of socialists held in Berne as reported in the *Geneva Journal* of January 3, the article is entitled "*Un nouveau socialisme.*" It contains the resolutions adopted on the occasion and an extract from a speech made by M. Gschwind. The resolutions definitely repudiate a part of the socialistic programme of 1888. Specifically they attack the proposition to monopolize the land on the part of the state. This they say would take away from the farmers their indispensable independence and deliver them into the hands of an expensive bureaucracy. In place of the former doctrine they would substitute the appropriation of ground rents. They also object in general terms to the centralizing tendency of the older socialism, and they would be less definite in the asser-

tion of the necessity on the part of the state to monopolize all the means of production.

The speech delivered in support of the resolutions reveals the fact that these new socialists expect to be viewed with disfavor by the older socialists. Yet they plead for the right of free discussion and private judgment, and they contend that believers in the doctrine of evolution ought to concede the right to change one's opinions. They would, however, have their brethren understand that they are just as good socialists as ever. If they are less definite than other socialists as to the right of the state to exploit *things* they will allow no one to surpass them in their efforts to prevent the exploitation of *men*. This, they say, is what constitutes the socialist, and for the attainment of this they are ready for a union of heart and hands, etc.

These new Swiss socialists seem to be much in the same predicament as was a congress of English clergymen assembled at Wolverhampton in 1887. They had asked Mr. Champion the socialist to address them, and custom required them to pass a resolution on the subject. So they *resolved* that "with the objects and aims of socialism they were in hearty sympathy." Now the object and aim of socialism is to better the condition of mankind, and it takes a mighty mean man not to be in favor of that. And as to this new definition of socialism surely Herbert Spencer himself will not allow any new upstart of a socialist to surpass him in dogmatizing against the exploitation of men on the part of the state. So in Switzerland the socialists have met the enemy (reasonably fairminded bankers and manufacturers) and if the socialists are not theirs, it is difficult to see whose they are or "where they are at."

When, a few years ago, the socialists secured a vote on the proposition to adopt a measure declaring it to be the duty of the state to furnish employment to the unemployed they were overwhelmingly defeated, yet it is probable that a large number voted for the measure who are not socialists. The conservative people in the towns and cities are accustomed to act in harmony with the spirit of this socialistic vote. The city governments make

definite plans to give employment to laborers during the season when there is a lack of employment elsewhere. This was one object which the government of Geneva had in view in entering upon the business of constructing tenement houses. If this business is left to the chance of private enterprise there will naturally be less regard for that most desirable item of continuous employment. Some of the cities have also established official boards to coöperate with private organizations to facilitate uniform employment.

This sort of official conduct, to our minds, naturally suggests paternalism. But this is a subject of which the Swiss seem hopelessly ignorant. There is no word to express the idea, and the idea itself seems wholly lacking. Their idea of democracy excludes paternalism. How all the people acting together or through their own chosen agents can be paternal is something they entirely fail to comprehend. I found a university professor who knew the term as applied to monarchy but he regarded its application to democracy as irrelevant.

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PARIS, FRANCE.

PROFIT-SHARING AT IVORYDALE.

THE purpose of this paper is to present the salient features and the results of one of the most successful and impressive examples of Profit Sharing in the United States—that of the Procter and Gamble Company, engaged in the manufacture of soap, candles and glycerine at Ivorydale, Ohio.¹

Before describing the experiment in profit-sharing a few words should be said about the home of the company, and its splendid facilities for carrying on the work in which it is engaged.

Ivorydale is beautifully located about seven miles north of Cincinnati. Perhaps no other village in this country, except Pullman, Illinois, can compare with it as an example of what a manufacturing village should be. A genuine attempt has been made to apply the principles of art to its construction and to beautify the daily surroundings of its people. The company owns sixty-seven acres of land upon which are grouped for convenience and beauty about thirty large buildings. The architect of these buildings, Mr. Beman, was also the architect of Pullman. Mr. Beman brought to his work at Ivorydale all the benefit of his experience gained in constructing the model manufacturing village of Illinois. The result of his labor ought to satisfy the æsthetic taste even of the fastidious. Ruskin himself could

¹ The facts presented have been gathered from personal study and from communication with members of the firm and its employes. The writer is especially indebted to Mr. D. B. Gamble, Secretary of the company, and Mr. J. W. Donnelly, Manager of the works, for information and for considerate attention while visiting Ivorydale. Free use has also been made of matter published by the Company for the benefit of its employes.

Other articles on the subject here considered are: "Two Successful Examples of Profit-Sharing," by PROFESSOR J. W. BLACKMAR in the *Forum* for March, 1895, and "An Experiment in Profit-Sharing," by WILLIAM COOPER PROCTER, of the Procter & Gamble Co. in the *Independent* for May 2, 1895. Of the latter article especially the present writer has made the freest use.

hardly be displeased with it. The conveniences of the company, its general equipment and its facilities for transportation of raw material and product, are perhaps unequaled in the same kind of business anywhere else in the world. The most improved machinery, special devices for saving time and labor, a complete system of telephones connecting the various buildings, and the general arrangement of the whole plant give it remarkable advantages in industrial economy. Beside tracks of its own, and locomotives for switching purposes, the company has direct connection with three railway lines. It manufactures its own boxes for shipping, and utilizes much of that which in a smaller establishment would be waste product.

Notwithstanding the completeness of the plant, the conditions for success in profit-sharing are not altogether favorable. The nature of the industry in which the company is engaged, and the character of the labor employed, are not the most desirable for such an experiment. Profit-sharing can be economically successful only where there is opportunity for such improvement in the efficiency of labor as to enhance the profits. "It is least effective," we are told, "in industries where mechanism is the principal agency, where interest on capital fixed in machinery is the chief element of cost price, and where the workmen assembled in large factories, can be easily and effectively superintended."¹ These, however, are the conditions at Ivorydale. The labor employed is of the most ordinary unskilled kind, a kind not quick to see and appreciate the benefits of the system. The opportunities for the enlargement of product by increased efficiency of labor are not so great as in some other industries, and wages form a comparatively small item in cost of production. The fact, therefore, that profit-sharing has succeeded in Ivorydale beyond expectation has all the more weight.

The original plan of allowing the workmen to participate in the profits was begun in April 1887, the motive of the company being both economic and philanthropic. During the year 1886, when the Knights of Labor were beginning to assume such

¹ SEDLEY TAYLOR, *Profit-Sharing between Capital and Labor*, p. 18.

prominence, and employés in manufacturing establishments throughout the country became more and more restless, the company was having a great deal of trouble with its employés. Within the year it had fourteen strikes, from eleven to one hundred and fourteen of its employés quitting work in a body, and for all sorts of trivial causes. The company was continually at the expense of breaking in new people and the question was one of constant anxiety. After considerable hesitation it was decided to put into force a plan of profit-sharing and to secure if possible some relief from these troubles.¹ There was also the thought of establishing friendly and kindly relations with employés, as is shown by the words of Mr. James N. Gamble in introducing the plan. "We want," said he, "to afford to the boys and girls and men an opportunity to make the most possible of themselves; we want these boys to grow up step by step to positions better and more profitable. . . . We want to establish friendly and kindly relations with you, to make your interests as far as may be our interests."

The plan as originally adopted provided for a division of net profits on the basis of proportion of wages paid to business done; each participating employé sharing according to his earnings. "It was decided to allow as a portion of the expense of manufacturing a reasonable salary to each active member of the firm, (\$4000) and to divide the remainder of the net profits between the firm and the employés in the proportion that the labor cost of of production bore to the total cost of production. In other words, if the sales were \$100,000, and the net profits, after deducting the salaries of the firm, \$10,000, then the total cost of production would be \$90,000. Assuming that the amount paid for wages was \$20,000, then the \$10,000 of profit would be divided, seven-ninths to the firm and two-ninths to the employés.² Certain limitations in regard to sharing profits were adopted, only those who had been employed more than three months being allowed to participate, and boys and girls receiving below \$4.50 a week (about seventy-five in number) were excluded.

¹ *Independent*, May 2, 1895.

² *Ibid.*

The plan, we are told, was accepted by the employés in a half-hearted way, and without any belief on their part that it would be of material benefit to them. At the end of the first six months, however, a dividend of 13.47 per cent. on wages was declared, the highest bonus received by one person being \$275. A second dividend of 11.8 per cent. was declared in April 1888, and in October a third dividend of 9.35 per cent. The effect of these dividends was not what might have been expected. They were received by the employés almost as a matter of course; the distribution being followed by a slight increase of the interest of the employés in their work, which soon dropped back into indifference. In April 1890, we find a member of the firm, in the semi-annual address to the employés, urging upon them more careful, diligent, and intelligent work, and saying "each speaker has urged the matter, but with so little effect upon some of our workmen that it became apparent that not only was injustice being done to the firm, who were getting no returns from these careless ones, but also that the girls and men who did try to prevent waste and to do better work, and to uphold the interest of the business were being unfairly treated by receiving no greater reward than those careless, indifferent and wasteful ones who were equally entitled to a share, if only they had been employed long enough." To break up this indifference the company decided to make free use of its right to deprive the indifferent of a share in the dividend. Consequently, in October 1889, the employés were divided into four classes as follows:

- (1) Those who showed unmistakable signs of their appreciation of the fact that it was incumbent upon them to help make the profits. These were paid double the regular dividend.
- (2) Those receiving the regular dividend; including the bulk of the employés.
- (3) Those who did not evince much interest in the plan and whose dividend was one-half of the regular amount.
- (4) Those who were cut out of any dividend whatever. Whether as a result of this classification or not, the dividend of April 1890 rose to 15.57 per cent. on wages. At all events, carelessness on the part of the employés grew less and less until it could

be said by one of the directors that "indifference has entirely disappeared." It should be said that the total amount of profit-sharing dividend, neither at present nor in the original plan, is affected by the number of those sharing. If for any reason an employé is debarred from participating, his share is always divided among the others.

This plan continued in operation until July 1890, when the organization of the company underwent a change. The firm was then incorporated as a stock company, under the prospectus of which it was in effect bound to pay 12 per cent. upon the common stock if that amount were earned. Now 12 per cent. was about the same rate as employés had earned under the old plan. Consequently it was an easy and just arrangement to adopt the plan of paying to the employés as their share of the profits the same rate of dividend upon their wages as was paid upon the common stock of the company; and this method was then adopted, and is the one under which the company is now working. Under this plan a man earning, say \$500 a year, receives a dividend of 12 per cent. on this amount, or \$60.¹ The requirement of three months' service before participation in profits is retained in the new plan, but with this limitation all may share unless the right to do so is forfeited by quitting, or being discharged from, the employ of the company. The right to deny the dividend to any employé for cause is reserved by the company, but the amount of his dividend, as has been said, must be divided among the others and does not come to the stockholders of the company. It is also customary to charge up any waste or loss of material due to carelessness or negligence on the part of an employé against his profit-sharing dividend. This amount goes to the company. The occasion for this, however, is rare.

The results both of the original and the present plan, so far as may be indicated by dividends, are shown by the following table giving the date of distribution, the number of laborers participating, and the percentage of profits on the wages paid:

¹ Letter from D. B. Gamble, quoted also in *Forum*, March 1895.

1887, October, 225, 13.47 per cent.	1892, July, 316, 12. per cent.
1888, April, 317, 11.80 "	1893, January, 326, 12. "
1888, October, 302, 9.33 "	1893, July, 338, 12. "
1889, April, 332, 12.13 "	1894, January, 347, 12. "
1889, October, 309, 12.50 "	1894, July, 364, 12. "
1890, April, 344, 15.57 "	1895, January, 405, 12. "
1891, January, 324, 12. "	1895, July, 411, 12. "
1891, July, 273, 12. "	1896, January, 469, 12. "
1892, January, 332, 12. "	

In order to encourage the interest of the employés in the business of the company the directors offer to assist them in purchasing stock. The plan is as follows: Upon application by the employé in writing, accompanied by first payment of \$10, the company will buy for such applicant one share of either the common or preferred stock of the company, as desired, at the guaranteed market price, subsequent payment to be made in installments of \$5 or multiples thereof. All payments upon any share of stock must be completed within two years. Four per cent. interest is charged upon the unpaid balance, to the payment of which the dividends upon the stock must be applied, and the company holds the stock as security until the purchase is completed. At any time previous to the completion of the purchase the employé may cancel his agreement with the company. Upon such cancellation, however, all money actually paid by him towards the purchase of the stock is returned, but the dividends paid or earned return to the company. The company assists an employé upon only one share at a time, and reserves the right to withhold its offer from any employé. Under this plan 91 shares have been taken by fifty people; one taking 7, one 5, four 4, three 3, ten 2, and the balance in single shares. Under an earlier plan over 1000 shares, which are now nearly paid for, were taken by the clerical force and foremen. The company firmly believes in this form of coöperation. "A most marked improvement," says Mr. D. B. Gamble, "is shown by those who have purchased stock, not only in their ability as employés of the company but in the general character of the men." Although this plan has been in operation since 1892 the

laborers are slow to take advantage of it. To encourage them to invest, the company proposes to guarantee them against loss upon their investments by making their stock a lien upon the property.

Another feature which must also be described is the pension plan, inaugurated in 1894. The plan for the establishment and maintenance of a pension fund for the benefit of the employés, and the provisions for its distribution, are as follows: The fund is created by setting aside the sum of \$500 semi-annually, one-half of which is taken from each profit-sharing dividend and one-half is paid by the company. This money is paid over to a board of trustees consisting of five members. The President of this board is the President of the company, and the remaining four members are chosen from the employés in the factory; two from the office force including foremen, and two from the operatives. Two trustees are elected annually, making the term of office two years. The election occurs at the profit-sharing meeting nearest January 1st, and the candidate in each class receiving the highest vote is elected. The board has the authority to invest the funds and to apply the income of such investment, or both income and principal, to the payment of pensions, and moreover, if at any time the trustees find that the income from investment exceeds the amount necessary to pay pensions, the semi-annual payment from the profit-sharing dividend, and from the company, may cease until such a time as shall be decided upon by the trustees. Only those who have been in the service of the company for a period of not less than seven years, and who have been permanently, partially, or totally disabled by accident, sickness, or old age may receive a pension. The board may reject any applicant or discontinue any pension. No pension may exceed 75 per cent. of the average wages earned by the applicant during the last two years of his service with the company. So far as possible the company provides those who are entitled to apply for a pension with such work as they can readily perform, and at such a rate of wages as the work which they are giving is entitled to receive. A

further sum is paid to them out of the pension fund sufficient with the wages paid them to make the total amount received equal to their former average rate of wages, but in no case may the sum withdrawn from the pension fund amount to more than 75 per cent. as above mentioned. The whole plan is an agreement between the company and its employés, and can be terminated at any time upon six months notice by either party. Thus far only one man has received a pension. The present condition of this fund is exhibited by the report of the trustees on February 3, 1896, which was as follows:

Balance on hand July 1895.....	\$554.65
Received dividends on P. & G. stock.....	60.00
Received January 1896, semi-annual amount from employés,.....	250.00
Received January 1896, semi-annual amount from the P. & G. Co.,.....	250.00
	<hr/>
	\$1,114.65
Paid for 2 shares P. & G. preferred, bought in August 1895.....	\$310.00
Paid pensions to M. Collins.....	204.75
	<hr/>
	514.75
Balance on hand.....	\$599.90
Total receipts since July 1893.....	\$3,184.00
Paid for 14 shares P. & G. preferred.....	\$2,000.00
Paid pensions to date.....	575.10
	<hr/>
Balance.....	\$599.90
TOTAL ASSETS.	
14 shares P. & G. preferred.....	\$2,009.00
Cash.....	575.90
	<hr/>
	\$2,608.90

No special effort is made by the Procter & Gamble Company to provide houses for its employés. Only twelve or fifteen foremen and officemen whose continual presence at the works is required, live in houses of the company. Rents are cheap, and the company thinks that the people are more independent in houses rented or bought of outside parties, and that the company is better served. Employés are encouraged, however, to invest

their savings in a building association, founded in August 1887, and managed by Ivorydale people. Two and a half years after its establishment it was able to report that eight men had purchased lots, and twenty-two had built or were building homes. The association had \$24,000 in mortgage loans, 95 per cent. of which had come from Ivorydale. At present the association is used as a savings bank in which many of the employés have neat balances to their credit. The association has handled \$320,749.07 paying semi-annual dividends which have averaged slightly over 6 per cent. per annum. No losses have thus far been incurred.

An unsuccessful effort at distributive coöperation (in the way of a coöperative grocery) has been made. For about a year there was considerable interest, but it gradually oozed out and the concern was put upon the regular stock company basis, which put it under disadvantage as compared with competitors, since, owing to its location, some distance from the main village, it had little or no local trade and had to look elsewhere for its business. It finally succeeded in building up a fairly profitable trade, but as it has failed of attaining the original object, it is now being wound up and will pay off its stockholders in full. The facts that only about one-half of the employés live near Ivorydale, and that these did not take the interest necessary to make the experiment a success, are responsible for its failure.

The provisions for the physical and social welfare of employés at Ivorydale are also worthy of mention. The machinery is so well guarded that injuries are infrequent. In case of accident, however, employés are given full pay. The company endeavors to promote the health of the people by furnishing light and airy rooms, well heated in Winter, and cooled by fans when necessary in Summer, and by providing a physician, whom they are at liberty to call upon for service at any time each day, and who is subject to call at any time by telephone from the office or elsewhere. A dressing room and lunch room is provided for women, which is kept neat and clean by each girl taking her turn in keeping it in order. It is well lighted and provided with tables and chairs. Pictures are on the walls, and a motto which reads,

"Labor has Sure Reward" hangs in a conspicuous place. The company was somewhat surprised to find that its efforts to provide this lunch room were not appreciated by the girls, who preferred to forego its privileges rather than open up their lunches in the presence of each other.

Among unsuccessful efforts to improve the social life of the employés has been a library and reading room, with smoking room and card room attached. The reading room was stocked with good books, technical, scientific and sociological, novels, history, biography, magazines, trade and daily papers; chess, checkers, dominoes and backgammon. The room was nicely kept, warmed, lighted, hung with pictures, and attended by a librarian, but it was not well patronized. The reason of this no doubt lies in the fact that the employés find more attractive associations outside of the group in which they work. When the employés have developed a higher social and intellectual life the reading room will probably be more generally patronized. There are influences at work which are gradually establishing more intimate social relations. Saturday afternoon, for instance, which is given as a half holiday without loss of pay, is spent by many of the employés in social intercourse, and in the enjoyment of sports and games. These half holidays amount in the course of a year to a month's time.

Another opportunity for developing the social life is the semi-annual distribution day — dividend day as it is called. It is a holiday given to games, sports, and a general meeting at which the employés are addressed by some representative of the company and by other speakers. The writer had the pleasure of being present at the last dividend meeting, February 3, 1896. Free transportation from Cincinnati brought a large number of persons, two thousand perhaps, to witness the exercises. After a few introductory remarks by the chairman, addresses were delivered by Dr. Washington Gladden and Hon. Benjamin Butterworth. The former spoke on "The Relation of Capital and Labor," and the latter on "Higher Citizenship." These addresses were followed by the report of the trustees, the distribution of

the dividend, and the election of the pension fund trustees. The employés evidently took great pride in the meeting. The large room in which the exercises were held was tastefully decorated, and everything appeared to have been done by the employés to make the occasion enjoyable to themselves and their friends. The writer was told that they take special pride in bringing their families and friends on dividend days to show them about the place, pointing out their particular departments which, by their free-will efforts, have been specially brightened up for the occasion. The meeting was followed by a dance.

What now are the results of the nine year's experience in profit-sharing at Ivorydale? In the first place, the company has attained its object of securing relief from labor troubles, there having been no strikes nor serious labor trouble of any kind since the plan has been in force. "We believe," says a member of the firm, "that it would be impossible to foment any such trouble among them now." As an illustration of how they feel we may mention that on several occasions some troublesome fellow has tried to produce dissatisfaction. The men themselves have gone to the foremen with details of the attempt and the suggestion that the disturber be discharged.¹ The old feelings of discontent and distrust have been replaced by that of mutual interest. The expense of breaking in new men has also been almost done away with. Instead of replacing one-half of the employés each year by new men there is now a change of perhaps not more, on an average, than a dozen each year. It is the policy of the company in case of vacancies, to move up if possible some one in its employ and to fill the lower position from outside, thus leaving always before each employé the idea of a chance of promotion if deserved. Many of its best men started with the company as boys, some few having been with it forty years, and quite a number from ten to twenty years. About 50 per cent. have participated in the whole seventeen dividends, and about 90 per cent. have received the last twelve. The employés are always on the lookout for positions for their friends, who as

¹ *Independent*, May 2, 1895.

a rule prove better than the average ordinary person who would be casually picked up to fill a vacancy. Thus both the permanency and the morale of the force have been improved.

Another beneficial result of the plan has been the saving of labor. Although it is difficult to determine the saving due directly to the profit sharing plan, there can be no doubt that it is considerable. In the year 1894 for instance, the labor cost of manufacture, including a 12 per cent. profit-sharing dividend upon the wages, was 63 per cent. of what it was during 1886, and this in spite of the fact that the average rate of wages in 1894 was a trifle over 12 per cent. higher than in 1886. Now figuring conservatively, and throwing all questionable items against profit-sharing, and estimating that the improved methods of manufacture are responsible for 28 per cent. of the 37 per cent. shown, there remains a saving equal to 9 per cent. plus the 12 per cent. increased wages, or 12 per cent. cheaper labor cost of manufacture to be attributed to profit-sharing.¹

Some of the improved methods of manufacture are also to be accredited to the interest developed by the profit-sharing system. For instance, the writer was shown a soap-cutting machine which had been so improved by the workmen as to save the company a considerable sum. The motive in this and other improvements by the workmen was the possibility of an increased dividend. The employ  s have developed also a greater interest in the character of the goods manufactured, taking special pride and pains in things in which they assume a large profit is made. They will call the attention of the foreman to little questions as to quality of the different brands of soap manufactured, showing plainly a desire to do their share in seeing that nothing goes out from the factories which would tend to injure the demand for the products of their labor.²

There has also been a saving in material, though just how much it is difficult to determine. One of the principal sources of waste in the factory is due to the waste of scraps and small

¹ *Independent*, May 2, 1895.

² *Ibid.*

pieces of soap, by allowing them to fall upon the floor and become trampled under foot. This dirty soap used to accumulate so rapidly that it was necessary to work over the accumulation every two or three weeks. Now it takes three or four months to accumulate a sufficient quantity to be re-handled. The effect of saving by the employés can also be seen in the general air of tidiness and cleanliness about the factories. The testimony of the members of the firm is, that the plan has been a success, that it has exceeded if anything their expectations. "Profit-sharing," says one member, "has proved to be good for both employer and employé."

What would be done in the event that no profits were earned, or a loss incurred? This is a question which the company has never been forced to meet. The position of the company however has been expressed by the secretary as follows: "The employés should not stand any portion of a loss. The wages that are paid them are paid for the ordinary efforts that laborers usually exert. The profit-sharing dividend is paid them for the extraordinary labor and care which they give in return for the dividend. Under these circumstances, if the business in which the profit-sharing system is in force should show a loss, we can see no reason why the employés should stand a portion of it, because they in reality do sustain a loss. The capital invested would certainly be no worse off than in a business where profit-sharing was not in force; but on the contrary, would have received from its employés better service than if such system was not in force; and the loss to stockholders has thereby been made less than it would otherwise have been. Under those conditions we certainly think that it would be wrong and a hardship to ask the employés to bear any portion of such loss; from the fact of their having given extra labor and care, for which they receive no compensation."

We have considered the advantages chiefly from the point of view of the employer. The benefits to the employé are obvious. He receives as high wages¹ as are paid elsewhere plus his part of

¹ Wages, owing to the small degree of skill required of employés, are low; 85 per

the profits. He shares no losses. He has the advantage connected with the pension fund, of free medical assistance and of the other incidental features of the plan which have been mentioned. The economic benefits are not greater than the moral and intellectual. He is schooled in thrift and economy. As was said by a member of the firm, in an address to the employés, "It is an advantage to men to be schooled even though a little unwillingly in habits of attention, carefulness, economy, diligence and social helpfulness. These form character, which becomes to a man capital. By this, he becomes a good workman and may always command a preference at least, and such men succeed where others fail." The benefits of this schooling has been clearly shown from year to year. The effect of the early dividends, for instance, was noticeable only for a short time after the distribution. While they were fresh in everyone's memory work was better and more skillfully done. Now the interest continues throughout the year. To encourage this interest various methods are employed. The following will serve as an illustration: In passing from room to room the writer's attention was attracted by printed placards containing directions and admonitions, of which the following are samples. "See that your time is fully occupied." "If you can't waste anything else you can waste time." "Do not become mere machines; give your work some thought and try to suggest some better means of doing it." "Try to be the best workmen in your department. It will pay." "A little waste every day would make a rich man poor." "The man who is careless and wasteful robs not only himself but also his fellow laborer." "The amount of the dividend depends on what you save." "Interest in your work makes your day's labor short and your dividend large." These placards serve as constant reminders to the laborer that he is not a mere productive machine, but a co-partner, though in a restricted

cent. of those employed earn \$1.50 a day or less. Wages, however, are paid by the week, except to girls in the wrapping department who are paid in proportion to the work they do. The average wages per week for men is \$10.00; for women \$4.75; for boys, \$3.50 to \$7.00. — *Forum*, March 1895.

sense, with his employer. On the whole it is beyond question that in this instance at least, profit-sharing has benefited the laborers both economically and morally.

The success of a single example in profit-sharing does not prove, of course, that it should be adopted everywhere. Although Marshall and other economists have expressed the conviction that profit-sharing tends to elevate the relation of employer and employé, and have given it a substantial basis in economic theory, general experience has not been such that one may confidently assert that it is destined to play a large part in future production. It may be said, however, that the experiment we have just described supports all the main arguments which advocates of profit-sharing have advanced in its favor. We have seen that under the plan production has been increased, the quality of the product improved, care and economy promoted, and industrial peace established. In so far as a conclusion can be drawn from this experiment alone, therefore, it would appear to be that of M. Chaix, the father of profit-sharing: "Certainly participation is no universal panacea, nor the last word of social well-being, but I do not hesitate to affirm that it constitutes an incontestible advance upon the existing system of the organization of labor."

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III.

A SURVEY OF ITS PRESENT WORK AND TENDENCIES.

Political Changes since 1848.¹ For a half century Prussia was gathering up her resources for the supreme effort to create a united Germany. Schools and universities, military discipline, gymnastic drill, subjection to central authority, submission to absolutism together with remarkable liberty of scholarship were among the elements of power. The Franco-Prussian war welded the nation into one. The consolidation of states extended the freedom of callings and of travel, and the right to poor relief to all German citizens, with certain exceptions in Southern Germany. Methods of private and public charity had to be readjusted to the new conditions.

Economic development.—In spite of the burden of taxation and military service industries and commerce steadily developed. Wealth smiled upon the patient industry and self-denying thrift of the people. Cities grew as rapidly as those of the United States, and the genius of municipal administration has been equal to the novel situation. German science has become practical and led the world in devices for health and convenience.²

¹ Compare the table printed with Article II, May 1896.

² A. SHAW, *Municipal Government in Europe*, p. 289 ff.

Economic inequality and suffering.—Countless causes have contributed to produce misery by the side of plenty and luxury. In no other country is the social question more bitterly debated than in Germany.¹ Wage workers are at the mercy of the crises and crashes of trade, and are swept about by the waves of the great industry. Youths can earn a certain low wage at an early age, and so become independent of parents and masters. The family bond is enfeebled; thoughtless marriages follow illicit connections and increase the proletariat; while the crowded tenements favor communism in practice and theory. A nation accustomed to handwork is not yet readjusted to machinery and capitalism. Democratic aspirations make the people acutely sensitive to slight, insult and inequality. Vices and crimes add other elements to the sources of misery. The sharp competition of city life differentiates social classes, lifts favored individuals to higher ranks and mercilessly crushes out those whose tardy movements cannot keep pace with the steam-driven machinery.

Socialism.—The laborers or "proletarians," under the able leadership of socialists like Lassalle, Marx, Engels, Bebel and Liebknecht, have advanced to a position of political power. Their strength is in manufacturing cities. About the time of the Franco-Prussian war they formulated demands for state help, and continued their pressure for universal and equal suffrage and for legal regulations of the hours and conditions of service. By 1879 they counted 508,000 votes for the Reichstag and had twelve representatives. The attempts of Hödel and Nobiling to assassinate the emperor produced a reaction and gave an excuse for severe repressive laws. Under these laws the socialists conducted their campaigns by means of secret societies, became more and more united, compact and hostile, and when the laws expired in 1890 they triumphed over the fall of their powerful foe Prince Bismarck. In 1893 they had 1,786,738 votes for the imperial legislature, and had become strong in Prussia.

Socialistic literature has been profoundly influenced by the materialistic philosophy of Karl Marx. Church and state are to

¹ PAUL GÖHRE, *Three Months in a Workshop*.

the workingmen one institution and the hatred of conservative legislation goes over to the church. The wage-earning class in cities is a distinct party arrayed in antagonism against the church, the so-called higher classes and the political authorities. At their meetings two policemen sit at the chairman's table with notebooks to register actionable speeches and armed with authority to disperse the assembly. Hatred of person and policemen is manifested in many ways. Anxiety and alarm are evident in political and ecclesiastical discussions. Church work and imperial legislation have taken account of this condition of tense strain and social hostility.¹

The workingmen share the mental unrest of the age, listen to discourses on Darwinism, detest clerical control, and copy the example of those in high place who live for money and sensual satisfactions. So they have drifted away from the church and are usually indifferent or hostile.

Trades Unions.—The workingmen have not waited for help from church, state or patronage. They have formed trades unions, since 1868, under two banners. The non-socialistic unions, led by Hirsch and Duncker have had an irregular course of success and disappointment, and still rally a respectable minority of wage-workers. The socialists, at first under von Schweizer, organized their own unions by trades, the strongest of all. Various mutual benefit organizations have been formed in all parts of the country, and there is a vigorous and vital movement toward self-help supported and officered by workingmen.

Coöperation of friends.—In organization and literary activity the wage-earners have been assisted by intelligent and sympathetic men. The names and services of Schulze-Delitzsch and Raiffeisen are honorably connected with schemes of investment, savings and loans.²

Government policy.—The German government has pursued a sternly repressive policy against socialistic organization. Each

¹ See ROBERT FLINT, *Socialism*, p. 86 ff.

² See WOLFF, *People's Banks*.

ministry has gone to the limit of possibility in the use of police power to exterminate the movement. But at the same time the general and local governments have led the world in their measures to render the life of workers secure and comfortable. Fear of rebellion, anxiety for order, philanthropy and religion have all served as motives for this movement.¹

Ecclesiastical.—The population of Germany is nominally two-thirds Protestant and one-third Catholic. The church is supported, in great part, by taxation. In the Protestant church every shade of belief is tolerated, and the official and legal unity covers real divisions and irreconcilable antagonisms.² In the practical and social measures of the Inner Mission is found the center of the most genuine and vital accord. Controversies proceed, but theology is becoming more distinctly ethical, less dogmatic and metaphysical.

The activity of the Roman Catholic clergy in the humane movement is a noteworthy fact. In 1846 Father Kolping, who came from the ranks of manual laborers, organized associations of young wage-earners. In 1864 Ketteler published his "Labor Question and the Church," and based his economic reasoning on socialistic theory. The clergy are required to study the social questions, and they have become a power in determining the economic policy of the empire. In the Reichstag their delegates have promoted many labor laws. They are bitterly hostile to the socialists on account of their attitude to religion. The Catholics sustain the institutions of their own Inner Mission.

Dissenters are few in numbers and strength, but they influence the people of the National church. They are often devoted, zealous and have the strong social attachments and clannish feeling of a persecuted people. They also, out of their poverty, support many of the works of Inner Mission, especially the young people's societies and the deaconesses.

The state churches have an apparent advantage of the Ameri-

¹ DAWSON, *Bismarck and State Socialism* J. G. BROOKS, *Compulsory Insurance in Germany*.

² *Fliegende Blätter a. d. Rauhe Hause*, April 1896, S. 149.

can churches in enjoying financial support without collections. Nor do they maintain a system of academies, colleges, and universities separate from those of the state. On the other hand, wealth is not so great nor so widely diffused as with us, and the habit of waiting for the authorities to act seems to chill private initiative. The effect is seen in the amounts contributed to missions.

The present organization of the Inner Mission.—The Central Committee was a part of the original plan of Wichern, and it continues to carry out his ideas. It has an office in Berlin. Its functions are instruction, inspiration, counsel, and assistance, but not legislation. It seldom conducts a benevolent enterprise directly, yet its influence is widely felt. It undertakes something of the work for which our Evangelical Alliance stands,¹ and its history encourages us to hope that a similar agency may some day bring order and efficiency into the chaos of our social services.

Provincial agencies.—Traveling agencies are maintained in various districts for the work of strengthening existing efforts, of leading to the organization of new enterprises, and of securing means for institutions. The agents go from church to church, present the needs, interest pastors and congregations, and take collections. Some of the institutions raise money by direct appeals.

Local societies.—Charities are often supported by a voluntary local society of persons who are interested in a particular form of philanthropy. They raise the funds, administer the trust, appoint the officers, and are responsible for finances and methods. The institutions are directly administered by persons who have the confidence of the directors of the society.

The training of workers.—German people have great respect for special training. They are served by officials in schools, on railroads and elsewhere, who have passed probations and examinations, and who belong to a profession. This idea of expert service is carried into the Inner Mission. The dea-

¹ See article by DR. JOSIAH STRONG, in *American Journal Sociology*, Vol. I, No. 2.

conesses are required to learn the art they are to practice, as teaching, or nursing the sick. The Central Committee bestows special attention upon provision for training the administrative officers and assistants.

Forms of work.—No attempt will be made in this place to describe in detail any of the institutions of the Inner Mission. Each kind of social work will be treated in due time in articles by various writers. The present purpose is to show the scope of the movement and its tendencies.

In a general way it may be said that the philanthropy of the church has grown upward as well as outward. It began with the "submerged tenth," with the objects of pity and commiseration; it advanced under socialistic pressure and Roman Catholic competition to touch the labor movement; and in its later phases it has laid hold on the industrial and political organization, with the purpose of making these minister to the highest life of men. It was in this general order that the various institutions of the Inner Mission arose in response to the growing humanity and intelligence of the Christian people. Biblical and theological criticism have removed many topics from church interest and driven men back upon practical manifestations of the certainties of Christian love. The work undertaken has been larger and more varied; there has been increasing division of labor and specialization of function; and the entire movement has been increasingly integrated by contract and confederation.

The duty of the church to assist the weak and defective is admitted by all, and on this ground the Inner Mission meets no theoretical objections. But when the labor question or political measures come into view there is denial of their legitimate connection with missions. Recent decisions of the highest authorities have legally restricted political activity of church people within narrow limits, and a state church is under the control of the dominant party.

PHILANTHROPIC INITIATIVE.

Care of Defectives.—In this field private charity has moved far in advance of the state, but is unable to overtake the need.

For cripples the governments have done little. A few very useful institutions have been erected for the physical improvement, education and protection of those helpless human beings. Many municipal schools are provided for the blind, but attendance is not compulsory. The chief field for the Inner Mission is preventive work in the homes of the poor, since blindness often results from the neglect of infants. Asylums are provided for the adult blind, employment is found for them, and the public is moved to befriend them. Deaf mutes are not required to attend school, and state provision is not yet complete. Voluntary benevolent societies supply this need pending governmental action. The feeble-minded are by no means adequately provided for. While the movement to make public custody and education compulsory is pushed forward, the chief burden falls on private institutions. When the state has provided for these classes the function of the Inner Mission will be to furnish that friendly and personal touch which the mechanical agencies of government are never able to supply.

The Vicious and Criminal.—Wichern was profoundly interested in the prison population. He hoped to train "brothers" as officers of prisons, but did not succeed. The humanitarian ideas of the eighteenth century prepared the way for reformation of the debasing conditions which disgraced the civilized world so long. But it was to the fervent and self-sacrificing labors of such positively religious persons as John Howard, Elizabeth Fry, T. Flidner, and J. Wichern that the advance was due. They secured a more rational classification of prisoners, improved sanitation, and the appointment of moral and religious instructors. They organized societies to provide visitors who should seek to influence the prisoners during their confinement and provide work for them after their discharge. The workmen's colonies have come to be, in large measure, temporary asylums for discharged prisoners who cannot find employment.

Voluntary societies have sought to help the drunkard. There is a very common notion among superficial tourists that

the land of beer has no curse of alcohol. But the statistics of the authorities should dispel this delusion. In recent years vigorous and earnest efforts have been put forth by temperance advocates. Asylums have been provided for the cure of dipsomaniacs. Societies with all shades of pledges, from total abstinence to a very moderate moderation, have sought by example, entreaty, and social influence to work upon the drunkards. Legislation comes in to punish the drunkard after he is already ruined. A few coffee houses have been established. Doubtless many individuals have been helped. But a recent circular of the "German Society Against the Abuse of Spirituous Drinks" declares that Germany consumes each year 676,470,000 liters of spirits (33 per cent. alcohol), 5,455,600,000 liters of beer, and 322,000,000 liters of wine. This costs about 250 marks to each family, on the average. The distiller and the brewer are great men in Germany, and the Inner Mission simply picks up their wrecks.

The efforts to diminish prostitution have provided twenty-one asylums for the fallen women, with eighty-five deaconesses. No asylums for fallen men are mentioned! Statistics of prostitution are generally of little value, and Schlosser's guess of 200,000 in Germany may be as accurate as any. The registration of illegitimate births is approximately accurate and reveals a depth of degradation which may well appal the friends of the nation. Efforts have been organized to build up a public sentiment favorable to decency and health. The crowded condition of the dwellings of laborers, the massing of soldiers in towns, the dissolution of religious beliefs, the depraved quality of press and theater, the iniquities of the system of license and pretended sanitary police control, are obstacles of the most discouraging nature and extent. Just because the outlook is so dark the supporters of the Inner Mission are urging all possible methods of reform.

Relief for the Dependent.—Voluntary associations of the church supplement the service of the state or municipality, or carry on independent institutions on the same field. The

"Elberfeld system" of outdoor relief has all the advantages of admirable municipal management, but it is thought to lack some of the adaptability and delicacy which go with a well conducted private charity. The religious societies find work left for them to do in the care of dependent children. The day nursery has found a sphere in German towns where poor mothers are often compelled to leave the home to earn part of the living for the family. They may be unable to give suitable care to their infants. The crèche meets this need by providing a comfortable place where the babes can be left with competent nurses during the hours of the mothers' absence. Through such institutions the deaconesses are enabled to instruct mothers in household arts. In 1894 there were in the German Empire 42 day nurseries in care of 62 deaconesses. Schools for young children take children between the ages of 3 and 6 years for shelter and teaching. There were 2209 of these institutions in 1888. The title "Kindergarten" is avoided by the writers on Inner Missions. They claim that while their schools resemble the Froebel schools in management that they differ from them in important respects; that children of that age should not be taken away from mothers save in case of great necessity; that systematic instruction should be avoided in favor of free play; and that a more definite religious doctrine should be at the basis of the work. Sunday services for children are becoming popular, but still bear marks of an exotic not yet quite at home. The title "Sunday School" is avoided, partly because it suggests the English origin and character of the institution. The service leads up to the national ritual. As religious instruction is practically universal and compulsory in public schools the necessity for Sunday Schools is sometimes contested. Since 1875 these schools have increased very rapidly. Recent statistics show 5900 schools, with 34,938 teachers and 749,780 pupils. The charity feature is still marked, but children of the well-to-do classes seem to enjoy the schools as much as in England or America.

Neglected and Homeless Children.—The Pietists were best

represented in the orphanage at Halle. In this century municipal and state authorities have greatly extended the care of imperiled children, but there is still room for free effort. The day for building large congregate asylums is over. The tendency is to find homes in families for children who have lost their parents or have been abandoned by them. In the training of abnormal children for home life, and in the selection and oversight of the families employed to shelter the wards, many branches of the religious societies find a field of usefulness. "Sisters" are especially trained for this service. Coöperation between public and church agencies is frequent. The unwieldy and mechanical agencies of the state will always require much supplementary aid of volunteers. Thus we see the gradual absorption of many of the benevolent functions of the church by the state, while we see the state again soliciting help of the kind of people who receive impulse from the church. Educational unions have provided occupation and recreation out of school hours for boys and girls, in order to counteract the demoralizing influence of idleness and in order to teach useful arts.

Associations for helping youth.—In former times the apprentice lived with the master and was under his shop discipline all day and under the household rule of the wife of the master at all times. But machine industry brought to the apprentice earlier freedom and independent wages, with attendant moral perils. Sunday afternoons and evenings are times of greatest temptations to young working people in cities. The Inner Mission seeks to provide wholesome and rational recreation for these empty hours. The entertainments thus provided are not in accord with the Calvinistic and English notions of Sunday, but are entirely consistent with those of Luther. The Catholics go farther than the Evangelicals and provide theatrical exhibitions and dances in the halls of the associations. The beer mug is of course entirely unsectarian and is found everywhere.

In addition to numerous municipal and communal schools

for technical training,¹ the friends of the Inner Mission have built up many useful institutions having the same end. Indeed these private and ecclesiastical experiments have often been pioneers in new realms of education, and their success has spurred the authorities to action and given data for methods. Girls are taught household industries. Domestic servants are trained for their occupation in homes significantly named from Martha, the busy housewife. It is found convenient and economical to connect these schools with day nurseries, hospitals, and homes for deaconesses, in order to utilize the apprentice labor. Trained sisters usually have charge of this department, and they seek to fit young women to be more efficient as wage earners or as mistresses in their own modest homes. Special inns or hospices are provided for young women who come to cities to seek employment. A friendless peasant girl, ignorant of the city, is in immediate peril when she arrives at the station, and such lodging places help to diminish the number of seductions of weak and untaught persons. Employment bureaus are connected with these temporary homes.

The factory system has produced another social need, the care of the homeless factory girls. Domestic servants require only temporary shelter, while factory girls who are away from home require a permanent boarding-house, where reading, music, recreation, and companionship may be enjoyed. A few such homes have been established, but the difficulties of management are said to be great.

The Young Men's Associations correspond quite closely to our Young Men's Christian Associations. They are formed for young men of the laboring classes and also for those in mercantile employments. No religious creed is enforced upon the members, and there is no distinction between active ("converted") and associate members. But religious meetings are held and personal efforts for spiritual welfare are put forth. Groups of young soldiers may be found in the prayer meetings

¹ See A. SHAW: *Municipal Government in Continental Europe*.

at the Berlin house, but the soldiers have their own services, compulsory as drill, in their own chapels at the barracks. The halls of the associations are provided with tables for refreshments, with libraries, sometimes with gardens and gymnasiums. Social festivities are frequent, and educational classes are sometimes provided.

An institution which bears the distinctively German stamp is the home for travelers (*Herberge zur Heimat*). In 1893 there were 426 of these, and they are joined in a confederation whose network stretches over the country. Each is under the charge of a "house father," who manages the hostelry, keeps order, and conducts religious services. These inns are intended to be a substitute for the demoralizing lodging-houses of the towns, and they certainly have given the advantages of competition to decent workingmen. Many of the anti-church and Socialistic class naturally dislike them, but statistics and observation show that they are much used and meet a real need.

The Workmen's Colonies are among the most interesting creations of the Inner Mission, and among the most instructive social experiments of our age.¹ In 1880 a beginning was made of a system of stations for assisting penniless wanderers (*Naturalverpflegungsstationen*). The communal and provincial authorities, largely under the influence of the energetic Pastor von Bodelschwingh, promoted this system, hoping to regulate vagabondage and test the sincerity of the tramping fraternity by offering lodging and food in return for work. Von Bodelschwingh found that many of these men were without skill or character, and could not find work. So he was thus led to establish a permanent agricultural colony where men could find a home, be trained to labor, and finally be placed in regular occupation. There are now about twenty-five of these colonies in Germany; a few of them in cities. The extravagant hopes of those who imagined this institution would "solve the social question" have been disappointed. It is not a panacea. A

¹See F. G. PEABODY, *Forum*, February 1892. G. BERTHOLD, *Die Entwicklung der deutschen Arbeiterkolonien*, Leipzig, 1887.

colony cannot be made self-supporting with its weak, fitful, and unskilled labor, and the financial burden is too heavy for private charity. Many of the men who drift to these colonies cannot be prepared for competitive life and self direction. Men of the better class of mechanics avoid them, and employers do not like to select workmen from this kind of laborers. But for all this the colonies meet a certain want, and the experiment is of great value. Here again the Inner Mission has been the pioneer, and the state has learned duty from its enterprise.

The societies of the Inner Mission have not only led the state, but have also gone in advance of the church in this peculiar work. When the ecclesiastical machinery has broken down, in cities where multitudes were utterly neglected, these voluntary associations have established city missions and preaching halls, and sought to win back the people to the religious life. In connection with these evangelistic efforts the nurses of the sick and the almoners of charity have been efficient adjutants.

COÖPERATION WITH THE LABOR MOVEMENT.

It must be regarded as a distinct advance when morally earnest and religious leaders pass beyond the tinkering task of patching up isolated evils of the social system and seek to regenerate the system itself. This step cannot be taken without error and antagonism, and it must be confessed that the traditional training of the clergy has not prepared them to understand the question or to be useful in the controversy. The higher task is more difficult. The Evangelical Workingmen's Unions represent the new attempt to ally the church with organized labor. These unions are not trades unions, but more like our benevolent orders. Their members meet for discussion of social questions, to hear lectures, to join in festivities, and they promote savings schemes and plans of mutual benefit. Members of the Inner Mission have assisted in the formation of the people's banking associations¹ which have had

¹For an account of these credit associations, consult *People's Banks*, by H. W. WOLFF. See *Gunton's Magazine*, May 1896, p. 323.

such a remarkable history in various countries of Europe. This movement was indicated in Wichern's programme of 1849, but the seed then planted did not at once germinate. The Catholics were quite in advance of the Evangelicals, and their clergy were first in the field. The first Protestant union was established in 1882. The most recent statistics report 237 societies, with 52,402 members; of whom 32,822 are laborers, 9,470 artisans, and 10,110 persons of other classes. The greatest strength is in the Rhenish-Westphalian provinces. In Berlin only one society of seventy to eighty members is reported. The movement was at first anti-Catholic and later anti-socialistic as well. It has encountered many obstacles and never attained great strength. Most workingmen detest clerical control. The trades unions think that a society which cannot strike is powerless when it is most needed, and they dislike the evangelical unions because they divide the forces of wage earners and seek alliances with capitalists. The socialists naturally hate a society whose avowed purpose is to win back workingmen from socialism. Many employers regard a union managed by the clergy as about as great a pest as a regular trades union. Politicians denounce it unless it leans toward their particular party. The movement does not seem to be a natural growth from the real life of working people as socialism and trades unionism are. The workers of the Inner Mission are seeking a way of coöperation with wage earners, but they have not yet found it. The Catholics succeed better, but even their powerful influence is subjected to severe strain. It is to the credit of the clergy that they have honestly sought to help the wage earners, but the impression made on an American student is that a more democratic alliance is the only one which offers any hope of success. The working class have concluded to drive their own team, and do not see the necessity for aristocratic, royal or ecclesiastical leadership.

COÖPERATION OF THE CHURCH WITH THE WIDER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The appeal of the sick, crippled and helpless is made to pity. But society makes a higher claim upon our sense of kinship and

brotherhood. The highest work of religion is not done for criminals and defectives. When men are rescued the best work of Christianity begins. The highest elements of religion cannot be given on this earth to the demented, the perverted, because their higher faculties remain stupefied and dulled, long after rescue. This idea that the social duty of the church is not merely to the vagabond and the imbecile is not even yet fully realized. Many devout persons imagine that "salvation" and philanthropy are for the abjects and weaklings. The truth is that the best fruits grow out of the strongest soils, and the best work of Christianity must be done by the strongest natures. The tendency of scientific philanthropy is not toward the mere support and relief of paupers and criminals but toward the gradual, painless and merciful extinction of the whole class. The movement here studied illustrates the development of this idea. The miserable are indeed helped as never before; more tenderly, generously and wisely. But men are learning from experience and reason that by associating the capable, by regulating the incapable, and by diffusing the higher elements of life, we can do more to diminish misery than by all the direct relief given since the world began. Much of the poverty which society is now relieving was caused by its ignorant and selfish methods of charity.

Under the influence of these ideas a group of members of the national church are seeking to develop the Inner Mission in the direction of influence upon the state. Among the clergy, Stöcker, Naumann and Göhre are conspicuous representatives of this spirit. They declare that the well-being of the working men cannot be advanced without help of society, and that political agencies need to be filled with the Christian spirit. But if direct coöperation with the working classes is difficult, this wider and higher movement seems to confront insuperable obstacles. It is true that Wichern's "Denkschrift" led the way for such activity, but his idea found lodgment in unfriendly soil and climate. Socialists hate Dr. Stöcker because he is a clergyman and because he hits them so hard. The conservatives drove him from the

court chaplaincy because his politics did not please them.¹ The highest authorities of the church have recently forbidden pastors to bring politics into their professional life.² The way seems hedged up on every side. But the ideal of a state ruled by Christ will not soon be expelled from consciousness. The Evangelical Social Congress, organized in 1889, offers a fair platform for discussion, and its reports are very able documents of the movement. The university men are comparatively free to speak and write. Such men as Professors Wagner, Schmoller and Schulze-Gävernitz join eminent authority as economists to deep interest in the religious life of the people, and they are prominent in the Evangelical Congress.

This article completes the preliminary survey of the German Inner Mission. In subsequent articles the particular method of social service will be subjected to a more detailed and technical treatment. In "Notes and Abstracts" recent developments will be illustrated from new publications and periodicals.

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¹ See *Fliegende Blätter*, a. d. Rauhen Hause, May 1896.

² Press report of May 16, 1896. The Emperor sends this message: "The clergy must not meddle with politics." To which Dr. Stöcker is said to have replied: "Since Christian social thought was tabooed in Berlin, socialism reigns politically there. As I have begun, so shall I continue. I leave the end to God."

SANITATION AND SOCIOLOGY.

Non est vivere, sed valere vita.—*Martial.*

AN eminent sanitarian has said that "the relations between sociology and hygiene are extremely intimate,—a fact which seems not sufficiently appreciated by the students of either subject." It is true that one need not search far for instances of the failure of people in general to recognize the close relationship which exists between sanitary conditions and social progress; but ignorance or indifference on the part of the general public may be pardoned, surely, because so little has been done in the past to diffuse general information concerning the facts and theories, or the actual and ideal achievements, of either sanitation or sociology. Such an attitude of mind, however, on the part of the expert in either subject is becoming almost worthy of censure, for sufficient progress has been made along both lines of investigation to show certain phases of their interdependence. The more study is given to these problems of life, the more helpful the student finds the possibilities involved in this relationship and the more impatient he becomes of the investigator in either department whose efforts to secure independence in his chosen field lead him to a false valuation of the good which may result from a recognition of the bond which truly exists and which is capable of reacting as helpfully for the one side as for the other.

Little time need be spent in searching for evidence that the sanitarian allows himself a very narrow outlook. In general, he limits his object to the prolongation of existence. The address delivered by Dr. Bowditch of Massachusetts at the first meeting of the first State Board of Health organized in the United States is recognized on all sides as epoch-making; nevertheless it contained so limited a conception of the aim of sanitary reform as is implied in the following statement: "I beg

you to bear in mind that all these investigations have been made by the state (England) with one sole object in view, viz., the improvement in human health, and for the lengthening out of human life of each individual man or women; certainly no object can be nobler, none more deserving the attention of learned men or of philanthropists or statesmen."

In corroboration of the view that this is frequently the governing principle in public health studies, it is found that treatises on sanitation and hygiene present an array of statistics concerning the rate of mortality, with theories as to the commercial value of the higher rate of prolonged existence. For example, it is shown that England has expended within a few years for public health six hundred million dollars. The rate of mortality was 22 per 1000 in 1875, 20 in 1880, and 17 in 1889. The number of lives saved increased in 1880 to 55,000 and in 1889 to 142,000 and for the period 1880-9 to the enormous total of 858,591. According to the statistician Farr "these lives represent a capital of six hundred million dollars, so that in ten years the nation would have more than recovered the sum it expended, while in the calculation no account is taken of disease averted and there can be no figures for that which cannot be calculated, such as suffering prevented, health improved and life made happier." Dr. W. E. Boardman showed in the sixth report of the Massachusetts Board of Health that the annual loss to the commonwealth by preventable sickness is considerably over three million dollars, or in other words "in order to affect a reduction in the annual mortality at the rate of only four per thousand, the state might expend a capital of over fifty-three millions of dollars in sanitary improvements and the sum invested in this manner would continue to return interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum."

Again, a noted sanitarian has called attention to the fact that but little more than one third of the value of the natural length of life is realized even in civilized countries and he states that the function of the sanitarian is to "prevent unnecessary disease and thereby unnecessary mortality."

Unquestionably the results as shown by the mortality records serve very important ends, as has been suggested, both in proving the practicability of preventing disease and in justifying and encouraging still further expenditures, labors and studies. And the question might reasonably be asked whether any worker in the interests of humanity might not well be content with such immediate and definite results and not seek a more remote and uncertain end. Is it not probable that he will eventually effect more for the welfare of mankind by keeping a concrete purpose, which time is proving to be feasible, definitely before him, rather than by groping blindly for other results, which may after all prove mere will-o'-the-wisps? Happily sanitarians are beginning to say "no" in most emphatic terms. The prolongation of existence is not in itself an adequate aim for human endeavor. It is impossible to stifle the conviction that sanitary experts have the right to recognize openly the higher purpose which, consciously or otherwise, is constantly influencing their efforts. The extension of the duration of physical life is not a sufficient motive for those who, while using their knowledge and strength to improve the material conditions of life, are not satisfied with the notion of man as an animal, but are fired in their purpose with the conception of which Hamlet's words are the expression—"What a piece of work is man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculties! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals!"

The duty of the sanitarian is therefore acknowledged to be of greater scope as the years pass and the meaning of sanitary reform is proved not to be restricted to the physical life of man, but to affect all his activities as a human being. The interest of the sanitarian is now said to be in "whatever can cause or help to cause discomfort, pain, sickness, death, vice or crime,—and whatever has a tendency to avert, destroy, or diminish such causes." We are told that preventable evils, such as loss of life, impairment of health, and physical disability, impose upon the people unnumbered and immeasurable calamities, pecuni-

ary, social, physical, mental and moral, which ought to be avoided.

It may be claimed that such a conception has always been somewhat recognized by the sanitarian. For instance, E. A. Parkes in the introduction to his work on *Practical Hygiene* says "Taking the word hygiene in the largest sense, it signifies rules for perfect culture of mind and body. It is impossible to dissociate the two. The body is affected by every mental and moral action; the mind is profoundly influenced by bodily conditions. For a perfect system of hygiene we must train the body, the intellect and the moral faculties in a perfect and balanced order. Looking only to the part of hygiene which concerns the physician, a perfect system of rules of health would consider the human being (1) in relation to the natural conditions which surround him, (2) in his social and corporate relations, (3) in his capacity as an independent being, having within himself sources of action in thoughts, feelings, desires, personal habits, all of which affect health and which require self-regulation and control." But such broad, general statements do not entirely satisfy. It is with a feeling of relief that we find that in the address of Dr. Bowditch already quoted the third object of the Massachusetts Board of Health was stated to be "to investigate the effects of the use of intoxicating liquors upon the industry, prosperity, happiness, health and lives of the people."

The sanitarian, then, who rests content with figures which show that his work results in a diminished rate of mortality and disease, utterly fails to grasp the real significance of his task and is, in so far, unfitted to accomplish it. While holding fast to the idea of the value of physical life, he should recognize the fact that there are other and higher ends which it is his duty to subserve. In the words of Sir John Simon, "When sanitary reformers appeal to the conscience of modern civilization against the merely quantitative waste of human life, their deeper protest is against the heedless extinction of those high and beautiful possibilities of being, against the wanton interception of such powers for good, against the cruel smothering of such capacities

for happiness Our science, which is becoming more and more able to preserve and strengthen to men their gift of life, would indeed offer but a joyless task to its administrators, if they had not the hope that the lives they endeavor to maintain would be lives of growing worth and happiness." The sanitarian is right in regarding his special field of work in relation to the higher activities of mankind. He should require that, in his own mind at least, every principle studied, every reform advocated, every plea made, should be considered in the light of its rôle as a part of the foundation for the highest and best expression of life, whether it be physical, intellectual, moral or spiritual. The sound body is of little use save as it can help in the manifestation of sound mental and spiritual activities. The house which is sanitarily perfect has a small function in the economy of life unless it contributes to the upbuilding of men with perfect minds and souls. And even though figures may fail for the proof, the sanitarian is justified in consciously striving after and demanding such results. As Emerson says—"A house should bear witness in all its economy that human culture is the end to which it is built and garnished. It is not for festivity. It is not for sleep. But the pine and the oak shall gladly descend from the mountains to uphold the roof of men as faithful and necessary as themselves, to be the shelter always open to the good and the true,—a hall which shines with sincerity, brows ever tranquil, and a demeanor impossible to disconcert."

If general assent is given to the proposition that the sanitarian has a part to play in promoting all the highest and best activities of mankind, the converse equally must be true that, if the sociologist is to study the facts of associated human activities with a view to social amelioration, he is but a partial and, in so far, a worthless observer, if he ignores the data which the sanitarian can furnish. The social reformer who overlooks or minimizes the influence of unsanitary physical conditions on the development of man robs himself of a weapon of great power. A careful and logical thinker would hardly believe that this could be done and yet there is ample evidence that frequently

very inadequate recognition is given to the real relation between social and sanitary conditions. An instance may be cited from a well-known work on the causes and remedy of crime, in which it is stated that the only simple and absolutely final division of the active causes of crime is into the two main heads heredity and environment, and yet, in a detailed study of the latter head, sanitary conditions are not even specified or discussed.

Cases are not lacking to prove that some phases of mediæval theology are not extinct in the present age, even among persons who pride themselves upon their advanced and progressive views on social themes. A few years ago a ward committee of the associated charities organization in a large city made a careful sanitary inspection and survey of a portion of the district under their charge which presented problems of unusual difficulty. An interested observer commended the work in speaking to a member of the committee, saying that it was only by the study and knowledge of fundamental facts and principles that any permanent good could be accomplished and among these the physical environment must certainly be counted. The reply was made that "after all, the sanitary conditions did not mean much—if the people were born to be bad they would be bad in spite of their physical surroundings." Such a view of the predestination of man upon earth is by no means uncommon and yet, if it were true, all endeavor in every realm of body, mind or morals would be practically fruitless.

But even when the connection between physical conditions and mental and moral manifestations is recognized, there is a tendency to make it abstract, to bury it in obscure terms, to relegate it to the battlefield of biological strife. Heredity, the transmission of acquired traits, the variation of species, and similar phrases are used to conjure with, until the seeker for an opportunity to increase the sum of human welfare begins to think that the only chance for usefulness lay in prehistoric ages rather than in the living present and with primeval man rather than with his suffering brother and neighbor.

A more rational and practical view, however, is gaining

ground. It was indicated as long ago as 1840, when Edwin Chadwick in his report on the sanitary condition of the laboring classes of Great Britain came to the following conclusions:

That the younger population, bred up under noxious physical agencies, is inferior in physical organization and general health to population preserved from the presence of such agencies.

That the population so exposed is less susceptible to moral influences and that the effects of education are more transient than in a healthy population.

That these adverse circumstances tend to produce an adult population short-lived, improvident, reckless and intemperate and with habitual avidity for sensual gratifications.

That these habits lead to the abandonment of all the conveniences and decencies of life, and especially lead to the overcrowding of their homes, which is destructive to the morality as well as the health of large classes of both sexes.

That the removal of noxious physical circumstances and the promotion of civic, household and personal cleanliness is necessary to the improvement of the moral condition of the population, since sound morality and refinement in manners and health are not long found coexistent with filthy habits amongst any class of the community.

This relationship between physical and social conditions is shown in another form by the following statements in Giddings' *The Theory of Sociology*: "Social aggregates are formed at first by external conditions, such as food supply, temperature, etc." "That the resources and other circumstances of the physical environment must be regarded as the true cause of social aggregation is plainly shown." "Society like the individual must adjust itself to a physical environment." "What is the fact of progress? In what does it consist? The answer of sociology will be that progress includes an increase of material well-being, etc."

This, then, is the relationship between sanitation and sociology: The individual is the essential element of society, his social value depends largely upon his health, while in turn his

health is partly determined by the conditions which society imposes. This conclusion leads to another which is of cheer to those who may perchance be discouraged and falter by the way. The disheartening status of mankind today is undoubtedly the result of the sanitary and social conditions of past ages and former generations, but the influences under which men of the present generation place themselves are more or less within their control and may be made to work for both present and future good. As knowledge and purpose unite for this end, the truth of the idea will grow that the degeneracy or perfection of future generations depends on the acts of men of today. Sanitation then will show what steps should be taken by society, individually and collectively, to secure the health of the race. Clean air, sunlight, wide streets, good pavements, public parks, nourishing food, sanitary schools, public baths, adequate housing, are sanitary measures which are most effective in both sanitary and social results if carried out at times when there seems no special cause for anxiety. The social reformer for his part will guide men to make some sacrifice of present comfort or enjoyment, to undertake labor and expense, so that all the forces of society may be united in bringing mankind as speedily as possible to the complete realization of its mighty and noble capabilities. Sanitation and sociology must go hand in hand in their effort to improve the race. The value of the relation which exists between them will be great in proportion as its importance is consciously and openly recognized.

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THE SOCIAL FORCES.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. VII.

THE second, or Greek, component of the word *sociology* is the one that is usually employed in the names of sciences. While etymologically it only signifies a *treatise* on some subject, it has come to signify a treatise of a systematic kind on a subject that can be reduced to law. The proper designation of a true science should have the termination "nomy" or "onomy," from the Greek νόμος, a law. Especially should this be the case for the abstract sciences, or those dealing primarily with laws instead of concrete objects, such as are all five of the sciences of the Comtean "hierarchy." As a matter of fact, the name of only one of these sciences, astronomy, has the proper termination. *Bionomy* has already been used,¹ and *psychonomy* and *socionomy* are naturally formed, but physics and chemistry do not readily admit of a similar modification. The former might logically be divided into *baronomy* and *etheronomy*, the first embracing the gravitant forces, and the second magnetism, electricity, and all the radiant forces. Chemistry, perhaps derived from Greek χημία, or from χήμη, a measure, or even from χημία, the Greek form of Khmi, a name for Egypt, has come to us through the Arabs in the form *alchemy*, which was variously spelled in early English literature, one of the variants being *alconomy*, said to have been employed from its analogy to astronomy. There would be no impropriety in restoring this variant and thus completing the series: Astronomy, baronomy, etheronomy, alconomy, bionomy, psychonomy, socionomy.

The scientific idea embodied in the word *law* is uniformity of movement. But moving bodies, such as atoms, collide and transfer their motions to others. Upon this is founded the

¹ Comte, *Phil. Pos.*, III, 331.

modern doctrines in mechanics discussed under the general name of the "theory of units." The three ultimate elements in this theory are mass, space, and time. Motion being assumed, the *rate*, or velocity is equal to the space divided by the time. When the mass, or quantity of matter is taken into the account there arise four manifestations of force. The simplest of these is mere *momentum*, which is equal to the product of the mass into the velocity. The next simplest stage is *force* proper, which is the mass into the rate of change of velocity, or acceleration. The third is *energy*, as now understood by physicists, *i. e.*, kinetic energy, which is half the product of the mass into the square of the velocity. The fourth stage represents the *power*, or rate at which energy is produced or consumed. The distinction between these fundamental quantities is clearly shown by the following algebraic statement, showing how the units of mass, space and time enter them. Denoting these units by *m*, *s*, and *t*, respectively, we have:

$$\text{Momentum} = \frac{m s}{t}, \text{ or } m v$$

$$\text{Force} = \frac{m s}{t^2}, \text{ or } \frac{m v}{t}$$

$$\text{Energy} = \frac{m s^2}{t^2}, \text{ or } m v^2$$

$$\text{Power} = \frac{m s^2}{t^3}, \text{ or } \frac{m v^2}{t}.$$

The theory of units is applicable to every true science in proportion as it can be reduced to exact measurement. In mechanics, astronomy, and physics the phenomena can, for the most part, be thus reduced, but in the more complex sciences, at least in their present state, this can be done only to a limited extent. It must not, however, be inferred from this that exact laws do not prevail in these domains. They are as rigid here as in the simpler ones, and the only imperfection is in our knowledge of them. The acceptance of this statement is what constitutes scientific *faith*. Those who do not accept it and doubt the uniformity and invariability of natural law in the fields of

life, mind, and human action, simply lack faith in the order of the universe.

In a certain very wide sense all force is one, but from its different modes of manifestation it is convenient to recognize a number of forces. The law of the conservation of energy, or of the correlation or transmutation of forces, shows that all these different forms of the universal force are interconvertible. Astronomy and baronomy deal with the gravitant forces, while etheronomy and perhaps alconomy, deal with the radiant forces, which seem to be opposed to the former. The workings of the universal force in bionomy we call vital or biotic, while in psychonomy we call them psychic. For socionomy I long ago proposed the name "*social forces*,"¹ not as an absolutely new expression, but as the first attempt to give it a definite technical meaning. For I went into a somewhat elaborate explanation of what constitutes the social forces, and especially of what they have accomplished and how they have accomplished it. In the second volume (chap. viii) I essayed to prove that they are true natural forces and obey the Newtonian laws of motion. But I did not in that work attempt to show that sociology derives its primary laws directly from psychology. This was done in my *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, published in 1893. In the Fifth paper of this series a portion of this argument was briefly recapitulated. The present paper can at best be only a similar brief recapitulation of the general treatment of the social forces as set forth in those works.

All sciences, in order to be such, must be domains of forces. Until a group of facts and phenomena reaches the stage at which these can be generalized into laws, which, in turn, are merely the expressions of the uniform working of its underlying forces, it cannot be appropriately denominated a science. Biology, since Darwin, has fairly entered upon this part of its history. Psychology and sociology have scarcely reached it. Most of the work in both is still confined to the observation of isolated facts without much attempt at their coördination or reduction to law.

¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, New York, 1883, Vol. I, chap. vii, p. 468 ff.

In psychology, as we saw, forces have as yet scarcely been recognized. Philosophers were content, until within quite recent times, to study the phenomena of the most derivative of the human faculties, and scarcely a suggestion can be found that these faculties could have been naturally produced. Intellect, memory, reflection, imagination, and other admittedly remarkable phenomena have been long studied, and a vast amount of speculation has been done in these fields. But the affective side of the mind in which the forces reside has been ignored so far as any attempt to understand its relations to the rest of mind is concerned. The appetites, passions, and even emotions, though recognized as having a necessary relation to ethics, have not been thought of as an integral part of mind. They are in fact the genetic source of all the other faculties, the seat of all psychic power, and the basis of any true science of mind.

In a somewhat similar manner the dynamic basis of society has been overlooked. The cause, not only of the primary fact of association itself, but of all other human activities, is *appetite*. Whether looked at from the standpoint of function or from that of feeling, *i. e.*, whether we consider the end of nature or that of the creature, it comes to the same thing. Every act proceeds from motive, and that motive can be none other than the satisfaction of some want. The capacity to want is planted in the organic structures. It is the necessary concomitant of the capacity to feel. The primary form of feeling is intensive, *i. e.*, it is either agreeable or disagreeable, pleasure or pain in some degree, however slight. This is the incipient distinction between good and evil. The pleasurable is the good, the painful is the bad. Every organism is thus constituted as a condition to its existence, and equally essential is it that the impulse should exist to perform the appropriate acts. This impulse causes the creature to seek the good and shun the evil. All this is readily accounted for on the leading principle of modern biology, natural selection, or, as I prefer to call it, the principle of advantage. In short, *desire*, taken in its widest sense, both positive and

negative, is the real force in the sentient world. It is the dynamic agent in the animal world including the human sphere, and therefore constitutes the *social force*. It is essentially psychic, and this is the bond which lashes sociology so directly and so firmly to psychology.

The same reason exists, and no better, for speaking of this phenomenon in the plural and recognizing the existence of *social forces* as we saw for speaking of the universal force in the plural and recognizing physical forces. Just as gravitation, heat, light, etc., are only so many modes of manifestation of the universal force, so the various social forces that may be separately considered are only so many modes of manifestation of the one social or psychic force. Indeed, this psychic force itself is in its turn only a mode of manifestation of the universal force. "Desire is the all-pervading, world-animating principle, the universal *nîsus* and pulse of nature, the mainspring of all action, and the life-power of the world. It is organic force. Its multiple forms, like the many forces of the physical world, are the varied expressions of one universal force. They are transmutable into one another. Their sum is unchanged thereby, and all vital energy is conserved. It is the basis of psychic physics and the only foundation for a science of mind.

It should, however, be added that the parallel between physics and *psychics*, as thus defined, fails at one point. While, so far as is known, there has never been any loss of psychic energy, it is certain that there has been an immense increase of it. Indeed, time was when none existed. It has developed or been evolved with all organic nature and has increased *pari passu* with the increase of mind and the development of brain. Complete analogy between the organic and inorganic forces is not reached until it is recognized that the former are derived from the latter, and that vital and psychic forces are simply additional forms of the universal force. The soul of man has come from the soul of the atom after passing through the great alembic of organic life."¹

¹ Psychic Factors, pp. 55-56.


This new force represents a step forward in the evolution of the world. There had been many such steps before this one was taken, and, as we shall see in a future paper, there has been at least one since. Each such step represents progress, and this progress is always in the nature of evolving new modes of manifestation of the universal force. Not only so, but each successive step secures a better, *i. e.*, a higher, more efficient mode of manifesting it. "The course of evolution . . . has been in the direction from the unorganized and inefficacious toward the organized and efficacious through the process of storing energy in appropriate forms. This has taken place by a series of successive steps, each resulting in a more efficient product, that is, one possessing, in addition to the properties of antecedent products, some new property with a special power of its own capable of better work."¹

Such is the essential or cosmical nature of the social forces, and it remains to consider in a general way the mode of their operation. It is clear that we must proceed exclusively from the standpoint of feeling. Each individual or social unit must be regarded as a magazine of feelings, for the most part in the nature of unsatisfied desires, and therefore representing as much force as it requires to satisfy those desires. This energy is always to a large extent potential rather than kinetic, but the leading problem of sociology is how to convert the potential energies of society into kinetic energy. The amount of energy thus set free is the true measure of the strength of the social forces at any given time.

The classification of the social forces from the standpoint of feeling is substantially the same as from that of function. This results from the fact already explained that both lead to the same result and are the necessary correlates of each other. In giving names to them in *Dynamic Sociology* I employed terms that connote function instead of feeling, because the latter would have been difficult to find. This is due to the functional

¹ The Natural Storage of Energy. *The Monist*, Vol. V, Chicago, January 1895, p. 257.

side being almost the only one ever mentioned, so that, not only are there no well-crystallized terms in which to describe the side of feeling, but even with the most careful explanation it is difficult to convey the idea. This is illustrated by the explanatory words which I placed after the several classes of essential forces in the table of classification on page 472 of Vol. I, which is here reproduced without change:



I have seen no reason to modify this classification in any essential respect. Some slight change in the phraseology might adapt it better to such a cursory treatment as I am now making, and place certain of its aspects in a somewhat clearer light. The "Preservative Forces" may be called the Forces of Individual Preservation; the "Reproductive Forces" may be called the Forces of Race Continuance; and the "Non-essential Forces" as a whole may be called the Forces of Race Elevation. Attention may also well be drawn to the fact that the "Essential Forces" relate primarily to bodily or physical wants, while the "Non-essential Forces" relate chiefly to mental or spiritual needs. These terms still connote functions, which seems unavoidable, and the Social Forces may be reclassified, as follows:

Physical
Individual Preservation

Positive
Negative
Race Continuance
Direct
Indirect
Spiritual
Esthetic
Moral
Intellectual

It is always a question, when treating of the bodily or physical social forces, whether it is preferable to begin with the preservative or the reproductive group. There are many reasons why the latter seem to be the more fundamental. The race is more important than the individual, and in developed society the family is the most important social structure and the basis of the state. But going farther back and tracing the two principles entirely through the biological series, we at last arrive at the most fundamental of all the truths involved, viz., that in its ultimate analysis and most original form, reproduction is merely a mode of nutrition. Resting the case upon this primordial truth, I will adhere to the order of treatment which I adopted in *Dynamic Sociology* and make the nutritive group the first of the essential social forces.

Forces of Individual Preservation.—When we come to deal with the social forces from the subjective side, *i. e.*, from the standpoint of feeling, we have to consider their direct effects as true natural forces. The individuals in whom they reside must be represented as impelled by them to perform acts, and as obeying these impulses as rigidly as physical bodies obey the influences that cause them to move. These impulses in human beings are of course exceedingly complex and subtle, so that in many cases this does not seem to be true, but this is because we are unable to take them all into account. In the advanced stages of human development when intellectual and moral influences have entered the field the case is still more complicated, but even then, if there is a social science, what I have characterized as scientific faith, when it is fully devel

oped, does not permit any doubt to come in and qualify in the least the universal law, and we must say, with Immanuel Kant, that "if we could investigate all the phenomena of his [man's] volition (*Willkuhr*) to the bottom there would not be a single human act which we could not with certainty predict and recognize as necessarily proceeding from its antecedent conditions."²

The preservative forces are among the simplest of man's nature. They may be divided into two classes, negative and positive. The negative ones are those that protect him from injury and destruction. Whatever produces pain is shunned, and even if nothing were known about death, every individual would fly from whatever experience had taught him to be productive of painful effects. The mere escape from physical danger and from enemies is only a small part of the effect of this class of forces. In man the most important sociological effects have been the many ways in which it has led him to provide for himself clothing and shelter as a protection from the elements and from a hostile environment in general. The application of all this to the science of sociology is too obvious to require elaboration.

We will therefore pass to the other or positive class of preservative social forces. These have directly to do with the function of nutrition. The fact that every one will seek food is so patent that no one ever stops to reflect upon a possible condition in which this should not be the case. Yet such a condition is easy to imagine. All we have to do is to suppose an individual devoid of taste and whose stomach is incapable of the particular sensation called hunger. This sensation is very different from the ordinary forms of pain, and it would make no difference how painful the sensation of an empty stomach might be, if it did not take this particular form no effort would be put forth to supply its needs. Hunger is a form of desire, and as such impels to the appropriate action for its satisfaction. Ordinary pain, no matter how acute, does not thus impel action. The case is not

² *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ed. Hartenstein, Leipzig, 1868, p. 380.

a purely hypothetical one. There have been recorded in the medical books many cases in which all sense of taste was wanting, and the temporary loss of appetite is a common occurrence. Some cases have been brought to light in which this state was chronic, and strenuous efforts were made artificially to introduce into the apathetic body sufficient nutritive material to sustain life. But it is obvious that in any but such exceptional cases, situated in the midst of an environment of intelligence and scientific skill, such a condition would speedily result in death, and that without the aid of natural appetite no creature, however intelligent, scientific, or skilled, could persist. *A fortiori*, no inchoate and undeveloped being could survive under such circumstances. If any such creatures have by chance been produced they must have immediately perished and left no record of their evanescent career. This alone is adequate to account, on sound, scientific principles, for the existence of the sensation of appetite. If, in the infinite number of devices which we may conceive Nature to have tried in her effort to discover a protective principle no such quality had been found there could have been no animal world.

It would be easy to carry this reasoning much farther and to show that the principle applies equally to every other form of desire. Indeed, it is the only conceivable explanation of the fundamental phenomenon of feeling of whatever kind. Pleasure and pain are simply devices of Nature for the preservation of such organic beings as have no other adequate means, and the existence of a sentient world is its natural result. Desire is that form of remembrance, either original or inherited, of pleasureable sensations which prompts the acts necessary to their repetition, and from the manner in which it has originated as a condition to survival, the satisfaction that results is that which maintains life. Pain, though, as it is now easy to see, a fundamentally different thing, and not in any proper sense the opposite of pleasure, had a similar origin, and the class of negative forces last considered result from the device called pain, which all creatures susceptible of it instantly fly from, and thus pre-

serve their existence. Such is the scientific solution of the problem of evil which has been so long discussed without reaching any satisfactory answer. It is not a moral problem at all, but a biological or psychological one, and is exceedingly simple. To live is to suffer, as the pessimists assert, but to the sociologist the problem is how to minimize the amount of suffering and magnify the volume of life. He is on strictly scientific ground. The problem is a practical one, and although the complete abolition of pain, like that of friction in machinery, is in the nature of things impossible, still, approaches toward it, in the one case as in the other, may be and are continually made.

These two innate tendencies or impulses of human nature, to escape destructive influences and to seek nutritive substances, constitute the preservative forces of society. They are universal, invariable, and reliable, quite as much so as the physical agencies with which mechanical science deals. Sociology must build upon them as physics builds upon the laws of gravitation, heat, light, or electricity, and only thus can sociology become a science.

Forces of Race Continuance.—There is no difference in the principle underlying the preservative and the reproductive forces. Independently of the fact above referred to that the latter in the last analysis prove to be only a mode of the former, we see that the law of advantage must secure the one as much as the other. In all the higher forms of animal life, and emphatically in man, the reproductive force is, like the preservative, an appetite, and its strength is as much greater than other appetites as the function is more imperative. It is equally universal, invariable, and reliable, and upon it as a true natural force sociology can build with perfect safety.

Under the influence of intellectual development, which, as we saw in the fourth paper, is attended by a corresponding increase in man's sympathetic nature and in his esthetic tastes which shape his ideals, this mainspring of race preservation becomes spiritualized and permeates society in the form of a refining and ennobling influence, which, although far more

powerful than the primary appetite, is infinitely more complex and subtle, and hence becomes a much more difficult agent for the sociologist to handle. Philosophers have therefore fought shy of it and abandoned it to the poets and romance writers. This field is therefore almost wholly new to science, and anyone who attempts to enter it from the scientific point of view is sure to be looked upon with suspicion. He will usually be regarded not only as having departed from the scientific method but as displaying a diseased mind. But this is not necessary. It is possible to deal with this subtle force in a scientific way. In fact, sociologists must do this or leave out of view one of the leading factors of the science. This transformed and transfigured agency in advanced societies must be recognized and appreciated at its full value. For the sociologist love is not a sentiment in the popular sense; it is a *principle*. It is the second, if it is not the first, of the great powers that propel the social machinery.

Forces of Race Elevation.—The two classes of forces thus far considered are absolutely essential to life. Failure either to preserve the individual or to continue the race would equally bring society to an end. Man's mental or spiritual wants are not thus imperative. From the standpoint of function the forces of race elevation are not essential. But from the present standpoint, viz., that of feeling, and also at the same time that of social advantage, they assume an even greater importance. It was shown in the fifth paper that they contribute the larger share of the volume of social good; that while their "necessity" is less their "utility" is greater. The point of view of that paper was that of the individual, but this is equally true from the point of view of this paper, which is that of society. The efforts put forth to secure the higher order of individual good at which they aim result in a correspondingly higher order of social good. The good sought by the lower impulses has for the most part only a static value. Although the efforts put forth necessarily, though unconsciously, produce change and progress, still this is small from the very fact that it is unconscious. The higher impulses, on the con-

trary, set up for themselves conscious ideals, esthetic, moral, intellectual, and pursue them till they are attained. They are therefore chiefly dynamic.

Here is perhaps the place to bring forward one of the most far-reaching laws in the domain of sociology, viz., that the relative value of feeling and function is not a fixed but a variable quantity, and that throughout organic evolution this ratio increases in favor of the former. More precisely stated, the law is that while function is fixed, feeling increases somewhat in proportion to development. It would be easy to illustrate this in the lower orders of life where everything seems to be subordinated to function, and nature seems wholly indifferent to feeling. In biotic progress it is obvious that the capacity for both pleasure and pain increases with the advance in structure. The truth is exemplified even in cases of degeneration where the opposite obtains. But it is still more apparent in man, where the psychic and especially the intellectual element so largely enters in. All that was said in the fifth paper relative to the object of man and that of nature applies at this point. There has been a steady rise, as it were, in the price of life. The lowest savages value life at a very low figure and throw it away on the slightest provocation. The value put upon human life is one of the safest tests of true progress. The gradual abolition by the most advanced nations of the so-called code of honor is one among many of the signs of this advance. Even the dying out of the spirit of martyrdom, regarded by many as a mark of moral degeneracy, is, on the contrary, an assertion of the growing value of life, and as such is a step forward.

But it is not life alone that is valued; it is rather what life affords. The primitive man is not only indifferent to life, but he is also indifferent to pain, as witness the horrible mutilations to which savages so often voluntarily submit, as we are told, without manifesting the usual reflex movements which even the thought produces in us. Here, of course, comes in the principle of *anticipation* which I have discussed elsewhere.² The savage,

² *American Anthropologist*, Vol. VIII. Washington, July 1895, p. 254.

like the animal, lives chiefly in the present, and does not suffer the acute pains which a developed imagination enables the more refined organizations to represent in advance to the mind.

But most important of all is the growing sense of *good* which equally characterizes the progress of intelligence. Not merely does man more and more value life and shrink from pain, but he progressively enhances his estimate of enjoyment, and properly so. This is to him the only good, and having been developed as a correlate of function it is safe in the long run to trust it as the expression also of universal or cosmical good—or, if any prefer, of divine good. It has served this purpose well thus far, and upon those who deny it this function rests the burden of proof. What specially concerns the sociologist is the fact that with the development of the race more and more attention has been devoted to attaining the satisfactions of life, until these become in the most advanced societies the real if not the avowed ends of existence.

To the credit of mankind be it said, moreover, that in all peoples at all developed, the lower satisfactions come gradually to constitute only a subordinate part of the object of existence, and more and more effort is expended in attaining those satisfactions which, though not essential to self-preservation or race continuance, possess for all elevated natures a far higher value. An ascending series of these was drawn up in the fifth paper, and their increasing worthiness is unaffected by the proof there presented that the amount of satisfaction obtained is greater at each step as we rise in the scale. It is moreover remarkable that this series, arrived at from the strictly psychological point of view, as an attempt to analyze the subjective qualities of the mind should harmonize so closely with the classification which the sociologist must make of the social forces.

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SOCIAL CONTROL. III.

BELIEF.

THE working of the legal and social sanctions described in the last paper is not without grave shortcomings.

1. They do not control that which is done in secret. The law, with all its argus-eyed sleuths, and the press, with all its ferreting reporters, cannot destroy the opportunities of men surreptitiously to get on at the expense of their fellows. Everybody cannot be watched all the time. As the institutions of family and property are always exposed to the secret assaults of trespassers, the need is felt for something that will intimidate a man when he is alone.

2. Law and public opinion are frequently paralyzed by the power of the man they seek to restrain. The current saying, "There is one law for the rich and another for the poor," witnesses that even now the courts do not dispense unvarying justice. The success with which bold or influential men can browbeat their accusers, hoodwink the public, and pluck profit from open offense is proverbial. In view of the failures¹ of the regular restraining organs, men long for a higher tribunal, where wrongs may be righted and the transgressor get his dues.

3. Human sanctions reach only the outward deed. But it is idle to repress actions when the evil disposition is untouched. Sooner or later opportunity comes and the evil will flash into

¹ The weakness of the English common law courts in restraining the powerful led to petitions to the Chancellor, the keeper of the King's conscience. Thus originated the Court of Chancery. "Most of these ancient petitions appear to have been presented in consequence of assaults and trespasses . . . for which the party complaining was unable to obtain redress, in consequence of the maintenance or protection afforded to his adversary by some powerful baron, or by the sheriff or other officer of the county in which they occurred." Preface to calendars of the Proceedings in Chancery, 1827. The petitioner usually beseeches the Chancellor to interfere "for luff of God and in way of charitee."

deed. If pressure could be applied, not to conduct but to the very intents and desires of the heart, something might be done toward reforming character. While moral character is not best built up by fear of the consequences of yielding to certain moods, and hope of reward for cultivating an opposite disposition, pressure of this kind is not without efficacy. In any case, when men reach the reflective stage, treatment according to desert wins much heartier approval than treatment according to deed.

4. The operation both of law and of public opinion is expensive. Moreover, as punishment both legal and social is cheaper than reward, they rely over-much on fear and fail to get the best service out of a man. They hold ground already won, but offer little stimulus to new and signal achievement on behalf of society. Even hope of fame will hardly inspire one to become a hero, martyr, or saint.

The recognition of these facts leads men to desire that defective human control be supplemented by the awards of a judge, who, by his omnipresence, his omnipotence, his omniscience and his infinite resources, might cure these deficiencies. Such a longing can be met only through belief in the supernatural.

If any one is to be influenced in his actions by the recompense attached, he must of course *believe* that the promised requital will come without fail. But this assurance, based on testimony, observation, or former experience, may properly be distinguished from a conviction grounded on inference, tradition, or authority. These unverifiable convictions regarding what is beyond the field of human experience we shall call *belief*, and the control of conduct by means of these convictions we shall term *control by belief*.

The first group of supernatural sanctions rest on the belief that there is a supernatural being who is interested in and follows the doings of men, and that he intervenes in this life to punish the bad and to reward the good. A perfect illustration of this type is yielded by the blessings and curses of the Mosaic law.

"If thou shalt hearken diligently unto the voice of the Lord thy God, to observe and do all his commandments . . . all these blessings shall come on thee and overtake thee. . . . Blessed shall be the fruit of thy body, and the fruit of thy ground, and the fruit of thy cattle, the increase of thy kine, and the flocks of thy sheep. Blessed shall be thy basket and thy store . . . and the Lord shall make thee plenteous in goods, in the fruit of thy body, and in the fruit of thy cattle, and in the fruit of thy ground . . . But . . . if thou wilt not hearken unto the voice of the Lord thy God, to observe to do all his commandments and his statutes . . . cursed shall be thy basket and thy store. Cursed shall be the fruit of thy body . . . The Lord shall smite thee with a consumption, and with a fever, and with an inflammation, and with an extreme burning, and with a sword, and with blasting, and with mildew; and they shall pursue thee till thou perish."¹

That a belief that sees in every event of life some immixture of the gods, and interprets every stroke of good or ill fortune in reference to past behavior, gives a tremendous leverage in the control of men, the history of priestcraft shows beyond a doubt. But such an interpretation of life can hardly last among the masses without the plausible explanations of quick-witted priests. A little reflection on life shows an apportionment of good and evil that can be reconciled with no conceivable standards of moral deserts. David sees the "prosperity of the wicked" and confesses that "their eyes stand out with fatness; they have more than heart could wish."² Says Professor Huxley: "If there is a generalization from the facts of human life which has the assent of thoughtful men in every age and country, it is that the violator of ethical rules constantly escapes the punishment

¹ Deuteronomy, chap. 28 :

" . . . Everie countrey chalengeth a severall saint for their patrone, assignying further to each saint a peculiar cure and office, with also sundry ways of worshiping : as this saint helpeth for the toothache, that socoureth in childbyrth; she restoreth stolene goods; another aydeth shipmen in tempests; another taketh charge of husbandmen's hoggs; and so of the rest; far long were it to rehearse all." Erasmus, quoted by Adams in *Law of Civilization and Decay*, p. 156.

² Psalm 73.

which he deserves; that the wicked flourish like a green bay tree, while the righteous begs his bread."¹

Besides the empirical test the theory that makes human life the sport of the gods succumbs to the victorious demonstration of law in natural events and human affairs. As group after group of happenings are seen to lie in the mesh of law and not in the palm of caprice, the expectation of recompense in this life fades before a growing skepticism. An orderly universe, with an occasional special providence, takes the place of a world riddled with the supernatural.

Thus fades the belief that men's acts dog their earthly footsteps till little is left but the vague feeling that somehow the course of things is against him who spurns the social interdict, or for private ends transgresses the tradition of the community. A dimly seen retributive tendency in life seems to betoken a mysterious moral drift deep in the heart of the universe. Law reigns, but to natural laws is paramount a moral law. This precious reflection that sometimes gives pause to men is carefully fostered by popular novels and dramas that depict the triumph of a justice that, because it occurs only in fiction, is called "poetic." A realistic treatment of life would shock the popular conviction that all things work together for him who obeys time-honored precepts. The worker for the common welfare, on the other hand, is shown as, in a way, coöperating with the Universe, as backed by invincible forces, and sure to triumph in the long run.

A variant of this type of sanction is the gift of supernatural powers in this life. "The mediæval saint was a powerful necromancer. He healed the sick, cast out devils, raised the dead, foretold the future, put out fires, found stolen property, brought rain, saved from shipwreck routed the enemy, cured headache, was sovereign in childbirth, and, indeed, could do almost anything that was asked of him, whether he were alive or dead."²

¹ *Evolution and Ethics*, p. 58.

² *Adams*, p. 41.

Another variant may be recognized in the penance. Here the punishment is experienced in this world and inflicted by man. But it is often only belief that makes it poignant. On this kind of sanction rested much of the moral discipline of the church. Nothing but belief could make temporary banishment from the communion table or excommunication an effective penalty. In other cases where the penance consists in abstinence, humiliation, mortification of the flesh, religious exercises, etc., it presents itself as an alternative to a directly supernatural punishment. "Every system of law," says Lecky, "is a system of education, for it fixes in the minds of men certain conceptions of right and wrong, and of the proportionate enormity of different crimes; and no legislation was enforced with more solemnity, or appealed more directly to the religious feelings, than the penitential discipline of the church."¹

A second type of supernatural sanction is presented by the Hindu doctrine of transmigration. Here we are taught that deeds draw after them their appropriate consequences in this world but not in this life. The souls of bad men suffer by being reborn in men of low caste or in animals, while those who are pure, are born again as kings or Brahmins or Devas. The allotment of good and ill to the soul in its wanderings does not proceed from an arbitrary deity nor yet from a just judge, but depends on the law of Karma. Karma is the moral kernel which alone survives death and continues in migration. The law of Karma is simply a doctrine of cause and effect applied to character. "There is no escape, according to this theory, from the result of any act; though it is only the consequences of its own acts that each soul has to endure. The force has been set in motion by itself and can never stop; and its effect can never be foretold."² This Hindu doctrine makes the minimum demand upon the supernatural. Its economy of belief stamps it as a device far superior to the ecclesiastical doctrine of the future states.

¹ *History of European Morals*, Vol. II, p. 8.

² RHYS DAVIDS, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 85.

A third species of sanction appears with belief in a supernatural life. In two vast unseen worlds, Heaven and Hell, is led an unending life, and the lot of each man through this infinite existence is determined by his doings in this brief earthly span of life. Though the connection of the two lives is close, it is not necessity but the will of a judge that binds them together. Hence the idea of a judgment day when the soul appears before the judge, its record is read, its deeds and thoughts are weighed and its doom is spoken. This analogue to law procedure is found in the religion of Egypt, of Greece, in Calvinism and in Islam. Of the possibilities of such a belief, Lecky writes: "The doctrine of a future life was far too vague among the Pagans to exercise any powerful general influence and among the philosophers who clung to it most ardently, it was regarded solely in the light of a consolation. Christianity made it a deterrent influence of the strongest kind. In addition to the doctrines of eternal suffering, and the lost condition of the human race, the notion of a minute personal retribution must be regarded as profoundly original."¹ "Experience has abundantly shown that men who are wholly insensible to the beauty and dignity of virtue, can be convulsed by the fear of judgment, can be even awakened to such a genuine remorse for sin as to reverse the current of their dispositions, detach them from their most inveterate habits and renew the whole tenor of their lives."²

When there are bonds of love binding the living to the dead, the doctrine of another world yields yet another stimulus. When loved ones dead are thought of as looking back upon this life with their former interest and concern, a powerful motive is given to do only that which will please them. The efficacy of this belief in fostering family piety and strengthening family bonds can hardly be overestimated. It is the ally of society, however, only in one great instance. For hundreds of thousands of young Americans the chief stimulus to self-denial comes not from hope of heavenly reward, but from the convic-

¹ *History of European Morals*, Vol. II, p. 3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

tion that their beloved Master is at this moment living and that he watches their efforts, grieving when they stumble, rejoicing when they stand. This is the most sublimated form of control by belief.

Of the four types of supernatural sanction we have examined, the third is the most characteristic, as it implies the greatest subordination of belief to a scheme of rewards and punishments. Taking it as representatives let us note its excellences and defects.

In the first place its rewards and punishments are cheap and can be amplified to any degree. In the second place, as from the all-seeing eyes of a god there can be no concealment, these sanctions admirably supplement law.¹ Thirdly the blending of belief with law increases the prestige of the latter and provides restraint in cases where the machinery of justice fails to operate. The last judgment is simply an earthly judicial inquest freed from its limitations and exalted to the highest conceivable perfection. The idea of a divine tribunal excludes all brow-beating or cajoling, all conflict of testimony, all partiality, all overlooking of desert by too close attention to outward deed. The divine awards conform to an ideal justice which human awards aspire to but never quite reach.

On the other hand, the drawbacks to this form of control are many. First, the Unseen practically becomes a mere appendix to the Seen. All man's speculation regarding the Invisible is unduly subordinated to the task of regulating people in their social life. Such a shackling of the noble speculative impulse checks the development of human personality, which is, after all, the end for which social life exists. Secondly, this kind of control gets in the way of new and higher forms of control. The guidance of men by ideals, enforced by honor and self-respect, which has become so general since the Reformation,

¹ "The notion of employing curses in defense of property is very ancient." "It was mostly applied to objects that were peculiarly exposed to depredation, such as graves, books, deeds." EARLE, *Land Charters and Saxon Documents*, p. 25.

requires that men rest under the illusion that their thinking is entirely free. The necessary disintegration of belief and rejection of authority which paves the way to this higher species of control has been bitterly opposed at every step by the earthly dispensers of supernatural rewards and punishments. Thirdly, as the whole system rests on belief, this must be hedged with the greatest sanctions. More than any social transgression must the gods hate and punish doubt, unbelief, disregard of the divine will, defiance of the priesthood, or neglect of ecclesiastical requirements. Not only does unbelief become the capital sin and belief the cardinal virtue, but even thumbscrew and stake, ban and outlawry will be used to crush out heresy.¹ Such a perversion of ethical values shocks the refined moral judgment and often drives the best men of a society into revolt.

Fourthly, the unconcern of people for distant consequences of present actions weakens the efficacy of rewards and punishments deferred to the close of this life. To overcome this handicap the horrors of hell and the raptures of heaven are exaggerated to the limits of the imaginable. Priests and seers vie with one another in a vividness of imagery and profusion of metaphor that shall make the future state seem as real as the present. The terror resulting is most fatal to the growth of that human sympathy which makes social control unnecessary. Fifthly, the theory of things with which the supernatural associates itself proves a stumbling-block to the progress of science and the consequent amelioration of human life. The waste of lives by the retardation of medicine and hygiene owing to the resistance of the church was a round price to pay for the discipline afforded by belief in heaven and hell. Sixthly, more perhaps than any other kind of control is belief liable to degenerate into an engine of personal and class oppression. Rarely is it found working obedient to the social interest. Certain cor-

¹ "Multitudinous anomalies occur, however — anomalies which seem unaccountable till we recognize the truth that in all cases the thing which precedes in importance, the special injunctions of a cult, is the preservation of the cult itself and the institutions embodying it." SPENCER, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. II, p. 815.

rective forces that guard from abuse the other agencies of control seem to be wanting here. History testifies that belief implies a very dangerous sacerdotal ascendancy that has perhaps been as often used against the common interest as for it.

For these reasons the system of supernatural sanctions, however serviceable it may have been during the early stages of social evolution, when laws were feeble, men fierce, and the finer instruments of discipline almost unknown, is today a decadent form of social control destined to dwindle in relative importance as time goes on.

We have yet to show how belief came to be the handmaiden of social control.

Modern scholarship, unlike eighteenth century opinion, holds that belief in superhuman beings was not devised as an engine of priestcraft or statecraft. Belief everywhere had a long career before it was turned to account for social purposes. Even after this the subordination was not complete, and dogma continued to be shaped by other influences. We must admit at least two forces as coöperating with the social motive in the development of belief, viz., the speculative impulse and the yearning for consolation. Theology was undoubtedly a theory of things when it predicated another life and another world; undoubtedly a disciplinary tool when it differentiated the other world into heaven and hell. The enormous development of popular theology from Jesus to Anselm must have been largely due to the demands of a hierarchy confronted with the problem of maintaining order after the collapse of the Roman Empire.

To see how belief became ethical, let us take the Semitic religion. In a chaos of superstitions regarding ghosts, our attention is fixed by the attitude of a group of kinsmen toward the spirit of a departed ancestor. The feeling here was not fear, but rather the trust and fellowship that was possible only between those who were held together by the bond of blood kinship. The branch of belief that led to the practice of magic

and sorcery with reference to strange or hostile spirits had no social possibilities, and decayed early. For us the main stream of belief is that pertaining to the known god of the community, blood kin to all its members, and not at the service of the individual in his private aims. "Religion," says W. Robertson Smith, "is not an arbitrary relation of the individual man to a supernatural power, it is a relation of all the members of a community to a power that has the good of the community at heart and protects its law and moral order."¹

The god being conceived as ancestor may properly claim from his worshippers the reverence and service that belongs to a father. As patriarchal institutions develop the god, like the patriarch, comes to be looked upon as judge and king. As the business of the chief, however, was to lead the community against its enemies and not to meddle with its internal affairs, so the god had at first little concern with the doings of his worshippers. "What the Semitic communities asked, and believed themselves to receive from their divine king, lay mainly in three things: help against their enemies, counsel by oracles or soothsayers in matter of national difficulty, and a sentence of justice when a case was too hard for human decision. For the rest, it was not expected that he should always be busy weighing human affairs."² ". . . The conception of the tribal god as father . . . does not carry with it any idea of the strict and rigid enforcement of divine commands by supernatural sanctions."³

As monarchy develops, the old independence is broken down and the king is more able to interfere actively in his subjects' quarrels. By his authority he replaces the rude trial by strength with judicial decisions, realizing some ideal of abstract justice. *Faustrecht* is made to yield to awards based on general equity. Through this evolution the godhead follows the kingship like a shadow. "As the god though not conceived as omnipotent is at least conceived as much stronger than man, he becomes in a special measure the champion of right against

¹ *The Religion of the Semites*, p. 53.

² *Ibid.*, p. 64.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

might, the protector of the poor, the widow and the fatherless, of the one who has no helper on earth."¹

The precise way in which the divine sanction was annexed to conduct appears to have been the extension of the idea of *taboo*. From very early times, men recognized certain spots as the haunts of the god, and therefore sacred from intrusion. Holy places and things were "surrounded by a network of restrictions and disabilities which forbid them to be used by men except in particular ways and in certain cases forbid them to be used at all."² This place-taboo, which had within it the assertion of common property against private license, was extended to guard the sanctuary against acts or liberties that might offend the personal dignity of the god. At this point it needs but the socializing of the taboo to transform a jealous regard for sacred etiquette into an ethical holiness to which the sight of evil or injustice is an offense and an abomination.

Here lies the crisis in the history of religion. Belief, which has been hitherto a political badge, expressing on the one hand the alliance of the members of the political group, and, on the other, its separateness from any other group, now assumes a social office. It asserts not tribe against tribe but society against its individual members. It becomes an agent of social control. This momentous revolution is achieved by a very simple turn of ideas, viz., by conceiving that the god is pleased not by sacrifices, praise and ritual, but by certain forms of conduct and certain elements of character. "To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? saith the Lord; I am full of the burnt offerings of rams and the fat of fed beasts; and I delight not in the blood of bullocks or of lambs or of hegoats." "Your new moons and appointed feast my soul hateth; they are a trouble unto me; I am weary to bear them. . . . Cease to do evil; learn to do well; seek judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow."³

The same idea is expressed by Gautama when he said, "Rituals have no efficacy, prayers are vain repetitions and incan-

¹ *The Religion of the Semites*, p. 72.

² *Ibid.*, p. 139.

³ Isaiah, chap. I.

tations have no saving power. But to abandon covetousness and lust, to become free from evil passions, and to give up all hatred and ill-will, that is the right sacrifice and the true worship."¹ But the complete identification of god-service with man-service awaited the exquisite humanity of Jesus' saying — "Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethren, even these least, ye did it unto me."

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¹ CARUS, *The Gospel of Buddha*, chap. ix, v. 21.

CHRISTIAN SOCIOLOGY. VI.

SOCIAL LIFE.

It is not difficult to see that the principle of fraternity must especially apply to those forms of social life outside the family circle which are neither political nor economic. In nothing do the better instincts of modern life more strenuously exert themselves than in the attempt so to adjust social relations that the chasms caused by differences in wealth and culture may be, if not abolished, at least bridged. Almost in the same proportion as one comes under the control of altruistic motives do these motives result in revolt against conventional distinctions, and an attempt at brotherliness, or at least neighborliness. This is at least one interpretation to be put upon not only socialism, but upon our new charitable movements and organizations and especially upon social settlements. Confessedly these new motives are Christian; nothing could be more so; but it may not be without results to follow the application of his general principle to social matters by Jesus himself.

I.

It may seem gratuitous to assert that Jesus was no ascetic or even semi-ascetic puritan. So far has the pendulum swung away from the mediæval conception of holiness that it often seems as if the chief need of today is a new Savonarola who shall fascinate the nineteenth century into new burnings of novels and gewgaws. But none the less, so ineradicable is the suspicion that religion is in some way a sort of prophylactic against the joys of life, that it is often forgotten that the founder of Christianity came eating and drinking,—in the envious eyes of contemporary religious teachers a winebibber and a glutton.¹

¹ Matt. 11 : 19.

It was in fact because he was so normal that Jesus' career was darkened by men's distrust. John the Baptist, whose work in a fashion Jesus may be said to have continued and completed, was quite another man. The prophet's dress and the pauper's food together with his sternly ascetic preaching gave him a popularity and a permanent position among the Jews which Jesus during his life can hardly be said to have attained.¹ Even nowadays it is by no means so easy to attract the crowds by respectability as by eccentricity and sensations. It is infinitely easier to preach against fashionable extravagances and social absurdities than to recall men to gentlemanly unobtrusiveness in goodness. Too many men measure their goodness by their sense of deprivation, making misery the thermometer of holiness.

But Jesus was evidently not of this class of charlatans and semi-ascetics. It cannot have escaped the notice of even the conventional reader of the New Testament that in the fourth gospel Jesus begins his Galilean ministry by providing a wedding company with new means for enjoyment.² And this was only one instance out of many in which Jesus used social gatherings for the furthering of his mission. In fact much of his teaching was connected with dining—the social meal giving either the occasion or the analogy for his thought. He distinctly rejected fasting as a religious form,³ and destroyed all ceremonial distinctions in food.⁴ If sometimes he himself fasted,⁵ it was from no desire to acquire merit, and if he withdrew into solitude it

¹ The hold that John had upon the minds of his contemporaries is to be seen not only in the oldest sources of our gospels (see for instance Mark 1:1-8) but also in the pages of Josephus (*Ant.* 18; 5:2). By the latter writer the misfortunes that filled the later days of Herod Antipas are said to have been popularly regarded as judgments for the killing of John. Even if, as very likely is the case, this reference to John has been subjected to interpolations, it stands on much securer critical ground than Josephus' reference to Jesus himself (*Ant.* 18; 3:3). Other tributes to the permanence of John's influence are seen in Acts 18:25; 19:3.

² John 2:1-12. It is impossible to think that the conditions of this story are fulfilled by the assumption that the wine provided by Jesus was non-alcoholic.

³ Matt. 9:14; 6:17, 18. In this connection the picture of the boasting Pharisee (Luke 18:10) is especially striking.

⁴ Mark 7:17, 19.

⁵ Matt. 4:12. Luke 4:2.

was for a brief season of prayer from which he returned the more devotedly to enter into public life.¹ For months he lived almost constantly surrounded by crowds.

But while the pleasures of social life are good in themselves, they are not to be ends in themselves. Life consists in something more than food,² and the kingdom of God, as Paul said later, was not to consist in mere sensual enjoyment.³ That something which can make eating and drinking goods subordinate to some greater good is the spirit of brotherliness in which they become means of furthering the happiness of others. The member of the new society was not to flee the world,⁴ but was rather to stay in it as a source of light and life.⁵ Social life was shown both by the words and life of Jesus to be the normal life of men. Just as marriage was the ideal form of the life of the individual, so the family and the feast were used by Jesus as the nearest analogies to what life in the new social order was to be. Friendships are to Jesus' mind instinctive and their fruit of necessity, kindliness.⁶

II.

It is not to magnify trivialities if attention be called to the attitude of Jesus towards the conventionalities of life. It is of course possible that a man should be thoroughly good and worthy of respect and yet be totally indifferent to the requirements of society. Many men today are undoubtedly nobly affecting the life of their communities through their sterling integrity and deep religious feeling who are ignorant or careless of conventionalities. But no cultured man wants a boor as his religious teacher any more than he would accept a filthy saint as his Savior. Even John the Baptist was less than the least in the kingdom of God.⁷ And it is nothing more than we should have expected when we find Jesus careful about those matters which indicate the gentleman. Though a poor man, and counting clothes as at best but a secondary good⁸ he seems to have

¹ Mark 6:46 sq. Matt. 14:23 sq. Luke 9:28.

² Rom. 14:17.

³ Matt. 5:14.

⁴ John 17:15.

⁵ Luke 11:5-8; 15:9.

⁶ Matt. 6:25.

⁷ Matt. 11:11.

⁸ Matt. 6:25, 28.

been well dressed¹ and to have followed the ordinary dictates of the Jewish fashions except, perhaps, in the matter of phylacteries.² His sensitiveness to matters of common civility appears in the words forced from him by the rudeness of a host who allowed conceit to drive out politeness.³ Indeed it would seem as if the fact that Judas should have betrayed him by a kiss added bitterness to the cup he was forced to drink.⁴

These matters are, of course, of small importance as they stand by themselves, but they gain in significance when they are seen to represent an attitude of mind. Conduct is always less hypocritical than language, and in the case of Jesus it had the added responsibility serving as an example for his followers. Accordingly, it is doubly necessary in his case to look for the spirit and ideal of which conduct is the expression. Such a spirit is clearly not that of the ascetic; but is it not equally opposed to that of the "man about town?"

Whether it may have been from this sensitiveness or from some other motive, as a matter of fact, Jesus, with all his love and eagerness to attract men, never cheapened himself by indiscriminate friendships. From one point of view, his brief career was marked by great reserve; indeed, it seems hardly more than a series of withdrawals from men in order that he might establish a few intense friendships. To the outer crowd he carefully refused to show the depths of his character; to the wide circle of mercurial "believers" he revealed hardly more of himself; to the Twelve as a whole he showed as much of himself as he could educate them to appreciate. But when he found a man or woman to whom he could open his heart, then all that they

¹ John 19:23.

² Matt. 9:20. The rabbis seem to have been as supreme in fashion as in religion. We know from their decisions not only the names and styles of the garments worn by Jews but also the order in which they should be put on and their relative importance. (The authority in the subject of Jewish costume is BRÜLL, *Trachten der Juden*. See also EDERSHEIM, *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, I, 621 sq.) The fact to be especially noticed in this connection is probability that Jesus wore the *tsitsith* or tassels on his *tallith* or outer garment.

³ Luke 7:36-50.

⁴ Luke 22:48.

wished to receive of him was theirs to receive. His joys and his sorrows alike might be shared by them. Some men are at their best in public; others, among their intimates. The first come dangerously near acting; the latter are seldom insincere. Jesus belonged emphatically to the second class. He would not cast his pearls before swine.¹ Thus it came about that while he was followed by multitudes, he was loved by only a few.

III.

Jesus does not recognize the existence of social classes in the new order of society. His limitations of intimacy were not based upon accidental differences. Such anomalies as exist within an unhealthy society were naturally impossible within a society composed of normal men. So long as men were bad, so long they could not be other than selfish. All of their efforts could be only for private advantage. Wealth could not fail to be other than a means for ungenerous enjoyment.² Prayer would lengthen itself immoderately that the Creator might be wearied into submission to the more persistent will.³ Social customs would be only new agencies for forcing an indebted acquaintance to repay hospitality in kind.⁴ Jesus saw all this clearly; and he saw its inevitable outgrowth: the stratification of men according to their ability to fulfill these purely materialistic conditions. With such stratification fraternity would be impossible. Therefore in the kingdom no man was to be called master, for they were all brethren,⁵ serving one another. No more striking lesson of humility was ever given than that of the Christ going about with a towel washing the feet of his followers.⁶ So emphatically does Jesus preach the gospel of equality as to say that in the coming order, the last should be first, and the first last.⁷

Yet he does not, like some modern champions of equality,

¹ Matt. 7:6.

³ Matt. 7:7.

⁵ Matt. 23:8.

² Luke 12:16-20.

⁴ Luke 14:12.

⁶ John 13:1-10.

⁷ Matt. 19:30. No sentence of Jesus seems to have made deeper impression on his hearers. It is constantly repeated in the gospels.

attempt the sudden destruction of all traditional distinctions. There is undoubtedly need of such iconoclasts, for reforms like revolutions are seldom made of rose-water, but that constructive spirit which is everywhere noticeable in the career of Jesus is present here in large measure. Social revolutions quite as likely as political produce demagogues, and even more quickly tempt men to denunciations that are the more violent because more indiscriminate. But Jesus kept himself from all such extremes. He himself belonged to the artisan class,¹ and knew what it was to feel the contempt of the professional teachers of his people,² and he did not hesitate to confess the immense advantage possessed by the educated man,³ but he never allowed these facts to lead him into tirade against other men's advantages.

It is however by no means inconsistent with this attitude that he recognized, that as things are constituted, men must of necessity be divided into servants and employés. He said nothing that condemned such a relation, and indeed at times spoke of it as a most natural thing.⁴ But this is simply the attitude that any practical man must take in his reforming of society. Your amateur reformer would dissolve society into its elements. Like Robespierre and other doctrinaires, he will break with the past, even though he brings the bones of departed kings to the lime-pit. But Jesus was never so crude a thinker as to imagine that society is a mechanical mixture of elements into which it must be disintegrated as a step towards a happier recombination. With him progress was biological, an evolution rather than a revolution. And therefore he did not destroy all social conventionalities or a traditional division of labor.

But to be a servant is not to be any less a man or, provided it is really the case, any less the equal of any man in another calling. If nothing that goes into a man can defile him, certainly no necessary work is dishonorable. If Jesus the carpenter and the son of a carpenter could become Jesus the Christ; if his

¹ Mark 6: 3; 13: 55.

² Matt. 13: 52.

³ Matt. 13: 54-56.

⁴ Luke 17: 7-10; Matt. 10: 24.

seemingly Falstaffian army of fishermen, tax-collectors, and reformed revolutionists, could become in a few months the pillars of the great church at Jerusalem and the evangelists of the world; it is unnecessary to argue as to Jesus' recognition of the equality of men as men. Indeed, nothing is more admirable than the catholicity of sympathy and practice that made him the friend of all sorts of people. Yet nothing more scandalized the aristocratic teachers and preachers and lawyers of his own day. How often did they rail against him as a friend of the publican and sinner! In their sight he could be no prophet, since he dared receive a repentant woman of the town.¹ With them as with all legalists the temptation was strong to judge harshly and superficially of all unusual characters, and their criticism of the generous habits of Jesus was a testimony to the openness of his sympathy with honest effort at reform and his disregard of all artificial distinctions. To the Pharisees the common people who knew not the law were accursed: to Jesus they were possible members of his kingdom.²

And his words were the echoes of his life. One of the proofs of his Messiahship that the disciples of John were to carry back to their unfortunate master was that the gospel was being preached to the poor.³ When a man was to give a feast, Jesus bade him invite the lame and the halt and the blind.⁴ Could social equality combined with an avoidance of self-seeking be more strikingly enforced?

IV.

Various objections may be urged to this conception of Jesus as a preacher of social equality.

1. It may be said that he discriminated against Samaritans and gentiles, holding both himself and his disciples straitly to a mission to "the lost sheep of the house of Israel."⁵ Yet even assuming (which is quite absurd) that such a distinction is a distinction between social classes, it would be enough to reply

¹ Luke 7:36 *sq.*

³ Matt. 11:5; Luke 7, 22.

⁵ Matt. 10:6; 15:24.

² John 7:49; Matt. 11:28.

⁴ Luke 14:13 *sq.*

that such a limitation was but a concentration. As the results showed, it was eminent sagacity that forbade the dissipation of energy and the extension of preaching by men not yet thoroughly imbued with his own spirit. In the plans of Jesus the evangelization of Jerusalem was to lead to that of Judea and Samaria and ultimately of the uttermost parts of the earth.¹ But as a more immediate reply it would be sufficient to match the story of Zacchaeus² with that of the Syro-Phœnician woman; and the words to the Twelve as they went out to a final conquest of the world with the advice given to them as they made their first experiment at heralding a disappointing Jewish Messiah.

2. It may be also urged that Jesus attacked the rich and educated classes and championed the poor. But such attacks and championings are rather proofs of his equalizing purpose. Princes were to be put down from their thrones and those of low degree were to be exalted,³ not that in their new conditions they might perpetuate old distinctions, but that it might be made evident that personality and not position or wealth is supreme. Equality with Jesus was not to be attained by equalizing wealth or honor, but by the possession of a common divine life, the enjoyment of equal privileges, and the performance of equal duties. It is moral not material.

It is true that Jesus attacked bitterly the upper classes, and at times seemed unduly to praise the poor and needy, but it is a superficial study that does not discover that these attacks spring from his perception of the evident anti-fraternal, selfish, contemptuous spirit of the Pharisees. In none of his words is there a touch of demagogism. A man was no more worse because he was rich than he was holier because he was miserable. Indeed, if there is anything that projects above the other teachings of Jesus it is the duty of every member of the kingdom of God to treat every man as his equal. This was to be not a mere social fiction but a test of devotion and character. "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples if ye love one another."⁴ To be a neighbor to a man is not to belong to the

¹ Acts 1:8.

² Luke 19:2 *sq.*

³ Luke 1:52, 53.

⁴ John 13:35.

same community, or set, or nation. It is to disregard all such artificial distinctions and to give him such help as he may need.¹ He who has such a spirit will ever be the Good Samaritan and to him every sufferer will be the man fallen among robbers.

3. Yet probably the strongest objection in the way of an actual recognition of this ideal of Jesus in actual life is the ineradicable conviction that social equality is impracticable. Men have dreamed of it and have died, leaving their dreams to the laughter of their times and the libraries of their descendants. These words of Jesus are beautiful but so are those of More and Rousseau—and no less visionary. Men are not equal and fraternity is a word for oratory and French public buildings.

So men say, or think if they keep silent.

As to practicability of these and other teachings of Jesus there will be something to say in a later paper. The reply to this objection to be made here is this: Jesus does not claim that men in the world today are physiologically equal. There are the lame and halt. Nor are they mentally on an equality. There are men to whom one talent was given, and those to whom five and ten.² Nor does Jesus so far fall into the class of nature-philosophers as to teach that because men are to be brothers they are therefore to be twins. The equality of fraternity does not consist in duplication of powers, but in the enjoyment of love.

According to the new social standard of Jesus two men are equal not because they have equal claims upon each other but because they owe equal duties to each other. The gospel is not a new Declaration of Rights, but a Declaration of Duties.³ As to what equality shall consist in when the perfect social order is attained Jesus gives us no clear teaching. But one can hardly doubt it would be little different. Men would then be brothers and society an all-embracing family, but individuality is not to be lost. And individuality is synonymous with personal inequalities.

¹ Luke 10. 25-37.

² Matt. 25:14-30; Luke 19:12-27.

³ The constitutional history of the French Revolution is a commentary upon this position of Jesus. It was a new age that replaced the *Declaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen* of the constitution of 1791, with the *Declaration des Droits et des Devoirs de l'Homme et du Citoyen* of the constitution of Fructidor, 1795.

V.

But this is a speculation into which Jesus did not enter. He is especially concerned with the evolving kingdom, and here his words are explicit. Social and economic distinctions are artificial and temporary. Differences in wealth and employment are to be no hindrance to fraternity. To use the noble words of Paul, who here again seems more than all men of the first century to have reached the heart of Jesus, in the new social order "there can be neither Jew nor Greek, there can be neither bond nor free."¹

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¹Gal. 3:28.

REVIEWS.

The Growth of British Policy, an Historical Essay. By J. R. SEELEY. 2 vols. Cambridge University Press.

AS THE title modestly indicates, *The Growth of British Policy*, does not pretend to be a history but an essay. The author has simply pondered deeply commonly accepted facts connected with a certain period of European history, and has attempted to show the relation of these facts to the contemporary development of England. He deals "not in narrative but in discussion." He presents "a book of large surveys and distant prospects"—a sort of round-arm sketch, the details of which are left for others to work out.

The period treated is, roughly, that included between the accession of Elizabeth and the death of William III., when "the three kingdoms were drawing together and acquiring stable mutual relations, while the complex whole was taking up a secure position with respect to continental powers."

Here we have the only hint which the author thinks worth while to give the reader as to what he means by British policy. It is British policy, in distinction from a merely English policy on the one hand; and on the other national, that is, a policy which takes in the interests of the people, in distinction from a policy which is merely dynastic, which has for its object simply the advancement of the interests of the royal family.

At the beginning of the modern period, the international policy of Europe was dominated entirely by the dynastic interests of the great rival Houses of Hapsburg and Valois. The part of England in the struggle, though not unimportant, was subordinate and secondary. The traditional alliance of England with Burgundy, renewed by the more recent Hapsburg marriage of Henry VIII, the traditional hostility of England to France had seemed to point out England as the natural ally of Spain. But the wanton insult which Henry had given his ally in the divorce of Catharine, his subsequent attitude to the papal supremacy and the consequent acces-

sion of England to the ranks of the Reformation, had practically thrown England into the balance with France against Spain. The accession of Catharine's daughter, however, her marriage with the heir to the Spanish possessions, and the return of England to the Catholic fold, once more caused a shifting of the balance, and now threatened to undo all that had been accomplished under Henry and Edward. England apparently was at last caught in the toils of the Hapsburg net. Should an heir be born to Philip and Mary, or failing that, should a third Hapsburg marriage be brought about with the House of Tudor through the princess Elizabeth, that which had so frequently happened before, might now happen again, and another people and another kingdom be merged in the huge Hapsburg agglomeration. France could not be oblivious to the results portended by this alliance, and hence the marriage of the Dauphin Francis in the winter of 1557-8 with a second Mary, with the secret proviso that the bride was to confer with her hand the Scottish throne, cannot be looked upon as other than a counter move of the House of Valois to the successful alliance made by its old rival. If England was once more moving in the current of her ancient traditions and prejudices, not less also was Scotland. If England now promised at no distant day to complete the girdle of Hapsburg domains which Hapsburg princes had been so patiently weaving about France, Scotland, as a Valois possession, always traditionally and bitterly hostile to England, threatened a no less serious counter diversion when the day should come for universal war. But this French-Scotch marriage promised even more. Mary of Scots was the granddaughter of Margaret Tudor. After Mary and Elizabeth she was the next heir to the English throne. But both Mary and Elizabeth had been declared illegitimate, and Mary of Scotland and her friends affected to regard them as such even now. Here was the basis of a claim to the English throne as well. Who could tell what change in the tide of fortune might some day enable the young Francis, or his heir, to make this claim good, when a prince of the House of Valois would reign not only over France and Scotland but over England as well.

It is not necessary to follow the history of these luckless alliances further. It is enough to show the kind of policy that dominated in the respective courts at Madrid and Paris, and the position of England relative to the two rivals. It has little dignity, little that Englishmen are proud of today.

One hundred and fifty years pass away, and all this is changed. Spain is no longer the great threatening European power. She is still blindly, intolerantly Catholic. But her blindness and intolerance now affect no one but herself. Her naval supremacy has been forever shattered. On all sides France has broken through the Hapsburg girdle. Stranger still, as a result of one of those very marriage alliances which Hapsburg knew so well how to manage to her own aggrandizement, a prince of the House of Bourbon, the modern representative of Valois, has been placed upon the throne of Charles and Philip. The Hapsburg name no longer disturbs the dreams of the court by the Seine. The once vast circle of its influence has been constantly narrowed, until Germany remains almost the sole field for the exercise of its ambitious projects. Direct Valois too has passed away, but a new Valois has risen greater and more powerful than ever in the modern Bourbon—the heir to the throne and the traditions of old Valois. England too has passed away as a distinct power, but only to be merged in the greater England—the modern great power which we know as the United Kingdoms. This new England of the eighteenth century has a policy of its own, very different from the petty dynastic policy of the sixteenth century, that “began with a lass and ended with a lass.”

The new policy was distinctively a British policy. It was founded upon trade and commercial interests common to the three kingdoms. It found its great rival in France. Side by side with the expansion of British power and the development of British wealth by colonization and trade, it held as a grim necessity the equal duty of crippling its mighty adversary across the channel and preventing the expansion of the power of Bourbon. In its wake it brought along also the navy and the standing army, the bank and the national debt.

This new policy was fully inaugurated in the revolution which placed William and Mary on the throne, and made England the center, and her king, the head of the coalition against the overweening ambition of Bourbon. This new and modern policy, distinctively British and national, that for two hundred years has been carried forward so ably, so mightily and with such overwhelming success, began with the eighteenth century. But beyond this point there was a slow period of growth when this British policy was in the making. The slow and tortuous unwinding, the successive stages of action and reaction, to the final unfolding in the reigns of William and Mary, and Anne, is the theme of Mr. Seeley's book.

In this progress Mr. Seeley finds three distinct periods of advance, interspaced by two periods of reaction, in each of which English policy drifts back again, and becomes once more entangled in the dynastic nets. The reign of Elizabeth includes the first period of advance. Elizabeth stood among the European sovereigns of her day, unique in this that she was connected with no foreign dynasty who could claim her support; while the stern circumstances in which her life had been cast forbade the making of a new alliance. Her nearest kin was the be-Frenched Scotch woman, the bitter rival of Elizabeth; both by creed, and by the traditions of her house the enemy of England, and whose every interest demanded the subversion and overthrow of the power of the Protestant queen. Plainly there could be no safe or substantial alliance here. The only other possible alliance that could strengthen and secure Elizabeth against her French-Scotch rival was one with the Spanish Hapsburg. On the part of the Spanish court there could be no real difficulty here, for England was still as fair a prize as ever, and the revolt of the Netherlands made such an alliance not only desirable but almost imperative, if the integrity of the Spanish empire was to be preserved. But two insuperable obstacles arose nearer home. The one was the inclination of Elizabeth herself, who was too much of a Tudor to put herself voluntarily into Spanish leading strings; The other was the temper of her people, who were in no mood to see the Inquisition introduced upon English soil, or the fires of Smithfield rekindled.

Elizabeth was too shrewd to break with either party. What her people needed most was peace; what she needed most was time to consolidate her strength. As long as either party retained a hope of a final marriage alliance, there could be no war. And so she addressed her woman's wit to playing the coquet; but never did coquet keep her suitors dangling to better purpose. For twenty-six years she managed to tread the narrow path—a "haggling, peddling policy," if you will, disgusting and offending even her own tried counselors, whose statecraft was not, after all, as unerring as the woman's instinct—but holding all at arm's length, committing herself to none, and having her own way at last, dying as she had lived, the bride of her people.

Here, then, we have the beginning, a hint, at least, of what may be called the British policy. It is not necessary to suppose that there was any conscious purpose on the part of England, or even of Elizabeth, of cutting loose from the old dynastic policy that had heretofore

shaped the international relations of the great states of Europe. The isolation into which stern circumstances had forced England, was regarded at the time as a position of extreme weakness internationally, and caused the gravest apprehension on the part of English statesmen. Elizabeth herself, certainly neither planned, nor desired such a result. She simply waited, and refused to act, because she knew not what to do. And, as often happens at such crises, inaction was the supremest wisdom.

A second stage in the development of British policy Mr. Seeley finds in the administration of the Protector. Cromwell, like Elizabeth, had no foreign family interests to further. He could not hope to make the succession of his son more secure by a brilliant foreign alliance. But, unlike Elizabeth, he saw himself at the head of the greatest military state of Europe. He was incapable of forming and carrying out any vast and consistent plan of international combination, such as that of William of Orange, but he had a firm grasp upon the fundamental principles upon which the Protestant states of Europe rested. Hence, when he found himself at last in a position to affect the international relations of Europe, he at once put an end to the fratricidal Dutch war on the one hand, and, on the other, sought to combine in a league against Spain, the Protestant states with France, who then, strange as it may seem to us today, stood for the principle of toleration and equal Protestant rights. It is admitted that this scheme of Cromwell's was shortsighted. From the point of view of the modern statesman, it was a stupendous blunder. It so crippled Spain, that it left France without the wholesome check of her old rival, and laid the foundation of the future power of Louis XIV. What Cromwell would have done after the success of his great league against Spain had been assured, we do not know. He died soon after the first stage had been reached. Dunkirk passed into the hands of the French. The advantages to England were allowed to slip from the witless hands of the restored Stuarts. But looking out upon the field of European politics when the name of Gustavus Adolphus was still green, and the ink was scarcely dry upon the treaties of Osnabrück and Münster, when the services of Henry IV and of Richelieu in the interests of toleration were still fresh in the mind of Europe, such a league, in such company and under such a leadership, was altogether natural. It stands out, moreover, in such noble contrast with the contemptible policy followed by the two Stuarts who preceded Cromwell, or the two Stuarts

who followed Cromwell, that we do not wonder that Mr. Seeley regards it as a sort of oasis in the midst of a wilderness of littleness and meanness—the connecting link between the policy of Elizabeth and the policy of William of Orange.

With the accession of William and Mary England is redeemed from the humiliation to which the later Stuarts had brought her, as a result of their alliance with Louis XIV. England now is drawn into the vast scheme of William for checking the aggressions of France. Instead of remaining a shameless stipendiary of the French crown she becomes henceforth a dangerous rival of the House of Bourbon, and the center of the Protestant powers of Europe. It is upon the spoil of her great foe, that England now proceeds to build up that vast world power—the British empire.

That the book is well done, or is well worth a careful reading, goes without the saying. It is Mr. Seeley's last work. It will not be ranked as his greatest work, but it represents the cream of many years of careful reading and careful thinking. From the beginning the author is handicapped by his plan. Even his brilliant style and well-known power of generalization fail to impart dignity to that which has no dignity, or unity to that which has no unity,—the foreign relations of England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The author, however, has bravely undertaken his task with his eyes open. In the introduction he calls attention to the fact, that in the field which he has chosen he is almost a pioneer. The great historians who have treated of this period, have dealt mostly with internal or domestic history. Their eyes have been directed ever upon the splendid struggle of Parliament, as representing the spirit of a great people, nobly and bravely working out the problem of self-government. This is in marked contrast with the method of the historians of Germany or France, who have given little attention comparatively to mere internal constitutional development, and have treated mostly of the history of their respective governments in their relations to other states. This is, however, a result neither of neglect, nor of oversight. The internal history of most of the continental states for this period is petty and uninteresting, because these states were so absorbed in the greater game, that internally they present little to attract either the student or the reader. For the same reason the foreign history of England for the greater part of this period is entirely secondary to her constitutional progress. The men who were really making Eng-

lish history were so completely absorbed in their own domestic affairs that they had little, or no thought to give to the nations across the Channel.

Thus a history of the foreign relations of England during the Stuart period must necessarily be a history of Europe, rather than a history of England, and the chief task of the author is to explain why England does not cut more of a figure in the seventeenth century, when her rôle is so important in the eighteenth.

In the main, Mr. Seeley's view of men and things does not depart much from the accepted view. Elizabeth suffers nothing at his hands. Poor old James I is as priggish and ridiculous as ever. Charles I appears stripped of the martyr's crown and suffering the penalty of his own folly. Cromwell is a hero, right in his instincts, true to the great principle which he represents, but, unfortunately, does not live long enough after he has once entered upon the larger arena of international politics, to cause England to be felt, as he and she deserve. Charles II if not the best, is the brightest of his house. In him Mr. Seeley finds a possible Machiavelli, a shrewd and farsighted politician, and unscrupulous in dealing with friend or foe. His love of ease and lack of nerve alone prevent him from becoming a really great prince. Mr. Seeley's view of James II is at least worthy of further examination. The cause of his fall was not so much his infatuation with the Pope, as his infatuation with Louis XIV and the House of Bourbon, of which he through his mother was a member. The fall of James was the final breakdown of the dynastic policy. It was the repudiation on the part of the English people, not so much of the Papacy and the Catholic church, as of the dynastic policy in general and of the French alliance of the Stuarts in particular. Here, as in other parts of the book, the author lays himself open to the remark, that in centering his attention upon the dynastic and foreign relations of England, he has, perhaps not intentionally, allowed the great religious struggle which penetrated all phases of national and international life during this period, not only to drop into the background, but at times almost to be lost sight of altogether. If he has not written the history of the period of the Reformation, with the Reformation left out, he has at least thrust the Reformation into a subordinate place, and exalted to the first place what ought to be treated only as a subordinate part.

It may seem ungracious to call attention to that feature of Mr. Seeley's style, which in earlier works has been so often criticised—

his fondness for repetition. With Mr. Seeley recapitulation becomes a vice. This is a real blemish in an author otherwise almost faultless. The reader never has to question a sentence twice to catch the author's thought. Unlike Freeman, he deals in no recondite allusions, so annoying and baffling to the really conscientious reader. Seeley rather goes to the other extreme and never takes the reader's knowledge for granted. And here, perhaps, is the explanation of his apparent fondness for repetition. Mr. Seeley was first and last a teacher. He wrote as he lectured—with the student ever before him. But what adds strength and completeness to a lecture, may become tedious even to wearisomeness in an essay or a book. It may be said, however, in defense of the oft occurring repetition, that Mr. Seeley never returns to a thought, once expressed by him, that he does not by a word, the new turn of a phrase, or a differently-constructed sentence, present his first thought in some new light, or add to what has already been said. His method is somewhat like that of a man who addresses himself to the opening of a door. He does not make one clean job of it at the first trial, but opens his door only a little way; yet with each successive trial, he throws the door open a trifle wider, and at last after a progress of such openings and shuttings, he leaves it opened wide to its utmost limit.

BENJAMIN S. TERRY.

Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Correction,
1895. Boston: GEO. H. ELLIS.

THIS volume illustrates the contemporary tendency to specialization, while the conference itself is one of the chief agencies for counteracting the dispersive and centrifugal movements of specialization.

The address of Mr. R. T. Paine, as president, gives a survey of the related fields of charitable endeavor, and the spiritual inspirations of social effort for the unfortunate. Rev. T. T. Munger's sermon leads into the religious sanctuary. Mr. F. H. Wines discusses State Boards of Charities. The National Conference is in reality a meeting of state boards and invited friends. Their function is to investigate the facts of dependence and crime and give counsel to authorities and associations. They are not to interfere with liberty but are able to prevent abuses in public and private charity. What Mr. Wines says of the relation of the state to voluntary charities is timely and wise. "What the state does is best done when done by the state's own agents and

appointees. Private institutions have no right to organize and go into business on the assumption that the state will support them, either by subsidies or by contracts, which are indirect subsidies." In Illinois subsidies are unconstitutional, but the law is evaded by a scheme of "contracts." "The effect of mixing the two methods is unfortunate in many ways: by the needless multiplication of institutions and the enlarged expenditure which it entails, by the conflict of authority to which it so often leads, by the lack of adequate and suitable supervision in so many instances, and by the inducements thus held out to fraud in the reception and retention of persons as objects of charitable care who have no valid claim to such care, and who are frequently injured rather than benefited by it." This is a matter of supreme concern in all states where the mixed system has crept in. Those who are connected with contract charities have most powerful personal inducement to oppose measures looking to the emancipation of the state from such influence. Twenty-three years' work for a state board gives authority to this paper.

Mr. Clarence Snyder makes a strong plea for giving power of control as well as of supervision to state boards, and appeals to Wisconsin experience. In the discussion which followed great diversity of opinion was, as usual, disclosed.

The papers read by university and college teachers are given a distinct place. The veteran reformer, Mr. Sanborn, has recently made merry with them in the *Charities Review*, chiefly for their nomenclature. Professor Brewer said to the practical people who compose the conference: "You can help us now more than we can help you; but the day is coming when it will be the other way,—when charitable and reformatory institutions will look to the universities for instruction in the laws and principles which govern their work, as confidently as the engineer, the mechanic, and the agriculturist do now." He makes a good point in showing what science has done for charity in the field of sanitation and the mastery of laws of heredity.

Professor Giddings offers a scientific classification of social members which is very suggestive, and his statement of the evolution of grades in ability is clear and strong. He does not, however, seem to state clearly the distinctive marks of the "defective" class.

Papers of great value on the insane, feeble-minded, neglected children, on immigration, nursing, medical charity, tramps, and soldier pensions are included in this volume. The Directory of State Insti-

tutions in the United States is very full, but not quite complete. The volume is simply indispensable to students of charity, and general students of sociology will find abundant materials for consideration in the discussions, since laws and principles of common life are illustrated from cases more closely studied than would be possible under normal conditions.

C. R. HENDERSON.

Essays in Taxation. By EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN. Macmillan & Co., New York and London, 1895. 434 pp., 8vo. \$3.

UNDER the designation of "Essays in Taxation" Professor Seligman has made a useful survey of that portion of the product of the taxing power, as applied directly, to which he assigns the name "taxes," leaving to the one side fees, and introducing special assessments only for the purpose of showing that—call them what we will, special assessments or betterment tax—they are not taxes. After a brief historical essay on the development of taxation he discusses the general property tax, the single tax, the inheritance tax and taxation of corporations, introducing incidentally to these subjects double taxation by the same and by competing authorities. He then classifies public revenues, reviews recent reforms in taxation, and closes with a critical estimate of the recent literature of the subject.

The writer is not as strong in history as in analysis and criticism, and in his opening chapter has failed to recognize the part played by purveyance in the evolution of taxation, consequently the order of growth given on pages 6 and 7 is not historical. The terminology at times is not clear; as on page 10, where the writer says that indirect taxes were introduced into England in the seventeenth century. On page 19 it appears that it was the excise which was introduced in the seventeenth century, and which seems to be used as an equivalent for indirect taxes. On page 40 we are told that there "is no evidence to prove that trading capital proper was ever taxed" at Rome, while on the following page we read that trading capital was taxed for the first time by Vespasian. It is with difficulty that we discover that the two remarks are intended to apply to different periods. On page 42 we read that "in England the feudal payments (*scutages*, *carucages* and *tallages*) became land taxes, just as the Saxon *ship geld* and *danegeld* were land taxes." The three feudal taxes mentioned were, in their origin, land taxes, and never went through a process of becoming such.

The discussion of the general property tax is admirable. The whole trend of the book is toward "faculty" as the basis of taxation. The general property tax was wholly condemned, because product has today superseded property as an index of faculty. Henry George's single tax theory is condemned for not going far enough. "Not the labor theory but the social utility theory is the real defense of private property," but if we accept the single-taxers' premises we are driven by logic from their camp into that of the socialists. The various arguments for the inheritance tax—the extension-of-escheat theory, the diffusion-of-wealth theory, the cost-of-service and price-of-privilege theories—are all presented only to be condemned, and finally the tax is justified upon the basis of relation to faculty.

The most valuable contribution of the book to the theory of taxation is the portion concerning corporations, covering nearly one-third of its pages. In briefest summary the conclusions reached are as follows: Corporations should be taxed separately and differently from individuals; locally only on real estate; for state purposes on earnings or on capital and loans. As to the latter, residence of share or bondholder should be immaterial; there should be no distinctions between foreign and domestic corporations. Property beyond the state should be exempt; capital stock and property both should not be taxed; where either of these is taxed the shareholder should be exempt, and so too the bondholder when loans are taxed. An additional tax should be levied on corporations which have through natural, legal or economic forces become monopolistic enterprises.

Those who have had experience not only in paying but in spreading special assessments will not fully agree with Professor Seligman, either in his classification or his commendation of this product of the taxing power. Special assessments are denied the quality of taxes because their product is measurable, because they are an equivalent for value received rather than proportional to faculty, and because they are not regularly recurrent. But these distinctions become somewhat indistinct as one examines the contrasts. It is notorious that the measurability of such assessments is largely theoretic and hypothetical and that the value received by the general public cannot any more be set off clearly from that of the persons assessed than can the so-called indirect benefits from the direct. The distinction as to recurrence is largely formal; substitute larger periods for years and it substantially disappears. Again, within the range of abutting owners the assess-

ment is according to faculty, and so in each widening circle of diminishing benefits. Professor Seligman cites the decisions of the federal courts in support of his contention; but in his discussion of "the police versus the taxing power" he condemns their decisions as contradictory and confusing. But passing from the name to the substance, one needs not to look to the corrupt management of our great cities to see much that is evil in the essence of the special assessment system. Even in our small municipalities where politics and boodles are yet unknown the system is anything but satisfactory when tested by the doctrine of equivalents, and none are less charmed with it than the municipal authorities who make use of it. There is at least an open question whether a system of local areas of general taxation would not work more equitably, such as is the basis of the rate for sewers in English towns. Taxation according to faculty for such improvements as special assessments cover in America might well tend to a diffusion of benefit according to faculty.

Exception has been taken to some of the minor details of this volume, but in its emphasis of the trend—historical, scientific and experimental—toward the incidence of taxation upon faculty, it has done good service for the student of finance. JOHN J. HALSEY.

Studies in Economics. By WILLIAM SMART. Macmillan & Co. 1895. Pages 322. Price, \$2.75.

DR. SMART is an economist—and a disciple of the Austrian school—who has also been an employer of labor. It is interesting to find a writer with such intellectual and business antecedents presenting groups of studies in Wages, in Currency, and in Consumption from a standpoint that is distinctly that of sociology. Of the ten essays contained in the book, the title of the last but one—"The Socializing of Consumption"—gives the keynote to the whole series, whilst the closing thought of the last essay—"Industry in the Social Organism" thus reproduces it:

"No considerations of the sacredness of private property or freedom of bequest should be allowed to obscure the fact that the birthright of every human soul in a civilized country is an education, a training, and finally, an occupation, that will make it possible for him to realize himself in what we know to be the only true life—the life of thought."

Utility rather than value is emphasized as "the last word in Polit-

ical Economy," and so, "the constant striving of economic progress is towards taking commodities out of the category of values, and making them pure utilities like the rain and the sunshine." This, the true goal, is obscured by "the necessity of measuring the results of economic action." The reasonableness of distribution of income according to product is maintained, only to be followed by a presentation of the difficulties of an attempt at payment by results.

In the discussion of the "standard of comfort" it is well maintained that there is a cost which determines value. "Cost gives its value to goods because it first gets this value from other goods and can continue getting it. It is quite true that here cost of production determines value. But it is not all or every cost. It is the cost that is itself first determined by its product . . . it is the Donegal peasant claiming a certain minimum wage in lacemaking because she was directly producing the equivalent of that wage in other circumstances." But the wage earned cannot, by mere insistence, extort a higher wage. For cost is not what the worker consumes but what he produces. Just on this account "the standard of comfort is a sure and certain thing which the worker is right to hold to, and that with all his might, because it is his own." Furthermore, it is shown that any trade union restriction of product is economically prejudicial to the laborers, and can be defended only occasionally on the ground of "the good life," which does not live by bread alone.

The writer's experience as a manufacturer gives force to his essay on "the sliding scale." His summing up is, that this system has the sanction of making wages follow price; that it merely formulates what is already done, and gains by peace what otherwise is decided by war; that antagonists in other respects declare that it can and does work; that the experimental period is past. The essay on "woman's wages" disposes of the so-called explanations for lower rate in supply and demand, auxiliary wage, and lower standard of comfort, as based upon the misconception that wants regulate wages. It finds the true explanations in the smaller efficiency of woman's labor, and the "cheap goods" quality of her product, giving rise to a customary wage on the level of bare subsistence, and it points for remedy partly to combination—but that only along with men—and partly to economic enlightenment. Under the title of "a mere commodity" bimetalism by international agreement is shown to be the rational solution of the money problem. Again and again the thought in this essay is most striking. It is a misfor-

tune, it is said, that the two money metals are commodity "universally necessary in every day-industry," yet "nothing could well be more inadequate than to dismiss this singular tool of exchange as a mere commodity or a mere metal." "This metal is not desired to use as we use other metals; the spending of money is not the consumption of it, but merely the transfer of its possession." "It might even be disputed if it expresses the essential idea of payment at all, seeing that it is a thing none of us would or could use for our living, but is simply a third body interposed for the time in place of other bodies." The conclusion of the essay entitled "Must Prices Fall?" is that while it is a necessity of our present monetary system that prices fall, it is not a necessary consequence of improvements in manufacturing processes or methods.

Professor Smart has given much food for thought in these modestly entitled "studies," and has done something toward the good work that is now going bravely on — of redeeming the so-called "dismal science" by socializing it.

JOHN J. HALSEY.

Les Sciences Sociales en Allemagne: Les Méthodes Actuelles. By C. BOUGLÉ. Paris: Alcan, 1896. Pp. 172. 50 cents.

IN this little volume M. Bouglé has succeeded in giving a very satisfactory discussion of the tendencies to be observed in recent German studies of sociology. He gives us an essay each on Lazarus and Folk-Psychology; on Simmel and the Science of Morals; on Wagner and Political Economy; and on von Ihering and the Philosophy of Law. With clear sight he goes to the heart of the work of each of these writers, giving first an analysis of its theory and then a critical discussion of its methodological standpoint.

An introductory essay discusses the four types of social science which the author thinks he can detect in Germany during this century: the speculative, the historical, the naturalistic and the psychological. The authors mentioned above all represent the last-mentioned type of work, though in varying ways. Ten pages are devoted to a brief but very interesting attempt to connect the development of these types of study, on the one hand, with foreign intellectual influences; on the other, with social conditions in Germany itself.

The conclusion undertakes a comparison of German with French sociologists on the following lines: First, the relation of sociology and psychology; second, the relation of sociology and the concrete

social sciences; lastly, the relation of theoretical to practical problems. The French authors considered are Lebon, Tarde, Durkheim, Bernés, and Lacombe.

M. Bouglé attempts to balance peacefully between all these different methods, but the position he occupies is probably more noticeable for its eclectic harmony in presentation than it would be for efficiency in practice.

A. F. BENTLEY.

Heredity and Christian Problems. By AMORLY H. BRADFORD.
New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895. Pp. xii + 281.

THE course of thought traverses biological teaching in respect to heredity and environment, in five chapters; and then doctrinal and practical problems of religion in the remaining part of the discussion. Of the first part Professor H. H. Donaldson writes: "The author has, in my opinion, chosen good guides and used them wisely, giving a very just balance to opposing views." A general statement of points on which biologists are agreed is made and the controversy between Weismann and his critics is presented.

This leads to a discussion of the psychological and metaphysical doctrines of the will, in which the claim of determinism to be a finality is disputed. Of course this controversy is not likely to be settled at once.

Practical applications of the biological doctrines are made in respect to the home. Assuming that his readers accept the Christian sense of duty, he lays upon the conscience the obligation of caution and self-control in respect to unfit marriages, and the perpetuation of a stock in which disease and weakness are inherent. Education must recognize heredity and environment. "I emphasize the fact that each child is at first a combination of streams of tendency from past generations, with a mysterious element of personality developing in course of time, to which appeal can be made."

The religious life must deal with pauperism and crime. The suggestions made here are sensible and just, though not new nor exhaustive. Their merit lies in showing just where the blind impulses generated by religious fervor come in contact with physical and economic forces, and the direction benevolence must take if it become beneficence. The author deals with the idea that character makes conditions by showing that the regeneration of character is itself effected by shifting the envi-

ronment and the heredity. Certainly the change of comparisons and of ideas is part of the improvement of environment, but it is not all. When large families are compelled by economic conditions and by defective police measures to herd in one-room dwellings, illegitimate births, prostitution and drunkenness are matters of course, even if there were a mission hall in every flat. This volume will help to hold the balance between the extreme notions which are simply fragments of one truth.

The author seeks to show to those who underestimate the social energy of religion and the power of individual choice that the "social mind" or "consciousness of kind" is emptied of its choicest contents when the divine element is denied and freedom of will is questioned. On the other hand he urges those who depend entirely on temperances pledges and individual acceptance of religious beliefs to revise their notions of the significance of heredity and environment. Thomas Chalmers, early in the century, sought to bring economists and theologians to exchange ideas, so that both might be more amply equipped for social service. Dr. Bradford now asks biologists and religious reformers and evangelists to enrich each other by spiritual commerce.

The book will not be acceptable to those who think of the divine life as nothing or unknowable; and it will give as great offense to those whose religious beliefs have petrified in verbal formulas. But it will prove helpful and inspiring to that large class of persons who are free to take and use all forces that make for human welfare, and also wish to be freed from traditional misconceptions which have become entangled with the essentials of the higher life. C. R. HENDERSON.

Moral Evolution. By GEORGE HARRIS, Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1896. Pp. 446.

IT is not easy, after Aristotle, to add a new principle to ethical discussion, but it is always in order to translate the ancient oracles into current phrase and interpret them in relation to contemporary problems. The preface makes this claim: "The distinctiveness of the book, if it has any, is the recovery of self from the mistaken neglect into which it has fallen at the hands of many philosophers, to its proper value." The evolutionary conception of history is made the

basis of study, and, against Mr. Huxley, is applied to morality. Against Mr. Benjamin Kidd it is argued that morality belongs to a rational order of evolution.

Altruism is not the whole of morality, and yet its omission would be irrational as well as immoral. The institutions of society have value merely as means to ethical ends, the well-being of persons. Well-being includes as inseparable components, happiness and virtue. "The ideal of the good has two elements, one of which is primary, the other secondary. The primary element may be best characterized, although with more or less vagueness, as worth; the secondary element, also with some vagueness, as happiness." Neither element can be more exactly weighed or measured than the other.

Professor Harris deals with these ethical conceptions as developed in the growth of the race, and now given in consciousness. Evolution and morality have a common element, an ideal progressively realized. That which has been produced in fact must have been the final cause of the process. With the metaphysical and theological discussions we do not deal here. They reflect the tendency to regard the Divine Being as ethical, as a moral Father, rather than as an arbitrary Sovereign.

The brief excursions into economics are rather suggestive of present social tendencies than exhaustive of discussion. The statement (p. 332) that productive industry is divisive and not socializing needs qualification. The conflict of wage-earners with employers, and the division of tasks and competition between workmen or merchants is only one aspect of the relation. The sentence on page 176 will appear painfully inadequate to many students of the labor question: "The serious economic problem is the restriction of production rather than the restriction of population." This will not satisfy the Malthusians who regard the moral restriction of population as one of the conditions of progress. It will not satisfy that large class of observers who believe that while a million men lack the necessities and comforts of life and are willing to work for them it is not "over-production" but imperfect adjustment which is the "serious economic problem." The relative values of material goods and institutions as compared with ideals and morals is well stated (p. 339).

A student of sociology must derive advantage from such a work, chiefly in the formulation and criticism of the ends of action. On the other hand, ethical discussion should gain in distinctness and comprehensiveness by a careful use of the more accurate and complete analyses

made by sociologists. A paragraph from Chalmers expresses the difference between ethics and social science: "It is not by the mere categories of ethical science that such a question [of labor and its combinations] ought to be determined. Such a law as would suit the republic of Plato, or some similar Utopia, might be the whole fruit of one's studious excogitations at home. But it is only by a survey abroad, and over the domain of business and familiar life, that he learns to modify, when needful, the generalizations of abstract thought, by the demands of a felt and urgent expediency." (Works of T. Chalmers, Vol. XV., p. 349.)

C. R. HENDERSON.

Labor in its Relations to Law. By F. J. STIMSON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895. Pp. 145.

THIS little book presents four lectures delivered at the Plymouth School of Ethics, July 1895. The author has in press a *Hand-book to the Labor Law of the United States* which will give a fuller treatment of the same subjects. One lecture is devoted to the "History of the Law of Labor," a second to the "Employment Contract," a third to "Strikes and Boycotts," and the fourth to a "Forecast of the Future."

The "true path of progress," the author believes, lies in the direction of association and collective bargaining.

The author's conclusion in respect to "government by injunction" is of special interest. "We all want order maintained throughout the country; and most of us, doubtless, commended Mr. Cleveland for his prompt and forcible action in the Chicago strike; but if such action had been expressly based upon the ground that the transportation of the mails was being interfered with, that riots and crimes were being committed which made, practically, a state of insurrection, so that the republican form of government in certain localities was being threatened, rather than upon the ground so much less impressive to the public mind that certain equity processes of Federal courts were not being executed; and then if all the offenders, whether arrested by troops or by deputy-marshals, had been brought before the Federal grand jury, indicted and tried by a jury in the ordinary way, I cannot but think that the lesson to the people would have been better given, and certain great dangers in the future avoided; for the government, and especially the judicial branch of the government, must not ever appear to take sides in this labor question."

The author does not hope very much from coöperation nor from profit-sharing. "What the laborer really wants is not profits as a capitalist, but a greater share of the profits of industry as part of his own wages." The income on capital as such is at too low a rate to excite hope. The main reliance is upon increase of wages, and to secure this the best method is some form of collective bargaining, regulated but not repressed by law.

C. R. HENDERSON.

The Poor in Great Cities. By ROBERT A. WOODS, JACOB A. RIIS and others. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895. Pp. 400.

THE note of this work is struck in the Introduction. "Awakening is not needed. Every thinking man has thoughts upon this matter. And along with this realization has come practical experiment, in many places and on an immense scale, toward a solution." The chapters have been written by people who shared in these experiments and who wrote as direct observers and eyewitnesses. There is no second-hand description here, and yet the facts presented are connected by a philosophy of life. There is no attempt at producing a momentary sensation.

Mr. Robert A. Woods writes upon the "Social Awakening in London," which he has so carefully studied. Rev. William T. Elsing describes the tenement-house life of New York with the fidelity of one who, as a city missionary, has made himself a part of the life. Mr. Jacob A. Riis tells of the "Children of the Poor." Mr. Willard Parsons, manager of enterprises of the fresh-air fund, gives a history of this form of beneficence and explains methods and results. Boys' clubs in New York are carefully treated by Mr. E. J. Wendell. President Tucker opens the principles of the social settlement in a philosophic treatment of the Andover House in Boston. Mr. Joseph Kirkland has a brief sketch of some phases of charity work in Chicago. Conditions of the poor in London, Paris, Naples and New York are discussed by Mr. Spearman, Mr. Mario, Mr. Oscar Craig, and Mr. Ernest Flag.

There is not much statistical treatment. The articles were prepared for a popular audience and originally contributed to *Scribner's Magazine*. But the scientific spirit of downright thoroughness is manifest in nearly every chapter. The practical suggestions of reform are

made upon the basis of personal experience and wide acquaintance with the best literature of charity and education. The authors are too close to the sad reality to be easily optimistic; but they believe that with vigorous and timely effort, all the evil forces can be kept under control and the beneficent forces can be made dominant.

C. R. HENDERSON.

The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus. By JOHN DEWEY. Ann Arbor, 1894. Pp. 151. \$1.15.

APART from any specific ethical deductions which may be drawn from it, this book is of great interest to the student of society. "The aim is not to discover the ideal at which all conduct aims, nor the law which it should follow: the aim, once more, is not to find precepts or rules, but to analyze conduct" (p. 12). The book "undertakes a thorough psychological examination of the process of active experience, and a derivation from this analysis of the chief ethical types and crises."

Professor Dewey holds that individual psychology, and social psychology or sociology, have the same content, looked at but from different points of view. The former deals with the process, the mechanism, of spirit, and therefore turns to the individual; the latter deals with the concrete filling up of the individual minds at different times and places, and therefore must have the social standpoint.

Ethics is a systematical and critical discussion of the value of conduct. Conduct, however, cannot be studied when one considers only the aims and interest of the agent. It is just as important to take the situation into account. "While conduct proceeds from an agent, the agent himself acts with reference to the conditions as they present themselves." Conduct is on one side the organizing of the concrete powers, the impulses and habits of an individual agent; on the other, it is bringing the different elements of a complex situation to a unity of aim and interest. Conduct is therefore consciously the same thing that a biological function is unconsciously. On this basis an ethical postulate can be formulated, analogous to the scientific postulate of uniformity of nature. This postulate is that "the conduct required truly to express an agent is, at the same time, the conduct required to maintain the situation in which he is placed: while conversely, the conduct that truly meets the situation is that which furthers the agent."

Chapter iii, contains "A General Analysis of Conduct." All conduct is at first impulsive, having no end consciously in view. In the reaction of the induced experiences into the inducing impulse a psychological basis for moral conduct is found. This back reference of the experience to the impulse, is termed the mediation of the impulse, or will. Through it the impulse is on one side idealized or given value; on the other, it is controlled or directed. Around this analysis is then grouped the discussion of the categories of Satisfaction, Good and Value on the one side: and those of Duty, Law, Control, Standard, etc., on the other.

While the Syllabus is limited intentionally to psychological ethics, and brings social conditions into consideration only incidentally, the theory advanced will be found to have very direct bearings on many of the most mooted questions of sociological method. Recent discussions have been very warm, as to how far it is possible to have an objective science of society on the pattern of the natural sciences, which is not shot through at every stage with valuations of its subject-matter; as to the difference between psychology and sociology; and as to the extent to which individual states of consciousness can be used in explaining actual social transformations. The position which is taken in regard to any of these questions will depend entirely on the psychological theory of conduct which consciously or unconsciously is being used; and without agreement here, no methodological agreement can be hoped for.

It is on account of the light which Professor Dewey's theory of conduct throws upon these questions, whatever one may think of the completeness of the theory itself, that a review of his Syllabus is offered in this place.

ARTHUR F. BENTLEY.

An Ethnologist's View of History. An address before the annual meeting of the New Jersey Historical Society, at Trenton, N. J., January 28, 1896. By Dr. Daniel G. Brinton, Philadelphia, pp. 24.

Dr. Brinton has performed a valuable service in maintaining the following thesis:

"I claim, therefore, that the facts of ethnology and the study of social psychology justify me in formulating this maxim for the

guidance of the historian : *The conscious and deliberate pursuit of ideal aims is the highest causality in human history*" (p. 18).

I am glad to believe that Dr. Brinton underestimates the size of the goodly fellowship with which adherence to this claim associates him. To what extent he believes his view of history to be unique, he does not specify, but the thesis just quoted is offered as though it were in contrast with all prevalent views of history (p. 4). I recall at once, *per contra*, a paragraph of Thomas Hill Green:

"Because the essence of man's spiritual endowment is the consciousness of *having* it, the idea of his having such capabilities and of a possible better state of himself, consisting in their further realization, is a moving influence in him. *It has been the parent of the institutions and usages, of the social judgments and aspirations through which human life has been so far bettered ; through which man has so far realized his capabilities, and marked out the path that he must follow in their further realization*" (Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 189).

To be sure Professor Green was not a historian, but this thought, so nearly identical with that expressed by Dr. Brinton, is fortunately at work among the historians. Interpretations of society which do not use this clue fall today into the rank of explanations of abstracted factors of social development. They cannot pass as revealers of the distinctive element in the social progress.

ALBION W. SMALL.

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

CONDUCTED BY J. D. FORREST AND PAUL MONROE.

Universal Organic Suffrage.—Universal suffrage in principle and in its application to parliamentary government is an idea altogether modern and does not antedate the last century. It is true that the name is very ancient, but the republics of antiquity were, in reality, aristocracies. There are many critics of universal suffrage both as to its theory and its practice. These are based chiefly upon the following defects: universal suffrage, as we now have it, is not at all universal; it is not real, not conscious; it ought to be free and secret; it ought to be facilitated by being taken at the voter's residence; the soldiers and marines should not be excluded; universal suffrage is at present amorphous and inorganic. Electoral groupings should be (1) of opinions, (2) local, (3) professional: a fourth grouping, that of sex, might be useful. Universal suffrage is at present only the rule of numbers; it should also be that of measures and of social values. Universal suffrage is not to be considered a privilege, nor even a right, so-called; but a social force comparable to natural forces. It should be obligatory; and the rôle of the legislator is simply to put all social forces into action.—*Raoul de la Grasserie, in the Revue Internationale de Sociologie, for April 1896.*

Evolution of the Social Medium.—The individual's consciousness of his social environment develops along with his consciousness of self. As this notion is developed he recognizes more clearly his dependence. Finally he perceives clearly that other men, that other living organisms, constitute for him an essential condition of existence. He has need of their coöperation, as they have need of his, in the amelioration of the common medium. They are under a common determination. The principal traits in the development of this common medium are: the amelioration of the material environment; the development and perfecting the means of communication in order to facilitate their coöperation; development of means of exchange, of credit and money; development of the division of labor, which increases production; development of commerce; strengthening of order, of coördination, of security in human relations; coördination of individual efforts by means of contracts; constitution and coördination of artificial social organism, of governmental organisms; development of science; education of the masses of individuals who compose the social medium in order to give them the means of coöperating effectively in the common work and of clarifying the notion of solidarity and community of aim; finally, the development of morality, in respect to the common aim. This last is destined to be the great regulator of progress, in the common march towards the universal aim, towards unity.—*L. Beaurin-Gressier in the Revue Internationale de Sociologie for April 1896.*

The Placing Out of Pauper Children.—A bill now before Parliament proposes to transfer the whole care of pauper children to an educational department, which is to have power to contract the children out to other bodies who may or may not be suitable for so important a trust. The end in view is the great extension of the boarding-out system; truly a laudable object, but only if under proper conditions and safeguards. Some of the oldest advocates and observers of the boarding-out system are deeply impressed with its special dangers of abuse, except when it is guarded by the most careful arrangements for supervision. There is a necessity for much more inspection of their adopted homes than has existed hitherto. In fact, in some districts the inspection seems wholly absent and impossible to be instituted. It is unquestionably excellent to transfer the class of either pauper boy or "city Arab" to the conditions of

healthy colonial life. For boys especially this is often most beneficial, provided proper precautions are insured. Such care is even more necessary in the case of girls. Some terrible accounts have from time to time been heard of the fate of young girls placed out in remote districts. Then again, the permanent and unchanging principles affecting the increase or decrease of pauperism cannot be safely disregarded. These principles are far more likely to be kept in view by a body like the Local Government Board, specially conversant with Poor Law systems, than by another body appointed to deal with questions of education apart from their economic bearings.—*William Tallock, Secretary of the Howard Association, in the London Times, May 26, 1896.*

Labor Legislation in the United States.—Strikes and the disorders accompanying them have become the subject of legislation. Many states have laws preventing the intimidation of persons seeking to enter into or who desire to continue in employment, and some of these go so far as to restrain interference with or disturbance of the peaceable exercise of any lawful industry; that is to say, neither employes nor employers may be intimidated. The importation of men for police duty (known as the Pinkerton men) is in a few states prohibited. In Pennsylvania and perhaps elsewhere strikes, if peaceably conducted, have by statute been declared lawful, or at least, not conspiracies. In a number of states and in federal legislation the principle of voluntary arbitration of labor disputes has been recognized, and in Massachusetts, New York, California, Louisiana, New Jersey, Ohio, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Wisconsin permanent state boards of arbitration have been established for the purpose of amicably adjusting differences in labor disputes and preventing strikes.

The economic effect of the employment of convicts upon free labor in similar industries has led to statutes intended to prevent injurious competition; bureaus of statistics of labor for the investigation of industrial problems have been established in thirty-three states and by the federal government, in a number of states a special holiday, or day of industrial rest, known as Labor Day, has been provided by law; and there are statutes intended to protect the laborer from interference in the exercise of the right of suffrage.

The subjects with which labor legislation deals are not as a rule within the province of federal control. There is, for example, no national law limiting hours of labor or relating to the schooling of children before their employment or providing for factory inspection. Such laws usually originate in a single state, either through the efforts of organized labor, the pressure of public sentiment, or both, and are gradually extended to others.—*HORACE G. WADLIN, in The Chautauquan for June 1896.*

Labor Unions in China.—There are many peculiarities in the Chinese labor unions; perhaps the most striking is the minute division of labor. Take for illustration, the silk-weavers' unions. All those who weave silk of a certain design form a union by themselves and those who weave silk of a different design form a different union. The mahogany cabinet makers have a union separate from the union of the rosewood cabinet makers. Men who draw landscapes on the Chinese fans have a union different from that of those who draw flowers and birds. In short, there is a union for each particular department of work. Thus, a single article may have passed through the hands of many unions before it comes into market.

In China there are several holidays in the year which people of all stations and classes observe. These are the New Year, the fifth day of the fifth month, and the fifteenth day of the eighth month. The last of the three is for the worship or praise of the moon. After this day the busy season of the year for all tradesmen begins. From this time on until the New Year all craftsmen are expected to work later at night than during other seasons of the year and as a rule their wages are increased during this period. Besides these holidays each union has its own holidays; that is, the days of birth and death of the supposed originator of its particular occupation. To celebrate the national holidays the employers always prepare a feast for their employes. But when a union observes its own holidays, its members contribute some money and have a banquet in a restaurant or hotel.

An interesting peculiarity of these unions should be mentioned here, and that is

the massing of the same industries in the same street. In China there is no very large manufactory, most of them employing about thirty or fifty men each, and all the manufactories producing the same commodity are located on the same street. This gives rise to the custom of calling such streets by the name of the commodity manufactured there, instead of by their proper names.—WALTER N. FONG, in *The Chautauquan* for June 1896.

Child-Study.—Child-study, as it is coming to be understood, in the broadest sense means more, too, than the study of the average normal child to find out general principles of physical and intellectual development; it indicates also a marked tendency, and a necessity on the part of teachers at least, always to consider and respect the individuality of each child under its supervision. There has arisen of late a pronounced feeling that children cannot be classified very closely according to age, and all the members of a class or group dealt with exactly in the same manner; but rather every particular child is a personality unto himself and requires for his best training somewhat different treatment from all other personalities with whom he may be associated in the home or in the school.

The greatest enthusiasm is manifested everywhere in our own country now in the pursuit of these two objects of child-study. A National Association for Child-Study was formed at the International Congress of Education at Chicago in 1893, and since that time almost every state in the Union has organized separate associations, having the same general purposes as the national society. These associations comprise in their membership not only teachers but parents and others, and many local societies composed almost entirely of parents are being formed in various cities and towns for the systematic study of childhood. There is hardly an educational publication that does not devote some portion of its space to this scientific work in child-study, and the popular newspapers and magazines seem also to be giving the subject some attention.

It is thoroughly believed by the majority of people today that there are universal laws of mind-growth and development which are as invariable and reliable as those governing the physical world, and one important aim of child-study is to discover what these are, so that they may be duly observed in the training of children in the home and in the school. The importance of this work cannot be over-estimated; and while perhaps not much has yet been accomplished compared with what remains still to be done, yet beneficial results may already be seen in great improvement in the work of the schools and perhaps somewhat in the training of the home.—M. V. O'SHEA, in *The Chautauquan* for June 1896.

Method of Conciliation or Synthesis.—Economic organization has for its ends the greatest possible production of goods and the distribution of product which is as equitable as possible. This is only part of the "Social question." Leaving aside technical economics the writer seeks to reconcile the elements of truth in conflicting theories. Socialism is right in demanding that economic adjustments are open for discussion. Liberalism is right in insisting that expedients must be adapted to local social conditions. Utilitarianism is reconciled with morality by insisting that the useful, the beautiful, the true all have a right to a distinct place. None must be suppressed but all should be harmonized. Communism does not absolutely exclude individualism; it is simply a question of giving a due place to authority in controlling common action and to personal liberty in enjoyment.—LEON WALRAS, in *La Revue socialiste*, April 1896; p. 130.

Workmen's Colonies and Casual Lodging Houses in Germany.—At a conference, May 4-7, 1896, at Berlin, those interested in the wandering population discussed the various modes of relief and care. There are now in the Empire 444 lodging houses (*Herberge*). The union which oversees them has now existed ten years, and they have steadily increased. The delegates agreed that the stations for relief (*Verpflegungsstationen*) should be connected more closely with employment bureaus, since they are now frequently abused by vagrants. A new suggestion is to provide colonies for women, similar to the workmen's colonies (*Arbeiter-Kolonien*). *Fliegende Blätter*, a.d. R. H., June 1896; S. 243.

Official re-statement of the aims of the German Inner Mission.—The Inner Mission is the free service of living members of the parishes to supplement the regular offices of the church in helping the tempted and fallen. Wherever there is a social need there the Inner Mission is in place, and no one can limit its activity in advance. It differs from other charities and reforms in its central principle that the ultimate root of physical and social misery is moral evil and the supreme remedy is the gospel. The spiritual love must be shown in deeds of helpful kindness to suffering men. Wherever industrial, political or social conditions hinder the moral life, the Inner Mission is ready to use all agencies of custom and law for amelioration, as in case of licentiousness, drunkenness, Sunday desecration, defective dwellings, usury, exploitation of laborers; but it will not become partisan in politics nor advocate a particular school of economics.—*Fliegende Blätter, aus dem Rauhen Hause.* June 1896; S. 209 ff.

Punishment of recidivist Criminals.—Between 1885 and 1893 the number of persons condemned to prison in Prussia fell from 8069 to 7534, about 6.6 per cent. The number who had been condemned 1-4 or 5 times fell; the number who had been condemned 5-10 times remained as before; while the number of those condemned 11 times and more rose from 1129 in the year 1885 to 2288 in the year 1893—about 110 per cent. This seems to indicate that the criminals by passion and by occasion are few, while the confirmed criminals increase. What can be done? Some favor flogging, starving and other methods of severity. But this simply means capital punishment in the form of slow torture. Better an indeterminate sentence for recidivists, with a different treatment for strong and wilful criminals on the one side and for weak men on the other. The workmen's colonies have shown the physical, moral and economical value of agricultural life. The moor lands of North Germany offer a field for such colonies of recidivists. The method would be costly, but not nearly so expensive as the present methods. The law of Prussia does not yet provide for indeterminate sentence and much opposition from lawyers is expected before the reform can be effected.—PASTOR EBERTS and HEIM. *Fliegende Blätter, aus dem Rauhen Hause.* June 1896. S. 235 ff.

Public Labor Bureaus.—Regular employment is in itself a great factor in the determination of character. This is a principle accepted by those who have studied the condition of the unemployed, and one which is at the basis of recent governmental attempt to remedy this evil. For some time past labor bureaus have been in operation in several English parishes. Not only is there a steady growth of employers using these bureaus, but a better class of employers, and the employment given is much more of a permanent character than it used to be. The function of the labor bureau should be strictly limited to facilitating the supply of and demand for labor, the bringing together employers and workmen, other than in strikes and lockouts. The existing bureaus should be taken over and worked by the Labor Department of the Board of Trade and a central labor exchange opened. These bureaus are a common ground on which those who advocate State aid and those who oppose it can work together. They are at least a palliative, and though they cover but a little ground of the great field of the problem with which they are connected, yet no real remedy should be neglected because its operation would be limited.—S. D. FULLER, Chairman of the Paddington Board of Guardians, in the *London Times*, May 1896.

The Psychological Method in Sociology.—The psychological method possesses a particular characteristic which distinguishes it from all others. The historical method, the statistical, the experimental, etc., correspond always to these two properties: (1) they maintain invariably their own logical type, that is, if they are inductive in one case they are in all others, and (2) they always present the same character of application, whatever may be the science in which they are employed. For example, the historical method is always inductive and it functions in the same way in political economy, in psychology, in ethics and in law. But the psychological method does not conform to these two characteristics. It appears sometimes as a form of inductive, and sometimes as a form of deductive logic. In the philosophy of law, for

instance, it is inductive, while in political economy it is deductive. And again, the form which this method assumes varies with the variations of the science in which it is employed, and sometimes with the nature of the principles which are to be discovered or verified. The psychological method may therefore be defined as that process of research which, when the phenomena are a mere product of psychic forces (sentiments, emotions, desires, beliefs, etc.), seeks the laws of such phenomena by means of the deductive or inductive treatment of these forces.

Now the question has lately been agitated, "Can a science of sociology be constructed by the exclusive employment of this method?" From the definition just given it would appear that its use must be limited to the investigation of purely psychic phenomena. But social phenomena are not solely the product of mental and spiritual forces. External nature exercises an influence upon the social constitution of a people equal to that of the mental factors. The psychological method, then, is applicable to only one set of social phenomena, namely, those produced by purely mental and spiritual forces. Those who wish to apply it exclusively must assign to sociology a problem quite different from that ordinarily assigned to it. According to them sociology, considered as a special social science ought to abstract the purely social side of history and make it the object of special observation; it ought to represent the study of the forces, the forms and the development of association and nothing else. This view starts out from the unestablished premise that in every human being there is an individual and a collective mind; that in every man there is a natural tendency toward associative life, independent of any prospect of individual betterment. Man, however, is not a social animal as an end but as a means. He does not aspire to associative life on account of its abstract, but on account of its concrete quality, that is, on account of the means which it affords of increasing his pleasures and decreasing the pains which he would otherwise encounter. In short the theory that there is in man a spirit of association, different from and opposed to the egoistic spirit, is a mere *a priori* conception of certain writers who need such a theory as a basis for their preconceived doctrines. If this be true the psychological method is inapplicable in the construction of a science of sociology.—VINCENZO TANGORRA, in *Rivista di Sociologia*, January and February 1896. Rome.

The Sweating System.—This term is used to describe a condition of labor in which a maximum amount of work in a given time is performed for a minimum wage, under conditions in which the ordinary rules of health and comfort are disregarded. It is inseparably associated with contract work, and it is intensified by subcontracting in shops conducted in homes. Such conditions prevail to a distressing degree in localities having a large, herded foreign population, and among people known for excessive industry and thrift. High rents and a subdivision of labor without an accompanying use of machinery are the other factors producing this condition. While the sweating system exists in a number of occupations, it is the garment making industry that has given it its real significance. It is in the manufacture of the better class of garments that the worst conditions prevail, for the cheaper grades are made in such large quantities that the more systematic production is more profitable. New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Illinois have aimed at the suppression of the sweat shop by radical legislation. These laws prohibit not only the manufacture of garments in living apartments, except by immediate members of the family, and in unsanitary workshops, but seek to interfere with the sale of such goods by making it necessary to have a label attached and by forbidding their sale until properly disinfected and the label removed. The Illinois law omits the label provision. The worst features of the sweating system are also being eradicated through the efforts of the United Garment Workers of America. The strike begun in New York and Brooklyn in 1894 was successful and was continued in other cities, though with less success. This has stimulated similar efforts in Germany, where an increase in wages of 12½ per cent. has been secured through strikes. Another weapon with which to fight the system is the influence of the purchasing public and also the union label. Factory legislation is accomplishing much in all countries where the evil is found.—HENRY WHITE in the *Bulletin of the Department of Labor* for May 1896.

Is Poverty Diminishing?—The first requirement is a standard of poverty. Mr. Charles Booth and his collaborators affixed the term poverty to all real incomes below a certain level, 21s., and found that about 31 per cent. of Londoners were subject to "poverty," or just about one-third of the whole population, if the inmates of public charitable institutions are added to the list. This is the only direct measurement of local poverty upon any considerable scale which we possess. It is a popular belief that poverty is decreasing, a belief based upon the decline of pauperism and statistics bearing upon the rise of wages and the general improvement of the economic condition of the working classes. The first argument is based upon statistics for outdoor relief, which afford no real basis for the contention. Those who adduce evidence derived from the general statistics of wages, prices, working-class consumption and savings to prove the diminution of poverty, fall into the patent fallacy of averages. Such arguments are quite consistent with an increase in the number and the proportion of the poor. In regard to the general economic prosperity, it is true that the standard of comfort of the poor has risen and is still rising. If we took as a sole and sufficient gauge of poverty the actual command of commercial goods, we should give an affirmative answer to our initial question, whatever limit we assign to the term poverty. But if we reckon in those elements of physical utility which are deteriorated by the very conditions under which the economic income of the poorer classes has been raised, we shall hesitate to register a judgment that there is among the poor any increased ability to maintain a wholesome physical life. Real poverty is a subjective condition. If our desires are rightly adjusted to legitimate objects of human satisfaction, while the barriers of external environment and the influences they exercise upon the efficacy of effort disables us from any reasonable prospect of success, that disability constitutes poverty alike from the individual and the social standpoint. This type of poverty is on the rapid increase.—JOHN A. HOBSON in *The Contemporary Review* for April 1896.

Crime Increased by the Lax Enforcement of Law.—If the criminal propensities of men are restrained by fear of punishment; if the actual punishment of crime prevents the criminal from repeating his offense and deters others from imitating it; if the seclusion of the offender suspends his criminal career during the period of his sentence and removes from society a crime-producing influence; and if, in some cases, the punishment of the offender occasions his reformation, then it follows, inversely, that a failure to interpose these deterrent and corrective measures must occasion an increase of crime. The main question, however, is not whether the lax execution of law causes crime, for this is admitted; but, what causes the lax execution of the law. This may result from any one, or more than one, of a dozen possible causes. These are defects in the law itself; disproportion between the crime and the penalty; an insufficient and inefficient police and detective force; the exceptional cunning, boldness, or desperation of the criminal; police corruption; bribery of courts and juries; incompetence or carelessness of the prosecuting attorney; the bad eminence of certain criminal lawyers; abuse of the pardoning power; bad politics that elect incompetent men to our legislatures; false public sentiment about special classes of offenses and offenders. The remedies lie along the same lines. We need better politics, better legislators, better laws, better lawyers, better police, better courts, better juries, a better penal and reformatory system, more intelligence and patriotism and public conscience among our citizens. Make the crime a cause and the penalty an effect, and let it be understood that the effect will follow the cause with the inevitableness of fate.—GEORGE HUNTINGTON in *Lend a Hand* for May 1896.

Limitations of the Introspective Method in Ethics.—Galton's investigations have demonstrated that the exclusive use of introspection leads to nothing better than one-sided results. The "objective method" has been generally applied in psychology, but has hardly been attempted in ethics, although it is generally admitted that a large proportion of ethical problems are psychological in nature. The introspective method can be relied upon only if moral ideals and modes of judgment of the members of the highest races are identical. But this is not the case, as is shown by

the contradictions of the leading moralists themselves. Most of the discrepancies can be accounted for on the ground that each moralist kept his eyes fixed almost exclusively upon himself, and failed to notice important elements in the life of the race. Bentham, driven by the necessities of his work as a reformer to the study of ethics, dogmatically stated his own opinions of its fundamental problems. Only one already in sympathy with his conclusions could accept them. Such was Mill, to whose broad altruism the happiness of the race appealed as a worthy end. But Wundt was moved by the same work almost to disgust, and defined morality as service of the "general will." Again, this is rejected by a reviewer as an inadequate end. Kant derives the commanding authority of morality from man's supersensible origin and freedom from taint of connection with the world of time and sense. But to Schopenhauer, Kant's sense of obligation meant simply fear of punishment. To him sympathy is the only moral motive, while Kant and Spinoza do not regard sympathy as a virtue. To Kant the good will is the one good thing in life, while Sidgwick regards it as good only as a means to the production of good effects. If the position is taken that the experience of one moralist differs from that of another, these divergent statements are easily explained. When a person makes a systematic study of the moral life, following the common practice, some dominating motive of the society of which he is a member gets more than its share of attention, because it occupies a preëminent position among his own springs of action. Experiences different from his own are not recognized, because it is held that it is impossible to bring our ethical judgments into a system unless the grounds of approbation are reducible to a single one. His neighbors are supposed to confound non-moral impulses with the moral motive. If this is true, the student of ethics must make an exhaustive study of the moral judgments of examples of all types of human nature. Such an investigation will disclose the existence of a considerable number of moral motives. Among civilized men of this century there are at least four. The first may be termed the teleological, the second æsthetic, the third logical, and the fourth is unreasoned sentiment. If one imagines that the problem can be solved in the absence of a complete acquaintance with these judgments in all their varying forms, he deceives himself as to his relation to society and his own past. "The scientific man has, above all things, to aim at self-elimination in his judgments, to provide an argument which is true for each individual as for himself." Until this is done a science of ethics is impossible.—F. C. SHARP in *The Philosophical Review*, May 1896. Ginn & Co.

The Agricultural Movement.—At the meeting of the International Agricultural Congress at Brussels last September, a paper was read by M. Parisel on the importance of forests. They have an influence upon temperature, rendering it more equable. They hold more vapor, and the rainfall is more abundant in wooded, than in bare countries. Observations made at Nancy from 1867 to 1888 showed that the rainfall in wooded districts was to that of unwooded as 100 to 79, and observations at the same place, from 1878 to 1888 showed that the evaporation in the former districts was to that in the latter as 1 to 3.22. Reports were also made on the organic débris of forests, the uses of the horse chestnut, and other subjects related to forestry.—G. FOUQUET, *Le Mouvement Agricole*, in *Journal des Économistes*, May 1896. Paris: Librairie Guillaumin et C^{ie}.

Banks of Emission in Switzerland.—The first of these, the bank of Berne, was established in 1834, but the development of the system has been since 1860. By 1870 there were twenty-seven establishments issuing bank bills. This multiplicity of banks of issue was the natural consequence of the economic and political decentralization which prevailed in Switzerland. The freedom of the banks is not limited by law; and the greatest diversity exists among them. The banks were isolated and their bills could not circulate beyond their own cantons. In 1869 the total emission in Switzerland was 18,468,000 francs for a population of 2,500,000. This had increased to 25,000,000 francs in 1871, and to 65,000,000 francs in 1874. Many of the banks were unable to redeem their notes. In 1870 it was proposed to pass laws similar to those of the United States; and the constitution of 1874 granted the federal

government the right to control banks of issue. But the cantons having state banks opposed the law when it was submitted to the people, and the reform was defeated. However, many of the people were in favor of some restriction, and twenty-one of the thirty-five banks, desirous of conciliating public opinion, entered into an agreement, July 8, 1876, to receive each other's notes, and established a central bureau or clearing house. This secures an inter-cantonal circulation of considerable ability; but the fact that so many banks kept out of the association proved sufficient to defeat the proposed reforms. Yet the creation of a federal monopoly was obvious to the public. The law of 1881 secured some relief. It provided that banks of issue must have a capital of not less than 500,000 francs and must not issue bills to more than double the amount of their capital, and must keep on hand metallic money to the amount of 40 per cent. of their circulation. Various securities are accepted for the other 60 per cent. An inspector is to publish statements of the condition of the banks. The law also provided for uniform notes. The authorized circulation of all the banks was 182,470,000 francs in 1894. They have a reserve of coin amounting to 92,000,000 francs. A new article was added to the constitution in 1891 by a vote of 231,000 to 158,000, authorizing the establishment by the confederation of a single bank of issue. In 1894 the council finally decided to establish such a state bank. The capital of the bank is to be 25,000,000 francs and is to be furnished by the confederation and the cantons. General surveillance will be exercised by the federal assembly and administrative authority by a committee of direction composed of six members, under the permanent control of a council of the bank composed of twenty-one members.—ACHILLE VIALATE, "Les Banques d'émission en Suisse," in *Journal des Économistes*, May 1896. Paris: Librairie Guillaumin et C^{ie}.

Labor and the Injunction.—A bill is pending in congress, presented at the request of the American Federation of Labor, preventing the United States courts, sitting as courts of equity, from punishing for contempt when the contempt consists of acts for which the offending party is indictable. Equity jurisdiction is barred from the punishment of crime. An injunction is never used for punishment, but to prevent wrongs to property which would be irreparable. The use of the injunction, in this country, to prevent aggressions of organized labor, occurred only once before 1890, and that was to prevent continued trespass to land. A violation of injunction is contempt of court and is punishable by fine or imprisonment on order of the chancellor. The offender must appear in person without right of being heard; he may not demand to be tried by jury, nor to be confronted with the witnesses, nor to be allowed to publicly discuss the admissibility of evidence; he has no right to a review of the proceedings, nor an appeal to the pardoning power. The only remedy for abuse of power by the chancellor is impeachment. In the case of *Debs* a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the supreme court on the ground that the entire force of the nation may be used to brush away obstructions to interstate commerce, and that an injunction might be issued in aid of the executive without regard to whether the government's property was endangered, and without regard to whether the acts enjoined were criminal. Yet the lower court had based its decision exclusively on the anti-trust statute. The injunction has proved inefficient to prevent irreparable injury to property. As directed against the commission of crime it does not prevent except as it forbids that which is already forbidden by law; whereas in civil cases what was before a mere violation of contract becomes punishable criminally. Nor is the injunction the only remedy in criminal cases; for the offender is already subject to indictment and arrest. There are two objections to its use: it infringes one of the fundamental guarantees of personal liberty—the right of trial by jury; and it tends to impair the already insufficient confidence in our criminal procedure.—EVANS WOOLLEN, in *Yale Review*, May 1896.

Commercial Relations of the Poor.—When we consider how large a part of the great fortunes have been made by investments, and how few people who have made any considerable saving have abstained from venturesome investments, we get an idea of the very small proportion of people who are contented with the safe interests obtained from a bank. When the poor are condemned for not appreciating a

bank account, it must be remembered that very few of the more prosperous classes are contented with that standard. Investments are cut off from the poor, and a larger proportion of fraudulent agents are found among them. Among the poor, insurance stands simply as a guarantee of slight reimbursement after the death of the wage earner, and actually does little more than provide for an extravagant funeral. Perhaps the greatest evils are connected with child insurance. About 1000 agents canvass New York for this class of insurance, and about 1,000,000 policies are issued. If the insured pays premiums to the full amount of the policy, the money is not available unless he continues to pay premiums until his death. Flaws are frequently made in writing policies preventing payment when premiums have been regularly made. If the insured is ill, the agent frequently refrains from calling, knowing that if premiums are not paid within two weeks of death, there will be no payment of the policy. Probably two-thirds of the policies lapse, though seldom without a struggle on the part of the insured. When such insurance is compared with that secured from regular companies, the inequalities of advantage are apparent. In regard to rent, the thrifty must pay for the unthrifty and irregular. If the poor man has to resort to law, he must employ a lawyer who has little ability, will hold on to his client as long as possible, and who arouses distrust in the mind of the judge. The courts are not hopelessly corrupt, but victory lies with brains which cost money. The rich man can borrow at a low rate of interest, and have the use of the property given as security. But the poor man must borrow at 30 per cent. and pawn his property as security. Another disadvantage of the poor is in the purchase of furniture on the installment plan at excessive prices and frequent losses from failure to make payments. There can be no relief for this situation except through legislation.—J. B. REYNOLDS, in *Yale Review*, May 1896, New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor.

Necessity of a Psychological and Sociological Interpretation of the World.—Transcendent monism places the unity of the physical and psychical in one substance, as that of Spinoza, in one force, as that of Spencer, or in one unknown. The theory which makes the physical and the psychical two parallel aspects of one and the same unknowable reality is a dualism in fact, encompassed by a unity wholly nominal and abstract. This is a pseudo-monism, without application in theory or in practice. The true monism is found by the reduction of the psychical to the physical or the reduction of the physical to the psychical. Two principal attempts are made to form one idea of the universe: (1) In its general laws or forms; (2) In its foundation and elements. The positivism of Comte and Littré is bounded by mathematical, physico-chemical, biological, and sociological laws, while the psychological laws are neglected. All scientific laws tend to this conclusion: there has been in the universe unity of composition. The consciousness of other men and of other animals is a mean term which warrants the passage from a philosophy of law to a philosophy of beings. A philosophy at once speculative and ethical opens to me the heart of things and authorizes me to conceive of my consciousness as a revelation of other consciousnesses, as well as a means of action to them. Intelligence depends on the life, which itself depends on that which we call matter; but how can we say that matter is truly foreign to the whole psychic element? The individual in exclusive particularity is an abstraction, since the individual does not exist. When we live our proper life, we live the universal life. It is unintelligible to explain experience except as produced by a mental function. The general properties which we assign to objects of exterior perception are the qualities of processes of perception themselves. Such phenomena are in such representations the results of psychical activity. The objects are the products of the subject. The true monism ought to be the unity of the subjective and objective points of view. The mechanical synthesis of the world is not a point of view which unifies the quantitative relations in space and time. The biological conception of the universe, which makes it a living organism, where all is in functional correlation, is superior to this. But the biological is on one side, an application of the mechanical, on the other, by its sensitive element, of the psychical sociology, which implies the psychological, furnishes a better type of the most important laws of universal synthesis. Human reason is in great part, a social product. Our

intellectual structure is explained by our social life. There is a social grammar, as well as a social logic, and that grammar is a science of life. The entire world appears as a society in process of formation. Selection in general is the choosing of beings the most capable of satisfying the fundamental appetite, not only in the present moment, but in the whole course of their existence, not only in their individual life, but in the race as well. The attempts to reduce society to an organism ought to be opposed. If society is an organism, it is such only in its rudimentary stages. The chief difference between an organism and society is that in an organism the cells are deprived of their true consciousness for the benefit of the whole, while in society the individual possesses the true consciousness, and social consciousness is only the coincidence of individual consciousnesses in certain common sentiments. All admit that it is impossible to treat society as an organism without extending the organic idea to conditions which have developed the social life of humanity. Idealistic monism posits universal relationships and a universal society in affirming the identity of that which is within with that which is without us.—A. FOUILLÉE, "Nécessité d'une Interpretation Psychologique et Sociologique du Monde," *Revue Philosophique*, May 1896.

The Fabian Society.—This society was founded some thirteen years ago by a group of obscure social reformers, whose avowed object was to effect the moral regeneration of society. The society accepts the Collectivist doctrine with all of its consequences, and is a powerful antagonist of anarchism in all its forms. That which is peculiar to the society is its method: it proposes to conquer by delay—by education. However, it also believes in striking when the time comes, and striking hard. The members of the society are divided into local groups, and are expected to participate in the work according to their power and their means. The total membership is about six hundred; it does not permit indiscriminate additions to its membership. The membership includes many journalists, poets, economists, historians, members of the London School Board and County Council, and similar influential personages. The society publishes many pamphlets, differing from much socialistic literature, inasmuch as every fact and statistic quoted is carefully authenticated. Their most important publication is the volume entitled: "Essays on Socialism," which has had an enormous circulation.—SIDNEY WEBB, in *The Revue de Paris* for March 1896.

Why Progress Is by Leaps.—Each new discovery in science and art becomes an aid to all previous discoveries. Such an invention is not a mere addition to man's achievements—it is a multiplier of them. The sciences and arts are series of permutations, where the newest of the factors, because newest, multiplies all the factors that went before. This is well illustrated in the use of fire by primitive man, or in that of electricity in recent times. Electricity in the past century has proved to be the creator of a thousand material resources; the corner stone of physical regeneration; a stimulus to the moral sense, by making what otherwise were an empty wish rise to sympathy fulfilled; while in more closely binding up the good of the bee with the welfare of the hive, it is an educator and confirmer of every social bond. The principle of permutation, illustrated in both fire and electricity, interprets not only the vast expansion of human empire won by a new weapon of prime power, it explains also why these accessions are brought under rule with ever-accelerated pace. Every new talent but clears the way for the talents newer still, which are born from it. This principle accounts for the leaps of progress, human and general, for the acceleration of that progress, and for there being chapters missing in its story.—GEORGE ILES, in *The Popular Science Monthly* for June 1896.

Solution of the Race Problem.—If the negroes were evenly distributed throughout the United States they would constitute only about 12 per cent. of the population and there would be no race problem. The race problem exists because of concentration in certain localities. These are (1) lowlands along the Atlantic coast, where there are 2,700,000 negroes and 1,800,000 whites; (2) the Mississippi bottoms, where there are 501,405 whites and 1,101,134 negroes; and (3) the Texas Black belt, where there are 82,310 whites and 126,297 blacks. Elsewhere the negroes form from 10 to 30 per cent. of the total population. In only one of these black districts are the negroes

increasing at a greater ratio than the whites. The race question will solve itself by the distribution of the negroes. Due to their failure as farmers and the resulting movement towards mining and factory employments, the movement of the negroes is to the North and the white immigration into the South.—A. S. VAN DE GRAFF in the *Forum* for May 1896.

Railways of the World.—The greatest extension of railways took place during the period 1885–1889, when 108,600 kilometers were built, an increase of 22.3 per cent. During succeeding five-year periods, the increase was as follows: 1886–1890—101,407 km., 19.6 per cent.; 1887–1891—84,917 km., 15.4 per cent.; 1888–1892—80,135 km., 14 per cent.; 1889–1893—75,086 km., 12.6 per cent.; 1890–1894—71,623 km., 11.6 per cent. At the close of 1894, 364,975 km., or more than half of the total length of 687,550 km., had been built in America. On that continent the rate of increase had fallen from 47,062 km., 15.4 per cent., in the years 1888–1892 to 42,678 km., 13.4 per cent., in 1889–1893, and to 34,399 km., 10.4 per cent., in 1890–1894. The combined capitalization of railways at the end of 1894 was 3436 million dollars, or an average of \$49,900 per kilometer. The rate of increase, total length, cost, etc., for the various parts of the world are shown in the following summary:

Territory	Length at end of capitalization				Sq. km. of country	Population of country
	1890	1894	Total	Per kilo- meter		
	Kilometers					
Germany.....	42,869	45,462	\$2,662,110,000	\$60,299	540,500	51,370,000
Austria-Hungary..	27,015	30,038	1,570,342,000	57,671	676,700	43,456,000
France.....	36,672	39,979	2,940,559,000	81,202	536,400	38,343,000
Great Britain....	32,297	33,641	4,692,320,000	139,483	314,600	39,134,000
Rest of Europe....	84,588	96,180	3,731,270,000	54,344	7,720,300	196,947,000
United States....	268,409	288,460	10,796,473,000	39,124	7,752,800	68,275,000
British America ...	21,509	25,966	887,975,000	37,380	9,060,800	5,149,000
Mexico	9,718	11,249	1,946,300	11,643,000
West Indies.....	2,338	2,582	167,400+	2,136,000+
Central America..	1,000	1,000	449,600	3,248,000
South America....	27,602	35,718	17,710,900	37,398,000
British India.....	26,299	30,220	1,077,769,000	36,104	5,143,100	290,593,000
Japan.....	2,333	3,600	53,860,000	34,228	382,400	41,388,000
China	200	200	11,115,600	360,250,000
Russia in Asia....	1,433	3,051	13,073,400	5,483,000
Rest of Asia.....	2,907	4,899	5,410,800+	61,116,000+
Africa.....	9,791	13,103	2,957,700+	15,759,000+
Australia and Pacific Islands..	18,947	22,202	585,903,000	28,638	8,206,100	4,251,000
Total.....	615,927	687,550	93,165,400	1,275,939,000

In the above table the items under capitalization are not complete even for the countries where figures are given. These items are omitted altogether for Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Malta, Jersey, and Man. In no instance is the capitalization given for the complete length of railways in the respective countries, but the lengths neglected are relatively unimportant and would not change the average capitalization per kilometer. This for Europe is \$74,212, and for the rest of the world, \$36,555.—ARCHIV FÜR EISENBAHNWESEN, Heft 3, 1896.

Restriction of Immigration.—By this is not meant the straining out from the vast throng of foreigners arriving at our ports a few thousands of persons, deaf,

dumb, blind, idiotic, insane, pauper or criminal. The necessity for this is now generally conceded, and to a considerable extent such provisions are enforced. The question today is of protecting the American rate of wages, the American standard of living, and the quality of American citizenship from degradation through the tumultuous access of vast throngs of ignorant and brutalized peasantry from the countries of Eastern and Southern Europe. The principle of population is intensely sensitive of social and economic changes. Social classes have resulted from immigration. The general growth of luxury among certain classes has been a result. Americans refuse to perform certain kinds of labor because of immigration, rather than, as popularly supposed, immigration resulting from demand for such a grade of laborers. Certain general changes demand a change of attitude towards the immigration question. These are (1) the exhaustion of free public lands; (2) fall of agricultural prices; (3) the existence of a labor problem. Our highest duty to charity and to humanity is to make this great experiment here, of free laws and educated labor, the most triumphant success that can possibly be attained. In this way we shall do far more for Europe than by allowing its city slums and its vast reservoirs of degraded peasantry to be drained off upon our soil. FRANCIS A. WALLER, in *The Atlantic Monthly* for July 1896.

The Coöperation Movement in France.—The editor seeks state help but is willing to accept any socialized effort which promises relief. A beginning of coöperation was made in 1848. The idea was to build up "productive" enterprises. Almost all disappeared. Under the Second Empire a new attempt was made, about 1863. The war of 1870-1 checked the movement. In 1876-7 the workmen's congresses of Paris and Lyons started anew. Resolutions favorable to coöperation were passed, but little was done. In 1879, under the leadership of Jules Guesde, a follower of Karl Marx, the collectivists gained control and a resolution was passed at the congress of Marseilles which said: "Whereas the societies of production and consumption, being unable to ameliorate the lot of any but a small number of privileged persons, cannot assuredly be considered as sufficiently powerful means to attain the emancipation of the proletariat, etc." Socialism triumphed. In 1885, however, a new start was made. There were in 1895, 1197 societies for "consumption" in all parts of France. They belong to the Rochdale type; sell at retail price, for cash, and distribute a bonus according to the amount of purchase. There are only about 81 societies of "production" 40 of which are in Paris. The article gives statistics of German, Belgian, English and Italian coöperation movements. The difficulties of securing organization are the opposition of small shopkeepers who fear the coöperative stores, the feebleness of social cohesion, the tendency to expect everything from the state, and the antagonism between the rural protectionists and the urban free-traders.—*La Revue Socialiste*, April 1896, p. 407.

Economics of Improved Housing.—Of 160,000 people in London who live in real model tenements, less than 25 per cent. reside in premises owned by philanthropic associations. In America, out of avowedly commercial enterprises engaged in furnishing improved housing facilities, but one paid less than 5 per cent. Two semi-philanthropic housing corporations found in America paid 4 per cent. In Europe but 3 out of 29 commercial housing corporations failed to earn at least 4 per cent., while 19 earned 5 per cent. or more. Of the European semi-philanthropic associations, 10 out of 14 earned 4 per cent. or more. Of them all 88 per cent. were successful, 6 per cent. earned a saving-bank rate of interest, and the others earned less. This success has been achieved under favorable sanitary arrangements. The Peabody Trust in London houses 20,000 people, and earns 3 per cent. on property which cost \$533 per room and rents for 52 cents per room per week. The Guinness Trust earns the same rate on a weekly rental of 45 cents per room. The analysis shows that 5 per cent. and a safe reserve can be earned on model tenements anywhere at the customary rents, when the cost per room does not exceed \$500. Improvement in rapid transit facilities, especially if fares are reduced, has an important influence on this problem. It is not desirable to make this class of buildings too attractive, for with moderate results par-

simonious members of the better classes would monopolize advantages intended for the poor. Coöperative building associations have rendered individual and social service but they present three drawbacks: too great expense to borrowers: difficulty in securing suitable business management; loss in case of death of borrower before payments are completed. A better plan was originated in Belgium in 1889, and is now being tried in France and Germany as well. Loans are made from the government savings banks to intermediate responsible parties, who form a corporation and pay in 10 per cent. of the capital stock. The workingman to whom a loan is made must pay down 10 per cent. of the cost of the property he desires to purchase. The company advances him one-third of the unpaid value of the property and the savings-banks loan to him through the company the balance upon a first mortgage. The borrower chooses a period of time in which to pay his obligations, and insures his life with the insurance department of the bank, in order to reimburse the bank in case of death during the period of liquidation and to secure his family in possession of the property. To the premium of about 6 per cent. for risk and expenses, is added the annual interest on the sum due at 4 per cent. The borrower then simply pays this installment for both property and insurance.—E. R. L. GOULD, in *Yale Review*, May 1896.

The Conception of Morality in Jurisprudence.—Jurisprudence has retrograded because it is founded on a false view of life and an inadequate conception of morality. Socially and politically the supreme authority rests upon morality, and only as its decrees coincide with the moral sentiments of the community are they possessed of force. What ought to be and what is cannot be separated. A comprehensive science of what is law contains in itself a theory of what ought to be law. Law is the living product of an organic society.

Whatever rights the individual conscience may possess, it can never be superior to society; so the jurist has a reasonable though mistaken horror of the "ought to be." Scientific jurisprudence now rests upon the assumption that law is the command of an unlimited sovereign power. A contract *contra bonos mores* is void only when it violates a rule of law, not because it tends to produce wrong. The view of obedience as an end in itself is inadequate. Life is more than conformity to law; it is organic growth. Moral life is a continuous evolution, the principles of which are constant, but which is not itself to be found in any mechanical arrangement; it cannot be summed up in a series of imperatives; it is spiritual and consists in a growth towards an ideal. Obedience to law is a means to an end, which is the realization of the true nature of man.

The jurist treats law as static. Law is broader than a mass of rules; it is the highest organic form of the moral life. The content and significance of statutes are supplied through judicial interpretation by the social self-consciousness of the nation. The true science of law must endeavor to determine the exact nature of law and of the forces which have produced it, the forces which are tending to its preservation, and the forces which are constantly modifying it. The law is the necessary product of social life, and as such is inseparable from morality. The unity of life is absolute. Society has no existence apart from individuals and no individual exists beyond the organization of society and the reach of law. (T. W. TAYLOR in *The Philosophical Review*, January 1896. Boston: Ginn & Co.)

Mutual Aid Amongst Modern Men.—The mutual aid tendency is deeply interwoven in all the past evolution of the human race. Economical and social institutions, in so far as they are the creation of the masses, new ethical systems, and new religions have all originated from this same tendency. The ethical progress of the race is simply the extension of this principle. This principle has developed through the savage tribe, the village community, the mediæval guilds, the mediæval republics. These gave way before the all-absorbing authority of the state which favored the development of a narrow-minded individualism. The destruction of mutual aid institutions has been going on for four hundred years, yet hundreds of millions continue to live under such institutions. The communal village did not disappear of its own

accord but was destroyed by the state throughout Europe, and many traces of communal possessions still remain. Along with these persist great numbers of mutual aid habits and customs, especially in continental Europe. These possess great economical value, but a greater ethical value. The recent rapid extension of agricultural syndicates in France, similar associations in Germany, village communities and peasant associations in Russia, similar institutions among the less civilized people of Asia and Africa all attest the very general importance of such institutions. The nucleus of mutual support institutions, habits and customs remains alive with the millions; and they prefer to cling to their customs, beliefs, traditions rather than accept the teachings of a war of each against all, which are offered to them under the title of science, but form no science at all. (PRINCE KROPOTKIN, in *The Nineteenth Century*, January 1896.)

Social Evolution.—The complexity of social life among human beings suggests that biological conceptions cannot without criticism and perhaps modification be applied to social phenomena. In every period the prevalent notion of what constitutes scientific treatment depends upon what happens to be the predominant science of the time. The sociologist must not assume that there are no other factors in social evolution than in organic evolution, nor that natural selection means the same thing in human society that it does among plants and animals. Industrial and commercial competition is far more closely analogous to the struggle for existence in the organic world than is a war between nations. War has been a more important factor than industrial competition in producing social *organisms*, as distinct from mere *aggregates*. It is not only through slow and deadly natural selection that the various elements of civilization have been produced and preserved. Many elements are transmitted by social inheritance, not by heredity in the biological sense. Consciousness and reflection may result from natural selection, but once originated they often lead to supplementing or supplanting natural selection by artificial selection. A habit, which otherwise could disappear only with the extinction of all individuals practicing it, may be changed without the extinction of the race.

Kidd's assumption that religion is what induces individuals to subordinate their interests to those of the social organism is solely a deduction from the general theory of natural selection. If what exists everywhere is due to natural selection, and therefore furthers social utility, reason must serve the same purpose here ascribed to religion. But Kidd regards reason as antagonistic to social interests. Independent of and prior to all religious sanctions there is a social instinct. Under conditions of modern life, in proportion as religions remain uninfluenced by rationalism they become sources of national weakness, not of strength.

In social evolution the transmission of a type of civilization may become more diffused because more fitted to survive in the struggle for existence with other types of civilization. The assimilative power of national civilization may be more important than numerical increase of the race. Natural selection cannot be humanized by the altruistic sentiment without ceasing to produce the survival of the fittest. The difficulty in the way of adopting rational artificial selection arises mainly from *non-rational* religious sentiments. To give equal social opportunities and avoid deterioration of the race, we must have socialistic organization of industry and a system of artificial selection. (DAVID G. RITCHIE in *International Journal of Ethics*, January 1896. Philadelphia.)

Programme of a Course in Sociology. By MARCEL BERNÈS.—Two leading articles in the *Revue Internationale de Sociologie* for December 1895 and January 1896. The former article is notable chiefly for its clear delimitation of *society* as a primordial and unique reality, and thus a proper object of study. Remainder of first article acutely criticises numerous misconceptions of the relation of society to antecedent phenomena; but misconceptions likely to bother beginners rather than proper interpretations of the fundamental conceptions of mature contemporary sociologists. The second article reaches the conclusion that the proper content of sociology falls into three divisions: (1) Analysis of social solidarity as a fact of present knowledge, a real fact of consciousness as reality reaching beyond the individual: *collective* or

sociological psychology. (2) The study of social evolution, or social solidarity in history, i. e., *philosophy of history or history of civilization.* (3) If social life is always in part composed of elements already fixed, it is always partially composed of collective tendencies, ideas, inspirations, and we need to appraise the value of these. Solidarity is not a fact once for all accomplished. It is an ideal capable of realization in the future. Society is a becoming, and the future is not wholly contained in the past. Sociological idealism, the relative value of past and future. Thus sociology will be the center of *sociological ethics*, not be separated from existing realities, but not to be reduced to mere discovery of standards of customs in nations or epochs.

These different problems complement each other. Every question presented by social life may be considered in its relation to each of points of view, nor is a social question truly solved until it has been considered under each of these aspects. (Giard et Brière, 16 Rue Soufflot, Paris.)

A Phase of Social Selection.—The quality of population is conditioned on the one hand by the laws of heredity and upon the other by the laws of selection. Of these forces heredity is the great conservator; but this tendency is overcome by the transforming forces of selection. The forces which determine the multiplication of certain elements of the population and the decrease or extinction of others are rather those arising from the character of that society than from external nature. The relation between the forces of social selection and the racial composition of populations is fundamental. "Dissociation" designates a subordinate and usually a preparatory phase of this selection. Dissociation by stratification results from the subsidiary struggle for comfort, wealth, power, social position, etc. Dissociation by displacement takes the form of the geographical separation of different elements through the migration of one or another among them. Colonization and emigration are the means of a vast selective process. Less conspicuous but not less important, are those emigrations within a single country, from region to region, from highlands to plains, from the rural to the urban districts. Especially in this last case the selective process tends to eliminate the migratory element, for the cities are the great consumers of population. European populations are mainly composed of two types, the dolicocephalic and the brachycephalic. The latter type is industrious, frugal, often receptive and intelligent. The former is the less uniform and mediocre, of higher capacity, more enterprising and self-reliant, and have ruled most of the great civilizations. This element is being concentrated in cities by means of the dissociative action of migration, and hence is becoming displaced. Direct proof of this law is now available in large quantity. Very recent investigations widen the scope of the generalization, by showing that migration, not merely urban immigration but movement in general, is especially characteristic of the dolicocephalic element of the population; that this type is characterized by greater general mobility. (C. C. CLOSSON in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, January 1896.)

Sociology and Democracy.—One of the first discoveries of sociology appears to increase the historic importance of masses of peoples at the expense of individuals. Our consciousness is nothing more than the point of intersection of social ideas. Our sentiments, knowledge, tastes, duties are borne only in and through society. But, on the other hand, sociology lowers what it elevates. The qualities of aggregates are different from the sum of their elements. Being heterogeneous, not homogeneous as claimed by Spencer, the powers of men neutralize each other, and cannot be added together. Thinking in masses, they are inferior to themselves taken singly. The more intelligent lower themselves; but the less intelligent cannot elevate themselves. Since, in evolution, the inferior faculties, being the more ancient, are more surely transmitted, the units of society resemble one another on their inferior side, while the superior units differ among themselves by their very superiorities. The intellects are not joined; they become equalized by lowering themselves. The homogeneous qualities form the collective opinion; but the heterogeneous qualities are the superior. By being surrounded by the consciousness of his fellows, the individual loses much of the consciousness and reflection necessary to the exercise of his superior faculties. This

happens less through rational discussion than by unconscious imitation. In a collective conviction ideas proper are always weaker than unreasoned images and associations. The cause of the *excessive sensibility* of an aggregate is also the cause of its *feeble intelligence*. The union of individuals also gives to each of them the feeling of great power, at the same time the feeling of responsibility is weakened. Aggregates are not inferior to individuals at every point. As they destroy the sentiment of responsibility, they restrain the egoistic act. Intensity of feeling is increased while intelligence is degraded by the union. In short, sociology has demonstrated that the society is different from the sum of its parts. Contemporary movements are democratic. All governments tend to come more and more under the influence of the people. Spencer holds that the organic conception requires democracy. The units of the organism are discrete and conscious. Society is not the end of the individual, but the individual the end of society. Coöperation is no longer forced, but voluntary. The progress of representative and elective government is a necessary consequence of the passage of the military form of society into the industrial. Tarde says the mechanism of imitation explains the democratic movement. Durkheim thinks the division of labor requires equality. The more labor is divided, the more individuals differ in functions of ideas. The solidarity is not mechanical but organic. The three agree that the evolution of society requires equal liberty, and what logically follows—general discussion and de-liberation, and the power of the masses.

Thus sociology maintains the two theses: (1) The impotence of the popular intellect; (2) the all-powerfulness of the popular will. The force of large sentiments may well be preferred to the influence of narrow intelligence. Democracy has reason to be proud of its achievements. The development of the critical spirit is a manifestation of the liberty of thought. Thus the worst consequences of the first thesis are counteracted. Those who would choose between democratic means and ends, and, because the people are not capable of perceiving their true interests, guard them by diminishing their powers, would defeat their own purpose. It is impossible to pursue democratic ends and reject democratic means. Yet we are not able to reconcile the first and second theses.—(C. BOUGLÉ in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*. January 1896. Paris: Armand Collin et Cie.)

THE PERIODICAL LITERATURE OF SOCIOLOGY.

II. POLITICAL ECONOMY; GENERAL AND THEORETICAL.

The facts for most of the characterizations below were obtained from the editors. The characterizations of those periodicals for which no such information has been received are based mainly on inspection of the files. Characterizations of the latter class are bracketed.

The classification of periodicals into Technical Sociology, Political Economy, etc., is necessarily only approximately correct; but this defect will be remedied by the index of journals in the last number of each volume and by a full alphabetical list of journals characterized when the list is completed.

Economic Journal:—First number, March 1891. Quarterly, 4 numbers. Per vol., 700 pp. Present vol. (January 1896) is No. 5. 20s. Macmillan & Co., New York and London. Back numbers complete. Edited by F. Y. Edgeworth and Henry Higgs. Official organ of the British Economic Association. Estimate of its editors: Its field, the science of economics as a whole; no particular tendency; scientific and impartial.

Economic Review:—First number, January 1891. Quarterly, 4 numbers. Per vol., 600 pp. Present vol. (January 1896) is No. 6. 10s. Rivington, Percival & Co., London. A few of the back numbers are out of print. Of these, January–April 1891, can be obtained of E. Buckle, 60 Stanhope street, London, W. C. Edited by Rev. J. Carter, Rev. L. R. Phelps, and Rev. H. Rashdall. Owned and managed by the Oxford University branch of the Christian Social Union. Estimate by its editors: Discusses economic, social and Christian problems; practical and definitely Christian; especially valuable for summaries of legislation and official reports, and its articles on commercial morality and the function of the church in regard to social questions.

Giornale degli Economisti:—First number, April 1875. Monthly at present; bi-monthly previous to June 1890. 6 numbers, per vol., 780 pp. Present vol. is No. 12 of second series, beginning July 1890. 25 fr. Prof. M. Pantaleoni, 37 via Nazionale, Rome. The file of back numbers for the first series very incomplete and of the second series not quite complete. Edited by A. de Viti de Marco, and M. Pantaleoni, with the coöperation of U. Mazzala and A. Tarli. Estimate of its editor: Its field, economics, pure and applied; finance and statistics; since 1890 has championed individualism, economic liberty, and classical political economy; especially distinguished by its theoretical work in mathematical economics.

Gunton's Magazine:—Till January 1896 was called the Social Economist. First number, March 1891. Monthly. 6 numbers, per vol., 480 pp. Present vol. (January 1896) is No. 10. \$2. Political Science Pub. Co., Union square, New York. Back numbers complete. Edited by George Gunton, President of the School of Social Economics, with the coöperation of the faculty. Estimate of its editor: Its field, economics, statesmanship and sociology, applied rather than theoretic; stands for the American as distinguished from the English school of economics; distinguished by its scientific treatment of the protective principle, wages question and banking.

Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft in Deutschen Reich:—(Formerly *Jahr. f. Gesetzgeb. Verwaltung u. Rechtspflege des deuts. Reich.* First number, 1876. M. 6. Duncker and Humblot, Leipzig. Edited by G. Schmoller. Field and function indicated by its title; valuable also for reviews and lists of new publications).

Jahrbucher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik:—First number, 1863. Monthly. 6 numbers, per vol., 960 pp. Present vol. (January 1896) is No. 66. M. 30. Gustave Fischer, Jena. Complete sets of back numbers can be obtained of A. Asher, Berlin, or J. Baer, Frankfurt. Edited by J. Conrad, assisted by L. Elster, Edg. Loening and W. Lexis. Estimate of its editor: Its field, the whole province of political economy and statistics; maintains a medium position as to parties and programmes; valuable for summary of economic literature and legislation of all countries.

Journal des Economistes:—First number, December 1841. Monthly. 6 numbers, per vol., 480 pp. Present volume (January 1896) is No. 108. 38 fr. Guillaumin et Cie, Paris. Set of back numbers complete can be obtained for 300 fr. Edited by G. de Molinari. Editor's estimate: Is an exponent of economic science in all its orthodoxy and advocates free exchange in trade. [In justice to the journal it should be added that in addition its articles cover a wide range of socio-economic questions and it has a valuable feature in its "Chronique Economique," conducted by the editor.]

Journal of Political Economy:—First number, December 1891. Quarterly. 4 numbers, per vol., 550 pp. Present vol. (January 1896) is No. 4. \$3. Chicago University Press. Back numbers complete. Edited by J. L. Laughlin and T. B. Veblen. Estimate of its editor: Its field, political economy; articles have dealt chiefly with practical questions; the past year the money question has received much attention.

Quarterly Journal of Economics:—[First number, October 1896. Quarterly. 4 numbers, per vol., 450 pp. Present vol. is No. 10. \$2. George H. Ellis, Boston. Most of the back numbers are for sale by the publisher. Edited by Chas. F. Dunbar, assisted by F. U. Faussig, W. J. Ashley, and Edward Cummings, all members of the Harvard faculty. Devotes considerable space to the discussion of questions pertaining to economic theory, but does not neglect the practical side of economics. Each issue contains a valuable bibliography of new publications.]

Revue d'Economie Politique:—First number, January 1887. Monthly, except that the numbers for July and August are bound in one, and also the numbers for September and October. 12 numbers (in 10), vol., 1100 pp. 21 fr. Larose, 22 rue Soufflot, Paris. Back numbers uncertain. Editors: Henri St. Marc is secretary of the editorial board, consisting of Charles Guide, Alfred Jourdan and several other professors of political economy in the French universities. Estimate of its editors: Its field, political economy, finance and sociology; has no exclusive tendency, which, for a French periodical, is a distinction; impartial and cosmopolitan.

Yale Review:—Succeeded the New Englander and Yale Review, May 1892. Quarterly. 4 numbers, per vol., 450 pp. \$3. Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor, New Haven, Conn. Back numbers complete from May 1892. Edited by George P. Fisher, George B. Adams, H. W. Farnam, A. T. Hadley and J. C. Schwab. Editors thus far have been members of the Yale faculty. Estimate of its editor: Committed to no party or school, it aims to present the results of the most scientific and scholarly investigation in history and political science. [An examination of the files shows that the Review has to do with economy to such an extent that it seems best to include it in this group.]

Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Socialpolitik u. Verwaltung:—First number, January, 1892. Quarterly. 4 numbers, per vol., 640 pp. Present vol. is No. 4. 10 fl. F. Tempsky, Verlagsbuchhandlung, Prague. Back numbers complete. Edited by E. von Böhm-Bawerk. Is the organ of the Gesellschaft Österreichischer Volkswirte. Estimate of its editor: Its field, political economy, statistics, and administration; articles of all tendencies are admitted; valuable summary of Austrian economic legislation.

[CORRECTION—The address of the Rivista di Sociologia, characterized in the May number, should read Palermo instead of Paterme.]

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[A selection of important books dealing with various lines of social work which have appeared since the beginning of 1896.

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- Cardinal Manning, St. George Mivart, NW., Je.
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- Protection vs. Free Trade: England's return to protection, Geo. Gunton, GM., My.
- Psychology: The mental cure in its relation to modern thought, Horatio Dresser, A., Je.
- The will to believe, William James, NW., Je.
- Entwicklungsfaktoren der niederländischen Frührenaissance, Fr. Carstanjen, VWP., Je.
- Die letzten Fragen der Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik, E. von Hartmann, ZPK., My.
- La follia di Ofelia, N. R. D'Alfonso, RIF, My.
- The accuracy of recollection and observation, Frederick Bolton, PsR., My.
- Character and the emotions, Alexander Shand, MI., Ap.
- Zur Diagnose psychischer Vorgänge mit besonderer Bezugnahme auf Hamlet's Geisteszustand, S. Landmann, ZPP., Je.
- Railroads: Twenty years of railways, H. R. Hobart, Railway Age, Je. 22.
- Federal railway regulation, H. T. Newcomb, PSQ., Je.
- English railway accounts for 1895, IR., My.
- Religion: The conception of immortality in Spinoza's Ethics, A. E. Taylor, MI., Ap.
- Il congresso delle religioni a Chicago nel 1893, B. Labanca, RIF., My.
- Russia: Russia and its Ruler, W. T. Stead, RRN., Je.
- Science: Generalisation et induction, G. Fongsegrive, RPh., Ap.
- The philosophical method of Isaac Newton, L. R. Harley, Ed., Je.
- La science rationnelle, G. Millhaud, RMM., My.
- Der Empirio-kritizismus als einzig wissenschaftlicher Standpunkte, R. Willy, VWP., Je.
- Single Tax: The ethics of the single tax, AMC., My.
- Societies: (For information as to the meetings of educational and scientific societies see Sc., Nt.)
- Social analysis: An analysis of the structure of a western town, Arthur Dunn, ChR., Ap.
- Socialism: Die Sozialdemokratie und die Landfrage, Wilhelm Böhmert, Ar., Ap.
- Le socialisme au XVIIIe siècle, Henry Clement, RefS., Ap. 16, also My. 1, My. 16.
- Les solutions socialistes et le fonctionnarisme, Eugene Rostand, RefS., My. 16.
- Social movements: (For Social movements see RefS., RiS., RIS., SS.)
- Society: Our American proletariat, GM., My.
- L'Elite intellectuelle et l'Aristocratie, J. Navicour, RPP., My.
- Sociology: Sociology (Review of Giddings' Principles of Sociology), Nt., My. 21.
- La musique au point de vue sociologique, Camille Bellaigue, RDM., My. 1.
- General sociology & criminal sociology, C. R. Henderson, ChR., Ap.
- Individualism & socialism, Z. S. Holbrook, BS., Je.
- Des forces qui déterminent l'évolution du milieu social, L. Beaurin-Gressier, RIS., Ap.

- Volksheime zur Pflege der Volksgeselligkeit und Volksbildung, Viktor Bohmert, Ar., Ap.
 The formulation of normal laws, S. N. Patten, AAP., My.
 Why progress is by leaps, Geo. Iles, PLM., Je.
 L'année sociologique 1895; la morale sociale, P. Lapie, RMM., My.
 Herbert Spencer's Sociologie, K. Vorländer, ZPK., My.
 Nécessité d'une interprétation psychologique et sociologique du monde, A. Fonillée, RPh., My.
 Statistics: Stoff und Methode der historischen Bevölkerungstatistik, Zofia Daszyneka, JNS., My.
 (For systematical statistical studies, *see* ASA., ASAr.; for general statistics *see* ESt).
 (Syndicates *see* Corporations.)
 Suffrage: De la transformation du suffrage universel amorphe en suffrage universel organique, Raoul de la Grasserie, RIS., Ap.
 Suicide: Les suicides à Lyon, A. Lacassanque, AAC., My. 15.
 Taxation: The income-tax decision, YR. My.
 Tramps: Le vagabondage Pathologique, J. As-tor, RPe., Ap.
 University Settlements: The university settlement movement, GM., Je.
 Water Supply: Filtration of city water supplies, Edwin Smith, S., My.
 Women: Does maternity preclude politics, Francis Fuller Victor, AMC., My.
 The benefit to women of suffrage rights, Harriet A. Marsh & others, AMC., Je.
 Die deutsche Frauenbewegung, Gustav Cohn, DR., Ap., My.
 Education of women in Turkey, Mary Parick, F., Je.
 Woman and the ballot, Alice B. Tweedy, PSM., Je.
 Constitutional suffrage for women, W. S. Harwood, NAR., My.
 Youth, Enemies of: La lutte sociale contre les ennemies de la jeunesse, E. Gounelle (& others), RCS., My.

ABBREVIATIONS OF MAGAZINE TITLES USED IN THE INDEX.

[The titles of articles selected from periodicals not in this list will be followed by name of periodical in full.]

A.	Arena.	JHS.	Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science.
AA.	American Anthropologist.	JMS.	Journal of Mental Science.
AAC.	Archives d'Anthropologie Criminelle.	JNS.	Jahrbücher für National-ökonomie und Statistik.
AAE.	Archivo per l'Antropologia e la Etnologia.	JPE.	Journal of Political Economy.
AAP.	Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.	LG.	Labor Gazette.
AC.	L'Association Catholique.	LH.	Lend a Hand.
ACQ.	American Catholic Quarterly Review.	LoQR.	London Quarterly Review.
AE.	Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen.	LQR.	Law Quarterly Review.
AGP.	Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.	M.	Monist.
AH.	Archive für Hygiene.	MHM.	Mansfield House Magazine.
AHR.	American Historical Review.	MI.	Mind.
AIS.	Annals de l'Institut de Science Sociale.	MIM.	Monatschrift für innere Mission.
AJM.	American Journal of Medical Sciences.	NA.	Nuova Antologia.
AJP.	American Journal of Psychology.	NAR.	North American Review.
AJS.	American Journal of Sociology.	NC.	Nineteenth Century.
AK.	Arbeiter-Kolonie.	NS.	Natural Science.
ALR.	American Law Review.	Nt.	Nature.
ALRR.	American Law Register and Review.	NW.	New World.
AMC.	American Magazine of Civics.	NZ.	Neue Zeit.
AMP.	Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, Séances.	PhR.	Philosophical Review.
AN.	American Naturalist.	PSM.	Popular Science Monthly.
Ant.	L'Anthropologie.	PSQ.	Political Science Quarterly.
AOR.	Archiv für öffentliches Recht.	PSR.	Psychological Review.
Ar.	Arbeiterfreund.	QJE.	Quarterly Journal of Economics.
ASA.	American Statistical Association, Publications.	QR.	Quarterly Review.
ASAR.	Allgemeine Statistisches Archiv.	RCS.	Revue Christianisme sociale.
ASG.	Archive für Sociale Gesetzgebung und Statistik.	RDI.	Revue de Droit internationale.
ASP.	Archiv für Systematische Philosophie.	RDM.	Revue des deux mondes.
BDL.	Bulletin of the Department of Labor.	REA.	Revue mensuelle l'Ecole d'Anthropologie de Paris.
BG.	Blätter für Gefängnisskunde.	Ref. S.	Reforme sociale.
BML.	Banker's Magazine, London.	ReS.	Revue Socialiste.
BMN.	Banker's Magazine, New York.	RH.	Revue historique.
BOT.	Bulletin de l'Office du Travail.	RHD.	Revue d'Histoire diplomatique.
BR.	Bond Record.	RIF.	Rivista italiana di Filosofia.
BS.	Bibliotheca Sacra.	RIS.	Rivista di Sociologia.
BSI.	Bulletin de Statistique et de Legislation Comparée.	RIS.	Revue internationale de Sociologie.
BUL.	Bulletin de l'Union Internationale de Droit Penale.	RISS.	Rivista internazionale di Scienze Sociali.
ChOR.	Charity Organisation Review.	RMM.	Revue Metaphysique et de Morale.
ChR.	Charities Review.	KP.	Revue de Paris.
CoR.	Contemporary Review.	RPe.	Revue penetentiaire.
DR.	Deutsche Revue.	RPh.	Revue philosophique.
DRU.	Deutsche Rundschau.	RPP.	Revue politique et parlementaire.
DZG.	Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft.	RRL.	Review of Reviews, London.
EcJ.	Economic Journal.	RRN.	Review of Reviews, New York.
EcR.	Economic Review.	RSI.	Rivista Storica italiana.
Ed.	Education.	RSP.	Revue sociale et politique.
EdR.	Educational Review.	RT.	Revue du Travail.
EHR.	English Historical Review.	S.	Sanitarian.
EM.	Engineering Magazine.	Sc.	Science.
EMo.	La España Moderna.	SP.	Science Progress.
F.	Forum.	SR.	School Review.
FR.	Fortnightly Review.	SS.	Science Sociale.
GEC.	Giornale degli Economisti.	VSV.	Vierteljahrsschrift für Staats- und Volkswirtschaft.
GM.	Gunter's Magazine.	VWP.	Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie.
HLR.	Harvard Law Review.	YR.	Yale Review.
HR.	Hygienische Rundschau.	ZE.	Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.
HZ.	Historische Zeitschrift.	ZGS.	Zeitschrift für die gesammte Staatswissenschaften.
IAE.	Internationales Archiv für Ethnographie.	ZPK.	Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik.
IJE.	International Journal of Ethics.	ZPO.	Zeitschrift für das privat- und öffentliche Recht.
IR.	Investor's Review.	ZPP.	Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane.
JAI.	Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland.	ZVR.	Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.
JEc.	Journal des Economistes.	ZVS.	Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Socialpolitik und Verwaltung.
JFI.	Journal of the Franklin Institute.		
JGV.	Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft.		

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SUPERIORITY AND SUBORDINATION AS SUBJECT- MATTER OF SOCIOLOGY.¹

I UNDERSTAND the task of sociology to be description and determination of the historico-psychological origin of those forms in which interactions take place between human beings.² The totality of these interactions, springing from the most diverse impulses, directed toward the most diverse objects, and aiming at the most diverse ends, constitutes "society." Those different contents in connection with which the forms of interaction manifest themselves are the subject-matter of special sciences. These contents attain the character of social facts by virtue of occurring in this particular form in the interactions of men. We must accordingly distinguish two senses of the term "society:" first, the broader sense, in which the term includes the sum of all the individuals concerned in reciprocal relations, together with all the interests which unite these interacting persons; second, a narrower sense, in which the term designates the society or the associating as such, that is the interaction itself which constitutes the bond of association, in abstraction from its material content—the subject-matter of sociology as the doctrine of society *sensu stricto*.

¹*Ueberordnung und Unterordnung. Superordination and Subordination* would be a more precise rendering, but above appears on the whole preferable. Tr.

²*Cf.* my paper, "The Problem of Sociology," in *Annals of the American Academy*, November 1895, Vol. VI, No. 3.

Thus, for illustration, we designate as a cube on the one hand any natural object in cubical form; on the other hand the simple form alone, which made the material contents into a "cube" in the former sense, constitutes of itself, independently and abstractly considered, an object for geometry. The significance of geometry appears in the fact that the formal relations which it determines hold good for all possible objects formed in space. In like manner it is the purpose of sociology to determine the forms and modes of the relations between men which, although constituted of entirely different contents, material, and interests, nevertheless take shape in formally similar social structures. If we could exhibit the totality of possible forms of social relationship in their gradations and variations we should have in such exhibit complete knowledge of "society" as such. We gain knowledge of the forms of socialization by bringing together inductively the manifestations of these forms which have had actual historical existence. In other words we have to collect and exhibit that element of form which these historical manifestations have in common, abstracted from the variety of material—economical, ethical, ecclesiastical, social, political, etc.—with respect to which they differ.

Now geometry has the advantage of finding within its field very simple figures to which the most complicated forms may be reduced. Truths respecting these simple figures are therefore very widely applicable. From relatively few fundamental truths all possible arrangements of form may be interpreted. In the case of social forms, on the contrary, an approximate reduction to simple elements has not been made. Social phenomena are too immeasurably complicated, and the methods of analysis are too incomplete. The consequence is that if sociological forms and names are used with precision they apply only within a relatively contracted circle of manifestations. Long and patient labor will be necessary before we can understand the concrete historical forms of socialization as the actual compounds of a few simple fundamental forms of human association.

When one says, for example, that superiority and inferiority is a formation to be found in every human association, though the proposition certainly involves very profound insight into the essence of human nature and human relationship, yet the assertion is so general that it affords little knowledge of particular societary formations. In order to reach such particular knowledge we must study separate types of superiority and inferiority, and we must master the special features of their formation, which in proportion to their definiteness of course lose generality of application.

In what follows I will exhibit some of the typical species of superiority and inferiority, in so far as they construct forms of association between individuals. For we must observe that superiority and inferiority is by no means a formation necessarily subsequent to the existence of "society." It is rather one of the forms in which "society" comes into being. It is one of the manifold interactions between individuals, the sum of which we designate as the socialization of the individuals concerned. The sociological task is therefore to interpret historical examples so as to show, first, from what material or formal conditions this form of society, in its different variations, takes its rise, and, on the other hand, what material or formal consequences attach themselves to the relation so discovered.

Every social occurrence as such, consists of an interaction between individuals. In other words, each individual is at the same time an active and a passive agent in a transaction. In case of superiority and inferiority, however, the relation assumes the appearance of a one-sided operation; the one party appears to exert, while the other seems merely to receive an influence. Such, however, is not in fact the case. No one would give himself the trouble to gain or to maintain superiority, if it afforded him no advantage or enjoyment. This return to the superior can be derived from the relation, however, only by virtue of the fact that there is a reciprocal action of the inferior upon the superior. The decisive characteristic of the relation at this point is this, that the effect which the inferior actually exerts upon the supe-

rior is determined by the latter. The superior causes the inferior to produce a given effect which the superior shall experience. In this operation, in case the subordination is really absolute, no sort of spontaneity is present on the part of the subordinate. The reciprocal influence is rather the same as that between a man and a lifeless external object with which the former performs an act for his own use. That is, the person acts upon the object in order that the latter may react upon himself. In this reaction of the object no spontaneity on the part of the object is to be observed, but merely the further operation of the spontaneity of the person. Such an extreme case of superiority and inferiority will scarcely occur among human beings. Rather will a certain measure of independence, a certain direction of the relation proceed also from the self-will and the character of the subordinate. The different cases of superiority and inferiority will accordingly be characterized by differences in the relative amount of spontaneity which the subordinates and the superiors bring to bear upon the total relation. In exemplification of this reciprocal action of the inferior, through which superiority and inferiority manifests itself as proper socialization, I will mention only a few cases, in which the reciprocity is difficult to discern.

When in the case of an absolute despotism the ruler attaches to his edicts the threat of penalty or the promise of reward, the meaning is that the monarch himself will be bound by the regulation which he has ordained. The inferior shall have the right on the other hand to demand something from the lawgiver. Whether the latter subsequently grants the promised reward or protection is another question. The spirit of the relation as contemplated by the law is that the superior completely controls the inferior, to be sure, but that a certain claim is assured to the latter, which claim he may press or may allow to lapse, so that even this most definite form of the relation still contains an element of spontaneity on the part of the inferior.

Still farther; the concept *law* seems to connote that he who gives the law is in so far unqualifiedly superior. Apart from

those cases in which the law is instituted by those who will be its subjects, there appears in lawgiving as such no sign of spontaneity on the part of the subject of the law. It is, nevertheless, very interesting to observe how the Roman conception of law makes prominent the reciprocity between the superior and the subordinate elements. Thus *lex* means originally *compact*, in the sense, to be sure, that the terms of the same are fixed by the proponent, and the other party can accept or reject it only *en bloc*. The *lex publica populi Romani* meant originally that the king proposed and the people accepted the same. Thus even here, where the conception itself seems to express the complete one-sidedness of the superior, the nice social instinct of the Romans pointed in the verbal expression to the coöperation of the subordinate. In consequence of like feeling of the nature of socialization the later Roman jurists declared that the *societas leonina* is not to be regarded as a social compact; where the one absolutely controls the other, that is, where all spontaneity of the subordinate is excluded, there is no longer any socialization.

Once more, the orator who confronts the assembly, or the teacher his class, seems to be the sole leader, the temporary superior. Nevertheless every one who finds himself in that situation is conscious of the limiting and leading reaction of the mass which is apparently merely passive and submissive to his guidance. This is the case not merely when the parties immediately confront each other. All leaders are also led, as in countless cases the master is the slave of his slaves. "I am your leader, therefore I must follow you," said one of the most eminent German parliamentarians, with reference to his party. Every journalist is influenced by the public upon which he seems to exert an influence entirely without reaction. The most characteristic case of actual reciprocal influence, in spite of what appears to be subordination without corresponding reaction, is that of hypnotic suggestion. An eminent hypnotist recently asserted that in every hypnosis there occurs an actual if not easily defined influence of the hypnotized upon the hypnotist, and that without this the effect would not be produced.

When we advance from this preliminary question, to the particular differentiations of the relation with which we are concerned, three possible types of superiority at once present themselves. Superiority may be exercised (*a*) by an individual (*b*) by a group (*c*) by an objective principle higher than individuals. I proceed to notice some of the sociological significance of these three cases.

The subordination of a group to a single person has in the first place as a consequence a very decided unification of the group, and this is equally the case with both the characteristic forms of this subordination: viz., (1) when the group with its head constitutes a real internal unity; when the superior is more a leader than a master, and only represents in himself the power and the will of the group; (2) when the group is conscious of opposition between itself and its head, when a party opposed to the head is formed. In both cases the unity of the supreme head tends to bring about an inner unification of the group. The elements of the latter are conscious of themselves as belonging together, because their interests converge at one point. Moreover the opposition to this unified controlling power compels the group to collect itself, to condense itself into unity. This is true not alone of the political group. In the factory, the ecclesiastical community, a school class and in associated bodies of every sort it is to be observed that the termination of the organization in a head, whether in case of harmony or of opposition, helps to effect unification of the group. This is most conspicuous to be sure in the political sphere. History has shown it to be the enormous advantage of monarchies that they unify the political interests of the popular mass. The totality has a common interest in holding the prerogatives of the crown within their boundaries, possibly in restricting them; or there is a common field of conflict between those whose interests are with the crown and those who are opposed. Thus there is a supreme point with reference to which the whole people constitutes either a single party or at most two. Upon the disappearance of its head, to which all are subordinate—with the end of this political pressure—all

political unity often likewise ceases. There spring up a great number of party factions which previously, in view of that supreme political interest for or against the monarchy, found no room.

This transformation in the political life of a people occurs not merely in the case of a complete abolition of monarchy, but also in the case of gradual limitation of its power, *i. e.*, of the *quantum* of its superiority. The parliamentary history of Germany and of France shows this very clearly. The unification of the group-elements through common subordination expresses itself moreover in this, that in this case factional disturbances are much more easily quieted than when the elements are independent and subordinate to no one. Here comes in force the conception of the tribunal of final appeal (*höhere Instanz*), of such weight sociologically, *i. e.*, for every form of human association. The Greek as well as the Italian city-states in many instances made shipwreck simply for this reason, that they had over them no higher authority which might have adjusted differences, as would have been done if they were in common subordination to a central power. Where several elements stand opposed to each other, and none of them recognizes a superior power, conflicts are, as a rule, to be reconciled only by direct comparison of force. The Christian religion is credited with attuning men's souls to peaceableness. In so far as this is the case the sociological ground for the fact is surely the feeling of the common subordination of all beings to the divine principle. The Christian believer is filled with the conception that over him and every opponent, be the latter a believer or not, stands that supreme authority. This thought removes the temptation to forcible measurement of strength as far from him as under normal conditions it would be from those who are subordinate to a supreme principle.

This unification may present itself in two different forms, *viz.*, as a leveling, or as gradation. In case a collection of human beings are alike subordinate to a single individual, they are in so far equal. The correlation between despotism and equality has long been recognized. On that account, from the other point of view, the autocrat often has an interest in equalizing the differ-

ences of social classes because marked superiorities and inferiorities in the relations between subjects come into real as well as psychological competition with his own supremacy. Thus we see in a large portion of European history, so long as feudalism and the legal differences of estates prevailed, that the struggles of the lower orders for legal equality were aided by the princes. The overlords sought to diminish the privileges of the nobility, because as rulers they elevated themselves to a more lofty and more equal eminence over an equalized society. But there is concealed in this relation between autocracy and the leveling of the ruled another social factor of great significance. This factor may be indicated as follows: The structure of a society in which a single person rules and the great mass obeys is to be understood only through the consideration that the mass, that is the ruled, includes only a portion of the personality belonging to the individuals concerned, while the ruler invests his whole personality in the relationship. Lordship over a developed society does not consequently differ so very much from rule over a horde, since the individuals build into the structure of the mass only fragments of their personality and reserve the remainder. There are wanting therefore in the mass, as the ruled subject, the resources, adaptabilities, the accommodations, the developments of power which the whole individual possesses through the unity and presence of his total psychical energy. Apart from consideration of this difference, this devotion of a mere fraction of individuality to the mass, the frequent facility of its subserviency is not to be understood.

Wonder has often been felt over the irrationality of the condition in which a single person exercises lordship over a great mass of others. The contradiction will be modified when we reflect that the ruler and the individual subject in the controlled mass by no means enter into the relationship with an equal *quantum* of their personality. The mass is composed through the fact that many individuals unite fractions of their personality,—one-sided purposes, interests and powers, while that which each personality as such actually is towers above this

common level and does not at all enter into that "mass," *i. e.*, into that which is really ruled by the single person. Hence it is also that frequently in very despotically ruled groups individuality may develop itself very freely, in those aspects particularly which are not in participation with the mass. Thus began the development of modern individuality in the despotisms of the Italian Renaissance. Here, as in other similar cases (for example, under Napoleon I and III), it was for the direct interest of the despots to allow the largest freedom to all those aspects of personality which were not identified with the regulated mass, *i. e.*, to those aspects most apart from politics. Thus subordination was more tolerable. It is one of the highest tasks of administrative art to distinguish properly between those characteristics of men with respect to which they may be included in a leveled mass, and those other characteristics which may be left to free individual development. For this distinction there is needed the most accurate knowledge of what is common to the mass, and what consequently is the material for the establishment of a common level, upon which the subjects may stand at a constantly equal height, while that in which the individuals composing the mass cannot be unified must be left outside the circuit of superiority and subordination. This is a formal sociological demand and arrangement which is by no means valid in political autocracies alone, but in every possible autocracy as well. It is therefore in this more exact sense that the leveling must be understood which corresponds with the superiority of a single person.

In the second place the group may assume the form of a pyramid. In this case the subordinates stand over against the superior not in an equalized mass, but in very nicely graded strata of power. These strata grow constantly smaller in extent but greater in significance. They lead up from the inferior mass to the head, the single ruler.

This form of the group may come into existence in two ways. It may emerge from the autocratic supremacy of an individual. The latter often loses the substance of his power, and allows it

to slip downwards, while retaining its form and titles. In this case more of the power is retained by the orders nearest to the former autocrat than is acquired by those more distant. Since the power thus gradually percolates, a continuity and graduation of superiority and inferiority must develop itself. This is in fact the way in which in oriental states the social forms often arise. The power of the superior orders disintegrates, either because it is essentially incoherent, and does not know how to attain the above emphasized proportion between subordination and individual freedom; or because the persons comprising the administration are too indolent or too ignorant of governmental technique to preserve supreme power. For the power which is exercised over a large circle is never a constant possession. It must be constantly acquired and defended anew if anything more than its shadow and name is to remain.

The other way in which a scale of power is constructed up to a supreme head is the reverse of that just described. Starting with a relative equality of the social elements, certain elements gain greater significance; within the circle of influence thus constituted certain especially powerful individuals differentiate themselves, until this development accommodates itself to one or to a few heads. The pyramid of superiority and inferiority is built in this case from below upward, while in the former case the development was from above downward. This second form of development is often found in economic relationships, where at first there exists a certain equality between the persons carrying on the work of a certain industrial society. Presently some of the number acquire wealth; others become poor; others fall into intermediate conditions which are as dependent upon an aristocracy of property as the lower orders are upon the middle strata; this aristocracy rises in manifold gradations to the magnates, of whom sometimes a single individual is appropriately designated as the "king" of a branch of industry.¹ By a sort of combination of the two ways in which graded superiority and

¹Of course such developments take place not in clear cut form nor in strict accordance with a scheme of explanation, but always in devious courses and obscured

inferiority of the group comes into being the feudalism of the Middle Ages arose. So long as the full citizen—either Greek, Roman or Teutonic—knew no subordination under an individual, there existed for him on the one hand complete equality with those of his own order, but on the other hand rigid exclusiveness toward those of lower orders. Feudalism remodeled this characteristic social form into the equally characteristic arrangement which filled the gap between freedom and bondage with a scale of classes. Service, *servitium*, united all members of the realm with each other and with the king. In those times of primitive economy the king had no other resort for rewarding his officials and for binding the great men of his dominions to himself than by enfeoffing them with land and laborers. At first this bestowal was only for life tenure or at will, but the fief later passed into property. The king parted with some of his domain, and his greater subjects likewise assigned land as fiefs to their inferior vassals and thus a gradation of social position, possessions and obligations came into existence. But the same progress came about from the opposite direction. The intermediate strata came into being not alone through concessions from above, but also through accumulations from below. On the one hand small landowners, originally free, gave up their land to more powerful lords, to receive it back from them as a fief. These lords of domains on the other hand, through constant accretions of power, which weakened royalty could not prevent, rose in their turn to kingly power. It is consistent with this contemporaneous duality of genesis that the feudal form of society may have quite antithetical consequences for its monarchical head. While the outcome in Germany was that the central power became hollow, being changed into a mere form, the

by all sorts of collateral phenomena. The sociological type which we derive from all this is always an abstraction, but not other than those at the basis of every science. The object of a special science seldom occurs in the purity and isolation in which it is scientifically treated, but in reality always mixed and entangled with phenomena to which other branches of science are devoted, so that each special science treats only an abstraction. It is therefore better to acknowledge freely that this is the case with the new science of sociology.

French crown founded upon the same system its power to organize and control throughout the entire realm.

So much with reference to the forms which the group assumes in subordination to an individual, which forms, either in clear exhibit or as elements of a complicated manifestation, are to be found in the structure of the most various groups, ecclesiastical not less than political, military as well as relationships which receive their structure entirely from the traits of character of those who compose them. It goes without saying that similar phenomena may occur in case of subordination to a numerous body. The numerical composition of the superior power is not always characteristic of it. In the sociological respect thus far referred to it may be a matter of indifference if the superior position of the one person happens to be occupied by a number of persons.

In passing to consideration of the relations which are characterized by the superiority of such a number of persons, I observe that monarchy is the type and the primary form of the superior and inferior relation in general. Monarchy is so expressive and effective that it continues to have a function even in those constitutions which arose from reaction against it, in constitutions which directly purposed to introduce in the place of monarchy a division of the sovereignty. It has been said of the American President, as of the Athenian Archon and of the Roman Consul, that with certain restrictions they are still merely the heirs of the royal power, of which the kings have been robbed through revolution. Maine has shown that the democracy of the French Revolution was nothing but the inverted French monarchy, equipped with precisely the same qualities as the latter; and Proudhon declares that a parliament based on universal suffrage differs in no respect from an absolute monarchy. If the popular representative be infallible, indestructible and irresponsible, the monarch cannot be essentially more. The monarchical principle according to this claim is as vitally present and complete in a parliament as in a legitimate king. Just in this respect is the significance of the *form* of socialization to be correctly apprehended.

If the organization of the group, the reciprocal relation of its elements has once become somewhat fixed, it persists, even if the motive and specific purpose from which it originated is thoroughly changed and even completely reversed. Quite new elements are introduced into the surviving form, yet in consequence of the stability of the form these substitutes exercise their functions in quite similar fashion. We shall presently meet again this further working of the form of organization.

In reference to those social structures which are characterized by the superiority of a number of persons, a social totality over individuals or other totalities, it is to be noticed at once that the consequences for the subordinates are very unequal. The highest wish of the Spartan and Thessalian slaves was to become slaves of the state rather than of individuals. In Prussia before the emancipation of the serfs the peasants attached to the state domains had a much preferable lot to that of those upon private estates. The situation of India under British administration is far better than under the sway of the East India Company and its private interests. In the great modern industrial enterprises where there is no entirely individual control, but which are either stock companies, or are under equally impersonal modes of administration, the employés are better off than in the smaller concerns where they are subject to the personal exploitation of the proprietor.

At the same time the contrary may be observed. The allies of Athens and Rome, the territories which were formerly subject to single Swiss Cantons, were more cruelly oppressed and plundered than could easily have happened under the tyranny of a single master. The stock company which, thanks to the methods in force in the business, as just now observed exploits its employés less than the private entrepreneur, is not at liberty in many cases, *e. g.*, where indemnities or special aids are in question, to act as generously as would be possible for a private owner who need not give account of his outlays to any one. And in relation to momentary impulses; the cruelties which were perpetrated for the amusement of the Roman circus goers, the extrem-

est refinement of which was often demanded by the latter, would scarcely have been practiced by many of these if the delinquent had been accountable to a single person alone. An immediately coöperating mass knows no individual considerations, because in the mass itself the individual impulses and qualities are paralyzed so that it cannot feel any sympathy with that which is specifically individual. The chief consideration is however that the point in which all the members of a large group securely coincide is very low in the scale of the moral; that consideration and delicacy is always of an individual and personal nature; that it will not usually be possible to unite a great number upon the same personal considerations; and that, especially in an association for economic ends, unlimited egoism in pursuit of material advantage and in saving cost is the one interest to be unqualifiedly accredited to all.

But subordination to a single individual may be preferred to that under a body of persons upon more ideal grounds, viz., when the superiority and inferiority bears a personal character, when it is a relation of fidelity, and the superior appears rather as a leader than a ruler. In that case there is in subordination a certain freedom and dignity which disappears when one is subordinate to a number of persons. Accordingly, the princes of the sixteenth century in France, Germany, Scotland and the Netherlands often encountered serious opposition when they allowed government to be exercised by learned substitutes or administrative bodies. The prerogative of command was regarded as something personal, to which one would render obedience only from personal devotion. The relation of superiority and inferiority existed only between person and person, whereby a higher and worthier rôle fell to the subordinate in the relationship than he could preserve in the case of subordination to an impersonal governing body composed of several individuals.

Of great importance for the outline of the sociological picture is the question whether and in what degree the lordship of a numerous body is exercised directly or through agents. The "agent" is a very peculiar phenomenon, emerging in every

highly developed form of intercourse. This phenomenon manifests its genuinely sociological character in the fact that it occurs in the most diverse sorts of groups and in the service of the most varied interests, everywhere exhibiting however certain similar formal traits. This common fundamental characteristic consists in the transference of responsibility. The real consequences of his action do not fall upon the agent, as they do upon every one who pursues his own proper interests. The affair itself does not make him responsible. Only because the consequences of his procedure fall upon another, and this latter has some sort of power over him, can the agent's action produce pleasure or pain in himself. This circumstance must make the essential relationship between the agent and the object of his action take a shape quite different from that which appears when the action is direct, without transference to the agency of another. On account of the greater distance of personal interest from the object the requirements of the agent may be less immediate and precise, and on that account very wide scope is often present for personal differences, especially where a totality is represented by a single individual. Here is room for hard-heartedness and pleasure in cruelty, which assumes the appearance of rigorous care for the interests of the principal; for pedantry or actual conscientiousness, which, in effect, amounts to the same thing; for negligence and complaisance, which tolerates lax discharge of duty on the part of the subordinate on the ground that the generality can easily bear the injury. This wide scope which the vicarious principle gives to personal tendencies, that are often little restrained by the requirements of the action concerned, is evidently one ground for the fact that subjection to a totality may have such widely contrasted consequences for the subordinate.

A peculiar form of subordination to a number of individuals is determination by vote of a majority. The presumption of majority rule is that there is a collection of elements originally possessing equal rights. In the process of voting the individual places himself in subordination to a power of which he is a part,

but in this way, that it is left to his own volition whether he will belong to the superior or the inferior, *i. e.*, the outvoted party. We are not now interested in cases of this complex problem in which the superiority is entirely formal, as, for example, in resolves of scientific congresses, but only with those in which the individual is constrained to an action by the will of the party outvoting him, that is, in which he must practically subordinate himself to the majority. This dominance of numbers through the fact that others, though only equal in right, have another opinion, is by no means the matter of course which it seems to us today in our time of determinations by masses. Ancient German law knew nothing of it. If one did not agree with the resolve of the community he was not bound by it. As an application of this principle unanimity was later necessary in the choice of king, evidently because it could not be expected or required that one who had not chosen the king would obey him. The English baron who had opposed authorizing a levy, or who had not been present, often refused to pay it. In the tribal council of the Iroquois, as in the Polish Parliament, decisions had to be unanimous. There was therefore no subordination of an individual to a majority, unless we consider the fact that a proposition was regarded as rejected if it did not receive unanimous approval, a subordination, an outvoting, of the person proposing the measure.

When, on the contrary, majority rule exists, two modes of subordination of the minority are possible, and discrimination between them is of the highest sociological significance. Control of the minority may, in the first place, arise from the fact that the many are more powerful than the few. Although, or rather because the individuals participating in a vote are supposed to be equals, the majority have the physical power to coerce the minority. The taking of a vote and the subjection of the minority serves the purpose of avoiding such actual measurement of strength, but accomplishes practically the same result through the count of votes, since the minority is convinced of the futility of such resort to force. There exist in the group two parties in

opposition as though they were two groups, between which relative strength, represented by the vote, is to decide.

Quite another principle is in force, however, in the second place, where the group as a unity predominates over all individuals, and so proceeds that the passing of votes shall *merely give expression to the unitary group will*. In the transition from the former to this second principle the enormously important step is taken from a unity made up merely of the sum of the individuals to recognition and operation of an abstract objective group unity. Classic antiquity took this step much earlier—not only absolutely but relatively earlier—than the German peoples. Among the latter the oneness of the community did not exist over against the individuals who composed it, but entirely in them. Consequently the group will was not only not enacted, but it did not even exist so long as a single member dissented. The group was not complete unless all its members were united, since it was only in the sum of its members that the group consisted. In case the group, however, is a self-existent structure—whether consciously or merely in point of fact—in case the group organization effected by union of the individuals remains along with and in spite of the individual changes, this self-existent unity—state, community, association for a distinctive purpose—must surely will and act in a definite manner. Since, however, only one of two contradictory opinions can ultimately prevail, it is assumed as more probable that the majority knows or represents this will better than the minority. According to the presumptive principle involved the minority is, in this case, not excluded but included. The subordination of the minority is thus in this stage of sociological development, quite different from that in case the majority simply represents the stronger power. In the case in hand the majority does not speak in its own name, but in that of the ideal unity and totality. It is only to this unity, which speaks by the mouth of the majority, that the minority subordinates itself. This is the immanent principle of our parliamentary decisions.

To these must be joined, third, those formations in which

subordination is neither to an individual nor yet to a majority, but to an impersonal objective principle. Here, where we seem to be estopped from speaking of a *reciprocal influence* between the superior and the subordinate, a sociological interest enters in but two cases: first, when this ideal superior principle is to be interpreted as the psychological consolidation of a real social power; second, when the principle establishes specific and characteristic relationships between those who are subject to it in common. The former case appears chiefly in connection with the moral imperatives. In the moral consciousness we feel ourselves subject to a decree which does not appear to be issued by any personal human power; we hear the voice of conscience only in ourselves, although with a force and definiteness in contrast with all subjective egoism, which, as it seems, could have had its source only from an authority outside the subject. As is well known the attempt has been made to resolve this contradiction by the assumption that we have derived the content of morality from social decrees. Whatever is serviceable to the species and to the group, whatever on that account is demanded of the members for the self-preservation of the group, is gradually bred into individuals as an instinct, so that it asserts itself as a peculiar autonomous impression by the side of the properly personal, and consequently often contradictory impulses. Thus would be explained the double character of the moral command. On the one side it appears to us as an impersonal order to which we have simply to yield. On the other side, however, no visible external power, but only our own most real and personal instinct enforces it upon us. Sociologically this is of interest as an example of a wholly peculiar form of reaction between the individual and his group. The social force is here completely grown into the individual himself. As by metempsychosis it has changed itself into the individual's own instinct. Within the souls of the persons so affected the instinct comes into reaction with those other impulses which are more personal and individual. The result of this process often continues itself in the acts of the individual, by which he exerts an

influence on the group. The influence of the group upon the individual, and that of the individual upon the group, in the case of these ethical occurrences, are far removed in time from each other. The former influence, through the transformation just indicated, is changed into a subjective imperative, which thus presents subordination of the individual to the conditions of the life of his group, in the form of obedience to an ideal impersonal principle.

We now turn to the second sociological question raised by the case of subordination to an impersonal ideal principle, viz., how does this subordination affect the reciprocal relation of the persons thus subordinated in common? Here again it should in the outset be observed that before this ideal subordination came into existence it was preceded by various kinds of actual subordination. We frequently observe the exercise of superiority by a person or a class in the name of an ideal principle, to which the thus prevailing personality is itself ostensibly subject. It appears to be the logical course for this relationship to precede and for the real organization of authority among men to develop itself in consequence of this ideal dependence. Historically, however, the way is as a rule the reverse. From interrelations of very real personal power there arise coördinations of superiority and inferiority, over which gradually, through spiritualization of the dominant power, or through extension and de-personalization (*Entpersonalisierung*) of the whole relationship, an ideal objective power grows up. When this stage has been reached the superior, the immediate representative of the power so derived, exercises only the authority of this objective power. The development of the position of the *pater familias* among the Aryans exhibits this clearly. The power of the *pater familias* was originally unlimited and entirely subjective; that is, his momentary desire, his personal advantage was permitted to give the decision upon all regulations. But this arbitrary power gradually became limited by a feeling of responsibility. The unity of the domestic group, embodied in the *spiritus familiaris*, grew into the ideal power in relation

to which the lord of the whole came to regard himself as merely an obedient agent. Accordingly it follows that morals and custom, instead of subjective preference, determine his acts, his decisions, his judicial judgments; that he no longer behaves as though he were absolute lord of the family property, but rather the manager of it in the interest of the whole; that his position bears more the character of an official station than that of an unlimited right. Thus the relation between superiors and inferiors is placed upon an entirely new basis. While in the first stage the latter constitute only a personal competence, so to speak, of the former, the objective idea of the family is now created. The family is thought of as standing above all the individual members. The guiding patriarch himself is, like every other member, subordinate to the family idea. He may give directions to the other members of the family only in the name of the higher ideal unity.

An example of formally similar development is furnished by the most recent times with their increasing preponderance of the objective and technical element over the personal. Many sorts of superiority and inferiority which formerly bore a personal character, so that in a given relation one party was plainly the superior and the other the inferior, are now so changed that they are both and equally subject to an objective purpose, and the subordination of the one to the other persists only as a *technical necessity* within this common relationship to the higher principle. So long as the relation of the wage-worker is looked on as a rental contract—the laboring man is hired or *rented*—so long does the relationship contain essentially an element of subordination of the laborer to the employer. This element is excluded however so soon as we regard the labor compact not as rental but as purchase of labor as an economic good. Then is the subordination which the relation demands of the laborer, as has been said, only a subordination “to coöperative progress, which for the entrepreneur, in so far as he performs any activity, is as essential as for the laborer.” The increased self-consciousness of the modern laborer must in part at least be

credited to this sociological perception. He has no longer the feeling that he is a subject person. He regards himself only as servant of an objective economic *technique*, within which the element that as entrepreneur or leader is superior to himself works no longer as a personal superior, but simply as a technical necessity. Inasmuch as the laborer is no longer hired as an entire person, but rather a quantitatively defined service is stipulated, he is freed as a man from the relation of inferiority. He now belongs to the relationship only as a factor of the process of production, *thus in so far coördinate with the leader*.

The disadvantages of the relation of modern servants, as it exists in central Europe at least, are traceable to the fact that here really the whole human being enters into the relation of subordination, since his service is not restricted to definitely limited tasks. Only under such restrictions does relative coördination of superiority and inferiority enter. This is the case in a measure when the persons in domestic service have only a certain defined part of the household work to perform. In so far they are coördinate with the mistress of the household, with whom they coöperate in discharge of the necessary tasks of the household. On the other hand the former, and still existing relation, which engaged domestic servants as entire personalities, made them subservient to no such objective purpose, but rather to the mistress of the house as a person.

To what extent subordination to an ideal objective purpose creates a sort of equality among those who have positions of superiority and inferiority within this process, is shown further by the relation between officers and common soldiers. If this coördination is most prominent in war, where subordination is so especially rigid, it is for the reason that in war the patriotic purpose which is above all individual considerations operates more powerfully and more perceptibly. In peace, on the contrary, this patriotic purpose falls relatively into the background, and the material technique of service becomes prominent. This is consistent with the utilitarian importance of the direct relationship of superiority and subordination, while constant and

conscious ranking under the highest purpose, to which the whole relationship is ultimately subordinate, is not so necessary.

In what manner the relation between superiority and subordination is modified by the fact that in its entirety it is subsidiary to an ideal purpose, depends upon the question, is the person in the superior station the representative of the higher objective principle as against the subordinate, or have they a similar relation to this principle, so that the gradation between them is a matter of technique and organization? The former case occurs in the relation of an official to the public; the second in his relation to subordinate officials. In the former instance the official represents the whole idea and power of the state over against the citizen, who by transgression of law, may have placed himself outside of normal civic relations. The power which the official exercises flows from that higher civic principle to which, to be sure, the citizen belongs, yet for the moment this power confronts the latter as an external constraint, and asserts itself as superior to him. In the relation of the higher to the lower official on the other hand, the civic principle, the superior idea, is alike present in both. The one represents this idea as well as the other. Superiority and subordination between them are not produced by the antithesis of two principles, but by organization within one and the same principle.

These two forms of superiority and subordination dominated by a higher principle, with their very different consequences, emerge in the most various social spheres and with the most manifold complications. In all the countless cases in which an objective idea, an abstract unity, manifests itself in hierarchical organization, this double relationship of the individual is to be found. He is clothed with the dignity and importance of that principle, and he therewith enters into a relationship of superiority to all those over whom the principle has power. This occurs most obviously in the case of civic officials, who by no means owe their superiority over the citizens to the power of their own personality, but only to that of the principle of which they are the exponents. The same is often the case with a member of a

priestly order, in short, in all those social structures in which each individual member, *even when he occupies a very subordinate place within the structure*, yet towards those without represents the whole power and importance of the principle. On the other hand, such attachment to an organization may give rise to a certain subordination to those without. This is true, for example, in the case of a member of a business house. In his position as representative of the interests of the business he must conduct himself with zeal and devotion towards the public, even though within the concern itself he occupies a very superior position. The like is illustrated by the begging monk, who within his order may hold a commanding and influential station, yet towards all others he clothes himself in the deepest humility and subordination.

We thus see the most remarkable complications emerge where superiority and inferiority between individuals is limited and crossed by the subordination of the whole relationship to a higher principle. From such a very special example it may be evident that only the most accurate analysis of the forms of the relations which occur among men may gradually lead at last to an actual understanding of the complicated structure of human society. For "society" means that these countless bonds, dependences, relations of equilibrium or preponderance establish themselves between individuals. It is evident that we can reach an understanding of these relationships only by casting the sum of a great number of real historical cases; that is, by leaving out of consideration the differences in the material content of these relations, and by making only the forms of the relations, in all their modifications, crossings and complications the object of our investigations, just as logic becomes a science when we disregard all defined and specific contents of thought and consider only the forms in which single representations are so combined as to form truths.¹

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¹ Translated by ALBION W. SMALL.

(To be continued.)

SOME SOCIAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

IN large manufacturing centers the ethnic type is to a great extent a misshapen being. The form is stoop-shouldered, the legs bowed, the gait shambling, the eye dim and the skin pallid. Dispensary physicians treat yearly multitudes of children afflicted with rickets and malformations, either congenital or acquired.

When more attention than ever before is paid to physical culture, what omission, what physiological hindrances does each distorted human figure stand for? It represents, alas! wrong living perhaps for generations, privation, lack of proper food, hereditary weakness or disease, disabilities caused by overwork and strained posture, and oftener still an uncared-for childhood, the burdened or indifferent industrial mother being too absorbed to prevent her babe from walking prematurely or injuring itself for life by falls. On the other hand, over-zealous care and active mismanagement of infants work as much harm as neglect does. Ignorant how to hold her child, the parent causes its body to be crooked and its spine twisted by dragging it on one arm while she, poor creature! cooks, cleans, eats and sews with the other, pressing the wailing mite all day against her hot, unhealthful bosom and smothering it at night under her heavy covers. The offspring of the poor, seldom out of arms for the first twelve months, are too sedulously "minded" by awkward little sisters and brothers to permit fair play for nature's processes of growth, muscular exertion and rest. These nurses themselves, frail, tiny, almost infantile, become stunted or deformed from carrying heavy babes; for, from mistaken kindness, the last heir is rarely laid on a pillow or propped in a chair, unhugged and unhampered. If there be a grandmother in the family, two able-bodied women often take turns in holding one perfectly normal child, which under incessant handling soon becomes a morbid little atom. Clothing is piled on its puny body while in all weather

its head and legs are bare; and the most hurtful foods are given it to silence the unwelcome bawl.

At the end of its first year, the mother-instinct is apt to weaken, and even though no other claimant for nurture appears, the infant is turned adrift in alley or street to run a thousand risks. Diminutive creatures battle for life in the filthy tenements, frequently in rain. "I worked in the mill and her grandmother neglected her," wailed the mother of a beautiful and cheery little maid of four years who had been suddenly stricken with paralysis and blindness, but who hitched her red rocker towards the visitor's voice, piping forth, "I'm named Ellie. What's oo name?"

Even those of the poor who dower their children with strong constitutions are pitifully apathetic to unhealthful conditions which deplete the family ranks. One woman, robust and vigorous, lost by an epidemic two babies within a week, yet stayed on in the fatal tenement. Shortly after, in thirty-eight hours' time, four more of her little brood died, victims of her ignorance or inertia; yet still she lingered where six of her offspring had perished. Soon the death of the seventh at last drove her, with only the oldest son surviving, into a cleaner abode which doubtless through her own shiftlessness will become another fever trap. In many cases the worker is not to blame for the unsanitary condition of his home, as where occupancy of the "Company's houses" is a condition of employment. The manager of a mill "block" where typhus with deadly virulence had threshed out the weakest, remarked of a tenant loom-fixer, "That man had five girls and boys when he took our rooms. A fortnight later, he moved out with only two. I hadn't the heart to charge him rent.' What sort of "heart" let him go into the house when death was well-nigh certain?

Housekeeping, in the good old Anglo-Saxon meaning of care for every detail, order and sweet prevision is, among very many working mothers, not a lost, but an undiscovered art. Beds are often still unmade and sleeping-rooms foul at five o'clock in the afternoon. Viands cooked and uncooked lie open all day near

hot stoves in tobacco-laden air. Numbers of women, unable to cut out, to fit or sew, spend their small incomes hiring their children's garments made, themselves ragged meanwhile. Parental discipline is rare except in violent outbreaks, a common substitute for gentle suasion or moral sanction being a leather strap as broad as the hand, cut at one end into strips, the more effectually to sting; and on big and little urchins alike, on male and female, corporal punishment is at times administered with this flesh-flaying device, compared with which the hickory switch of wholesome memory was a fairy wand. At other times wayward little ones, unrebuked, kick the parents in passion or pound the grandparent; and as they grow older, untrained and uncontrolled, they become moving spirits in those misdoings that fill the penitentiaries and reformatories with young men and women criminals under the age of twenty-five. Such, in our urban tenements, are the surroundings and the habits of too many of the average working population.

On the other hand, improved tenement blocks are not always full, and our hitherto clumsy ventures in coöperative housekeeping, with all its labor-saving appliances, are shunned from deep-rooted prejudice. In one town a model building adapted for fifty families contains but thirty, while in neighboring rookeries, paying higher rent for wretched accommodations, dwell thousands of human beings to whom tidiness and decency are almost unknown. Other cities point with similar failures the moral of our ill-considered and unsympathetic philanthropies. Near a large commercial center an excellent library being opened for cotton operatives exclusively, the operatives would not consent to be classed apart by availing themselves of it, so the rooms were closed and the books given away. Indeed, reading rooms, lessons and other social features of religious or benevolent organizations are often scantily patronized, because there has been no previous schooling or no genuine sustained human interest under the perfunctory meetings. Homes established for underpaid women-workers are invaded by the well-to do, albeit the friendless factory girl, lodging in an attic or

sleeping on a floor promiscuously with men and paying dearly for the shelter, is without a respectable place to lay her head. In only a bare half dozen houses of various philanthropic associations is the neediest claimant received—the tobacco stripper, the slop-shop victim, the wage-earner in obnoxious and repulsive callings. Perhaps she does not apply. At all events she is not there.

New York alone, it is asserted, has twenty thousand vagrant children without parents, instruction or steady occupation, dodging about alleys and sleeping in hall-ways and ash-barrels. Though lofty asylums rear handsome fronts, girl-beggars dog the footsteps of the citizen and the jails harbor boys detained with criminals, until it seems that neither private benevolence nor state care adequately provides for helpless youth. Everywhere, too, roam hordes of unemployed, many of them decent men who claim that there is no work for them; and because of this involuntary idleness their wives must wrest bread from the factories, their sons and daughters must grow up ignorant, if not vicious, in those very cities where millions flow for institutions of learning and reform. The ill-paid tenement seamstress or shop girl, haunting the streets for warmth or excitement, and gliding to ruin in concert halls, is but the natural product of a poor home, over-supply of unskilled labor, and killing competition. Meanwhile vast remedial forces for readjusting and improving social conditions beat almost ineffectively the empty air.

What signify these sharp contrasts—so many mortals needing to be cared for, taught, uplifted, so many activities eager to protect, to elevate, to inspire, yet the chasm between unbridged? Why do the means fail frequently to reach the end? What resistance renders the current of benevolence and Christian effort not always a source of power and light, banishing destitution and ignorance, but as often a deadly stroke to self-respect?

Not wholly with our economic system lies the fault. Other influences cause even those institutions to languish which are conceived in the unction of the highest devotion to humanity. We need to cultivate a new ethical sense and more imagination.

One great manufacturing firm built for its operatives a sort of palace of delight; but the founders were bitterly disappointed in its results, until, years after, putting aside their own preconceptions as to the way in which the pleasures and opportunities they offered should be used, they gave rein to the wishes of the workers, when, behold! a multitude of wants, worthy wants, cropped out of which the originators had never dreamed. Now, the palace is really a delight. Another practical philanthropist and merchant prince who has fitted up a home on a grand scale for his employ  s and has tried profit sharing to some extent, finds the home regarded askance and avoided, and the profits discounted a year ahead in costlier raiment or self indulgence. But in neither home nor store were the workers ever allowed to feel the slightest sense of ownership. Even Toynbee Hall, the socialists declare, is a failure. The university men, they claim, went to East London "to teach the poor a thing or two;" the poor, on the contrary, have taught the young men a thing or two, with result that the college reformers are becoming socialists.

To make availing these and kindred efforts for the relief of suffering mankind, to deal wisely and in a practical way with the arbitrarily called "lower classes," it behooves us, first, to abandon our Procrustean endeavor to fit workers to *our* ideas as to what ethical ambitions are proper for industrial communities to cherish. Surroundings that satisfied toilers a generation ago suffice no longer. Distinctions then admitted are now resented. Standards of living are higher. Social aspirations quicken in the breast of the lowliest—healthy outcome of the democratic germ. In theory, comparative riches are easily enough provided for gaunt sewing women and weary clerks, at domestic service; but as they hate it and are unfitted for it, out-at-elbow "young ladies" throng the factories, while the comfortably appointed kitchens of the rich remain a solitude. To argue, to inveigh is useless, until some of the present requirements of household service are changed—separation from one's family, for instance,—and until public sentiment so annihilates inequalities of station that young men with a social career before them will not be

thought to demean themselves by marrying Mrs. Dives' cook or maid.

Equally short-sighted and utopian it is to expect immediate success from educational experiments upon that wage-earning population which we are now assimilating. Only traditions of culture and study, or ample command of time, or natural susceptibilities and ambitions bring real enjoyment of lectures, literature and historic and artistic collections. Although in many places libraries and museums are shut on Sundays and at night, although parks are so distant from the workingman's home that to take his family there for an outing costs fully one-tenth of his weekly pay, still there is unreasonable complaint and railing among unthinking people because, in spite of society's fiat that the lower orders shall profit by picture shows and reading rooms open at impossible hours, nevertheless beer gardens and concert halls of the worst character continue to be crowded. As if, to spiritual and æsthetic beauty ignorant eyes could be unsealed in one hour! The poor are often strikingly sensitive to such forms of beauty as they know; and they save every bright rag or battered flower for adornment. Since the Metropolitan Museum in New York has been accessible on Sundays and in the evenings, three-fifths of the annual visits occur at those times. London, too, is at last wheeling into line by throwing open its national collections of books and art on Sunday, the only day when the plain people can enjoy them.

It seems to me that educated women, more than any other element of the community, have the power to better the condition of all wage-earners. They have ample command of time; they have influence; and some of them have intelligent sympathy with workers that does not degenerate into sentimentality. But it would be necessary first to discard the inhuman notion which good women often entertain—and which is fostered by their conservatism and the traditions of their life—that there is a fixed social gulf between leisure and toil. The privileged would have to meet their laboring sisters, whether in factories shops or

domestic service, on the only just and helpful basis, true womanly regard for woman. After all, accident rather than inherent right to the world's best gifts lavishes on one daughter of Eve culture and broad opportunity, while goading another through poverty to incessant drudgery. Some of the richest men today may from fire, flood or fraud be paupers tomorrow and their children may be reduced to the workbench. I have seen just such delicately nurtured women stooping over machines in many big factories, their fortune gone, and themselves, like most graduates of female schools, without a single developed talent or practical resource for gaining a livelihood in higher pursuits. Had the grandfathers of our aristocracy of mere wealth remained in the old world throttled by class distinctions, the sons of these men might have been only small shopkeepers or humble artisans whose daughters would now look at labor problems from a six-loom weaver's standpoint, would groan from these problems in a tenement, or starve with them in a garret. Hard travail crushing out all but the material element of their existence, would such women be conscious of those higher needs the lack of which is flung as a reproach in the face of the poor?

Vulgarity is not a cause but an effect. Most working people desire money for wherewithal to live before they can think about manners; and to those who have never had refinements of living it is no actual hardship, as we conceive it, to be shut out from the beautiful, delicate and stately. The outlook would be more hopeful did all feel it a hardship. Only when present conventional and economic differences shall have been leveled will a new growth of spiritual tenderness appear. The average wage-earner of today makes, all things considered, wonderfully much of his small resources. But, being without ballast from experience in any pursuit more responsible, without the wisdom born of gradual use of unwonted powers, this average wage-earner, if suddenly transformed into the creature of the reformer's standards, would be a wholly disappointing being, out of place in his surroundings, at war with his kindred, a useless incumbrance. Such in truth is somewhat the present tendency of public school

training—to produce young men and women marred for the industrial career but unqualified to grasp a higher. Could the socialist's dream of equal privileges and possessions for all mankind become at once a fact, the unnatural relations and the natural dislocations consequent upon the change would wreck the social organism. The duty to usher in a juster, wiser economic dispensation is less imperative than the duty to fit men, now, in their present actual relations to their family and society, to be worthier the demands of the existing order and capable of using and profiting by new improved conditions as they arise, so that abuse of privileges will cease to cause a reaction in favor of continuing ancient restrictions. The supreme law of gradual preparation and development should govern. Attempts to get larger opportunities for the laborer or to restore his diverted rights ought not to be spasmodic, lifting him, then neglecting him till he falls lower than before. Whenever the worker is capable, then he may rule. Let us help to make him capable, instead of aiding him to seize power while yet he is unfit. Universal equality of condition might not remain a chimera, if philanthropic endeavors were more bent upon raising and perfecting the type and less set upon rendering the poor abjectly content, as a Christian duty, with a lot in which they must always resemble beasts of burden. On the contrary it were wiser to develop in the breadwinner a loftier moral nature even at the risk of revulsion from his material environment. Higher knowledge is not to be discouraged because it brings bitterer repinings and keener insight into the injustice of the existing economic rule, because the drudgery and negations of life entail more suffering as one's perceptions and sensibilities sharpen. Discontent has noble uses; and the negations of life are for the present inevitable.

One means of widening the wage-earner's horizon is to educate him in the line of industrial expertness and supremacy. What is the main reason for the small trader's failure and the shirt maker's despair? The small trader cannot keep accounts, has no business training; and the shirt maker never learned to sew. It is a grievous mistake to suppose that those who

must work therefore know how to work. Self-supporting arts are neither an endowment of nature nor taught as yet in our schools. In shops and factories, too, so far has division of labor been carried, an expert in one branch can perform no other function. Girls can scam up a garment but cannot cut or finish it; can stitch straw hats, but are unable to trim them; can tuck the bosom of a shirt while they would botch the collar. All-around instruction has been abolished under the thralldom of machinery, which tends more and more to specialize. This narrow training, the sole preparation of our wage-earners, not being pieced out by manual education, our girls especially lack those handicrafts which would qualify them for self-maintenance, and that industrial skill which simplifies household pursuits and helps to make comfortable and to adorn the home.

It is a fact of much ethical as well as economic significance that, in the domestic management of the poor, wages or the greater part of them are usually turned over absolutely to the wife. She it is who expends the funds. Every week or month she holds in her hand what represents and ought to secure the physical and moral welfare of her family—rent, food, raiment, schooling, thrift and content,—but which sometimes is converted by waste into misery alone. If, as seldom happens, the woman knows how to make the utmost of her resources, knows how to select nourishing food, to provide suitable attire, to attract her children to their home and neutralize the temptations of the street; if she is wise enough to turn and save, that they may go longer to school, instead of being broken in early to the premature toil that means bodily and spiritual deterioration, this humble mother becomes in the moral and economic world as mighty a factor as the steam engine is in the material universe. She has generated power from crude elements and has created a new moral dynamo.

But the "instincts of motherhood" alone are not to be trusted where the welfare of millions is at stake. Higher sanitary standards make the wiser portion of society revolt from leaving even the care of infancy to unguided maternal freaks. A wretchedly

destitute woman whose son had St. Vitus' dance paid her last two dollars for a dog to sleep with him, believing that the disease would leave the boy and attack the animal, citing in proof the case of a child with "worm fits" who was said to have given the malady to two dogs which died in turn while the patient recovered. Curative efforts, nearly always thus illogical, the inadequate "instincts" of motherhood helpless to ward off murderous tenement house ills—these causes, besides contributing to infant mortality in all densely peopled centers, swell the record of sickness and inefficiency. The man or woman too inefficient to earn a living sometimes gets a living by guilty means. Our vast complicated machinery of hospitals and prisons now aids the survival of the weakest, not the fittest, by providing for and in one sense rewarding and perpetuating disease, inebriety and crime. Yet all these evils might be nearly abolished, certainly greatly lessened in the next five generations, if parents could be induced to live up to the highest hygienic and ethical ideals—ideals hidden equally from fashion's slaves and those ground down by toil and want.

Thorough industrial training, such as is given in the house-keeping schools of France and Belgium, would enable the mothers of the working class so to order their households that neglected homes would not, as they now do, beget intemperance or the scandals of divorce. Nor, with the resource of skillful hands to mend and remake, and otherwise eke out their allowance, would wives need to supplement the husband's earnings by going themselves into the mills, thus by over-supply lowering wages for all. Less frequently would fragile, stunted child-rivals cheapen pay and take bread from the mouths of honest workers. Were domestic economy better understood and incomes more wisely laid out, child-labor would cease to be, as so many selfish or really underpaid toiling fathers now claim that it is, the only recourse against debt. The married female worker or the self-supporting single woman is not herself always responsible for those short comings which make her home wretched. She leaves it at six in the morning and except on Saturday does not return

much before seven at night—the victim of an economic system that asks the longest possible hours at the smallest wage. The one precludes domestic life. The other, neither her own clamor nor philanthropy nor public sentiment can as yet increase. Even the best intentioned employer is often shut off from schemes of reform by that system of competition which ordains that he must undersell or himself become bankrupt. To undersell generally means that he must underpay workers or else supersede them with a cheaper kind—with half educated or miseducated and wholly inexperienced girls, or else with the latest foreign industrial invaders who can subsist on sixty cents a week. Fiercer grows the struggle for existence in the routine employments, due partly to glut of unskilled labor. The misery thus engendered tends to excite deplorable class antagonism; and whenever workers are arrayed against capitalists, caste warfare usually threatens.

An ounce of prevention here would be worth many pounds of cure. One way to allay this social discontent is to raise the whole *morale* of labor by first uplifting the female. Whatever promotes the intelligence, technical ability and material prosperity of women promotes at once the welfare of the entire body of workers; secures them better homes and thereby creates stronger local attachments and civic spirit—in fact, changes tendencies that might prove revolutionary into safe and useful aspirations.

The outlook brightens. Enlightened opinion in America and abroad is slowly preventing by legislation and otherwise both individual and corporate oppression. Under present conditions, the female breadwinner, on the lowest round of the ladder, suffers most. Her lot would be eased, I repeat, if influential advocates of her own sex, in clubs and out of them, would seriously devote themselves to bettering her situation. So much in any event they can do—plead with legislators for immigration laws that will improve the *personnel* of the foreign competition; for adequate factory and inspection laws, protecting the workingwoman from accident to life and limb, and mitigating as far as possible the

necessary evils of her burdened life. This is not all. She needs also sanitary and building laws that will render her poor home more comfortable, not a generator of every ill. She needs such school laws and supervision as will vitalize her meager education by more effective and stimulating methods; and schools enough to include all the youth of the country, with compulsory education for the neglected street vagrants. She needs revival of the handicrafts and technical training. She needs parks close at her door, cheap transportation, good music, rational amusements without separation of the sexes. At least, the favored classes, by moral support and more active personal interest, might bring about strict enforcement of such legal provisions in behalf of workers as already exist, but which disuse and the selfishness of individuals often convert into mere skeletons of once vital enactments.

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THE IDEALS OF SOCIAL REFORMERS.¹

ONE of the special tasks of our generation is the work of wedding Christianity and the social movement. They are divorced now. The bulk of our church members is either ignorant and indifferent in regard to the social movement, or else suspicious of it. The majority of social-reform workers, at least if we include Europe, fluctuates somewhere between contempt and avowed hostility toward the church and spiritual religion. We of "The Brotherhood of the Kingdom" believe that such a separation is unnecessary, unwise, and undesirable, detrimental to the full success of both parties concerned, and perilous to the future of humanity.

We believe in the spiritual life, in the fact of sin and corruption, in the need and possibility of salvation, in holiness and eternal life. We have no desire to see evangelical Christianity bled to death; to see the church of Christ turned into a reform club; to see the hidden life of the believer toned down to a mild and sapless altruism; and to have Christian theology changed into a modern gnosticism, into a system of evolutionary philosophy, with a place for Christ as one of the evolutionary forces. On the contrary, we find fault with modern Christianity because it is not Christian enough. We desire a completer surrender to the Spirit of God, a fuller life of trust, and a more ardent zeal for all missionary work, and for the universal reign of King Jesus. But, on the other hand, we also believe in the social movement of the nineteenth century. We refuse to regard it as a red-hot lava eruption from the crater of hell. We hold that it is a river flowing from the throne of God, sent by the Ruler of history for the purification of the nations. We see God's hand in it; we see Christ's blood in it; we see the creative ener-

¹The author is corresponding secretary of "The Brotherhood of the Kingdom," and this paper is written from the view point of that organization.—ED.

gies of the Spirit in it, bringing out of its chaos the beauties of a new world.

We have this two-sided faith. But our faith is not yet supported on all sides by knowledge. The two chemical elements have not yet completed their union in us. A long and earnest process of thought is necessary. We must overhaul all the departments of our thought and work out that social Christianity which will be immeasurably more powerful and more valuable to the world than either an unsocial Christianity or an unchristian socialism. After the process of union is in a measure completed in ourselves, we can become mediators for others, breaking down the middle wall of partition between Christianity and the social movement, bringing them into their just and natural relation to each other, infusing the exalted fervor and power of religion into the social movement, and helping religion to find its ethical outcome in the transformation of social conditions.

In examining the ideals of social reformers I shall try to take up the great ideals that are common to the whole social movement, rather than isolated schemes and measures. I shall first set forth the elements and tendencies in which we can heartily concur, and then the points where the dangers of the social movement seem to me to lie.

The starting point of the social movement is the conviction of the inherent worth of a human being. Its goal is to secure the recognition of that worth in all departments of life. The mention of a few facts will help us to realize that this feeling, that human life is a precious thing, is the hydraulic force in the social uplift.

We view with pity and indignation single concrete cases of suffering or wrong. Last summer the case of Maria Barberi agitated the people of New York. The pity may have been foolishly bestowed in this case; I pass no judgment on that; but the pity was there; thousands of people took thought for it that a single human life, one among two millions, was to be ended. Remember also the public resentment when wrongs done to a whole class are brought to light. Remember how the common

people of Brooklyn sympathized with the trolley strikers, in spite of the discomfort the strike inflicted on the city. Think how we are aroused by news of oppression even in foreign countries. The indignation aroused by the Bulgarian atrocities, by the Armenian outrages, by George Kennan's accounts of the Russian prisoners, are cases known to all. Of course, those who espouse a movement of that sort feel that the public conscience is very sluggish and easily goes to sleep again, and that is true, too. But, after all, is it not a remarkable thing that in this great crowded globe, where men are suffering and dying every second, and where most of us need all our strength to provide bread for our own stomachs and to fight off others who are trying to step on us, there should be any interest at all in a lot of foreigners whom none of us has ever seen? Remember, too, how we winced, when the heathen at the Parliament of Religions pointed out the poverty in our own cities. All this pity, indignation, and shame are based on the sense of humanity. They are human beings who suffer, and human beings are too good to suffer thus. The argument of the political economist who says that this is the struggle for existence, and that this suffering works out the greatest good in the end; the pious sigh of the Christian Pharisee who assures us that we shall have the poor with us always and that things can't be changed till Christ comes; and the shrug of selfish over-culture which assures us that these people are very low and sordid and desire nothing better; they are all swept away like chaff before the feeling that a man's a man for all that, and the knowledge that human tears are scalding hot and hurt when they fall on our hearts.

Another evidence of the power which this sense of humanity has already acquired over us may be found in the attitude taken by the artistic interpreters of our thoughts. Consider the change which has come over literature since Horace wrote his

"Odi profanum vulgus et arceo."

What modern poet would care to write like that? Compare with that the lesson of Sir Launfal's search for the Holy Grail, or these lines of Lowell:

" In a hovel rude,
 With naught to fence the weather from his head,
The King I sought for, meekly stood ;
 A naked, hungry child
Clung round his gracious knee,
 And a poor hunted slave looked up and smiled
To bless the smile that set him free ;
 New miracles I saw his presence do, . . .
No more I knew the hovel bare and poor,
 The gathered chips into a wood-pile grew,
The broken morsel swelled to goodly store ;
 I knelt and wept : my Christ no more I seek,
His throne is with the outcast and the weak."

While not all of our modern poets are such prophets of Christian democracy as Lowell, yet with singular unanimity the greatest novelists of the Christian nations are full of reverence for plain suffering humanity, and full of scorn for the polished selfishness of the upper classes who used to absorb the attention of older novelists. In religious literature we look almost in vain for any honest dealing with the text about the camel and the needle's eye ; but one can find quite wonderful expositions of it in Tolstoi's *War and Peace*, Bourget's *Cosmopolis*, Charles Dudley Warner's *A Little Journey in the World*, Franzos' *Ein Kampf ums Recht*, and many others.

In pictorial art it is the same. Compare Watteau's well-finished pictures of well-clipped parks, full of well-dressed ladies exchanging compliments with well-behaved gentlemen, with Uhde's pictures of the Christ in the village school, or Christ at the peasant's table, and feel the difference of spirit, and the sense of the sacredness of life in its lowliest forms, which glorifies the latter. At the International Art Exhibition at Berlin I saw among the statuary the figure of an old man sitting on the ground, his clothes ragged, his shoulders bent, his face dull and weary, a broken potsherd of humanity. Underneath was the simple legend : "*Proximus tuus.*" Modern art is full of such prophetic sermons in oil and marble ; but where do we see anything like it in older periods of art ? In one of the most popu-

lar paintings of our time, Millet's "Angelus," the artist has simply tried to show us the beauty and dignity of the humblest life and labor, by surrounding it with the halo of God's sunset and glory of piety.

I have tried with a few touches to bring before our recollection and imagination the strength of that humane sentiment which pervades Christian civilization in spite of its mammonism and greed of pleasure. That sentiment is the nerve of the social movement; the rest is muscle. If that nerve were dead or paralyzed there would be no social movement. There is, in fact, no social movement outside of the Christian nations.

Now that sentiment seeks embodiment. It seeks to stop that which offends it; it seeks to create conditions which it can accept. It has already sought to give even the children of the poor their share in our intellectual heritage by providing universal elementary education, guarding the intellectual rights of the child even against its parents by some measure of compulsion. It has provided night schools, free lectures, free libraries and museums, and many aids to secure even a higher education for those who desire it. In the political domain it has gone a long way toward endowing the lower classes with a voice, by the extension of the suffrage, and is constantly laboring to secure that right against bribery or intimidation by devising better methods of voting, and to make the will of the people act more surely on legislation by planning systems of minority representation and direct legislation. It has abolished many remnants of feudal privileges and made men more equal before the law. It has compelled the state in the face of traditional political economy, to assume a certain guardianship over women and children and to limit their exploitation in industry. It has granted woman very nearly all that she has really been serious in asking. In religious life there has been a decline of priestly prerogative, a growing recognition of the universal priesthood of believers, an increase of lay activity fostered especially in the young people's movement, and a reaching forward to save the lost classes. The Salvation Army is penetrated with the social spirit

Here then we have a great movement actuated by the conviction that a human life is precious, and seeking to give every man an opportunity to live his life worthily. What attitude shall the Christian disciple take to this movement? Who ever felt the worth of a soul more deeply than Jesus? Who felt intenser pity for bodily disablement than he who touched the leper and quieted the demoniac's stormy soul? Who had more of the spirit of real democracy than he who shared the fisherman's food, rebuked with dignity the haughty Pharisee who had failed in the common duties of hospitality, exalted the mite of the widow, and made his royal entry into the city of David on the back of a donkey, with boughs scattered by peasants as a carpet on the way? Whose eye was ever quicker to detect the divine glory of a human heart beneath the rust and foulness of sin and social ostracism, than his who made friends with the publicans, and championed the repentant harlot at a dinner table of gentlemen who were his social superiors? We cannot help feeling that the social movement was in Christ, and that Christ is now in the social movement. The disciple of Jesus must follow his master, and he cannot follow him unless he goes in the same direction. By their attitude to this movement, more than by assent to formulated truths, will the men of our generation be judged before God.

"Once to every man and nation comes the moment to decide,
In the strife 'twixt truth and falsehood, for the good or evil side;
Some great cause, God's new Messiah, deals to each the bloom or blight,
Parts the goats upon the left hand and the sheep upon the right,
And the choice goes by forever 'twixt that darkness and that light."

I have spoken mainly of the effort to secure for the poor and oppressed of our own nation the chance to live a worthy life. But the sense of humanity works horizontally sideways, as well as perpendicularly downwards. It quickens the feeling of interest and kinship between nations and races. The student of history knows what barriers the difference of nationality and religion has drawn between man and man in the past. In Latin the word for stranger and the word for enemy were the same.

The barrier is still broad. Of course the increase of commerce and travel has worn away many prejudices, but it has not produced much love as yet. Commerce with uncivilized nations is ruthless and often almost devilish in selfishness and cruelty. I know of only two forces that are really making for international fellowship with fairly unselfish motives. The one is the social movement. It is international in its tendencies. Karl Marx taught European workingmen the cry: "Proletarians of all nations, unite." The tendency to international solidarity is as yet but rudimentary, but it has been strong enough to send many thousands of dollars across the seas to aid in social struggles. It has been powerful enough to alarm thoroughly the governments whose interests lie in an exclusive patriotism. The other force making in the same direction is foreign missions. Foreign missions have come in for many hard blows from humanitarians, but after all has been said, they are the only case of anybody expending capital on uncivilized peoples without expecting to get anything back. No one has ever charged Christian missionary societies with trying to make more money out of the natives than they spend for them. Scientists go among savages to bring back knowledge; merchants to bring back wealth; explorers to bring back fame and trophies; but the missionary is the only one that makes even a pretense of going for the sake of the people.

Here again we see the confluence of the two streams. The social movement has developed international tendencies and promoted the fraternization of the nations engaged in it. Christianity from the very outset has been international in its character; it has been remiss in fulfilling its missionary obligations, but it has never repudiated its international character, and has always boasted of whatever broadness it could prove.

A second great ideal at work in the social movement lies in the principle of association. Suppose men are politically free and starting in life with equal opportunities; it still remains to be seen what they will do with their freedom and equality. Will they fight or unite? The development since the French Revo-

lution, or rather since the Protestant Reformation, has been toward the enfranchisement of the individual. The victory of personal liberty as a principle is complete in the leading nations; the practical application of the principle is also nearing its completion. The next great word, as Mazzini says, is *association*.

The process of enfranchisement has unfettered immense forces, but it has also resulted in disorganizing society. The old feudal bonds have been dissolved, but new bonds have not taken their place. The peasants of Europe are no longer bound to the soil or to its lord. They are free to go where they like. As a result many of them are torn loose from the sheltering and restraining ties of kinship and neighborhood and are swept like human flotsam and jetsam into the great cities where none knows them or cares for them. Is it a clear gain to them? The same process comes close home to us in the negro population of the South. They are free now, under nobody's ownership, but also under nobody's care. It is probably fair to say that the benefits resulting from their emancipation have not been as great as had been hoped. In Germany improved agriculture has shortened the harvest season; as a result large bodies of men and women migrate from place to place, hiring out as laborers; they move like the tide, and one section is swept bare of its youthful population, while other sections are inundated with a crowd of strangers. It is easy to imagine that this migratory life does not tend to stable habits, family affection, or clean morals.

With the city population things are similar. The guilds are gone. The relation of master, journeyman and apprentice has given place to that of employers and hands. The human interest and relation between them has dwindled away; the money relation is the sole bond. The old feudal relations were often unjust and dwarfing, but they gave a certain security and a definite place in which a man could live and move. Now men are free, but it is often the freedom of grains of sand that are whirled up in a cloud and then dropped in a heap, but neither cloud nor sand-heap have any coherence. This condition is not a final one. New forms of association must be created. Our dis-

organized competitive life must pass into an organic coöperative life. We all know that this is one of the great ideas of the social movement. The socializing tendency is the dominating tendency in sociological thought and is bound to become the dominating tendency in economic life too. Men may differ about the extent to which the socializing process ought to go, and about the chemical formula according to which the two ingredients of individualism and socialism are to be mixed, but the new ingredient will have to go in. It takes no prophet to foretell that.

What then shall the attitude of Christian disciples be to this great ideal of social reformers? I feel that it will have to be friendly. The law of *laissez faire*, if untempered by any force of loyalty and association, would have found little grace in the sight of Old Testament lawgivers and prophets, and still less in the sight of Jesus. One of the deepest principles of the New Testament is the principle of *κοινωνία*, of fellowship, of association. One of the two ordinances of the church is a meal of fellowship. The early church made a bold attempt to realize this principle of fellowship in regard to property also, and the attempt has been repeated again and again in the face of overwhelming obstacles, wherever a serious effort has been made to live according to Christ's law of life. The power of association and cohesion was implanted by the Spirit of God; its theory was formulated by Paul in his illustration of the body and its members, an illustration so true, that men like Schöffle and Dr. G. D. Boardman, in developing a theory of a true social life, could do no better than to unfold that illustration in detail. True Christianity emphasizes to the utmost the value of the individual and has been the real motive power back of the efforts to secure personal liberty. But it contains more than individualism; it also contains the principle of association, and implants the trustworthiness, love and unselfishness which cement men together and make association a workable idea. In so far, therefore, as socialism is the effort to translate into facts of political economy the Christian tendency to association, in so far it has a right to claim our approval.

It will be my task now to criticise the ideals of social reformers by mentioning the dangers to which they seem to me liable. Of course not all are liable to the same mistakes. Considering the space at my disposal I can only sketch in a broad way the dangers to which large sections of men devoted to social progress seem to tend.

First, there is a real menace to individual liberty in the schemes of socialism. For working purposes I am myself a socialist. We want more socialism than we have at present, anyway. Our present individualism is no real individualism. It is a race between men on horseback and men on foot. As long as public functions are in the hands of private corporations and they can tax the public, individualism means tyranny. So I am in favor of at least enough socialism to take natural monopolies out of private management. But when we consider the socialistic programme that lies beyond that practical necessity, we cannot escape the impression that it is full of danger to personal liberty. When the entire nation is organized as a colossal machine, and every cog is dependent on its connection with the machine for its chance to work, will there be freedom enough to make life tolerable? If a man is harried by a tyrannous foreman or a spiteful fellow-workman now, he can quit his job and try elsewhere. He may be out of a job for a while, but there are at least other employers to try. In the socialistic state there is to be only one employer, the state. If a man there quits his job, he cannot even employ himself. All the instruments of production are to be owned by the state. He cannot escape the bullying foreman or spiteful mate, except by setting the official machine in motion and securing a transfer.

Only those who have lived where liberty is scarce know its sweetness. As a young man I spent four years in Germany. On my return to my native country, I was conscious, not only of the thrill of a young patriot, but also of an invigorating ease and freedom in dealing with men. I studied the cause of the sensation and concluded that it was due to the larger freedom accorded here by everybody to everybody. Later I crossed the sea again

with a number of Germans of the middle classes and heard with astonishment how little love they had for their fatherland and how ready they were to transfer their allegiance to their new home. Outwardly New York cannot compare with Berlin. Our streets are dirty and ill-paved, our tenements squalid, and the opportunities for easy and pleasant recreation and for the enjoyment of music and art are much fewer. Yet it seems that there is something in New York life that makes it more attractive than Berlin. I know no other cause than the greater freedom.

Freedom gives the real zest to life. Freedom is also necessary to develop a nation of vigorous characters. A high level of culture and ability can be produced without freedom, as we can see from the educational work of the Jesuits. But it will be the commonplace usefulness of barnyard fowl, assiduously laying eggs, but without wing enough to fly over the fence. The Jesuits have developed no new thoughts; no Jesuit has ever led humanity onward into the unexplored country of the future. If socialism takes away our freedom, it stifles the future leaders of humanity before their birth.

On the other hand it is well for the advocates of personal liberty who urge this objection against socialism, to remember that liberty is today the possession of a favored few. Few boys in New York really choose their profession. A job is the great arbiter of their destinies. Would a boy like to become an engineer? But his father gets a job for him in a butcher-shop, and a butcher he becomes. Can the tyranny of socialism be much worse than that which locks the door on factory operatives now at the stroke of a bell, as if they were convicts, and docks them an hour's wages if a passing train makes them five minutes late in the morning?

A second danger in social-reform tendencies threatens the stability and importance of family life. This danger is often exaggerated by conservatives who are in need of a bugaboo. An aged brother once assured me that the application of the Single Tax would inevitably lead to a communism of wives. Communism of nonsense! Yet I think there is a considerable inclina-

tion among social reformers to loosen the rigor of the family bond. The wrongs of women are preached to us by determined voices, voices that are often painfully vibrant with the memory of personal wrongs. And because to such the walls of the house were a fiery square of torture, they ask to see the walls torn down, forgetting that these same walls to innumerable others are the breakwaters of God's most blessed haven.

Socialists also frequently aim at an easing of the marriage bond, because they recognize in the family the great bulwark of individualism. They see men absorbed in securing a competence for their families, and in pushing their children one degree higher up in the social scale, and there is no interest left for the elevation of their city. Most men would sell out their interest in social questions to secure \$5000 a year for their families. But how is the interest in the general welfare, which the socialist state will demand, ever to be secured if it has to work against this family selfishness? So it is that in the socialist pictures of the future, the state is more and the family less; the public buildings are opulent, but the family lives in narrow quarters; the children are less the property of the parents and more the property of the state. I recently read a book by Solomon Shindler giving the autobiography of Young West, the son of Mr. Julian West and Edith Leete, of *Looking Backward* fame. Young West's earliest recollections are of the public kindergarten in which he, like all other children, was brought up. He was very fond of one of his teachers. A lady came to see him once a week, and he was told that this was his mother, but he didn't know what that might mean. As he grows older he occasionally goes to see Dr. Leete and his mother and her second or third husband, but these visits are about as warm as if a boy of our times paid a visit of respect to his second cousin's uncle. Generally the boy and his companions act like young prigs and Philistines, which is no wonder, seeing they were brought up in a succession of model orphan asylums. Later, when Young West marries, he has a child and is very fond of it, but he and his wife love it too well to keep it long under their own ignorant

care, so they pass it on to a public institution where trained professionals are sure to do much better by it.

Is it not a curious and solemn Nemesis that has come upon us? We have housed the working people in tenements, worked them in factories, raised their children in institutions, and sent them to homes and almshouses to die. And of these ingredients glorified the working classes have built their ideal of the New Jerusalem: a vast industrial army in ideal factories with plenty of wages promptly paid; great asylums as educational institutions, splendid public pleasure resorts, and little dwarfed homes.

It is true that marriage is often an instrument of torture today. But the remedy does not lie in making marriage a pleasurable friendship to be dissolved at will, or a pædotrophic partnership; that would twist the sexual relation into a scourge to lash us all. It lies rather in securing such a diffusion of fair prosperity and such a stability of economic conditions that the money motive will be practically eliminated from marriage, and that the worry and stress will be eased which now create nervous exhaustion, irritability, and discord. It is true, also, that the exclusive love of family is a real hindrance to social progress. But here too the remedy does not lie in paring down the family, but in preaching the civic as well as the domestic virtues, the Kingdom of God as well as individual religion, and in getting women interested in something outside their own families and churches.

Let us ward off any social ideals that impair the stability and scope of the family and home. There is no need of impairing them. Even with a socialist system of industry there is ample room for a private home. If it were not so, if there were no place there whither a man could withdraw from the press of the world to the restful society of a beloved woman and his own children, it is a question if any gain in external comforts purchased by the change would be worth so great a price.

In the third place certain tendencies of social reformers contain a danger to national life. We have spoken of the inclina-

tion to international union among workingmen. This inclination has been planted and watered by the jingoism and commercialism of bourgeois politics. The national flags have so often had to serve as a cover for lust of conquest, in which the people furnished food for the cannon, that a hatred has grown up against nationality and its symbol, and the red flag of socialism has been substituted, not to denote bloodshed, as some think, but the common blood of humanity. In Germany national history and pride have been so much used to prop the monarchy and existing institutions that socialists are now creating a new historical literature which reverses the old verdicts, calls the national heroes intriguers and butchers, and pours contempt on the great events of the nation's past. This is deplorable. Nationality is a good and holy fact. As the individual has a right to his individuality, so the nation has a right to its nationality. And as human life is infinitely enriched by the differences in individuality, so the life of the race has been enriched by the differences of nationality, and this is destined to be far more the case as increasing inter-communication brings the nations face to face and introduces them.

The internationalism of the working classes is nobly right in protesting against a narrow and warlike patriotism, but we must never lose our loyalty to our own country, nor our reverence for her past, her heroes, and her flag. As the new social enthusiasm must contain in itself the old love of family, so the new love of humanity must contain the old love of the fatherland.

In the fourth place many social reformers more or less openly look forward to a revolutionary break of development by force. It is not unnatural that they do. Progress is so slow and resistance so stubborn and subtle; it is so hard to get remedial legislation enacted and so much harder yet to get it enforced, that men naturally get impatient, especially if they are themselves the grist that is being ground. Especially men whose only strength lies in their brawn are bewildered and enraged to find a just cause bound hand and foot by a smiling lawyer with a bit of red tape, and they feel that if they could only close in a death-

grapple for once, there might be some chance for them. The wonder is that force is so seldom used.

Yet those who are dissuading workingmen from efforts for a gradual change, and urging them to try the way of force, are playing fast and loose with the future, and will, in the long run, probably retard social progress. There is a recoil after the use of violence which carries a cause almost back to the line from which it was shot by the explosion. Remember the almost universal jubilation of Europe when the French Revolution began; but remember also how the smoke of blood rose from the guillotine and obscured the judgment of men, so that it took two generations or more for the great ideals of that tremendous uprising to shine out in their first brightness again. If ever there was a grand and holy revolution it was the Puritan revolution under Cromwell. But a certain Charles Stuart, a perfidious traitor, was beheaded; a reaction followed; and today the English Prayer Book still contains prayers for a day of humiliation and fasting for the martyrdom of his blessed majesty, beseeching God not to punish England for his death. Remember the confusion engendered by our Civil War and the bitter hatred left for these thirty years to poison the springs of our national life.

I do not say that force is never to be used. It is certainly useful as a rod to hang on the wall, and there are bad boys in these United States more alive to the swish of that rod than to all moral suasion. I am only contending that force is not as effective as it looks. The period of agitation and development which has been cut short by it simply comes in afterwards in another form. Not only the violence, but also the suddenness is dangerous. The slow conflict of opposing forces is God's method of educating a nation. He maketh even the stubbornness of conservatives to praise him, though he sometimes does not appear to turn the remainder of it aside. In the peaceful conflict crude schemes are melted down and refined; ideas are elaborated; the public mind is permeated; old fogies die; a young generation grows up with the new ideals bred in their bones; and when the change comes, it has a backing in the people. While if it were

forced on an indifferent or hostile majority by a determined minority, there would be a reaction, a repeal, and a great and wise measure would go down to the record of posterity discredited and abolished after trial. Therefore let us counsel patience, not for the sake of the people who might get hurt in a scrimmage, but for the sake of the cause and its ultimate success. Steady progress, measure by measure, is best, feeling our way from step to step with sure-footed Anglo-Saxon caution, keeping our feet on the ground, and not going off in a French balloon of abstract principles and logical schemes.

Right here is a sphere of influence for members of the Brotherhood and others of their kind. We are mostly members of the classes that have money, culture, and power, and have inside influence with those classes. By our influence we can weaken their selfish resistance to the progress of justice, induce them to make piecemeal concessions, and so work off in steady progress the steam which, if accumulated, would burst the boiler.

Fifthly, lastly and chiefly, many social reformers are practical materialists. In Germany and other continental countries socialists are mostly avowedly materialists. Socialist political economy and materialistic philosophy are there like the two sides of the same cloth. Christian people in Germany seem to regard it as a demonstrated certainty that a Christian workingman will shipwreck his faith if he becomes a socialist. Things are not so bad in this country, but of practical materialism we have enough. We see it in the disproportionate emphasis on the economic side of sociology. Many social reformers do not seem to be aware that there is anything in sociology except taxation, finance, and monopolies. They regard the social body as one of those humble creatures that have no organ except an alimentary canal. How to increase and regulate the production of material goods is the main question with them.

Now it is desirable that men acquire refined tastes and habits, and these presuppose an abundant production of economic goods. It is still more desirable that the goods produced be justly distributed. But the main thing is not more goods, but more

justice and equality; not a more luxurious life, but a saner, nobler life. A nation's wealth might grow from \$300 per capita to \$1000 and people might grow unhappier all the time. Scotland and Scandinavia have been poor in goods, but rich in noble hearts and vigorous minds. Greater average luxury may only lead to greater average lasciviousness. "Jerusalem waxed fat and kicked." Jesus parted company with the social reformers of his day on this very point. They wanted material prosperity. He did too, but he wanted first the kingdom of God and God's justice, and prosperity as the natural outcome of that; without that basis prosperity may be a curse. It is true for nations as well as individuals, that the great thing is not the quantity or quality of meat and drink, but righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost; that is, a just, peaceable, and glad life in the Holy Spirit.

This practical materialism is shown not only in picturing the aim of social improvement, but also in planning the means. They put their trust in improved arrangements, voting machines, asphalt pavements, patent street-sweepers, cheaper car-fares and telephone rates, etc. Now these things are highly desirable, and I would gladly put in a good shift of work to secure any of them, but any or all of these things will not save a nation. We might have streets as smooth and clean as a Paris boulevard, and the people on it might yet be a libidinous lot, working out their own destruction. If any man says: "Get men converted and never mind how the streets look;" I say, "Not a bit of it; as long as children play on them, it matters a lot to me how they look." If another man says: "Let us have ideal streets, and we shall have ideal men," I say, "That is falser yet. You cannot load human cussedness into Col. Waring's ash-carts and dump it into New York Bay, nor smother the devil under a patent pavement." Material improvements are important, but social reformers must not forget to look deeper than that.

I have tried to sketch the noble desires for personal liberty, equal opportunity, and fraternal association, which furnish the material for the ideals of social reformers.

I have also tried to point out the dangers to the liberty of the individual, the integrity of the home, and the just pride of nationality to which some of them are prone; also how they may frustrate the realization of their own hopes by revolutionary methods and the fostering of a materialistic covetousness and trust in material improvements.

I have made similar criticisms before to audiences of socialists, but never to a religious audience, because religious people are inclined to accept such criticisms as ground to excuse themselves from participation in the movement. I hope that will not be the effect of this paper upon Christian readers. We ought to join in it exactly to avert these dangers. For my part, at least, I am a social reformer, though with feeble strength and sad cowardice. I am also a Christian disciple, and in this double quality I have tried to hold the balance even.

WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH.

NEW YORK.

THE FUNCTION OF THE CHURCH.

INSTITUTIONS can do their work much better if the function which it is proper for them to perform is accurately defined. Perhaps the church is not adjusted to the needs of society, and this may be the reason why it does not meet the test to which it is put. Does it succeed in bringing humanity to a state of high moral life? The result of the work of the church should be full ethical development, not simply in scattered individuals, but in a multitude, so that it can be said in truth that a developed ethical life is possessed by the social organism. Institutions for intellectual development, grouped together and spoken of in this article as the college, are subject to a like test,—Do they educate the mass, so that the social organism is characterized by high intelligence? Neither the church nor the college as yet performs its mission fully. But the college has determined its proper function and does its work systematically; the church seems to be in doubt, and its work is desultory.

The rise of sociology is the salvation of the church, because by the application of the sociologic method the function of the church as a social institution can be accurately defined. It is probable that, on analysis, it will be found that there is some special common end to the accomplishment of which society has a right to ask each church to direct its energy. If this common end of labor can be discovered, then the denominations may feel it their duty to work for this, and harmony and efficiency of work may come naturally and easily.

Different meanings are sometimes conveyed to different readers by the same word, and this makes it necessary for the writer to state the meaning which he wishes a few important words to carry. It is not claimed that the definitions given are final. It is not the purpose of this article to determine what is ethical and what is religious, nor what the word "educational" ought to mean when

used by a writer of good English. The definitions are simply a means to the understanding of the thought herein presented.

"Life" is thought of as the potential principle of all existence. "Religion" is the human being's personal, feeling-appreciation of its relations to the Infinite Life, the God-Life. "Religious life" is life characterized by a more or less deep experience of religion. "Ethics" is the science of the conduct of human beings, considered as units in an inclusive social organism, society. In its practical effort ethics seeks to state the results of human actions, and from these results to determine by insight the actions best suited to serve the purpose inherent in each human being's life. "Ethical life" is life characterized by a more or less deep experience of obligation to fulfill the ideal conduct which ethics sets up. A distinction is recognized between the ethical and the religious life. The fact that many experience a strong feeling of communion between themselves and their God, and yet do not experience a mastering obligation to live true to ethical ideals, leads the writer to designate them as of high religious life and of low ethical life. There are many who have high ethical life and low religious life. The expression, "the development of the ethical and religious life" means the development of the potential principle of existence indwelling in the individual into an experience of strong sympathy with the Infinite God-Life, and of mastering obligation to act always according to conscience. "Church" is the term used to designate the institution of society which has interested itself practically and theoretically in matters of ethics and religion. The term includes all organizations devoted to this kind of work, no matter by what prophet they have been founded.

What is the proper function of this church? The church is to help human beings perform their great life-task. This task must be the realization of some individual, personal ideal. This ideal is determined for each by the characteristics of his own internal life and by the needs of the envioning life; it is both self-centered and altruistic. And the process by which this ideal for each is gained by each is a process of personal development.

The usual function of institutions is to serve the individual in his development. The progress of society comes through the development of the individual. The state furnishes the freedom which results from protection against interference by others, and freedom must be had in order to make the realization of the individual, personal, ideal possible. The college assists in gaining intellectual strength. It serves other ends, but serves this chiefly. The home plays a large part in the fulfillment of the individual ideal by giving opportunity for the perpetuation of life in children, and for gaining the completeness of the individual.

The proper function of the church is like to that of the state, the college and the home. The church has all along been of service, though indirectly and by somewhat crude methods, in the struggle for self-realization. The church, to perform its function, needs to render direct and skillful assistance. The ideal self is gained by personal growth, and if the church is to help in the gaining of this ideal self, it must be an institution for the production of development. But the production of development is education, and the church is, therefore, in the last analysis, an educational institution.

A common use of the word "educational" makes it mean the disciplinary processes connected with intellectual strength-gathering. The process of strengthening physical life is called "training." But educational processes are not always directed toward the development of intellectual life. The gymnasium teacher is an educator. It is educational discipline by which he produces physical strength and perfect control of strength. The church, producing as it does a development of life, is in the full sense of the word an educational institution, and is to be classed with institutions of this kind.

The special work of the church is the education of the ethical and religious life. The discipline of the college will contribute to this, and that of the church will contribute to intellectual development, but the centers of the activities of the two institutions are distinct. It is the business of the church to

educate humanity into highly developed ethical and religious life.

If the above analysis of the relation of the church to society is correct, it becomes clear that society has a right to ask each church organization to furnish each human being intrusted to its care a discipline calculated to produce growth into developed ethical and religious life. Each church is to be judged according to its fruits. The young, crude life of its children is to be skillfully assisted in its efforts to gain fully developed ethical and religious manhood and womanhood. That church which produces men and women who live intelligently and in perfect devotion to the fulfillment of their highest ideals, is the church that is greatest, because it serves society's needs.

Denominational divisions have arisen from the belief that God has given a revelation of the divine law. Each group united about a peculiar interpretation of the revelation has formed itself into a church, for the purpose of advocating its interpretation. The motive which has governed the organization of these denominations has been a determination to carry on a propaganda, whether the various interpretations are justified or not. The resulting organizations are, therefore, such as to serve only indirectly the great end of existence for the human being, the realization of the individual, personal ideal. An organization formed for the purpose of subduing all to belief in a particular system of ethical and religious doctrines in many ways obstructs the development of the individual. These are times in which the rights of the individual are being determined: each is king and servant. The organization of the church needs to be somewhat changed, and suited closely to the function which it is proper for the church to perform, the education of the ethical and religious life. The church that serves society as it is today must needs be an educational institution instead of an organ for propaganda.

Since the church has an educational function, it follows that its proper method of work will be determined by the application of general educational principles to its special ends. It will not do for the church to adopt the methods of the college *in toto*. The

education of ethical and religious life is a different task from the production of intellectual development. To bring the growing mind to an understanding of the subject of ethics is to achieve an intellectual end, but that to be gained in ethical education is not simply an intellectual understanding of the right. An experience of mastering obligation to live true to the ethical ideals which the intelligence determines to be right, is to be produced. We want men of honor and as unselfish as the Christ. Religious education brings not simply intellectual insight into the infinite, but, also, a feeling of personal union with the superpersonal God-life. Under a powerful religious education the child is touched with love of every living thing. The boy and the girl hear the voice of nature in the prattle of the brook; the trees speak by the rustling of their leaves; the thunder tells of power to be trusted, not feared. Death is nature's doing, and life is eternal. Courage, contentment, ambition to have part in the great world-struggle, possess the man and the woman, because of love for the God in whom they live and move and have their being. The aged lie down in peace: their trust is sufficient in the hour of death. The mourners are content to finish their tasks: they see the face of love. So the methods of the church must be suited to its special field. It holds services rich in inspiring music, in strong expressions of religious feeling, and in these services the members find opportunity for the expression of their own personal spontaneous emotions. Going to church is going to the very heart of things, to gain renewal of life. The room in which the religious service is held is an expression of the universal spirit; the large chorus interprets the God of love; the leader of the service is at one with his God, and speaks from the heart. Out of the experience of religion comes enthusiasm to live the life of high ideals. The college can never do the work of the church; these institutions stand coöperating and coördinate institutions. Educational principles govern the work of both, but each must needs have its own methods.

In order that different kinds of churches may be compared, a name is needed for this church which considers its functions

those of an educational institution, and which is founded on the great purpose of educating ethical and religious life. The best name in sight is the Educational Church.

A course of discipline must be arranged for this educational church. The life of the child, the boys and girls, the young people, those of middle age, and of the aged, is to be supplied its proper food. Those who have large capacity for religious experience are to be furnished a religious service far richer than that furnished by most propaganda-loving churches. People who have little or no capacity for religious experience are to be impressed with the sociologic sanctions for conduct, to be stimulated by lectures in applied ethics and by the presentation of the beauty of ethical ideals. The crude methods of the churches of the ordinary type are to give place to more skillful.

There are many practical questions of organization, but with these this paper does not deal. They can wait for solution until after sociology has determined the function of the church. If the educational church ought to be, then many a church will in time become the fulfillment of this ideal.

A course of discipline calculated to produce the results which it is the function of the church to achieve, is now submitted for consideration. The course here given is not wholly visionary, because the Children's School of Ethics and Religion, the Junior and Young People's Clubs for Personal Development, the Young People's Class in Ethics, and the Religious Service of the Senior Church have been proved by experiment to produce the results which they aim to produce. The other departments outlined seem essential to completeness of institutional life.

THE EDUCATIONAL CHURCH.

The following is the discipline.

AGE.	DEPARTMENT.				
6 to 8	Children's School of Ethics and Religion, Kindergarten.				
8 to 10	"	"	"	"	Boys' and Girls' Dep't.
10 to 12	"	"	"	"	Children's Department.
12 to 14	"	"	"	"	Senior Department.
14 to 17	Junior Church.				

AGE.	DEPARTMENT.
14 to 17	Junior Club for Personal Development.
17 to ?	Senior Church, Religious Services.
	“ “ Ethical Lectures.
17 to 20	Young People's Class in Ethics.
17 to 21 ¹	Young People's Club for Personal Development.
20 to 23	Bible Class.
23 to 25	Class in Religious Philosophy and Comparative Religions.
25 to ?	Class in Social Problems.
Adults	Class in Philanthropy.

PREACHERS AND TEACHERS.

Senior Preacher.	Senior Church, the Religious Services.
	“ “ Short course of Ethical Lectures.
	Bible Class.
	Class in Religious Philosophy and Comparative Religions.
Junior Preacher.	Junior Church.
	Superintendent of C. S. of E. & R. and Teacher of
	Class A., Senior Department.
	Director of the Y. P. C. for P. D., and its teacher of
	Sociology.
Seven Teachers in	{ Kindergartners, 2 Children's Department, 2 Boys' and Girls' Dept, 2 Senior Department, 1 And this teacher is also the Director of the J. C. for P. D.
C. S. of E. and R.	
Teacher of Ethics.	
Teacher of	Young People's Class in Ethics, and of Anthropology, in Y. P. C. for P. D.
Teacher of	Class in Social Problems, and of American Political Ideas, in Y. P. C. for P. D.
Teacher of	Class in Philanthropy
Various Lecturers.	Senior Church, the Ethical Lectures.

THE CHILDREN'S SCHOOL OF ETHICS AND RELIGION.

An eight years' course. Sundays, 12 to 1:15.

GENERAL EXERCISES.

Roll call.

Violin solo. (Kindergarten withdraws.)

Hymn.

Scripture reading.

Extempore prayer.

¹ All sessions come on Sundays or Fridays.

Response service.

Hymn.

Poem.

Class sessions.

Hymn. (Kindergarten returns with other classes.)

Children's prayer.

Song of praise.

KINDERGARTEN. Children about 3 to 8 years of age.

Class B. Ethical Ideals.

Stories of the obedient, respectful, helpful child.

Class A. Ethical Ideals.

Stories of the generous, loving, truthful child.

Both Classes. Religious Ideas.

God the One who makes all things live and move and have their being. All are his children.

INSTRUCTIONS TO TEACHERS.

Teach without making much explanation of why it is right to do this and not that. Set forth ethical ideals by means of stories, and incite the scholars to imitate the children of the stories. Set forth religious ideas by means of talks about plants and animals; get the scholars to watch them live.

The opening and closing of the kindergarten is to be by means of a liturgy written for this department. The kindergarten meets with the rest of the school for the musical opening, and joins also in the closing exercises.

CHILDREN'S DEPARTMENT. About 8 to 10 years of age.

Class B. Ethical ideals.

Elementary discussion of the qualities of the

obedient, helpful, loving,
respectful, generous, truthful child.

This child is to be made to appear a reasonable and possible child.

Class A. Ethical ideals.

Elementary discussion of the qualities of the

strong, intelligent, useful,
industrious, thoughtful, brave,
skillful, unselfish, conscientious men and women.

The boys and girls are to become men and women, and the school hopes that these qualities will be gained by them.

Both Classes. Religious ideas.

God the life of nature wants his children to grow into the fulfillment of their highest ideals. Conscience is the voice of God, and is to be obeyed. Punishment comes when conscience is disobeyed. True joy comes from obedience to God's voice.

INSTRUCTIONS TO TEACHERS.

Study the character of the scholars and apply these personal ideals to their lives. Make continual expression of your love for nature, and of the greatness and power and love possessed by the God-life which you feel to be in nature. Express your longing to become perfectly obedient to the voice of conscience.

BOYS' AND GIRLS' DEPARTMENT. About 10 to 12 years of age.

Class B. Ethical Ideals.

Biographical studies of the youth of men and women who illustrate the fulfillment of the ideals of the school.

Example. Abraham Lincoln.

strong,	unselfish,	conscientious,
intelligent,	truthful,	brave.
thoughtful,	useful,	

Religious Ideas.

The earth has grown from a ball of fire to its present state, and the God-life has controlled its growth. The God-life is through and through all the universe, and is to be trusted and obeyed. Study the religious experiences of the men and women chosen to illustrate the ethical ideals

Class A. Ethical Ideals.

Biographical study of the lives of Jesus and his apostles.

Religious ideas.

The religious ideas and experiences of Jesus and his apostles.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT. About 12 to 14 years of age.

Class B. Ethical Ideals.

A discussion, systematic and thorough, of the ideals of the school.

obedient,	strong,	useful,
respectful,	industrious,	brave,
helpful,	skillful,	conscientious,
generous,	intelligent,	self-controlled,
loving,	thoughtful,	ambitious men and women.
truthful,	unselfish,	

Religious Ideas.

The meaning of all important common religious terms and phrases.

Class A. Ethical Ideals.

Discussion of the question: For what is it worth while to live?

Is it worth while to live according to conscience and one's highest ideals?

A systematic discussion of fundamental religious ideas.

NOTE.—Only those who do the work satisfactorily are allowed to remain members of the school, and only those who do the last two years intelligently and earnestly are allowed to graduate. A certificate of graduation is given.

JUNIOR CHURCH. Sundays, 4:00 to 5:15.

A three years' course. Young people about 14 to 17 years of age.

Ethical and Religious Services.

Organ voluntary.

Violin solo.

Hymn.

Scripture reading.

Response service.

- a.* Expressions of high ethical sentiment and deep religious feeling, read in concert.
- b.* Written prayers read by the preacher and responded to by the worshippers.
- c.* Musical expressions of thanksgiving, sung in concert.

Sermon. (Subjects appropriate to this period of life and arranged in a three years' course.)

Hymn-anthem.

Reading of original essays. (Topics in ethics and religion assigned.)

Anthem.

Discussion of the sermon and essays.

Extempore prayer.

Philanthropic offering.

Hymn.

Benediction.

Song of praise.

Instrumental postlude.

NOTE.—This service is to have all the formalities of the ordinary adult church service, but the thought of the hymns, scripture, sermon and essays is to be suited to the needs of the young people. This Junior Church, if contrasted with the Senior Church, will be found more emotional and its movement more rapid. A certificate is given to those who complete the work of the Junior Church and Junior Club.

JUNIOR CLUB FOR PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT. Fridays, 7:30 to 9:00.

Open to boys and girls over 14 years of age.

ORDER OF BUSINESS.

Call to order.

Roll call.

Original work by members of the club.

Talk by the director of the club.

General games.

This club is in charge of a competent director, and is designed to train the boys and girls into self-reliance, to enable them to make use of their

powers when in formal association with others, to bring them into sympathy with matters of public interest, and to give them the discipline to be gotten out of games.

The club binds its members together in devotion to the principle of personal development, and only those who stand firm in the principle are allowed to continue members.

The original work centers in social and current topics. The talks of the director cover practical topics pertinent to the daily lives of the members and are arranged to cover three years, so that by remaining a member for three years the entire course will be accomplished.

SENIOR CHURCH. Sundays.

Membership in the Senior Church implies the intention to attend its services regularly. One who does not feel the need of a religious service may elect to attend simply the ethical lectures.

Religious Service, 10:30 to 11:45.

Organ voluntary.

Violin solo.

Hymn.

Poem.

Ethical and religious liturgy.

Anthem.

Scripture.

Hymn-anthem.

Prayer.

Choral response by congregation.

Sermon. (A discussion of religious theme, and an expression of personal religious experience.)

Philanthropic offering.

Hymn.

Closing ethical and religious liturgy.

Benediction.

Song of praise.

Organ postlude.

Ethical Lectures. 7:45 to 9:00.

Address. On some subject of applied ethics. The lecturer is judicial in his treatment of the theme; he strives to assist the people to make wise judgments in matters of public and immediate interest.

Discussion of the address. By those to whom the privilege has been granted, because of their fitness and ability.

YOUNG PEOPLE'S CLASS IN ETHICS. Sundays, 12:00 to 1:15.

This class offers a three years' course.

Course of Study.

The elements of ethics.

Practical ethical questions.

The ethical ideals of the prophets (this word is interpreted as referring to sacred and secular writers).

These three years of work need not be taken in any prescribed order. Each year is made a distinct course. It is possible to enter the class at the beginning of any year, and to take the course in the order which happens to come, without serious loss from disarrangement.

Examinations are held at the end of each year, and only those who do the work satisfactorily are allowed to continue members of the class. Certificates of graduation are given to those who complete the entire course.

YOUNG PEOPLE'S CLUB FOR PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT. Fridays, 8:00 to 9:45

Open to any young man or woman of good reputation.

Order of Business.

Call to order.

Roll call.

Reading of minutes.

Reception of new members.

Study classes.

Social fifteen minutes.

Unfinished business.

New business.

Reading of fines.

Adjournment.

The club offers three years of prescribed work, and further electives.

Course of Study.

Anthropology.

Sociology.

American political ideas.

Elective work according to the choice of the members.

The studies of the club are chosen with reference to the central purpose of the club, personal development. Each member is expected to continue true to this principle. The course is calculated to develop an appreciation of the part which the individual plays in the social organism, and to equip the members for their social service as members of their community. A certificate of work done is given to those who complete the prescribed work.

BIBLE CLASS. Sundays, 12:00 to 1:15.

This class is open to those who have finished the course of the Young People's Class in Ethics, and to others whom the teacher may consider prepared.

Course of Study. Three years of work.

Old Testament history, and the development of ethical and religious ideas during this period.

New Testament history, and the development of ethical and religious ideas during this period.

The Development of the Christian Church.

Regular attendance is required, and faithful work expected. A certificate of graduation is given on examination.

CLASS IN RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY AND COMPARATIVE RELIGIONS.

Fridays, 8:00 to 10:00.

This class is open to those who have taken the work of the Bible Class, and to others whom the teacher may consider prepared.

Course of Study. Two years' work.

Religious philosophy.

Comparative religions.

Regular attendance is required, and faithful work expected. A certificate of graduation is given on examination.

CLASS IN SOCIAL PROBLEMS. Sundays, 12:00 to 1:15.

This class is open to adults, and it is expected that those who join this class are somewhat prepared to deal with social problems. The class is under a competent leader, and deals continually with the social questions of the day. If the class so determines, it may enter upon practical work, and seek to bring about developments in which it believes.

CLASS IN PHILANTHROPY. Sundays, 4:00 to 5:15.

This class is open to those who wish to engage in philanthropic work and the control of the philanthropies of the church are in the hands of a committee of five, all of whom are graduates of this class.

Course of Study. Two years and to be followed by as long a period of practical work as possible.

The principles of philanthropy.

The methods of successful philanthropies.

Examinations are held, and certificates of graduation given.

PHILANTHROPIC WORK.

The different departments of the Children's School, the Junior Church, and the Senior Church, are each engaged in special and appropriate philanthropic work.

The above plan involves three leading departments, the Senior Church, with its religious and ethical services, the Junior Church, and the Children's School of Ethics and Religion. The clubs and classes are supplementary to these. Most well-con-

ducted churches are already working on very much these lines. This outline possesses system, and, if worked to, would induce a thoroughness which the work of the ordinary church does not have.

In order to become an Educational Church, the ordinary church has but to give itself heart and soul to the perfecting of the ethical and religious life of its members, to look upon the children as worthy of skillful help, and to test itself by its ability to send forth into society men and women free from ethical crudeness, devoted to the fulfillment of their highest ideals, and aglow with that deep and wide sympathy which is religion.

E. M. FAIRCHILD.

TROY, N. Y.

THE MECHANICS OF SOCIETY.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. VIII.

PRIOR to the eighteenth century, when mathematics was almost the only science known, it was customary to treat all subjects under the mathematical form. Dr. Henry More, in an elaborate work, demonstrated the immortality of the soul by a series of geometrical propositions and notations, and, as is well known, Spinoza's *Ethics* consists of an array of Euclidean theorems, corollaries, and scholia. In those days it was supposed that if an argument on any subject whatever could be reduced to a perfect logical or geometrical form and contained no violation of the well-learned rules of reasoning its several propositions were apodictically established.

In modern times all this is regarded as mere pedantry, and any attempt to apply mathematics to the complex phenomena of life, mind, and society is looked upon with suspicion. While all may admit that the test of exactness of any science is the degree to which its laws can be subjected to mathematical rules, it is generally denied that the laws of biology, psychology, and sociology can be thus subjected.

While I am one of those who have emphasized this truth, and justly condemned the ambitious propensity to give to such complex phenomena a greater precision than they possess, I have never denied that the goal toward which even the highest of them must ever tend is just that perfected stage at which their laws may be mathematically formulated. Moreover, these laws are capable of being roughly classified in this respect, and while some of them may lie beyond all hope of such a formulation others may have nearly reached the point at which it is possible.

The basis of this classification is the generality of the laws

themselves, and it is found that only the most general of them all are susceptible of any such treatment. The founder of sociology, long before he had proposed that name for the science, gave it the name of "Social Physics," which showed that he perceived an analogy between social phenomena and physical phenomena, and so far as his treatment of the subject is concerned, he might as well have called it social mechanics, for he at once subdivided the phenomena into static and dynamic, terms borrowed from the science of mechanics, a branch of pure mathematics, and being a mathematician himself, he must have known what the terms meant. All future studies have tended to confirm the justness and appropriateness of this classification. It is, however, only in their most general aspects that social phenomena are capable of being thus treated in the present state of the science, and it is to such general aspects that I propose to confine myself.

The word *science* has been variously defined. Etymologically it signifies, of course, simply knowledge. But it is admitted that there may be knowledge that is not science, and the most common definition of science is "methodized knowledge." I prefer a somewhat different form of expression, which may not after all differ from this in any fundamental respect. I believe that science is properly confined to an acquaintance with the laws of phenomena, using that expression in the broadest sense. All phenomena take place according to invariable laws whose manifestations are numerous and manifold. A mere knowledge of these manifestations is not science. Knowledge only becomes scientific when the uniform principle becomes known which will explain all the manifestations. This principle is the law.

But we can go a step farther back. A law is only a generalization from facts, *i. e.*, from phenomena, but these do not take place without a cause. The uniformity which makes such a generalization possible is in the cause. But a cause can be nothing else than a force. This force acts upon the material basis of phenomena and renders it *apparent*. As all force is persistent the phenomena it causes will necessarily be uniform

under the same conditions, and will change in the same way under like changes in the conditions.

As an abstract proposition all force is one, but there are a great many fields of phenomena due to as many different general conditions under which the universal force acts. It has been the custom to speak of the action of force under such different conditions as the action of so many different forces. This is at least convenient, and so long as the law of the correlation of forces is recognized it can lead to no error.

Now, it follows from this that every true science must be a domain of force; that each science must preside over some one of these various forces, and that any field of knowledge which has not been brought under the operation of some natural force is not yet a science in the proper sense of that word. The mere accumulation of facts does not constitute a science, but a successful classification of the facts recognizes the law underlying them and is, in so far, scientific. In fact, classification is always the initial step in the establishment of a science, and the more recondite workings of the force over which it presides are discovered later. We have only to look over the history of the several recognized sciences to see ample illustrations of these principles, and I cannot now stop to undertake an enumeration of them.

If, therefore, sociology is a science, it must agree with all others in this respect, and all knowledge that is not systematized according to this principle must be ruled out of the science of society. I have always maintained that sociology does constitute a science, capable of being submitted to this test, and if I have contributed anything to that science it has been in the direction of pointing out the nature of the social forces and the mode of their activity. I propose briefly to recapitulate the general results which I claim to have reached in this field of research.

In the first place the social forces are psychic. They have their seat in the mental constitution of the individual components of society. But here it is necessary to understand what the mind includes. The popular conception of mind is far too nar-

row. It embraces only the thinking faculty, or at most, that and the special senses. Now, suppose we try to define the several great groups of phenomena that are constantly appealing to us in the ascending order of their complexity, beginning with that of gravitation and rising through the radiant group of heat, light, electricity, etc., and the group of elective chemical affinities, to the vital group, including everything that relates to life but does not relate to mind; and then pass directly to the senses and the intellect. A glance is sufficient to show that a great group has been omitted. This lies between the vital group and the intellectual group. It constitutes the entire domain of *feeling*. This domain is distinct from the senses in the popular usage, for these do not necessarily involve conscious feeling at all. Those of sight and hearing are feelingless, and even that of touch, sometimes called the sense of feeling, need not involve feeling, and its value as a sense, *i. e.*, as a means of furnishing the mind with a knowledge of the nature of the objects touched, is inversely proportional to the amount of feeling. I call this *indifferent* sensation in contradistinction to feeling proper, which I call *intensive* sensation. This latter is always either pleasure or pain of whatever degree, and it would be easy to show that it is the primary form of feeling, and that the indifferent form is secondary and of far later origin. In fact intensive sensation—pleasure and pain—constitutes the simplest and earliest manifestation of the psychic faculty. This great field of phenomena—the domain of feeling—is not physical, chemical, or vital; it must therefore be psychic and belong to mind.

We thus arrive at the dual nature of mind. It has a great primary department of feeling and an equally great but secondary department of thought. The former I have called the *affective* side of mind; the latter its *perceptive* side. The affective department of mind has formed no part of the philosophy of mind. It has only been seriously treated under the head of moral philosophy, and thus chiefly for the purpose of warning against the power of the passions. It has been regarded as

something gross and impure, and wholly unworthy of a place in any scheme of philosophy.¹

But in quite recent times, under the stimulus of modern ideas of biology, the conception of the biological origin of mind has begun to work a change in the prevailing habit of thought on the subject, and psychologists are coming to recognize the feelings as a department of psychology. In sociology the least reflection reveals the immense importance of this department. Indeed it is found to constitute the true foundation upon which that science must be built, so that it may be said that "the stone that the builders refused is become the head stone of the corner." The secret of all this is that it is in the affective side of mind that the forces of society are found to lie. Feeling is a force. It is the only psychic force, and is at the same time the fundamental social force.

The particular form under which feeling manifests itself as a force is *desire*, and the social forces consist in human desires. They are true natural forces and obey all of the Newtonian laws of motion. They are either negative—desire to escape pain—or positive—desire to secure pleasure. In either case they impel the individual to action. A convenient and highly expressive synonym for desire in its widest sense is *will*, but the word must then be used in the philosophic sense of motive, and not in the popular sense of choice. Schopenhauer based his entire philosophy on this conception, and by projecting the will into the inanimate world he showed in the clearest manner the true nature of will as a simple mode of manifestation of the universal force. In identifying all forces with will he simply demonstrated that the human will is a force. From an economic point of view we may identify it with *want*, and contemplate the combined wants of mankind as constituting the social forces.

This conception is susceptible of great expansion. It really embraces the whole domain of feeling in the intensive sense, *i. e.*, as having to do with pleasure or pain. All instincts, affections and emotions range themselves under it. All the "passions of

¹JAMES: *Principles of Psychology*, II, 9.

the soul," of which Descartes treated, all loves and hates, fears and hopes, yearnings, longings, ambitions, aspirations, and a great variety of other forms of the one principle belong to it.¹ The central idea common to them all is embodied in the two words *impulse* and *motive*, and these terms sufficiently imply the indwelling force of the will. It is that which impels and that which moves. It is the *nisus* of nature transferred from the physical to the psychic world. It is force and motion ensouled. It is the true soul.

From the standpoint of social mechanics this embodiment of psychic and social energy becomes the *dynamic agent*. The word dynamic, primarily and etymologically relates to force, but usage has sanctioned its extension to include that which force normally accomplishes, viz., motion, change. In the expression "dynamic agent," both the narrower and the broader conceptions are involved, but in most of the other applications of the word "dynamic" it is mainly restricted to the narrower sense, and may be defined as: producing movement and change as the result of force. It is thus clearly distinguished in its scope from the term *kinetic*, employed in modern physics, which relates to motion only, without connoting force. The use of the term dynamics in the sense here indicated was first made in mechanics, and constitutes a department of that science in contradistinction to statics in which the forces are conceived as in equilibrium, so that no movement results. The next science in which a dynamic department was recognized was geology, and latterly the term is being applied to other sciences. From the principles with which we set out it is clear that every true science must have both a dynamic and a static department. This has been sparingly recognized in biology, and distinctly so in economics by Dr. Patten and in sociology by Comte.*

In treating of the mechanics of society, therefore, it is of the utmost importance to understand what constitutes social statics

¹ Some attempt at an enumeration of these appetitive attributes may be found in *The Psychic Factors of Civilization*, pp. 53, 61.

* Not by Spencer, notwithstanding his work on "Social Statics."

and what social dynamics, and how these two primary departments are to be marked off, distinguished and recognized. First of all it must be insisted that the terms are not used merely as smooth expressions that have a scientific sound, or as remote analogies to those of exact science, but for what they actually mean, and in precisely the same sense that they have in pure mechanics or in solar astronomy. By this is not meant that the phenomena of society are capable of reduction to exact mathematical tests in any such degree as can be done in astronomy and physics, but merely, as already pointed out, that the highest generalizations in sociology are subject to theoretical treatment as exact as the observed phenomena of the planets or of falling bodies. It may be regarded as a sort of *pure* sociology, and it certainly has a far better sanction than either the "pure morals" of Kant or the "absolute ethics" of Spencer.

Beginning, then, with social statics, it must be defined as: social forces in equilibrium. We must then seek for cases in which social forces are in a state of equilibrium, or approximately so; for in so complex a field as society nothing absolute is to be expected when actual phenomena are under investigation. A moment's inspection shows that the social forces do not always and universally result in movement, that they conflict and collide with one another, that they choke one another, and are constantly tending to bring about a cessation of motion, *i. e.*, they tend towards the state of equilibrium. The larger masses (social groups) are first brought to rest, but within these masses there goes on a sort of molecular activity by which free paths are opened for the performance of minor operations. The general result is what may be called a social structure. In a wider sense these social *structures* may be called *institutions*. As examples of social structures proper may be mentioned the family, the clan, the tribe, the state, the church, and each and all of the innumerable voluntary associations of society. As examples of institutions may be instanced marriage, government, language, customs, ethical and conventional codes, religion, art, and even literature and science.

Society itself, which includes all the structures and institutions that may exist at any given time together with a certain vague but general psychic integration, may be regarded as a great structure in which the social forces have to a certain extent been brought into a state of equilibrium. It is only the most general aspects of the will that are thus equilibrated, and within this great social structure there are others which in advanced societies may be classified into a sort of subordinate hierarchy of structures, along with many that are more or less coördinate.

In general it may be said that society as a whole, including all its structures and institutions, both general and special, constitutes a *mechanism*. The structures are not chaotic and haphazard, but symmetrical and systematic. They conform to the universal law of evolution which creates the spheres of space and the adapted forms of organic life. Although all this is believed to go on spontaneously and to be the normal result of purely genetic causes, in the great poverty of language to express this process, it is almost necessary to resort to the language of teleology, which will convey no false implications to the well-informed. We may therefore say that society constitutes a mechanism for the production of results. Every social structure or institution exists for a purpose. It is necessary to guard against the mistake of confounding social statics with social stagnation. The social mechanism, taken as a whole, constitutes the social *order*, and social statics is simply the science of social order.

To regard social structures as mechanisms is a luminous point of view for the treatment of social mechanics. A machine, properly understood, is simply a device for reducing the forces it is designed to utilize to a state of equilibrium. Without the machine these forces would run to waste so far as the user of the machine is concerned. The machine checks their natural flow, and, temporarily at least and theoretically, equilibrates them. In other words the energy of nature is *stored* by the machine for the purpose of being utilized to far greater advantage and at the will of the user. This is clearly seen in the principle of the

valve, of the pendulum, etc. It is really one principle and underlies the working of every mechanism. But the result is not a loss but a gain; not a diminution but an immense increase of the product of these forces. Such mechanisms are of course the work of intelligent design on the part of man, but the same is true of the purely genetic mechanisms of natural evolution. A plant or an animal is a mechanism in this sense. It is an organic structure and represents a large amount of stored energy. It is a device for bringing a certain class of forces into equilibrium in order to increase the amount of work that can be accomplished with the same expenditure of energy. The social structures rest on the same principle. Man accomplishes more in society than out of it. The various organized groups produce more than the same individuals could produce if unorganized. Every institution increases the power of society to do work.

The work which any mechanism, whether physical, organic, or social, normally performs constitutes its *function*. If it is that which the mechanism was intended or adapted to do it belongs to this class. The function of a cotton mill is to make cotton goods, that of a grist-mill to make flour, etc. The function of a leaf is to transpire, that of an anther to fertilize, that of a pistil to develop seed. In animals the function of legs is to run, of wings to fly, of jaws to bite, of the stomach to digest. The function of an entire individual organism may be said to be that of protecting, nourishing, and preserving itself. That of a sexual pair or group is to reproduce its kind and continue the race. Rising to social structures we find that each has likewise its function—the particular work that it was created to perform. Society itself is organized for the protection at least of its members. Every voluntary association exists for a particular purpose which is its function. Government and the state exist for the good of society. Its protection against anti-social influences is their function. Religion and the church exist for the protection of society from assumed spiritual beings and to propitiate them. From a highly philosophical point of view they have a far deeper and more recondite function, viz., that of

antagonizing the tendency to violate the laws of nature and jeopardize the existence of the race. The moral and conventional codes have a similar function to the last named. Every ethnic custom before it passes into a mere "survival" has a purpose or function and performs it. Marriage and the family have the supreme function of continuing the race. And so on to the end of the list.

All this belongs strictly to statical sociology and shows the immense importance of the social order. But we may go a step farther. Statics is not limited merely to preservation and perpetuation. It also includes growth and multiplication. So long as the same normal function is performed by the same structure the phenomenon is statical, although the amount of the product be increased to any extent. If more spindles of the same kind are introduced into a factory whereby a greater quantity of goods is manufactured the function of its machinery is the same. If by reason of favorable conditions an organism attains an unusual growth without any physical modification of its organs, its function is still normal. If a species of plant or animal succeeds in multiplying its individuals without any change in its structure it remains the same species and its condition is technically statical. So of social structures and human institutions, no matter how great the results of their functional activity, so long as they remain the same structures and the same institutions, their study belongs to social statics.

One further step might be taken before the strict bounds of statical sociology are exceeded. It is an important fact not to be overlooked that structures are at first crude and poorly perform their functions, and that they usually continue gradually to improve in quality and attain correspondingly increased efficiency. This, too, properly belongs to statics, although it would seem to involve a true progress. Great caution, however, is required in this study of the improvement in the quality of types of structure. There is always danger of overlooking the true character of structures. They are almost always composite and consist of what may be called substructures. The

character of the function performed by the compound structure will depend upon the nature of its component structures. Any change in the nature of the functions is liable to be due to essential modifications in the substructures which may leave the compound structure to all appearances unchanged. We may therefore really be dealing with a dynamic phenomenon without knowing it. If this error be carefully guarded against, the general proposition that the perfection of identical types of structure is a statical phenomenon remains altogether valid, and we have as the broadest truth at which we have thus far arrived the law that all considerations of structure and function are statical. The investigation of structures is anatomy, that of functions is physiology, and in all sciences, including sociology, the study of both anatomy and physiology belongs to the department of statics.

We turn next to the dynamic aspect. We have seen that the dynamic agent resides in the feelings or affective department of mind, and it exerts its power through the myriad forms of appetitive desire constituting impulses, or impelling forces, and motives, or moving forces all of which may be embodied under the general term will, and regarded as making up the true soul of nature, of man, and of society. I have endeavored to show how the original and unrestrained operation of these social forces causes them to collide and antagonize one another, to check and control the movements set up, and ultimately to result in definite structures consisting of mechanisms for the equilibration of the forces and for the storage of the social energy. I have further shown that through such social structures society is enabled to systematize the work of the social forces and accomplish infinitely more than could have been accomplished without them, and that the work thus performed constitutes the function of these social structures. All this belongs to the department of social statics.

But there is always a limit to the efficiency of any fixed mechanism, and the same agencies that caused the origination and development of these structures, from a condition in which

none existed, continued to act in the same direction, which could now be none other than that of their modification and transformation into different and more efficient structures. Both the origination of structures out of the structureless condition and the modification of the type of structures already formed are dynamic phenomena. All nature is plastic and this incessant pressure of the social forces for the betterment of types of structure has resulted in an almost universal but exceedingly gradual change in these structures. The sociologist has before him the task of explaining the precise *modus operandi* of these changes. The fact to be contemplated is that while the functional effects of almost any social structure are greater than would be the effect of action without any structure, the effects of the later modified structures are greater than those of the earlier unmodified ones, and the effect of the progressive transformation of human institutions has upon the whole been that of vastly increasing their social efficiency. The same effect has attended the creation of new institutions, or the multiplication of social structures. How does this take place?

We saw that feeling was the dynamic agent, and therefore it is here certainly that we must look for the initial impetus of all dynamic phenomena. We also saw that function (nutrition, reproduction, growth, multiplication, qualitative perfectionment) is essentially statical, and therefore it is useless to look in this direction. If, however, we examine the phenomena of function we shall see that they are all *indirect* in the sense of not following immediately upon the act that produces them as the effect of an efficient cause. The acts are not *causæ efficientes* but only *causæ sine qua non*. In unintelligent beings it is not to be supposed that the agents that perform the acts that produce functional effects have any conception of the nature of such effects. The animal does not eat in order to nourish its body, but to satisfy hunger, nor does it perform the reproductive act in order to continue its race, but to gratify an instinct. In the human race, so far as man's animal nature is concerned, the case is scarcely different, and the most rational communities would forth-

with disappear but for the impulses that indirectly lead to their preservation. These functional results are undesired. They are automatic. The will does not enter into their production. This of itself explains their static character. Whatever is dynamic must be desired, must be due to motive, must be a product of will power. The act itself of satisfying desire is not dynamic and if no effort were required there could be no modification of structure. It is precisely because, in the great majority of cases, effort is necessary that transformation takes place. From the very outset there have been obstacles to the satisfaction of desire, to remove which has required greater or less effort, and it is this effort that has resulted in change.

The fact to be noted at this point is that the effect (removal of obstacles) is not, like the functional effects hitherto considered, indirect and remote, but is direct and immediate. The effort is a true efficient cause and the effect is a purely natural physical consequence of the activity. In the animal world this effect is mainly subjective. It transforms the organism, modifies organs, multiplies structures, and creates new varieties, species, genera, and even families and classes. In man it does this too, but only to a limited extent. Here the principal effects are modifications of the environment to adapt it to the organs and faculties that he already possesses, and the degree to which this takes place is proportional to his superiority over the animal. It is a measure of his psychic development, and especially of his intellectual development. The removal of obstacles to the satisfaction of desire is the underlying cause of all social progress. It transforms the social environment. It modifies existing social structures and originates new ones. It establishes institutions. It resists the repressing tendencies of obsolescent customs and codes. It inaugurates reforms, which are at bottom a sort of social exuviation. If old, hardened structures prove too obdurate, it results at length in revolution. In short it constitutes the dynamic process of society.

Social progress is either genetic or telic. Progress below the human plane is altogether genetic and is called development.

In the early human stages it is mainly genetic, but begins to be telic. In the later stages it is chiefly telic. The transition from genetic to telic progress is wholly due and exactly proportional to the development of the intellectual faculty. The intellectual method is essentially telic. The intellect was developed as an aid to the will for the sole purpose of securing the more complete satisfaction of desire. It enables man to obtain by an indirect method what he could not obtain by a direct method. Through it satisfactions are multiplied and life correspondingly enriched.

On the subhuman plane the organic advances that nature accomplishes all take place according to the genetic principle. They constitute what is commonly understood as development or organic evolution. Certain writers, however, have used the term *genesis* in this, or some more or less modified sense. When we take in human evolution it becomes evident that it includes something more than is involved in the evolution of irrational beings. The moment we rise to the social sphere we encounter the telic aspect of the subject. It is still development or evolution, but a new principle, radically different from the genetic, has now been introduced, and in all the higher forms of social progress it assumes the leading rôle. Obviously, therefore, the sociologist at least demands a terminology that shall clearly indicate this important distinction. That much of social progress consists of simple genesis there is no doubt, but the greater part of human evolution is not genesis. A term is wanted to describe this major part of social evolution. So pressing is this need that I feel justified in striving to find and introduce such a term. We already have the word *teleology*, formerly employed exclusively in a theological sense, but which I long ago showed to be applicable to human activity.¹ From this we have the adjective *teleological*, and these might suffice for the purpose. But there is a shorter adjective form *telic* which is preferable to *teleological*, and possesses the advantage of being converted into the name of a science, *telics*, as proposed by Dr. Small. These two words may be conveniently set over

¹*Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 28, 29.

against *genetic* and genetics, thus greatly facilitating the expression of a large class of ideas with which the social philosopher must constantly deal. The only serious lack, then, is a similar antithetical term to be set over against *genesis*, to denote the distinctively social process which results from the application of the indirect, intellectual, or telic method. In order to supply such a term I propose to revive the Greek form *telesis*,¹ giving to it the required meaning.

There are two kinds of telic progress, or telesis, individual and collective. The former is the principal kind thus far employed. The latter is as yet so rare as to be almost theoretical. Society itself must be looked upon as mainly unconscious. Its operations are the result of the combined activities of its individual members. But the individual is conscious and seeks his ends by the aid of all the faculties he possesses. In societies at all advanced the individual units possess a developed intellectual faculty which they employ in precisely the same way that non-intellectual beings employ their unaided conative faculties, only with vastly greater results. This mind power acting in conjunction with the

¹ Gr. *τέλεσις*. This word was little used by the Greek philosophers and writers, and only, so far as I am aware, in the primary sense of the verb *τελέω*, to complete, fulfill, accomplish. Still, there seems no good reason why it may not take on not only all the meanings of that verb but also all those of the noun, *τέλος*, from which all words containing this root are derived. That word also meant primarily an end accomplished, but it was made to serve in a great number of cognate significations. Plato used it in the sense of an end of action or "final cause," and from this have sprung all the derivatives employed by philosophers. *Teleology* was not used by the Greeks, but we find *telic* (*τελικός*) in the various senses of *τέλος*, and especially used by the Stoics in an ethical sense, *final*. Mediæval and modern writers have always felt justified in employing any of the derivatives of *τέλος* in the Platonic sense. The adjective *τελεστικός* (fit for finishing) was used in religious ceremonies in connection with the office of consecration or initiation, where it may be rendered initiative, or mystical, and some modern mystics, as Cudworth have revived it in that sense. An Italian writer, Sig. L. Ferrarese, in a volume entitled, "Saggio di una nuova classificazione delle scienze," 1828, has employed the word *telestics* in a sense similar to that in which Dr. Small and myself have used *telics*. The latter would seem to be the preferable form. I am indebted for the reference to Ferrarese's work to Professor George E. Vincent of The University of Chicago, but I have thus far been unable to consult the work itself. I am not aware that the word *telesis* has hitherto been revived in any modern language.

will power has worked the same class of transformations that the latter accomplished alone, only it has done this on a much larger scale. This is individual teleis. It constitutes almost the only social progress that has thus far taken place.

The intellect is not itself a force, it is only a guide. Just as the desires collectively considered constitute the dynamic agent, *i. e.*, represent the forces to be dealt with in the mechanics of society, so the intellect constitutes the directive agent, and has for its function to guide the will into safe and effective channels of action. As the object is always to avoid the obstacles to the satisfaction of desire, the nature of this guidance must be to find paths, as it were, around these obstacles, and therefore its method is necessarily indirect. While the psychologic character of this indirection is always the same it appears under two quite different forms. Which of these forms it will assume depends upon the nature of the obstacles with which it has to deal. The two principal classes into which the objects of the impinging environment naturally fall are the animate and the inanimate, or, from the present point of view they may better be called the sentient and the insentient. Intellectual indirection practiced on sentient creatures is always in the nature of *deception*. The advantage of the agent is the opposite of that of the sentient object, or at least, is so regarded by the latter. The purpose is to circumvent the will of the creature that constitutes the obstacle. Both the agent and the victim may be either animal or man. There are therefore four possible cases: (1) animal acting on animal; (2) animal acting on man; (3) man acting on animal; and (4) man acting on man. But as the victim is usually inferior intellectually to the agent, the second case is rare or wanting, and in the first and fourth there is generally more or less inequality between the exploiting and the exploited animal or man. From the sociological point of view only the third and fourth cases, *i. e.*, those in which man is the agent, are involved. I surely need not dwell upon the familiar phenomena of the exploitation by man both of the animal world and of other men.

The psychological process involved has received a number

of names according to the degree of intellectual power called forth and to the nature of the being acted upon, but there is not the slightest difference in the essential quality of the mental act. We may distinguish five ascending grades of this act which will be sufficient for the present purpose. These are, (1) low or ordinary cunning, largely aided in animals by hereditary instincts; (2) sagacity, such as is manifested by the most intelligent domestic animals, and also by the less developed human beings; (3) shrewdness, best exemplified in business transactions; (4) strategy, as practiced in war; and (5) diplomacy, characterizing the intercourse of nations with one another. This group of intellectual actions, since it involves more or less pain, temporary at least, in the feeling beings exploited, represents the *moral* aspect of the principle under discussion and may be called *moral indirection*.

The other form of indirection, viz., that in which the intellect, or directive agent deals with inanimate or insentient objects forming obstacles to the satisfaction of desire, appears only to a limited degree at any stage below the human. At least animals exercise it only by avoiding such obstacles, and never by modifying them. But man, at all stages at which we know him, and doubtless almost from the beginning of his strictly human career, has always and everywhere sought with more or less success to modify his environment and to adapt it more completely to his needs. The principle involved is in all respects the same as that by which he has thwarted the will of animals and his fellow men. In a certain sense he may be said to be engaged in deceiving nature or exploiting the inorganic world. In circumventing the will of animals and men he is making use of all the knowledge he possesses of psychic forces. In modifying the inanimate environment he in like manner makes use of his knowledge of physical forces. It is the same faculty employed in the same way only on another class of objects.

The objects being inanimate and insentient their manipulation can cause no pain and therefore no moral considerations are involved. Such action is innocent or *unmoral* (*amoral* or *anethical*),

and this form of indirection may, in contradistinction to the moral indirection already considered be called *physical indirection*. So, too, the terms that are applied to the various grades of moral indirection—cunning, sagacity, shrewdness, strategy, diplomacy—are not generally applied to physical indirection, although there are many etymological usages that acutely suggest the identity of principle. Cunning is often a synonym of dexterity. Art has the two derivatives, artful and artificial. From craft comes crafty. A machination becomes a machine. The usual generic term for this exercise of the intellectual faculty is *ingenuity*. An ingenious act is an invention. The product of invention is art. Art is the basis of culture and the measure of civilization. All art is thus telic. It consists in the utilization of the materials and forces of nature. As supplemented by scientific discovery and crystallized in machinery, it constitutes the great mainspring of human progress. As already remarked, the greater part of all that has been thus far achieved has been the work of strictly egoistic individual action. The vast dynamic results have been the immediate and direct effects of this action upon the impinging environment. It was not contemplated by the individual, and so far as he is concerned, it was incidental and unintended. Still it was the necessary result of his effort to satisfy desire.

But, as has also been hinted, this individual *telesis* is not all that is to be expected from the human race, endowed as it is with a highly developed, and as I believe, Galton and Kidd to the contrary notwithstanding, still rapidly developing intellectual faculty. There is possible another step resulting in a social or *collective telesis*. The individual has grappled with physical forces and with psychic forces and has laid them tribute to his will. It remains for society in its collective capacity to grapple with the social forces and to render them in like manner subject to the social will. But to do this society must wake to consciousness even as the individual has done. It must develop a social intellect capable of exercising both the forms of indirection described. Society must become cunning, shrewd, strategic and diplomatic in compassing its own interests, but especially it must

acquire ingenuity and inventiveness in dealing with the heterogeneous mass of human beings out of which it is constituted, all of whom, however, are actuated in every movement by fixed laws that it must first discover. This social intellect must imitate in all respects the individual intellect. It must even be egoistic, since its own interests are also those of its individual components, and therefore there is no possibility of injury except through failure to secure those interests.

But these propositions are too general. Let us descend to something more specific. The general result of a careful study of the alleged "social organism" results in the conclusion that the only true basis of comparison between society and an animal organism is psychological. In this comparison it is admitted even by Spencer that the true social homologue of the animal brain is to be found in human government. The social intellect, if there is to be one, must be located in the governing body of society. That such a thing is possible is obvious to any one who is capable of divesting himself of popular prejudices.

Of course, as already remarked, this is largely theoretical in the present state of society, but nothing is clearer than that the legislative body of any given state may exercise intelligence. It is supposed to do this now, and only misarchists will deny that it generally does so, albeit an intelligence of a rather low order, as ought to be expected from a body that does not pretend to do more than represent the intelligence of its constituents, including the lowest as well as the highest, *i. e.*, a body representing approximately the average social intelligence. In a more highly developed community the degree of intelligence applied to legislation will necessarily be correspondingly greater, and, in theory at least, it may ultimately reach the level attained in the present state of society by those individuals most highly developed intellectually. As soon as the social brain shall have attained this stage of development it will begin to employ the indirect method so characteristic of the individual. It will not only display shrewdness and diplomacy, but it will also display ingenuity. A science of government will be established, based

on an investigation and discovery of the laws controlling social phenomena. This, as in the physical sciences, will constitute the foundation, for a genuine process of social invention. The laws made by governments are totally different from the laws of nature. They are simply applications of them. Properly viewed they are, when effective, nothing more nor less than so many inventions in the domain of the social forces. Legislation, in so far as it is scientific, is invention.

It is of course easy to see how widely this ideal legislation differs from most of the actual legislation. In the latter the intellectual method of indirection is rarely employed. Most laws are mandatory or prohibitory, *i. e.*, only brute force is employed, the same as that by which irrational creatures strive to attain their ends. The inventive method consists in devising mechanical adjustments such as shall direct the forces to be controlled into paths foreseen to be advantageous. As the forces are indestructible and ever pressing, and as they will necessarily follow the lines of least resistance, they must flow along these useful paths foreordained by human ingenuity. Man would never have established art by attempting to compel physical forces to act this way or that. He not only abandons brute force but he ceases to use his own force at all and applies himself to leading, or, as it were, *attracting* the natural forces into their prescribed courses. And when the mechanics of society shall have been made in like manner the prolonged and successful study of the intelligent legislator, this method will completely supersede the present crude, unscientific and largely ineffective method, and the results for society will compare with those now attained as the highest industrial art compares with the crudest empiricism. I have called this method Attractive Legislation, the further consideration of which must be deferred to the final paper of this series.

We thus perceive that the mechanics of society naturally falls under the two general groups of social statics and social dynamics. The first of these groups need not for present purposes be subdivided, but the second primarily dichotomizes into

what, for the sake of uniform terminology, may be called social *genetics* and social *telics*; furthermore, this last in turn assumes the two forms of individual telics and collective telics. These are the several scientific aspects of the subject. The corresponding processes which it is the purpose of these branches of the science of social dynamics respectively to study are: (1) social genesis; (2) individual telesis; and (3) collective telesis.

The entire scheme of the Mechanics of Society may therefore be formulated as follows:

Social Mechanics, treating of the Social Forces.

Social Statics, treating of Social Order.

Social Dynamics, treating of Social Progress.

Social Genetics, treating of Social Genesis.

Social Telics, treating of Social Telesis.

Individual Telics, treating of Individual Telesis.

Collective Telics, treating of Collective Telesis.

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SOCIAL CONTROL. IV.

SUGGESTION.

WE have seen how, by means of sanctions, legal, social, and supernatural, the stubborn will is bent to right action. We have now to consider how society without the use of any sanction can attain the same result. This calls for a study of suggestion.

Sentiments and ideas can be suggested as well as volitions. Why, then, it may be asked, is suggestion treated in connection with the will rather than with the feelings and judgment? The answer is that when society by means of reiterated suggestion, beginning with the plastic child mind and continuing through the whole period of character-making, graves deeply into the soul of the individual certain admirations or certain estimates, it is these latter that are the immediate stimuli to conduct, and hence subject matter of this series of studies. The rôle of suggestion in moral upbuilding will be described when we come to explain the sway of the feelings by social ideals and of the judgments by social valuations. Under "Suggestion," as an independent topic, we are called upon to consider only the direct shaping of conduct by social inclination, *i. e., vis-a-vis* modification of the will.

The marvelous control of the operator over the hypnotized subject shows how obedient a person in a neuropathic condition may become to impressions from without. But it is likely that most people, quite apart from the hypnotic state, experience a shock when something is suggested. The onset of a perception, idea, or emotion has a real force, and is stayed only by a certain resistance. In children suggestibility is high—a fact which was seized upon by the genius of Guyau and made the corner stone of a scheme of moral education.¹ As the mind develops, how-

¹ GUYAU, *Education and Heredity*, chapters i and ii.

ever, the control of self and the strength of will increase till in hale and firm characters among adults the daily impact of suggestion causes no more tremor than a flight of arrows against an iron-clad. But only the few attain this self-possession; the great mass of adults retain a responsiveness to hints from without that must be taken into account in the social regulation of conduct.

Bodily and mental condition has much to do with suggestibility. Fatigue, disease, and "nerves" lessen the inhibitive power, while mob-madness leads men captive to the impressions of the moment. The *source* of suggestion is, moreover, a vital matter. The peculiar power of certain individuals of authority or prestige to fascinate and impose their wills on the many is well known. The services of this power on behalf of social control will be treated in the paper on "Personality." Two other things to be considered in measuring the importance of suggestion are its *volume* and its *purity*. It is frequent, reiterated, manifold suggestion, suggestion from all sides, from everybody, that wins mastery over the will. As continual tapping with a hammer will break an iron beam, so innumerable mental impacts break down the firmest resolution. It is this cumulative aspect that makes *social suggestion* emanating from the community itself the chief kind to be considered in connection with the conduct of adults. Again the force of a suggestion is vastly lessened if it encounters opposite suggestions that inhibit and block it off. It is therefore social suggestions, *protected from contradiction*, that are most signal in results.

Everything we do confesses the pull exerted by social suggestion. Our choice of food and drink, our style of dress and furniture, our lying down and our getting up, our amusements and our pastimes feel the sway of fashion and vogue. Whatever is common is suggested by way of example or advice or intimation from a hundred directions. In our most private choices we are swerved from our orbit by the solar attraction (or repulsion) of the conventional. Nor is this sway of usage without a dash of control. Break with social practice and there

arises a buzz of insistent suggestion intended to win for the many the homage of your imitation. Fashion becomes vocal and presses itself with considerable emphasis and pertinacity upon the nonconformist.

But social suggestion becomes imperative only in the field where individual and social choices clash, *i. e.*, in the field of conduct, of social behavior. Here from a medium of social influence it becomes an agent of social control and a hand-maiden of morality.

No little care is needed to discriminate between control by suggestion and the fear of public opinion, the ascendancy of what everybody thinks from dread of "what people will think." Nor is it easy to mark the difference between a social standard that one obeys because he feels he must, and a social ideal that one works towards because he has learned to admire it. Again it is necessary to distinguish one's tendency to gravitate towards the social imperative, from his readiness to adopt and to act upon ready-made social judgments.

A concrete case will indicate the true nature of social suggestion. A wife continues to live with a respectable husband for whose person, however, she has an inexpugnable loathing. She is deterred from desertion by no fear of consequences legal or social. She does not dread the disapproval of the community. Her ideal of womanhood does not include unconditional submission. She has no theory of conduct which subordinates personal happiness to abstract virtue. Yet withal she may smother back her repugnance, and sacrifice her impulses to the perpetuity of the marriage tie. Why? Because her impulse is emphatically inhibited by the community will. If the bar to her will is simply the veto of society, as it appears to her through her friends, intimates and associates, she acquiesces with a sense of necessity. If, as is more usual, she yields, not solely to pressure from outside, but rather to the inner tension that results from accumulated past suggestions, ingrained "shalts" and "shalt nots," she succumbs to a feeling of obligation.

The "sense of duty," then, is the emotional state that answers

to the bias the will receives from suggestion. It is not, as Schopenhauer thought, the foreshadow of punishment. It does not symbolize the sway of our ideal over our particular choices, or the rule of principle over impulse. The feeling of oughtness, except when it is the pressure of instinct, is the force of past or present social suggestion working directly on the will. It registers the subjection of the individual's desires and interests to the ascendancy of outsiders.

The extent to which this prevails in anyone depends on whether his individuality is feeble or developed, whether the influences to which he has been exposed are uniform or varied. People of narrow orbit—children, farmers' wives, spinsters, peasants, humble village folk, fishermen, often soldiers and sailors—are slaves to the sense of obligation. Prolonged exposure to a circle or group that speaks always with the same decision the same commands, benumbs the will over whole areas of choice.¹ On the other hand, whatever invigorates the will or reduces the grip of the environment—education, discussion, travel, varied experience, contact with unlike types of men, leadership, new ideas and wants, changes in general opinion, or intellectual progress—undermines the tyranny of group suggestion. In a country neighborhood made up of unlike elements, not crystallized into a close-grained community, the individual counts for much. Likewise in a large city, with many types of belief and sentiment. On the other hand in a military academy, a garrison, a colony, a New England village or a provincial town, the many get the upper hand of the one. Sometimes the coercion is not in the will of the community but in certain traditions. In old colleges, in universities, monasteries, senates, academics, soldiers' homes, ancient families, quiet neighborhoods are traditions that fascinate and profoundly modify the choices of those who come under their influence. So around rank, station, caste, and office cluster powerful precedents and traditions which quickly regulate the conduct of the newly initiated.

¹ Variety is the soul of originality and its only source of supply.—BALDWIN, *Mental Development*, p. 360.

Such are the products of social suggestion. What is its process?

The first noose thrown over the neck of inclination is example. Whatever kind of family type, social manners, neighborly helpfulness, trade practice, business transaction, civic activity, or patriotic sacrifice becomes common tends to draw the practice of individuals in its wake. Standard conduct becomes a fashion, and is imitated as a style of dress is imitated, even at cost to the imitator. To approximate this social pattern is often mere drifting, oars in lap. Consider the difference between succumbing to the prevailing standard and surmounting it. It is the difference between the sinking of the released pendulum to its nadir, and its rising on the other side. Not to deceive the assessor is one thing; to produce overlooked property is another. They are alike in principle, but the latter means much more, because it transcends the ordinary practice. There is one merit of the lawyer who will not cheat his client, a far greater merit of the lawyer who will not cheat the jury about his client. Yet the difference is simply that the one is borne up by the example of his profession, while the other unaided rises above it.

Again there is the force of expectation, which is by no means identical with example. Even if the general practice is low, men pitch high their expectation of how another is going to act. As he who circulates a subscription paper professes to expect much more than there is any hope of getting, so society assumes for each a behavior above the average attainment. The moral sentiments that are applauded on the stage or the platform, that each professes to act on, and that each professes to expect everybody else to act on, by no means underlie actual practice. Yet it is not for a Juvenal or a Zola to abolish this gap between expectation and reality. The satirist has his day, but the generations belong to the optimist. Only in times of moral decay, when society is dropping to pieces, does the cynic give tone to current belief, discussion, and literature. Usually it is the book, the play, the poem, the sermon, the appeal, that takes good instincts for granted, deems the great heart of the people sound, assumes high

motives for right conduct, and finds egoism the abnormal, the exceptional thing, that wins applause and adherence.

The cynic declares that this Fool's Paradise of expectancy is debilitating, that shams rot out the moral fiber of a people, and that our first concern is to see things just as they are. Yet there is something to be said on the other side. The notice "Gentlemen will not spit on the floor," is optimistic, but it gets itself realized. The signal "England expects every man to do his duty," provides no sanction, yet elicits noble effort. "It has been justly said," says Guyau,¹ "that the art of managing the young consists before anything else in assuming them to be as good as they wish themselves to be." "The same principles find their application in the art of governing men. Numerous facts from prison-life show that to treat a half criminal as a great criminal is to urge to crime." The open assumption on the part of everybody that of course everyone is going to be pure, honest, and public-spirited, acts on many men as an imperious suggestion they cannot but obey. Abandon it and you lose a stimulus to right action.

The tonic effect of this atmosphere of illusion may be shown by an analogy. Usually the temper of a social set is more cheerful and buoyant than the average mood of its members. The reason is that in all social intercourse, especially the developed kind, there is a secret understanding that each shall put his best foot foremost and keep his private griefs to himself. Good form bids each tell of his good luck, but not of his misfortunes, report his elations, but conceal his worries, pains, disease, and anguish. Each does this and requires it of the others on penalty of avoidance. The result is that the social atmosphere is charged with an ozone of gaiety, hopefulness, and *joie de vivre* that helps each to bear his private burdens. Why may not a like beneficent illusion create a social atmosphere that will morally brace and buoy up those on the point of yielding to their selfish instincts?

Besides exalting the tone of social suggestion society interposes to exclude counter-suggestion. Knowing better than our

¹ *Education and Heredity*, p. 26.

forefathers the blight of evil example, we set no one in stocks or pillory, veil decently our prisons and prison-discipline from the common gaze, avoid public executions, forbid brutal exhibitions, stamp out the fighting of cocks, dogs, bulls, or men, look after the treatment of car or cab horses, restrict vivisection, confine prostitutes to the back streets, keep our saloons away from the churches and the schoolhouses, and suppress open drunkenness as a public scandal. Furthermore we exact from our public men, as a price of their leadership, a private life that shall offer no stone of stumbling to the foot of weak imitators. The publicity that illumines for the multitude the habits and doings of those in high places compels a close scrutiny of their private as well as their public conduct, and a prompt disowning of those whose example is a danger to the public *morale*.

The suggestion of word is no less an object of concern than the contagion of deed. Our public places have been so looked after that from one end of a great thoroughfare to another we find nothing to remind of vice or crime. From the pulpit, on the platform, in all meetings and social gatherings, it is a grave offense to speak save sparingly and in way of condemnation of aught but that which is pure and of good report. One can trace the purgation more and more clearly as personal relations become social relations. Where two or three are gathered the tongue wags freely. Before twenty, in the sewing circle or the lodge room, one stammers and thinks of the morals of his neighbors. Before a hundred the social *cloture* is in full operation, and to an audience mingled of both sexes and all ages it is always the pontiff and not the man that speaks.

The daily newspaper, in its catering to ever-widening classes, has often become mere printed street gossip, quite oblivious to any suggestive effect. But the recurring agitation for the purifying of the press and the growing clamor for an endowed newspaper, herald the day when judicious selection of news will be exercised in the interest of social morality. Some years ago Mr. Howells complained that American fiction was hobbled because our magazines were constructed always with reference to

the young girl of the American family. That is to say, most of our reading submits to a censorship that reduces it to *littérature pour la jeune fille*. This phrase hints at a striking difference between America and continental Europe in dealing with suggestion. There they establish hothouses in which the young are carefully shut away till their characters are sufficiently formed. As this seclusion makes it less needful to purge the general social atmosphere, there ensues a frankness of expression and a freedom of deed that is startling to us. Here there is little isolation; the young are more and more granted the right to go anywhere and everywhere, and in front of them society vigorously plies the broom. Whatever the American girl invades or touches—religion, politics, literature, art, science, drama, social intercourse, festivity or sport—must be cleansed of evil suggestion, not by a *police des mœurs*, but by the far more pervasive censorship of public opinion.

The immediate effect of all this is to lend to society an outer gloss of respectability that makes decency and courtesy, honesty and public spirit, seem far more common than they are. The innocent can, if they will, tread the mazes of our social life as uncontaminated as they would be in convent or boarding school. Whatever miasma may lurk in the back alleys, the highways are kept decent. The eager air that on the Continent nips adolescent virtue outside the hothouse is here tempered to the immature. Of course this keeping up of appearances in order to purify suggestion is a shining mark to the slings of the cynic and the moral prophet. The cynic wants things to seem as they are, the moral reformer wants things to be as they seem; but both see in the contrast between being and seeming nothing but cowardice, hypocrisy, and moral decadence. Unmindful of the fact that "conventional lies" seem to grow apace with civilization, the veritists proclaim the dogma that the truth can never injure.

But the guarding of social suggestion is justified of its fruits. Arizona girds at New England for hiding vice behind a lustrous varnish of respectability, and lauds her own frankness in regard

to evil doing. Yet Arizona become *mater familias* will assuredly resent the flaunting of anti-social practice, and take steps to purge the atmosphere of the community. Long before hypnotism practical men valued moral tone, and with the maxim *Corrumpunt mores bonos colloquia prava* set about to make the general tide of suggestion favorable to the social nature. The importance of suggestion in the control of the sexual instincts early established a decency and reserve in such matters which is now being extended to other aspects of conduct.

It is not, however, to be forgotten that there are other interests at stake. Life is more than society, welfare is more than virtue. The gyving and gagging of people in their social life may go on till the cost far outweighs the gain. The strong naturally do not want their literature, art, drama, festivity, and sport emasculated on account of the weak. That there are people who, when suicides abound, dare not look at a razor, is a pity; but we cannot go bearded to spare their susceptibilities. Between Puritan tyranny and Restoration profligacy, between Louis Quatorze and Louis Quinze, there must be a wise middle course. Moreover, there is a danger in overmuch coddling of anti-social or defectively social natures. It is as possible to make things too easy for the morally unfit as for the physically unfit, for Puritanism to check the elimination of the former as communism would check the elimination of the latter. The over-zealous guardian of public morals, like Emerson's conservative,¹ "assumes sickness as a necessity, and his social frame as a hospital, his total legislation is for the present distress, a universe in slippers and flannels, with bib and papspoon, swallowing pills and herb tea."

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¹ Lecture on The Conservative.

THE CRITERION OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE.

THE problem of the relation of the moralist to the subject-matter of political economy has occasioned the shedding of much ink, and yet it is at bottom a comparatively simple one. In so far as the economist attempts to state the laws which, as a matter of fact, at any given time underlie the process of production and distribution, the intrusion of the moralist into his field is as impertinent as it would be for him to thrust himself into the councils of the geologist or the biologist. With the attempt to understand, judgments of approbation or reprobation have absolutely nothing to do. But political economy is something more than a science, it is also an art. In this capacity it aims to serve as a guide to legislation and perhaps even to private initiative in marking out the channels in which the stream of industry should flow; in other words, it sets before us ideals and attempts to point out the means by which these may be attained. Here the presence of the moralist is emphatically demanded, for these ideals and the means suggested for their attainment must submit to be measured by ethical standards on pain of forfeiting the allegiance of the best members of society; and that the untrained and unaided common conscience is incompetent for this complicated task will, we hope, be apparent before the conclusion of this paper. The contributions of ethics to economics will fall into two divisions; first, a general statement of the principal demands which morality makes upon all forms of human activity, and, second, a criticism from this point of view of such particular legislative and other innovations as the economist may from time to time propose.

Of all the ethical conceptions with which the economist is compelled to deal, none stand so imperatively in need of clearing up as does that everyday term justice. The present industrial system is constantly the object of bitter attacks because of the

alleged injustice involved in the extremes of wealth and poverty which it permits to exist, while it is defended by some with equal warmth of conviction as the very flower of that which is fair and just. Most of these discussions lead to no result simply because the disputants have never taken the trouble to clearly define, even in their own minds, the words they so glibly employ. If examined on this point common sense is quite certain it knows precisely what it is talking about. But the considerable number of mutually exclusive formulæ that have been proposed, the vagueness of a large proportion, and the palpable absurdity of some show that the conception is a complex one, whose real nature can be brought out only in a careful and extended analysis.

As a matter of fact it is no easy undertaking to even enumerate the phenomena to be included under the term justice. For generations this has been used so loosely that it has now become impossible to frame a comprehensive statement of the various forms of morality to which the name is actually applied. It may, however, be defined as such a distribution among two or more parties of things considered desirable or undesirable as would be sanctioned by the moral consciousness. "The things distributed" may be material or otherwise, money or its equivalents, honors, preferment or affection, or, on the other hand, pain, fines, etc. A number of objections will doubtless suggest themselves to this definition, many of which could easily be shown to be more apparent than real, but they do not require an elaborate discussion in this place, for the definition given is at all events sufficiently exact for the purposes of this paper. The far more important question is that with regard to the standard of distribution. Nothing better exhibits the vagueness of popular notions on this subject than the verbal jugglery with which common sense has here allowed itself to be imposed upon. A famous formula reads: "Justice is the firm and constant purpose to give every man his own." If this statement merely means to call attention to the fact that justice is concerned with distribution, it is well enough, but as a criterion it is worse than useless.

For "own" must mean either that which a man possesses or that which he ought to possess. In the first case the principle is outrageously false, in the second it merely supplies us with the valuable information that a person ought to be given what he ought to have.

Turning away from such emptiness we find two criteria in the field, each intelligible, each with the best claims for a careful hearing and consideration, each commanding the allegiance of many intelligent men. It will be the aim of this paper to present such data as may place the reader in a position to decide between them. The former is a special application of the criterion of morality which is accepted by the two leading schools of moralists in England and America today. According to this view the rightness or wrongness of every action is determined by the relation in which it stands to the well-being of those directly or indirectly affected by it. This principle, applied to the problem of distribution of property would stamp that industrial system as right which all things considered makes for the greatest amount of well-being. One member of this school may claim that this result is best attained on the whole by a system of *laissez faire*, notwithstanding the room it gives to the play of luck, of inheritance, of wealth created by others, etc.; a second, by an organization of society by which the return for labor expended is measured solely by the amount and excellence of the services rendered; still another, by a system in which rewards are apportioned directly according to needs. But all would agree that the problem in each case is the same, namely, to get such a ratio between quantity of production and equality of distribution as will best serve the economic interests of all concerned, while at the same time none of the higher elements of human life shall be sacrificed. Such a system these moralists would declare to be just, whatever particular form it might take.

The second of the criteria above referred to is one that never fails to commend itself to the popular imagination; it declares that reward should be proportioned to individual desert. According to this view, if not taken in a Pickwickian sense, as is

too often the case, we have nothing to do with the question whether a community will be richer in all the elements of well-being under a given régime or whether the most valuable fruits of civilization may be thus best preserved ; justice, we are told, has nothing to do with effects, therefore let desert be rewarded "though the heavens fall." As thus stated most persons would doubtless condemn this formula without hesitation as abject absurdity ; and if we could drop the subject here, there would be no need of farther argument. But many would claim that such conclusions involve carrying a good principle too far. We may, they would insist, apportion reward to desert up to a certain point, but as soon as we thereby begin to interfere very seriously with the welfare of society we may adopt a different standard. In this respect they follow exactly the example set them by the apostles of absolute liberty. But who does not see that either the general welfare or the principle of reward according to desert must be supreme, and if so that one or the other must be appealed to consistently whenever collision arises ? So that the common trick of shifting allegiance from one to the other of these two principles is as if a sick man should call in the homeopathic physician on the days when he thought himself convalescing and the allopathic whenever he felt that he was losing ground.

But it cannot be denied that such a line of reasoning usually produces little effect. Few persons know what it means to take an ethical ideal seriously and they accordingly feel as little compunction in changing their allegiance when occasion makes it convenient as did an Italian captain of the sixteenth century in serving now under the banner of Venice in its wars against Genoa and then enlisting in the army of Genoa in its campaigns against Venice. A man who believes that society is under supreme obligation to reward everyone according to desert should be prepared to push this through even if it reduced us all to a common level of bread and water and one shirt, or wrecked civilization itself. But his unwillingness to see his principle carried to this length will seldom prevent him from holding that it is a

sound rule of action up to some undetermined point where its consequences finally become black enough to frighten him; while if you talk of consistency the word is as one from an unknown tongue. We shall therefore attempt to establish the position that social well-being is in all cases the only criterion of justice, by showing that from its very nature desert cannot be made the measure of reward; and that, not because it would require the solution of problems that are difficult, but rather such as are in their very nature impossible even to formulate. We may assume with confidence that any conception of duty that requires of us that which is in its essence impossible is a mistaken one. If therefore we can prove our minor premise, we shall have no fear as to the conclusion.

In the proper sense of the term desert or merit is directly and indissolubly connected with the phenomenon of effort and that alone. There would be no such words if everywhere and always devotion to duty were alike easy, if we did not sometimes have to *fight* temptation, and if this conflict did not involve the putting forth of effort. With the concrete examples of this phenomenon all are sufficiently familiar. If a man with a hot temper controls himself under great provocation, we attribute to him much greater merit than to one who could not get angry if he tried. Similarly the credit attaching to a gift for a public charity or to a service rendered to a friend depends, other things being equal, in the first case upon the intensity of the individual's love for money, in the second upon his native indisposition to activity, his inertia as it were. This principle holds as truly in the industrial world as in any other department of human life. He who carries on a legitimate business is engaged in supplying the wants of his fellowmen. If such activity were mere fun instead of being on the whole a task, if strict devotion to duty did not make considerable demands upon our powers of self-control, if it did not frequently or usually involve a rising superior to the mere inclination of the moment, then, however useful it might be, we should never attribute credit to anyone in connection with it, it would involve no claim for reward on the

ground of desert. Or if desert were attributed to it this would be solely on the ground that during the time thus occupied we might have been engaged in serving ourselves instead of those to whom we are supposed to be personally indifferent. In a word we are considered to deserve well of others only in so far as the attempt to serve them has involved genuine sacrifice of inclination in some form or other. Any interpretation of the term less thoroughgoing than this the moralist must hold to be inadmissible.

Thoughtful advocates of the existing industrial system frequently attempt to vindicate its justice on the ground that it involves an exchange of equivalents, value for value, service for service, so that a man's share of the world's wealth is proportional to the amount he has contributed to its production. Denying the fact, many socialists have held up this same principle of reward according to service as the ideal to be striven for. But whatever may be said in favor of such a plan on the score of "expediency," our definition shows that it does not involve even remotely the apportionment of reward according to desert. The amount of social service which any person actually performs is determined only in part by the faithfulness with which he devotes himself to his business. Keen powers of observation, good judgment, insight, tact, a tenacious memory, the power of combining facts apparently remote, and even a sound digestion, good spirits, and excellent health, to say nothing of dispatch and native energy, determine very largely the amount of a man's contribution to the world's wealth. One brakeman out of a hundred thousand may rise to be the president of a railroad, but who does not know that his faithfulness to his humbler duties was but a small element in his success? The main point was that he had "brains." This would hold true in Utopia itself. The amount of service any man is capable of performing depends to a very large extent on gifts which nature implanted in him at birth, and how far the abilities he possesses at any given time are dependent upon that original endowment, and how far upon conscientious cultivation, no human being can ever know.

Is it possible, then, to conceive of a state of society where each might be rewarded according to the amount of effort put forth in the service of his fellows? If we could be absolutely certain that everyone would work up to the limits of his powers we might answer "Yes," for then we could introduce absolute equality of distribution. To be sure this innocent-looking term, equality, conceals a nest of difficulties, of which most people have never dreamed. But we can afford to neglect these and turn our attention to more fruitful matters. For, in the first place, all sane persons would agree that an order of society in which everyone worked till exhausted would be the very reverse of ideal, and yet, as will soon appear, short of that the existence of equality of effort can never be demonstrated. But, waiving this, as long as man remains an imperfect being, inequality of effort will always remain a fact to be reckoned with. The first problem will accordingly be the construction of a standard by which to measure the relative amount of such efforts. Now this, it is easy to show, is absolutely impossible. By such a statement we do not merely mean that it would involve difficulties in its practical application, for that is a defect common to all human ideals. Rather do we affirm that the standard in question is incapable of even an intelligible formulation. Time, of course, can be easily measured. But this is only one of three elements involved in determining the amount of genuine desert, the other two being intensity of application and natural indisposition to work. Everyone knows that of two carpenters of apparently equal ability one can accomplish twice or thrice as much in a day as the other, simply because he "works harder." If this is true of manual labor, how much more does it hold of the intellectual activity such as fills the working day of a railroad superintendent! The completeness with which attention is concentrated on his problem for a long period, the strain voluntarily submitted to in order to keep every faculty keyed up to the highest pitch, sometimes makes all the difference between good results and poor. Now this intensity of application there are absolutely no means of measuring. It cannot be estimated

by the actual amount accomplished, for then the factor of natural gifts disturbs our calculation in the manner already exhibited. Some can with the greatest ease solve problems which others with superhuman exertion could not even bring themselves to comprehend. On the other hand a subjective standard in the way of feeling is unthinkable. In the absence of anything to serve as a unit I can compare the intensity of application of one time with that of another only as I vaguely think of it as more or less. But whether it is twice or three times as great I myself could never tell; indeed it would be difficult to show that these terms have any meaning whatever. But if so, how much farther are we from being able to compare the amount of exertion which one man puts forth with that of another. Or, waiving this, how are we to equate exertion and time, so as to determine what must be the length of a period of time in which a certain number of units of exertion are put forth—whatever this may mean—in order to counterbalance another period with a greater number of effort units? And, finally, how shall we equate these factors with the intensity of the man's aversion to his particular task, or to steady work in general? Unless we can answer these questions the moralist is forced to maintain that the very notion of apportioning reward according to desert is an absurdity of the first class. The attribution of merit and demerit is undoubtedly a fact of human experience, but we can never know in even the remotest degree their relative amounts in any two individuals; and if not, then our instinctive impulse to create a system of society based on the apportionment in proportion to such amounts of reward (and penalty)—an impulse having its roots in gratitude and resentment—cannot be an integral portion of the moral ideal. Rewards, indeed, we may still bestow as a sign of approval or gratitude in those cases where the problem of quantity is a subordinate one; as where we make up a purse for a fisherman who has saved a child from drowning; rewards we may also bestow for reasons of expediency; but to anything beyond this nature itself has set up impassable barriers in the very constitution of the human mind.

These conclusions will appear to many persons so paradoxical that it may be worth while to enforce them by a brief reference to still more patent phenomena in a closely allied department of morals. The form of justice we have thus far been dealing with is called distributive. It assumes the existence of a given amount of wealth, and asks by what principles this shall be apportioned among the members of society. Our first impulse, as has been pointed out, is to give the reins into the hands of gratitude, and attempt to make reward commensurate with desert. But gratitude, and still more frequently its correlative resentment, may be called in to solve another problem, that of retribution. A crime has been committed, and it becomes necessary to determine the severity of the penalty. Common sense would again reply, let the punishment be proportioned to the desert. But here a difficulty at once arises over and above those which this conception has already been seen to involve. The degree of guilt is measured by the amount of effort that would have been requisite to overcome the temptation. Assuming for the moment that this amount could be determined and expressed in "units of effort"—a supposition which we have seen to be absurd—how determine the unit of punishment which shall be equivalent to a unit of demerit? Shall it be a day in the penitentiary at hard labor, or a week, or a month? If a man, under the stress of a given temptation, has stolen ten dollars from his employer's till and thereby contracted five "units of guilt" shall he be imprisoned five weeks or five months? No one can really answer, and the only principle which is capable of a consistent application in such cases is, by an exploration of the records of past experience to determine what penalties are most effective in preventing crime and what methods of punishment promise to do most for the reformation of the criminal. These are the principles adopted by modern penology, but they involve the application of the criterion of well-being and not of desert. Our conclusion with regard to the standard of distributive justice thus seems to be confirmed by a study of retributive justice. Our denial of the possibility of apportioning reward—as well as penalty—to

desert is seen to hold good for each. The position taken with regard to the former involves, therefore, nothing unique or exceptional, but is simply a special application of a general principle. If this view be correct, and if it be absurd to suppose that the demands of morality, properly interpreted, can ever require that which in its very nature is impossible, then we are compelled to maintain that the criterion of social justice can be nothing other than social utility.

Can a formula so vague be of any value to the economist or legislator in solving the practical problems with which he is called upon to deal? The answer seems clear. The fact that you see the target is, of course, no ground for assuming that you will be able to hit it, but certainly it is a *sine qua non* for that result. So of every problem involving a consideration of ends. There can, for instance, be no intelligent discussion with regard to the school curriculum until the question of educational values has first been faced. What holds for the educator is not less true for the social economist. Some of the most unnecessary and unfortunate conflicts of the century have been and still are being waged with regard to individual liberty, which might have been entirely avoided if the parties concerned had paused long enough to inquire seriously into the ends gained by the protection of liberty. In the same way false conceptions of justice have, to say the least, led to the waste of the time and energy of many able thinkers. If we could but agree that the justification of any scheme for the distribution of property, as for any determination of privileges—"rights"—is to be found solely in the relation of the same to the welfare of the society affected, then all forces might be united in a harmonious effort to solve the problem of ways and means. If the moralist can do nothing more than contribute to this result his presence in the arena of economic debate is certainly justified.

FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP.

CHRISTIAN SOCIOLOGY. VII.

THE FORCES OF HUMAN PROGRESS.

It is comparatively easy to construct an ideal for society, but it is rare that the reformer sufficiently considers the applicability of his ideal to actual human nature. It is this that has made an archæological puzzle of Plato's Republic and a romance of Utopia. Men instinctively feel that no dream of a regenerate society is worth serious consideration that does not in some distinct way show its ability, as Carlyle would say, "to walk." Jesus cannot escape such a test. If his ideal is worth anything, and if his teachings are to be anything more than a collection of oriental apothegms, he must be seen to have approached the problems of human progress with a full conception of the inertia of life and the repugnance most men show towards anything like social effort. In other words, Jesus must be required to set forth with reasonable fullness the forces upon which he counted for the realization of his new social order. We ask of him not merely an ideal but a method.

I.

If, in a search for a recognition on Jesus' part of such forces, one comes to the memorabilia of his life fresh from the study of modern efforts at social regeneration, nothing is more surprising than the forces in human society upon which Jesus does not count.

1. It is of course not surprising to find that he distinctly refuses the use of mere physical force as a means of establishing his kingdom.¹ A Mahomet may rule as prophet in a kingdom of Allah built upon the sword, but a Jesus cannot. A Charlemagne may build an empire from Saxons who have chosen baptism as a lesser evil than death, but not so the followers of him whose

¹ Matt. 4 : 10, 11; John 6 : 15.

kingdom was not of this world.¹ As has already appeared, the new social order was to be spiritual, not material. But it is less to be anticipated that Jesus should have so passed over those claims for justice which today are urged with an ever increasing passion. It would not do to say that Jesus is oblivious to the rightful claims of those who have not shared sufficiently in the good things of life. No man's teaching has been more potent in forcing the strong to yield to the weak, the rich to the poor, the noble to the lowly. But none the less is it true that Jesus is far less interested in the rights than in the obligations of men. It matters little that logically the two conceptions are complementary. Practically there is a vast difference between the bald demand of one man or class for things due it, and the extension of privilege which sympathy and a sense of obligation may induce a favored man or class to effect. Of the two, it is easier to inculcate justice, but no one who knows the crimes that have been committed in the name of liberty, and the hereditary hatreds that have been the outgrowth of struggles after rights, need be told that the victories of justice leave scars as ineradicable as its demands are righteous. It was from some appreciation of this that Jesus made duty paramount to rights. The Jew was ready enough to grant the rights of a neighbor—when once neighborhood had been defined and proved. In the estimation of Jesus to be a neighbor was not to have rights that put others under obligation to oneself, but to be conscious of duties. Not the wounded traveler, but the Levite and the priest and the Samaritan needed to show the spirit of the neighbor.² He was the neighbor who fulfilled duties, not he who enforced dues. Indeed, to one who has been assailed loudly with the evils of today's economic inequalities, it is at first sight surprising to find Jesus so indifferent to much that today's reformers emphasize so strenuously. The ordinary appeal which we hear addressed to the wage-earner nowadays is a paraphrase upon Proudhon's "property is robbery." The poor man is urged to get a larger share in the wealth he helps produce; to cease to be a horse that

¹ John 18:36.² Luke 10:25-37.

drags the coach in which the rich folk ride. Now, again, the position of Jesus in regard to wealth puts him here uncompromisingly upon the side of the man who has not shared justly in the distribution of the products of labor and capital. But to urge the poor man to struggle after wealth might be to spur him to selfishness as deep as that of the rich man against whom he struggles. It might be necessary to subdue nature, to make natural forces the servants of production, but wealth and sensuousness and selfishness, Jesus saw, go hand in hand.¹ Mere bigness is not goodness, and enthusiasm over bank accounts is not the spirit of the Master. The kingdom did not come with observation.² Life was more than food and fraternity more than wealth.³ Social agitators, John the Baptists of economics are needed; we may yet count Karl Marx and Lassalle among the prophets, but what sort of kingdom would a Christ have established whose evangel was a political economy and whose new age was set forth in a programme?

2. Nor does Jesus appeal to the æsthetic side of men's nature. It is no sign of disloyalty to beauty and the educational function of art, to say that the world yet waits the advent of an æsthetic philosophy whose guarantee of constant progress can be accepted. As in the case of the demand for economic justice, so in the case of an exclusive appeal to the love of beauty, selfishness crouches at the door. To say nothing of the fact that comparatively few men are susceptible to any persistent moral impulse from the æsthetic side of their natures, the call to be beautiful and to love that which is beautiful is not made of the stuff that makes heroes and martyrs. It is indispensable as a subsidiary motive, and as such at least Jesus seems to have recognized it,⁴ but from the days of beauty-mad Greece, an æsthetic culture has failed to develop a long lived, virile, generous civilization. The apostle of culture finds his case weak, in fact hopeless, if mingled with the æsthetic conception of the Greek there be not the stern Hebrew sense of right and God.

¹ Luke 8:14.

³ Luke 12:23.

² Luke 17:20.

⁴ Matt. 6:28

3. It goes without saying that Jesus does not base his hopes of a new society upon an "enlightened self-interest," or any other hedonist philosophy. That the individual would seek his own good he seems to have assumed.¹ That this in any way needed excuse, or that it was necessary to raise this natural impulse into a philosophy and reduce all social service to terms of a whitewashed selfishness seems never to have occurred to him. No man ever struck out more manfully against both self-depreciation and selfishness than Jesus, but the motive upon which he expected men to act was not that of the improvement of the individual atom. Self-preservation may be the final motive of physical nature, but not with the followers of Jesus. "Whosoever will save his life shall lose it."²

Taken altogether, it is obvious that the forces upon which Jesus relied to make his ideal society an actual fact in life, were neither mechanical nor selfish. Whatever approach society as he found it was to make towards that better order which he described would not be the result of external propulsion nor of calculation. As the kingdom of God was spiritual, so are the forces which bring about its realization; and as it is a family, so are its members to be not self-seekers but brothers.

II.

If, now, we attempt more positively to set forth those primary forces upon which Jesus counted for the accomplishment of his ideals, we are forced back upon his fundamental conception of the nature of man. Jesus trusts the inherent powers and capacities of the race. The ideal he portrays was not intended for creatures less or more human than the men with whom he associated and out of whom he hoped to form his kingdom. Individual and social regeneration is possible because man and society are inherently salvable. And deep in the heart of

¹ Matt. 7:12; Luke 6:31. In his promises of rewards the position of Jesus is similar. And in addition it will be noticed that these rewards are gained at the cost of sacrifice.

² Matt. 16:25.

humanity that could be saved were its wants. Not that he ever formally classifies them. Indeed he can hardly be said to recognize all their categories. But nevertheless he presupposes them. In his estimation they are in themselves morally neutral, yet according to the relative importance assigned to each of them they may express either a healthy or decadent personality. It is in this perspective in which he sees the various wants of men that Jesus shows the instinct of the practical man and not that of the fanatic. Thus in the case of purely physical wants, with a characteristic loyalty to his anti-ascetic ideals, Jesus assumes the legitimacy of the child's cry for food,¹ bids his disciples pray for bread,² and pities a multitude which he saw grow faint with hunger.³ Yet physical wants are inferior to many others. Man is not to live by bread alone,⁴ and spiritual intensity might altogether lift one as it did himself, quite above mere physical hunger.⁵ One of the sharpest rebukes he ever administered to his disciples was occasioned by their crude misinterpretation of one of his sayings as a caution against certain classes of bakers from whom they might be tempted to buy bread.⁶ The same is true of all economic wants. Who better than Jesus ever appreciated the power of a merchant's desire to succeed in business,⁷ or of a laborer's passion for a larger wage?⁸ The Heavenly Father knows his children have need of food and raiment,⁹ but just for that very reason men are not to make the search for them the chief end in life. A man's life does not consist in the abundance of things that he possesses.¹⁰

The satisfaction, not of these lower wants, but of those other and higher desires after truth and the higher verities and experiences of life, is to be the underlying motive in the new order of life. Men are not to be compelled to be good, but their desires are to lead them to goodness, or, if the desire be lacking, are to

¹ Matt. 7:9.

² Matt. 6:11.

³ Matt. 15:32; Mark 8:3.

⁴ Matt. 4:4.

⁵ John 4:31-34.

⁶ Matt. 16:5-12; Mark 8:14-21.

⁷ Matt 13:45.

⁸ Matt. 20:2 *sq.*

⁹ Matt. 6:31, 32; John 6:27.

¹⁰ Luke 12:15.

be convinced of the sin of the lack.¹ Not obedience, but loving impulse is the key to noble living. The members of his new society are to be not servants but friends,² and conventional duties are no measure of what friendship may prompt.³

Chief among these basal desires of men Jesus would class the desire to know God. To know him not merely as a truth or principle, but as a person. The cry of Philip, "Show us the Father,"⁴ was the outburst of humanity's heart, and the answer it drew forth has satisfied generations. The chief significance of the life of Jesus may be said in the light of history to have lain in himself rather than in his teaching. He was the revealer of God. So his contemporaries judged him, though at first but dimly. So the second century thought of him exclusively.⁵ And although Jesus does not describe with any detail the nature of this want of a more perfect knowledge of God, and treats it more as a need than as a desire, it is always present as a postulate controlling his preaching and life.⁶ He had come that men might receive the divine life more abundantly.⁷

And similarly in regard to the relations existing between men themselves, Jesus, while never analyzing the psychology of ethics, addresses himself to that which was even more sadly evident in his day than in ours, men's need of some standard and motive for better dealings with their fellows. For this reason it was, that, according to the oldest source of our gospel, he received so sympathetically the rich young man who

¹ John 16:8-10. In this connection one recalls the eagerness with which Jesus met an honest seeker after truth like Nathaniel and Thomas, Zacchæus and Martha, as well as the earnestness, not to say severity, with which he answered those whose ignorance was in part due to their own failure to follow their better instincts, as Nicodemus and Philip. Compare also the philosophy by which the fourth gospel accounts for the presence or absence of the faith that accepts Jesus. John 3:18-21.

² John 15:15.

³ Luke 17:10.

⁴ John 14:8.

⁵ If there were need reference might here be made to the epistles of Clement of Rome and Barnabas, but the fact is so uniformly admitted that argument seems gratuitous. How deep an impression this conception of Jesus had made by the very beginning of the second century is to be seen in our fourth gospel.

⁶ This is especially felt in reading the fourth gospel. Thus, John 6:57, 17:1-26.

⁷ John 10:10.

desired to be perfect,¹ and the lawyer who could appreciate the summation of Mosaism in the double command to love God and man.² These men were no mere tricksters, but seekers after a more definite ethical standard. And doubtless it was in large measure for the same reason that the multitudes for a while hung upon his words. He would not be a judge and a divider in matters of property,³ but he taught freely in regard to social duties, as he saw men needed his instruction. And it mattered nothing whether the want was in a hasty woman,⁴ a timid son⁵ or overzealous disciples.⁶

Still, the questions return: the duty he set before men furnished the standard for life; did it also in any way furnish the motive for more rational social life? Granting that men do want, or at least need a knowledge of God and a better ethical standard, how does Jesus proceed to turn the need into motive? Was he, after all, but another in the list of noble men who have commanded men to love but who have not made love easy?

If we revert once more to Christ's conception of man we see the basis of this double need. Man is a social being who finds his normal life only in union. It is the imperfect union that causes unrest. Jesus but deepened the need when he revealed the normal life of men; a life which, as has already appeared, involves a twofold social relationship: a divine sonship and a human fraternity. These are the sources of the Christian motives that inevitably make toward the building up of both the individual and society.

III.

It is not necessary again to discuss what Jesus meant by the terms "father" and "son" as he used them to describe the relations that may and should exist between man and God.⁷ It will be enough to consider how the supreme relationship they express may furnish motives for social life.

¹ Mark 10: 17-31.

⁴ Luke 10: 39 *sq.*

² Mark 12: 28-34.

⁵ Matt. 18: 21, 22.

³ Luke 12: 14.

⁶ Mark 9: 38 *sq.*

⁷ AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, I, 372-376.

The revelation of the possibility of the divine sonship of man by Jesus becomes the source of motive power in two particulars.

1. As in the case of all ideals, the revelation of the possibilities of human life made by the character and life of Jesus himself stirred men's hearts to emulation and duplication. But Jesus never represents himself in the fashion of the Stoic, strong enough in his own unaided virtue to conquer sin within and difficulty without. His was a life of prayer.¹ He did always the will of his Father.² The depths of his life were united with the Divine.³ He and his Father are one. In these particulars Jesus has always been an inspiration for all those who have studied his life. Men who are dubious about the historic records of his life, nevertheless are anxious to see this ideal type of character more and more reproduced in themselves.⁴ And whatever may have been the explanations of his influence given by others, in Jesus' own mind the highest result that could come from his intercourse with his disciples was their sharing in this complete life; a life that should satisfy their nature's demands for a life united with God; a life in which they were one with themselves, with him and with his Father.⁵

2. Yet the results of this new relationship—this sonship—were after all the fundamental things with Jesus. As his example was calculated to lead men to something other than an atomistic, self centered moral life (if such a thing is conceivable) so the new sonship would result in new moral impulses, new moral states out of which might rise new motives and choices. And

¹ Matt 14:23; Luke 5:16; Mark 1:35; Luke 6:12; 9:28; John 14:16; 16:26, 17; Matt. 26:36.

² John 6:39; 8:29; Matt. 26:42.

³ John 10:30. This is also the clear implication of the stories of the baptism. Matt. 3:13-17; Luke 3:21, 22; John 1:32-34. How quickly this oldest conception of Jesus passed on the one hand into a confusion of his person with that of the Father and on the other into a mechanical conception of his power, may be seen in the literature of the second century. Compare, for instance, the Epistle of Barnabas with the Gospel of Peter.

⁴ SHELDON, *An Ethical Movement*, p. 123.

⁵ John 17:22, 23.

this was the condition of entering the kingdom—"a man was to be born again."¹ "He that hath the Son hath the life."²

The older theologians seldom failed to read the words of Jesus at this point with unanimity,³ and that too while tending to displace the psychological fact with forensic justification. Nothing is nearer the heart of the teaching of both Jesus and Paul than the moral change that is the result of the interpenetration of the human and the divine personalities—a process that is with Jesus no more figurative than the ordinary change which is wrought in the characters of two friends through their constant intercourse. It is precisely at this point that the unique significance of Jesus as an ethical teacher appears. So far from divorcing morals and religion, or from making morals the basis of religion, he makes religious experience the fountain head of good conduct, and in his own life gave a concrete illustration of his philosophy. He revealed God and he revealed also the possibilities of human life. It is not necessary to follow the strictest sect of the orthodox to appreciate the truth of this revelation made by Jesus of divine sonship. Nor is it necessary to follow the mystic into the heights of his ecstasy.⁴ The thought of Jesus himself is very simple and concrete. By sonship he meant an actual likeness in the characters of men and God. And this likeness while made possible by the original capacities of humanity is something more distinct. It is the result of the influence of God upon a man's heart. Those who thus have come under the renewing influence of the Divine Spirit are none the less themselves. On the contrary they have found themselves⁵ in their new ideal—the perfection of their Father.⁶

¹ John 3:3, 6.

² John 5:12.

³ There may have been wide divergence among theologians in the explanation and the philosophical placing of regeneration, but they were at one in emphasizing the fact. For outline statement see SHEDD, *Dogmatic Theology*, II, 490 sq. And yet at this point the Ritschlian school seems weakest.

⁴ And one is tempted to add, the newer Ritschlian school into the mysteries of a new birth that can be neither "seen nor grasped but only believed in," something which it is "absurd to suppose can be experienced as a process in time." See HERRMANN, *The Communion of the Christian with God*.

⁵ Matt. 10:39. Compare Luke 15.

⁶ Matt. 5:48.

And, if we may so use the other form this saying takes, the expression of this new family character is to be expected in deeds of kindness and mercy.¹ Sometimes Jesus full of the Divine Spirit represents himself as furnishing the new life with moral impulses as the vine furnishes life to its branches.² Sometimes his followers are conceived of as plants which his Father had planted.³ Yet always the new phase in life is the soil out of which noble impulses are to grow. The doing of noble deeds,⁴ the keeping of the commands of Jesus,⁵ these are the tests of the new and divine life that comes from the impact and the infusion of divine life. From the heart thus changed will be the issues of a new life. As Paul expresses it, the fruits of the spirit are love, joy, peace, longsuffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, self-control.⁶ So that, although the new man is not a perfect man, he will progress towards perfection, for he is a new sort of man, a prodigal faced toward home.⁷

IV.

And here, as the outgrowth of this central thought of his system we find a second element in Jesus' philosophy of social progress: *the love that springs from a sense of brotherhood*. Two men, brothers in the physical sense, love each other instinctively, spontaneously. So in the case of this new fraternity, of this genetic relationship that exists between two men and God. If each is a son of God, are they not brothers?⁸ If once they realize their common nature will they not love one another? So at any rate thought Jesus. Love between a man and his

¹ Luke 6 : 36.

³ Matt. 15 : 13.

⁵ John 14 : 15 ; 15 : 10.

² John 15 : 1.

⁴ John 15 : 4.

⁶ Gal. 5 : 22.

⁷ HARRIS, *Moral Evolution*, p. 243.

⁸ While this would hold true in a sense, in case it be applied to the universal fatherhood of God and brotherhood of man, as Jesus uses the terms they gain greatly in force. As a matter of fact, does a recognition of the universal brotherhood of men prompt to special deeds of kindness in any such way as a realization of some wretch's earnest effort to grow nobler and more Godlike? On the other hand it should be noted that the term "brother" is not coextensive with "church member" any more than the kingdom of God is coextensive with the church. To narrow Jesus to such definitions would be contrary to the entire spirit of his teaching.

enemy was a thing to be commanded ¹ but not between brothers. That was to be expected.² Anything that prevented such fraternal feeling was to be removed, even at the cost of religious punctuality.³ It is true that if men fail to appreciate their fraternal relations when they exist, they will need the command to love one another.⁴ But this, like all law, is but a provisional matter. As the realization of their relations to one another as members of a fraternity deepens, men will love less and less from a sense of duty and increasingly from impulse. And this new love was to be like Jesus' own, ready for any sacrifice that might seem necessary.⁵

But evidently at this point we are dealing with social motives. A man thus inspired is no longer living for his individual, his atomistic self, but for his social, his altruistic self. In his revelation of the love of God and the possibility of a new and divine sonship, Jesus prepared the way not only for the saving of each individual sinner. He did more. Every man who comes thus into a conscious reinstatement in the love of God, becomes also a brother of all other men in the same relation. And so is set in motion a multitude of fraternal loves which, disregarding place, and time, and birth, and social station, will forever remain unsatisfied until they express themselves in reciprocal deeds of kindness and bring in a new social order. Each man will seek to minister, not to be ministered unto; to become a servant of all.⁵

¹ Matt. 5 : 44.

³ Matt. 5 : 22-24.

² Matt. 5 : 47; 18 : 21, 22.

⁴ John 13 : 34; 15 : 12. Yet even here the example of Jesus himself is to be an incentive.

⁵ But self-sacrifice is not the central principle of Christianity as some urge. A man must be ready to sacrifice himself if there be need, but sacrifice in itself may be wrong. The center of the teachings of Jesus cannot be found in any such ascetic notion of life. It lies in the person of Jesus himself—that object lesson in the divine life in human life. Love involves self-sacrifice but self-sacrifice does not of necessity involve love.

Nor does self-sacrifice mean self-annihilation be it from never so holy motives. Jesus is the last man to preach either Nirvana or pantheism.

⁵ Matt. 20 : 26, 28.

V.

If now we look somewhat more closely at this new social force which is the dynamic side of the apprehension of brotherhood (which it must not be forgotten is itself the outcome of the new and divine life in man made possible by Jesus), it will be evident that it is in itself composed of something more than mere emotional elements, and that Jesus regarded it as involving to an equal extent the will.¹ Were it otherwise it would be impossible to see how one whose love was thus the outgrowth of the sense of a new reality could ever be expected to love a person in whose case the reality was not appreciable. Such a love, it would be urged, is perhaps understandable in the case of two persons who answer Jesus' conception of brothers, but would be inconceivable between one man who was a member of the kingdom, and another man who was not. How then could there be progress, or how could the kingdom fail to become a close corporation? But if the full sweep of Jesus' teaching be considered it will be seen that this spontaneous love that arises from the sense of kinship may be directed towards one's enemies. It may, perhaps, not always be possible for one to feel the affection for one's opponents that seems to have been felt by Jesus,² but one can always treat one's enemies *as if* they were brothers. In such a case the conduct inspired by loving affection, outlines the way for duty. The same kindness that was done spontaneously for a lover, is now to be done from the sense of obligation for a persecutor.

And what will these acts be? Jesus does not specifically bid the member of the kingdom to do much else than pray for and bless those who are planning his harm;³ but after all his meaning is not hard to find. Both the spontaneous love and the controlled love will seek the accomplishment of those conditions which go

¹ It is not necessary for such a view to strain the difference between *ἀγαπᾶω* and *φιλέω* with their cognate forms (TRENCH, *New Testament Synonyms*). Even if it be granted that the two words were used in the later Greek somewhat indiscriminately, the thought of Jesus is made clear from its context.

² Matt. 23 : 37.

³ Matt. 5 : 44.

to make up Jesus' ideal society. Circumstances will naturally determine different means and different processes, but the love that springs from a sense of brotherhood, will never be satisfied until it has established a social order in which fraternity will characterize all phases of social life. Sometimes such impulse and duty will need instruction, and this, it has appeared, Jesus has given in broad principles; but in special cases, he seemed to believe that the divine life within man thus enlightened could be trusted to work out better and more Christian social institutions.¹

Therefore it has been that those times and places in which men have come most under the influence of the words and life of Jesus have been those in which institutions at variance with fraternity—branding, polygamy, the exposure of children, slavery, drunkenness, and licentiousness—have disappeared. Indeed, one might almost say, that there has been no healthy progress towards fraternity except as it has sprung from the sense of this divine kinship. Pleas and battles for justice have wrought revolutions and wrecked institutions; but only when they have been supplemented and corrected by this fraternal impulse have they yielded the peaceable fruits of righteousness.

VI.

Thus Jesus is thoroughly consistent with himself. The new social order which he outlines is not beyond the powers of man as he conceives them. It is true that a moral regeneration of the individual is presupposed before society as such can be perfected, but here Jesus is true to human capacities. Religion, just as much as selfish calculation, is one of the motive forces in human life, and to disregard it is to throw away the most powerful source of moral impulse. Therefore it is that while one may perhaps wonder that Jesus should have counted to so small a degree upon other forces that have made forward movements successful, it is quite impossible to say that he has erred in thus centering attention upon the religious side of man's nature and

¹ John 16:13.

upon that enthusiasm for humanity which is the outgrowth of a perception of the consequent new human fraternity. Life is indeed something more than search for creature comforts. Those men of the past who have marked stages in the march of the race have always so judged. Take from the goodly company of those men who have permanently benefited society, those men whose impulses have not in some way sprung from the sense of God or the sense of fraternity, and how many will be left? In his revelation of divine sonship and the consequent human brotherhood Jesus has furnished the basis for lasting social progress. For if humanity is to become a family inspired by the love of the divine Father, there is no power in earth or hell that can prevent the realization of the noblest social ideals of which the world has dreamed.

SHAILER MATHEWS.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

REVIEWS.

The Principles of Sociology. An analysis of the phenomena of association and of social organization. By FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS. Macmillan & Co. Pp. xvi + 476. \$3.

THE appearance of this long promised book is an event of first-rate importance to American sociologists, and it calls for extended notice. Whatever Professor Giddings writes is sure to be read with attention and respect by a public that the ablest might count it an honor to address. This book will confirm its author's reputation as a strong and growing thinker. He will deserve this credit for the comprehensiveness of his plan of sociological survey, and for his generous attempt to synthesize phenomena which are usually treated in isolation, rather than for the reliability of his book in detail, or for the conclusiveness of its reasoning, or for the logical coherence of its parts. A serious attempt to outline a system of sociological analysis and interpretation merits the gratitude of everybody who can appreciate the need of correct clues to social relations. Professor Giddings' effort deserves frank admiration even from those who are farthest from pronouncing the effort a success. That he has not accomplished what his programme promised does not prove that he has failed to make a contribution to sociology. It simply illustrates the inevitable. In the present state of knowledge the task which Professor Giddings undertook is superhuman, and he is only a man. While his book is by no means to be put in the same class with Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* it is safe and right to say that, with the single exception of Ward's path-breaking work, no book has yet appeared in the United States which will do more than this volume to promote the pursuit, define the problems, and perfect the method of sociological investigation. I offer this as a sincere tribute to the energy and devotion which the book represents. I hope the value of this recognition will be increased rather than diminished by the equal frankness of my qualifications and reservations. I do not find in the book much that is new, either in form or substance, which is likely to stand the test of criticism. Indeed, the parts which are most nearly the

author's own are least likely to maintain a permanent place in sociology. The book is bound however to provoke criticism that will clarify thought, and much improvement upon our present knowledge and system will result. It is a distinct service to have furnished the occasion for this needed critical work. Professor Giddings has had the courage of his convictions, and has submitted to the judgment of his peers the best proposal for correlation of social facts which he has been able to develop. He has thus, at all events, helped to advertise the need of a system of social interpretation. He has also stimulated interest in the invention of an adequate system. I am sure, however, that he will be among the first to outgrow satisfaction with the appearance of system which the present proposals contain.

As Professor Giddings is a thinker with whom one cannot disagree without serious risk of being found wrong, and as I most emphatically disagree with him at many cardinal points, I want to make it very plain in the beginning that radical difference of position is in spite of very high respect for his work in the past, and belief that he will presently improve upon the book now before us.

The volume consists of three easily distinguishable divisions: first, prolegomena upon methodology, Book I; second, arrangement of a body of evidence, Books II-III; third, general interpretation, Book IV. Without attempting to analyze the second and third of these divisions in detail, I shall discuss the book as a whole with reference to the outline of method in the first division. In a word my estimate of the entire system contained in the work is that it is an impossible combination of contradictions. There is apparent unity, but it is mechanical. That a real system may grow out of this first attempt, structural principles must be observed which will introduce correspondence in the place of essential incompatibilities.

The first of these anomalies in Giddings' scheme is that it is an entangling alliance between the art of pedagogy and the science of sociology. It is betrayed in such language as this:¹

The sociology of the working sociologist, and of the university, will be a definite and concrete body of knowledge that can be presented in the class room and be worked over in the seminarium. These last conditions are crucial for the existence of the science; for when sociology has as distinct a place in the working programme of the university as has political economy or psychology, its scientific claims will be beyond cavil. But that will be only when

¹ P. 31.

educated men have learned to conceive of sociology as distinctly and concretely as they conceive of other sciences. The word must instantly call to mind a particular class of phenomena and a definite group of coördinated problems.

This is among the many instances in Book I in which attempts to compose previously published essays into a consecutive argument result as usual with new patches and old garments. Prudential considerations about sociology as a university study have no place in a system of scientific methodology. Giddings does not properly distinguish between considerations calculated to win academic tolerance for the new science, and arguments with collaborators about the scope and method of the science. He is not sure whether he is more concerned with preparing a syllabus which will be a convenient guide to university lectures, or with the direct attempt to deepen and broaden scientific knowledge. The book is thus confused by the influence of two considerations which have no business together: (1) can sociology be so formulated that it can secure a foothold in the universities? (2) is it possible so to perfect methods of studying association that profounder knowledge of society will result? The latter is the scientific question. It has been made subsidiary in Giddings' whole programme. The former is a question which the investigator, as such, has no occasion to raise. It is not his affair. Besides, to a man of scientific temper the question "Can sociology be studied in the university?" would seem to be sufficiently answered by the significant fact that it is studied there, and by the apparent impossibility of preventing extension of the study. Giddings has however unconsciously allowed the supposed demands of university pedagogy to dictate the form and substance of his sociology.¹ The tacit reasoning is:—Sociology must be a body of doctrine that can be comfortably taught in the universities. A definite system of premises and deductions is such a body of doctrine. Therefore a system of premises and deductions sociology shall be. This is a veritable parody of science. It is like making scientific endorsement of a proposed method of reaching the North Pole depend on the probable ability of Cook and Gaze to popularize the route with tourists.

When we read the book closely, therefore, we find several distinct questions hopelessly intertangled. Thus: (1) What sort of instruction belongs in a university? (2) Can sociology lend itself to

¹ Cf. pp. 67-8.

that kind of service? (3) What is yet unknown about human associations? (4) What method is indicated for increasing knowledge of this unknown? With the investigator the third and fourth questions are paramount. With Giddings the first and second have been decisive.

It is far from my purpose to disparage the pedagogical interest, or to imply that it is beneath the consideration of scientific minds. I simply call attention to the fact that the pedagogical aim and method are quite distinct from the investigator's aim and method. It is not only permissible but commendable in a teacher to present to his students a syllabus of the most trustworthy conclusions which he can reach about the whole range of his subject. It is right for the teacher, provided that he at the same time properly marks the provisional and tentative character of his generalizations, to urge his pupils to accept that conspectus as a working hypothesis of the facts and their connections, until they can reach independently a more satisfactory synthesis. But while such a syllabus, regarded as a medium between teacher and pupil, may be admirable, regarded as a communication from an investigator to fellow investigators, it may become preposterous. A large part of the matter and manner of this book falls under this condemnation. I can find no excuse for these portions except that they are really intended not as serious scientific propositions, but as assumptions pedagogically permissible pending further examination of evidence by investigators. The book asks for no such consideration, however. It boldly claims to have given sociology the formulation of principles with which it need no longer go astray.¹ We must accordingly judge the book as an exhibit of method and results supposed by the author to be scientifically sanctioned. Measured by this standard it is more than defective. Professor Giddings has done his share and will doubtless contribute his quota in the future toward the solution of problems both in practical pedagogy and in sociology. Nevertheless in failing to keep the two kinds of problem entirely distinct in this book he has beautifully befogged both. In asking primarily "What sort of doctrine can we conveniently teach?" he has seriously handicapped himself in approaching the real problem, viz., What do we need to find out about society relations, and what method is competent to yield the knowledge?

A second capital fault of Giddings' scheme is its admission of two essentially different conceptions of sociology. These reappear in all

¹ P. 17.

sorts of complications in different portions of the book. What is the sociologist as such driving at? What is he trying to do? What relations is he trying to determine and explain? In one class of passages Giddings commits himself to the view which, in principle, is most generally prevalent among sociologists. Thus:

Sociology is a science that tries to conceive of society in its unity, and attempts to explain it in terms of cosmic law and cause.¹

Sociology is the science of mental phenomena in their higher complications and reactions, and of the constructive evolution of a social medium through which the adaptations of life and its environment become reciprocal.²

Specifically, sociology is an interpretation of social phenomena in terms of psychical activity, organic adjustment, natural selection, and the conservation of energy.³

The sociological task is the double one—to know how social relations are evolved, and how they react on the development of personality.⁴

Sociology is an attempt to account for the origin, growth, structure, and activities of society by the operation of physical, vital, and psychical causes, working together in a process of evolution.⁵

Whatever modifications of these formulas might be demanded by individuals there is nothing necessarily involved in them which would distinguish Giddings' view from that which has become commonplace with intelligent sociologists. I will not attempt to explain Giddings' failure to abide by this view. I do not know whether it is cause or effect of his contention that sociology is the fundamental science, rather than a dependent science. I will not undertake to show its relations with the *a priori* character of his whole method, to which respect must be paid later. It is a fact, at all events, that Giddings weaves into his system another sort of sociology, which contains all that is peculiarly his own. On page 70 he says:

Description and history must precede theory; it is impossible to study with profit the general questions of law and cause until much has been learned about the concrete particular aspects of things and events; before we generalize we must be familiar with the constituent elements of our phenomena, with the manner of their action, with the forms that they assume in combination, and with the conditions under which the combinations occur.

All this is precisely what is meant by the men from whom Giddings tries to differ, when they say that sociology is impossible until antecedent sciences have done at least parts of their work. Instead of being content, however, to follow this programme consistently, Giddings

¹ P. 16.² P. 26.³ P. 419.⁴ P. 421.⁵ P. 8.

unconsciously allows the terms "social" and "society" to carry a double meaning, and he is betrayed into entertaining an alternative conception of sociology which turns the whole book into a puzzle for readers. Thus :

Of the present tendency of sociology to seek unity of subjective interpretation there is abundant evidence in the work of its younger students. Everywhere they are asking: *What characteristic is it that stamps a phenomenon as social*, and so differentiates it from phenomena of every other kind? When this question is answered the sociological postulate will be disclosed.¹

Again: It is the consciousness of kind, and nothing else, which distinguishes social conduct, as such, from purely economic, purely political, or purely religious conduct; for it is precisely the consciousness of kind that, in actual life, continually interferes with the theoretically perfect operation of the economic, the political, or the religious motive.²

Once more: One object of sociology is to learn all that can be learned about the creation of the social man.³

Giddings has evidently not thought out the formal relations of a comprehensive doctrine of human association, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, of a theory of that element in human association which he sometimes calls "social" in a restricted sense. He has consequently allowed ambiguity to run through his whole treatment of the "social." I find in this alone sufficient evidence that his supposed explanation of association is an illusion.

For a number of years I have found it convenient to use, among others, a classification of human activities according to their uppermost objective aim: Thus; activities seeking (a) health, (b) wealth, (c) sociability, (d) knowledge, (e) beauty, (f) rightness.⁴ So far as human beings have been observed, they sooner or later manifest effective desires for objects of satisfaction which may be grouped under these six heads. Assuming for the sake of illustration that this is an objectively justified classification, and therefore likely to become permanent in scientific usage, it is quite conceivable that six parallel sciences of action within society may be developed, each having for its task determination of the laws of human action with reference to the utilities represented by its peculiar object of desire. Each of these conceivable

¹ Pp. 13, 14.

² P. 18.

³ P. 421. This last is a sample of remarks which are capable of either of the interpretations under discussion.

⁴ Cf. SMALL and VINCENT, *Introduction to the Study of Society*, pp. 175 sq.

sciences would evidently be the science of an abstracted element of the phenomena of human association. We have a relatively complete science of the laws of human action so far as the desire for *wealth* is the determining impulse. Possibly it is feasible and desirable to construct similar sciences of these other species of activity. It seems to me that Giddings has at times really been working at the foundation of such a science of actions that seek satisfaction in "sociability." This is certainly not the programme carried out by the book as a whole, yet the proposed principle, "consciousness of kind," in so far as positive agency can be predicated of it at all, would seem to afford a plausible hypothesis for the explanation solely of phenomena within the special category "sociability." This use of "consciousness of kind" might be parallel with that of "economic self-interest" in economic science.

Inasmuch as Giddings clearly does not mean, on the whole, so to restrict the field of sociology, the confusion in the book is hopeless. There is no constant and consistent view of the relation of "social" to other phenomena in, of, or pertaining to "association." Are "social" phenomena inclusive or exclusive of "economic" phenomena, for example? Giddings sometimes apparently makes "social" include all the phenomena of association. Thus:

Finally, economic, political and cultural phenomena are only differentiations of social phenomena; they are not so unlike the more general phases of association that we can speak of them as differentiated *from* social phenomena.¹

Taking Giddings at his word, that the "social" includes the economic, does he actually mean that economic self-interest—the operation of which he of course does not dispute—is a manifestation of the *consciousness of kind*, and that this alleged underlying state of consciousness affords any explanation of forms of consciousness—economic self-interest, for example—which according to his dictum are derived from it? He has the courage to say so!

Sociology studies the phenomena that are consequent upon one state in particular, namely, the consciousness of kind. In like manner the subordination of the special social sciences to sociology is another necessary conclusion from our first principle. The consciousness of kind undergoes integration and differentiation. Sometimes its differentiated forms conflict among themselves, or with the parent form. They then often appear as motives

¹ P. 27. The Italics are Giddings'.

wholly distinct from the consciousness of kind, though in fact they are derived from it.¹

This is revelation indeed! How it resolves the chaos of human contradictions! The good Samaritan and the slum lassie are products of the social principle in the rough. When the "parent form" of the principle of association is sufficiently integrated and differentiated it gives us the battle-field and the torture-chamber and the slave-pen and the sweat-shop!

If we try the other alternative, and assume that Giddings means on the whole to make "social" phenomena exclude economic phenomena, the tax upon our credulity is not removed. Are we to think of "social" phenomena as embracing all the phenomena of association except the economic, or are social phenomena supposed to constitute one of several series of phenomena coördinate or parallel with, or antecedent or subsequent to the economic? Or are the "social" represented in Giddings' thought as in some other way related to economic phenomena? In above quotations from pages 18 and 27 Giddings uses terms as though at least four series of activities, one of which is the "social," are to be distinguished among the phenomena of "association." The whole programme of the book, however, is an attempt to cover the total reality resolved into these series by a generalization which in its present form can be plausibly asserted of only one series at most. This fallacy is an incident of the conflict throughout the book between the dialectic and the positive method, of which more presently. In detecting the fallacy we discover too that Giddings has not distinctly delimited his problem. He has not isolated the subject-matter of his enquiry. He is not sure whether he is in search of the law that governs choices within the series "social" (in the restricted sense), or the law that governs choices which correlate all the series which societary activities include.²

The book, then, does not even make a consistent exhibit of the sociological problem. Much less does it "combine the principles of sociology in a coherent theory."³ I am nevertheless inclined to believe that Professor Giddings is on the trail of something in this connection which will prove a distinct contribution to sociology after it is hunted down.⁴ What we need, however, is not an *a priori* dogma about the part which "consciousness of kind," or recognition of

¹ P. 22.

² Referring to last par. of p. 20.

³ Preface, p. v.

⁴ *Vide* below p. 302.

likeness, has played in human association; but observation, arrangement and generalization of facts.

But the book fails to reconcile a more radical and fatal antithesis than either of the preceding. It would be useless to make conjectures about the causal relations of these anomalies. It is evident, however, that different parts of the book were written under widely different subjective conditions. Their incoherence is too marked to escape even a superficial critic. After Professor Giddings has had time to see how the different parts of his copy look together in print I am sure he will perceive that the argument is a picturesque yoking together of the scientific ox and the speculative ass. The alternative title points to an analytic examination of reality. The preface *per contra* proposes an *a priori* process. Book I, Chapter III, goes off on the other tack and outlines a positive method, and finally the main contention of the volume returns to the programme of the preface, with interpretation by assertion and deduction in the place of demonstration. I do not apply the statement to the book in detail, but of the structure of the main argument, in which the details have their setting, I do not hesitate to say that its spirit throughout is that of pre-Cartesian speculation, rather than of post-Darwinian science. This is all the more noticeable because nobody is more acute and punctilious than Professor Giddings in judging others by scientific canons. In various parts of Book I he has formulated principles of positive procedure as justly as any scientist could desire.¹ Yet he deliberately chooses to cast his main argument and to mass his material in the mould of speculation and deduction, instead of organizing the material at his command so as to show its precise inductive value. He uses formulas of scientific reasoning with admirable precision, but there is no evidence in this book that he has "experienced" science.

The key to Giddings' own explanation of his reasoning is in his account of the "objective" and the "subjective" method in sociology. If space permitted I should undertake to show that these terms have at least two sets of connotations in the book, with consequent confusion. In brief Giddings sometimes means by the "objective" method "the explanation of society in terms of physical law," and by the "subjective" method "the explanation of society in terms of volition or motive."² At other times, and particularly when there is a dearth of facts in correspondence with his hypothesis, he means by the

¹ Pp. 39, 40, 49, 55, 56, 70, etc.

² Pp. 11 and 36.

"subjective" method a non-positive method, a method of speculation, contrasted with the method of observation. Giddings seems to assume that phenomena of consciousness and a subjective method of explanation are necessary correlates; and by "subjective" in this connection he plainly means conjectural and deductive. Perhaps Professor Giddings will be able to convince his colleagues in the department of psychology that they cannot apply the objective method to psychic facts. Fancy a psychologist of the present generation admitting that his method is anything but objective!

That I have not misrepresented Giddings will appear from his own description of proper "subjective" method, viz.:

. . . the subjective explanation has not in like manner been carried through the whole range of social phenomena. Much less has it been reduced to terms of a single motive or principle, uniquely characterizing the conscious individual as a social being, and determining all his social relations in so far as they are volitionally created. Instead of an attempt to find such a principle, to *deduce* from it all its consequences, and to organize about it all the conditioning motives or circumstances that should be taken into account, '—etc.

That is to say, in order to correct the "objective" by the "subjective" process, "find"—by which Giddings' procedure in the book proves that he means "assume"—a single motive or principle, then construct your explanation of society by asserting that everything which occurs is caused by that supposed mental condition. Few will care to claim that any vestiges of objectivity are left in the plan so projected, and an equal few among those able to consider the case at all will wittingly pin their faith to the sort of subjectivity that takes its place. In plain English this is flat repudiation of science and recourse to assumption. It is a travesty of psychical investigation. A guess about relations of cause and effect in the realm of human motive has no more scientific authority than a guess about the function of the vermiform appendix. Giddings' practical disregard of this fact vitiates his whole methodology.

In order to insure complete subjectivity for his method, and to banish any appearance of objectivity, Giddings directly renounces the inductive method, and, in the rest of the sentence interrupted above, burns all his bridges behind him after this fashion:

. . . there has been a tiresome endeavor to enumerate all the motives that actuate man in his varied relations, and in the satisfaction of all his

wants, as if all motives were of coördinate importance to sociology. The result is not the reasoned knowledge that is science.

This method is remarkable for two reasons. It reverses the method that has been used effectively in the physical interpretation of society. It reverses the method that has been applied successfully to subjective interpretation in politics and especially in economics. Political economy does not construct its doctrine of conduct by inventory, but by abstraction. . . . If sociology expects to obtain scientific precision it must follow this significant example of the value of consistent method.¹

The above misconception of facts is in some respects the most unaccountable vagary in the book. Did Darwin pursue a faulty method in collecting material for years, instead of propounding a "subjective explanation" and taking his chances of finding facts in accordance with it? *Who* says, while he collects and arranges evidence for an inductive process, that all items of evidence are of "coördinate importance?" A part of the process is the classifying of the data, bringing them into hierarchies of categories, discovering principal and subordinate relationships down to the minutest order. Giddings' method brushes all this aside as "tiresome," and substitutes for it a "principle." In contrast with a generalization from critically observed data, that which he calls a "principle" takes logical rank along with Thales' principle *water*; and Pythagoras' *number*; and Anaximenes' *air*; and Anaxagoras' *voûs*. It would be placed higher than it deserves if the principle "consciousness of kind" were compared with the principle *phlogiston* of the old chemistry. Undoubtedly Stahl and others used that presumptive explanation of fire as a guide to observation that at last revealed the process of combustion. The iniquity of these arbitrary assumptions emerges in their practical inhibition of observation as possible impeachment of their authority. This is obviously the case with Giddings and his principle "consciousness of kind." It makes him contemptuous toward analytic examination and classification of actions containing positive evidence of the play of motive.

It should be noted further that Giddings' assumed "principle" at once authorizes him to reconstruct the history of other sciences. The two "remarkable" reasons alleged against the positive method are remarkable because they exist only in Giddings' imagination. The history neither of physical nor of psychical science contains justification of his dictum. The assertion that "political economy does not construct its doctrine of conduct by inventory, but by abstraction," may

¹ P. 12.

mean either of two things. First, that political economy proceeded *without* facts. This is the sense which Giddings frequently seems to connect with the terms "abstract" and "abstraction."¹ Or, it may mean, second, that the term "inventory" is intended to damn some use of facts by sociologists whom Giddings accuses of putting an inventory to a use different from that employed by other positive sciences.

As to the second of these alternatives I merely remark that there may be other sociologists besides Professor Giddings who do not understand the scientific use of an inventory. If so they deserve censure or pity for every mismanagement of their material. As to the former alternative I am obliged to declare it a distortion of history to claim that political economy since Adam Smith has ever sanctioned such a use of a "principle" as Giddings makes of the "consciousness of kind." Half-taught economists have perverted logic in this way, but they must be held individually responsible, just as Giddings, not sociology, must be charged with the attempt to foist these speculative survivals upon social science. The right-thinking economists had no difficulty in discovering credible evidence of "economic self-interest" in man's actions. Their "abstraction" was the disentangling of this one motive and the actions determined by it from all others, not denial of the existence of others; not necessarily the relative valuation of this and other motives; but the tracing of the operation of this one motive so far as its influence could be detected. In order to do this political economy has over and over again arranged economic activities in "inventories," and it has been obliged to do so in order to be sure that no classes of cases had been overlooked in observing the effects of self-interest. The sociologists whom Giddings had in mind are likewise using inventories strictly in accordance with the rules of observational and experimental science.

Giddings is entirely wrong again in his interpretation of the logical significance of the Austrian school.² He would make it appear that the Austrian economists are exploiting one of his pre-Platonic metaphysical fabrications. They are doing nothing of the sort. Giddings speaks of "abstract analysis" as though it were an analysis of something that has an existence apart from facts, and independent of them. The process which the Austrian school are trying to perform is that of

¹ *E.g.*, p. 47. That is, he confounds abstraction with formal reasoning, with which it may or may not be identical. This is another antinomy in his thinking almost as vital as the others.

² P. 12.

a larger generalization of facts than has previously been accomplished. They have detected in the phenomena of human desire and volition estimates of more than one species of utility. They are accordingly using such inventories of human acts and motives as they can make available to reveal contained evidences of habitual standards of valuation in general. It is along this line that Professor Patten is proceeding, and with prospect of reaching important results.

Accordingly it is entirely false to put the method of the Austrian school, or of any other positive investigation, under the descriptive term "abstraction," over against the method of observation and classification and interpretation; as though they were mutually exclusive. There can be no generalization of scientific value that is not the generalization of classified facts, *i. e.*, of an "inventory." On the other hand, classified facts, or inventories, are no more a completed body of scientific knowledge than the words of the *Iliad* arranged in alphabetical order in a glossary would be a poem. Giddings succeeds in making it appear that there is not only an unbridged chasm but a principle of hostility between arranged facts and rational interpretation. His presumption is that explanation must be anterior to knowledge of the facts. *Abstraction* in his usage, if not in his definition, is speculation apart from data. On the contrary, scientific generalization is perception of uniformities within the data. According to Giddings, abstraction is withdrawal to a remote distance from facts for undisturbed rumination. The product of this ruminating process is a substance of truth to be added to facts, if the thinker be so unfortunate at last as to encounter reality. Giddings has apparently no working idea of abstraction proper—*viz.*, contemplation of a distinguishable group or series of phenomena, regarded temporarily without reference to the bearing of other actual phenomena, from which they have been conceptually separated for convenience of inspection.

Nothing more is needed to prove that this book does not fulfill its promise of furnishing the basis of a system of social interpretation. It is worth while, however, to pay a little more attention to the alleged principle "consciousness of kind." Giddings brings it forward with the modest introduction:

. . . that new datum which has been sought for hitherto without success, but which can now no longer remain unperceived in the narrowing range of inquiry. Sociology must go right from this time forth . . . because it has tried all possible ways of going wrong. (P. 17.)

That it is not a "datum" at all, but only a dictum, appears after we have searched the book in vain for any authorization of it. The nearest approach to an attempt to give it logical sanction is in the remainder of the passage just quoted :

Since contract and alliance are phenomena obviously more special than association or society, and imitation and impression are phenomena obviously more general, we must look for the psychic datum, motive, or principle in the one phenomenon that is intermediate. Accordingly the sociological postulate can be no other than this, namely : The original and elementary subjective fact in society is *the consciousness of kind*.¹

This is as though we were searching for the greatest common divisor of two numbers, say 50 and 500. Some one has proposed 10; but inspection shows this to be too small. Another proposes 1000; but inspection discovers that this is too large. Whereupon we conclude: "As *all possible* wrong solutions have been tried, the only term that is intermediate between 10 and 1000 must be the correct solution. That half-way term is 495; *q. e. d.*" Need the illustration be amplified? Further inspection would show that the first assumption is false, viz., that *all possible* wrong solutions had been tried. There is the arithmetical mean, for instance, and then the geometrical mean, and then nearly a thousand other wrong proposals which we might test before the possibilities of exclusion would be exhausted. Secondly, granting that 495 is the one term intermediate between 10 and 1000, we find by inspection that the inference does not follow, viz., that this intermediate term is the divisor sought.

It is almost as plain from inspection that Giddings has assumed a conclusion for which there is no warrant in any visible premises. In the first place, a hundred other debatable explanations of social reactions are conceivably possible. In the second place, granting that "imitation" is one extreme error, and "contract" the opposite extreme, it is neither demonstrated that consciousness of kind is "the one phenomenon that is intermediate," nor that, if it is, it is "the original and elementary subjective fact in society." It is not even demonstrated that there is any such thing as "an original and elementary subjective fact in society," in the sense in which Giddings uses the expression. The "original fact," so far as our power to represent reality can go, may turn out to be a congeries of facts, reducible only by inference to hypothetical unity. Giddings wants us to deduce the facts from his

¹ P. 17.

presumption.¹ Positive sociology is an attempt to set in order the facts so that an induction may some day be sanctioned.

The thesis is plausible that the essential likeness of all men is a fact; that this fact has always been one of the conditions of human association, and has fixed an outer boundary beyond which men would not pass in their treatment of each other; that progressive tacit recognition of aspects or connotations of this fact has tended to contract the boundaries of authorized inhumanity, or to fit conceptions of justice to partial recognition of the fact of likeness; that recognition of likeness has been conscious in a few exceptional men; that recognition of likeness tends to become general, to pass from a negative to a positive influence, to become a relatively more potent factor among the social forces; that this recognition of likeness is the social desideratum, as the major premise of social judgments, and the basis of social action. Something very like this is the pivotal idea in Janet's *Theory of Morals*. All that is true in this connection seems to be contained in the open secret which Jesus left as his legacy to the world.² Our failure to see with his insight and the impossibility of getting many people even today to accept his discovery as point of departure for their social policy, mark the precise antithesis of Giddings' version of history. He no more expresses the social truth than he would express the physical truth if he said "Gravitation is the cause of all physical phenomena."

These items by no means exhaust the list of structural weaknesses in the book. In spite of their radical character, however, which destroys all continuity in Giddings' system, we may discount their effects and still recognize an important and valuable remainder. It is Giddings' foible to magnify his disagreements with other sociologists, and then by *oratio variata*, or perhaps without it, to reduce the difference in practice to a minimum.³ I am inclined therefore to consider the dogmatic

¹ Preface, pp. 19, 22, 38, 183, etc.

² *Vide* Professor Mathews' article above p. 283 *sq.*

³ *E. g.*, p. 7 and p. 9, note. In the former case he gratuitously attributes a foolish idea to others and then credits himself with superior sagacity for meaning precisely what the criticised always asserted. In the second case he reflects very contemptuously upon a programme proposed by others, which is precisely what he has attempted to carry out in the body of his own book. The only difference between the programme which he adopts and that at which he sneers is that the latter has no recognized place for dogmatism. *Vide* also p. 66, where the phrase *method of psychological synthesis* permits him to come into line with the conception which he in terms rejects—viz., that

elements in the book rather as pedagogical devices. The contradictions pointed out in his formal methodology stamp that part of his work as too immature to be taken seriously until revised. Books II, and III, however, represent a creditable effort to do what has been growing more and more visibly necessary since Bastian began to accumulate ethnographic material, viz., to arrange facts gathered and criticised by anthropology, ethnology, folk-psychology, and history, under categories in which their significance will appear.

More specific criticism of this really valuable part of the work must be postponed. The material which he handles is but a minute fraction of the evidence which has been and which must be collected and arranged. The sort of work which Giddings has done with positive data will go far to strengthen an intelligent demand for prosecution of like work, wherever data can be found, until a basis for induction is gained. I venture the observations, however, that Professor Giddings might have profited by consulting his colleagues in biology about the latest indications of experiments upon the irritability of animals;¹ he would have inspired more confidence in the safety of his generalizations if he had drawn his inferences from a larger number of observations;² he would have simplified the

sociology is a synthetic science. *Vid.* again, *inter alia*, pp. 399 and 419, where he adopts both the language and the ideas of "the organic conception" which he has been so anxious to discredit. Perhaps the most amusing example is his severity (p. 26 *et passim*) toward those who assume anything about social laws previous to the performance of inductive processes. The primary and secondary problems of sociology must be worked through before the sociologist will be qualified to deal with "those final questions that have so often been placed at the very beginning of sociological exposition." Here seems to be logical austerity which signally distinguishes Giddings from his fellows. But what does it amount to in practice? Chief among the reprehensible prematurities to which he alludes is the assumption referred to in the well-worn formula "society is an organism." That assumption, at its lowest terms, is that there is a coördinating nexus of some sort between the different parts and processes of social order and progress. Giddings denies to others the privilege of making this innocent assumption, without which it would be senseless to begin to look for social laws at all. Giddings himself however not only starts with the assumption of a coördinating nexus of some sort, but he still further assumes that he knows precisely what that nexus is, viz: *the consciousness of kind*. According to his own claim, deductive use of this assumption is the distinctive merit of his book. This is the most ingenuous case of the mote and the beam that I remember to have encountered.

¹ Cf. p. 107.

² Pp. 233, 234. This extends an observation of a single set of "mixed bloods" to the whole world.

case for sociology if he had omitted the discussion leading to "merely hypothetical conclusions,"¹ in the chapter on *Anthropogenic Association*; and he would have made a more compact and impressive presentation if he had refrained from lugging in "consciousness of kind" to display its futility. To be sure he does not err in the latter respect very often. Instead of rendering assistance in generalizing facts, this "principle" is so obviously an afterthought that I feel sure the references to it are both recent and perfunctory interpolations.²

Book IV fairly bristles with points of antagonism which Giddings thrusts forward with the force of unsustained opinion. It is less completely wrought out than the earlier portions of the work, with which it has apparently but slight connection. They ought to have furnished the data for the interpretations which it proposes. On the contrary it seems to encounter the social problem afresh and independently, and to be no nearer the solution after all. It declares: (p. 377) "Held together in social relations men modify each other's nature." This is the objective fact in a nutshell. The business of sociology is to find out *how* men modify each other's natures, and the work leaves the problem precisely where it found it. This concluding section is rather an outline to be filled in later than a sustained treatment of the subject. It seems to have been inserted to give the appearance of formal completeness to the system. It could not be fairly discussed without rehearsal of very large portions of the laws of logic which it disregards. It shows more of the influence of Spencer than the earlier parts of the book, and it is Spencerianism at its worst.

The real process of Giddings' reasoning is hinted at in two expressions, "inductive verification,"³ and "in illustration and verification."⁴ The method to which the phrases apply runs through the whole volume, and is a reappearance of the dangerous counterfeit of induction which Spencer has done so much to circulate. It is the process by which history may be made to teach anything, like the context-violating and word-worrying method of interpreting the Bible. It is the gold-brick scheme in logic, but it chiefly victimizes its operators.

¹ P. 238. Even if the conclusions were demonstrated, they are *obiter dicta* so far as the immediate purpose is concerned.

² *E. g.*, p. 169. "The consciousness of kind is the compelling power" is an assertion so manifestly unauthorized that its confident insertion between two cautious generalities is delightfully humorous.

³ P. 408.

⁴ P. 414.

In a word then, so far as Giddings has applied his strength within the recognized lines of scientific method he has earned the gratitude of sociologists. In so far as he has attempted to operate a method of his own his processes are of a sort which the maturer sciences long since disowned, and most sociologists have had enough scientific discipline to insure them against voluntary exchange of positive science for dogmatism.

The task of analyzing forms of human association, past and present, of determining the forces operating through these forms, and of generalizing the laws of their action, is a task in which real progress can be made only by strict observance of those conditions of knowledge which have passed into settled scientific tradition. The unscientific remainder in our minds is never perfectly secure against seduction by the fair promises of lawless speculation. It is to be regretted that Professor Giddings has made the meretricious element so conspicuous in his book that it will have more influence upon the great majority of readers than the strictly scientific portions.

ALBION W. SMALL.

An Introduction to Sociology. By ARTHUR FAIRBANKS. The English and Foreign Philosophical Library. Pp. xv + 274. \$2.00. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons.

THE author's programme is thus stated in the preface: "It has been my aim to furnish a brief introduction to the subject, which would make plain to the reader something of its scope and importance, and, it may be, aid him in further study. That the specialist in sociological investigation will find much here to advance the knowledge of the science is not my expectation." Taking this explanation at face value I should say that the book does unusually well what it proposes. No one who can intelligently read current technical discussions in sociology will find in the volume either new information or contributions to method. College teachers are dealing continually, however, with students who are just beginning to suspect that there is something real beneath that obscure term, sociology. I have seen no better book to put into the hands of students at just that stage. Herbert Spencer's *Study of Sociology* might be prescribed to create the appetite which this book may for a time feed. Mackenzie's *Introduction to Social Philosophy* contains in principle everything that is valuable in this book,

but not in so elementary and easy form. Compared with Giddings' book this one is less pretentious, less speculative, and less fanciful. I should say that its author has worked his way through some of the plainer preliminary commonplaces of sociology, and his conclusions so far are set down in a way that will prove helpful to others who have not yet had that experience. The book seems to me on the whole a sane expression of opinion about more obvious phases of social phenomena, by a man who has had good introductions to most forms of contemporary thought. Whether he has had immediate scientific contact with reality at any point I am unable to judge.

The most serious charge which I should bring against the book as a tool for beginners is that it stops with giving them the author's views. It does next to nothing in the way of pointing out how they are to exercise their own powers in deriving knowledge of society. From allusions here and there I infer that the author had theological students chiefly in mind. The method of the book does nothing to correct the inevitable tendency among men of their usual intellectual antecedents to be satisfied with approach to reality mainly through books. I am very sure that the wisest teachers will one day agree that much study of social activities in the concrete should precede study of sociology. This book does not seem to have broken with the superstition that we may arrive at scientific knowledge of society by working over unscientific opinions about society. The author has not himself gone far astray in this direction, because he has evidently tried to systematize conclusions which are reasonably clear, and has withstood the temptation to get credit for originality by unwarranted theorizing. Nevertheless his manner of treatment and the bibliography appended lead me to the belief that his own method of work is practically the averaging of essays.

Whatever be our hypotheses about society or sociology, all investigators ought to be agreed that an essential condition of the advance of social science is accumulation of precise data all along the line. Of catchweight evidence we have had enough. Yet men who do not count on raising grapes from thorns nor figs from thistles still imagine that dialectic agitation, if kept up long enough, will churn ignorance of society into social science. I say this the more freely in this connection because the occasion is rather in the omissions than in the commissions of the book. I find, however, that in the treatment of social development the author has done little to show how

vague and hypothetical is most of the biological interpretation which he assumes in stating the apparent course of social evolution. Every man who presumes to deal with sociology ought to resolve that whatever else he does, he will convince his students that further knowledge of society is not to be gained by rearranging the inexact notions stored up in the symbols of current language, but by patient examination of social details and reconstruction of unauthorized concepts.

The book is full of indications that the author is not yet sufficiently at home among the sociologists to give the essentials and the non-essentials of their procedure proportionate attention. He betrays more nervousness than necessary about trivialities, and even personalities, which he imagines to be of some general significance. This might be illustrated throughout his discussion of the organic concept of society. He has evidently failed to distinguish between individual versions of social relations and the essential conception, about which there is really no disagreement. He apparently prefers on the whole to class himself with those who do not call society an organism (339), yet I doubt if even Spencer meant more by the organic analogy than is implied throughout this book. Everybody who finds it worth while to study society at all does so because he believes that there are coherences, both contemporary and consecutive, between social activities. If this were not so a science of society would be as impossible as a science of a sand-heap. Froude in his youth asserted the sand-heap analogy, but he could not hold to it and study history. If we agree with the later and wiser Froude, we are at one on the fundamental relation. Our differences are upon the extent to which social coherences are made out, and the best names to give them. Even if we were to admit that Lilienfeld and Spencer and Schäffle worked out the organic analogy in tedious and extravagant detail, it remains true that all this was necessary to hammer the perception of omnipresent social coherence into the brains of a few observers of society. The book before us could not have been written had not Schäffle's *Bau und Leben* given the impulse. I protest against the ingratitude of denying to these pioneers their due. No expert can read this book without tracing the direct and indirect influence of the Schäffle school. I do not mean that the book contains indications that its author has read Schäffle. He has at least caught up so much from the method which Schäffle has done most to form that I fail to understand how he can

be unconscious of his debt, or how he can honestly omit generous acknowledgment of it (*cf.* pp. 31-2).

The arrangement of the book seems to me rather accidental. It was apparently an afterthought to make a separate title—Part II, Social Development—for the last four chapters. There is no corresponding title, "Part I," and the frequent references to social development in the first ten chapters (*cf.* pp. 124 *sq.*, 141 *sq.*, 158 *sq.*, etc.) lead the reader to suspect that the purpose to treat that phase of the subject separately was not in the author's original plan. On the other hand, chapters xiii and xiv seem to be much more an analysis of contemporary phenomena than of the historical process of social development. They are not sufficiently unlike Part I to deserve a separate heading.

Perhaps the author's manner of dealing with the "social forces" illustrates as well as any portion of the book the rudimentary character of its conceptions and methods. On page 62 we read: "Both social and unsocial tendencies are at work in each stage of social development: some forces (*sic*) tending to draw men closer together in society, and others tending to break up the societies so formed." In contrast with this very plain proposition, chapter v, "Causes of Social Activity," starts out with the following observations:

Those writers who have recognized this dynamic character of society have generally discussed the topics of the present chapter under the title "Social Forces," and in choosing a different term I may properly point out the misconception which I believe is involved in the use of the former one. Social force properly denotes the energy of a social group. This force is essentially the same, and is to be determined in the same way, for each of the different kinds of social groups. . . . Social forces do not exist, but only social force, and the study of this force belongs to the study of the general composition of a social group.

This sort of thinking is possible only among persons who are still in the bonds of dialecticism. If we wish to substitute a dogmatic monism for analysis of phenomena, why stop with the unity of *social* forces? Why not avoid all need of discrimination by resting in the unity of *all* force? The author seems to see nothing but a quantitative meaning in the use of the term "social forces" which he rejects. His declaration that social *forces* do not exist, but only social *force*, is true and false precisely as the like is true and false of physical forces or force. As it stands in this chapter it is entirely gratuitous and

irrelevant from the point of view of the investigator, though it is rendered harmless by well-ordered discussion of obvious manifestations of the social forces under the name "Causes of Social Activity."

In classifying the "Modes of Social Activity" (chap. vi), the author has fallen into the very error which he deplors in others, *i. e.*, division according to more than one principle (108). He would have done better had he adopted De Greef's classification of social activities ("Phenomena"). The latter is at least more self-consistent. Division of activities into (1) economic, (2) social, (3) political, (4) psychical applies neither an objective nor a subjective principle consistently, as the author half realizes (121). Were the operations of the silver miners' agents in the Chicago Convention an "economic mode of activity" or a "political mode of activity?" Is the campaign now in progress "political activity" or "psychical activity?" Questions of this sort might be multiplied indefinitely to expose the mixed method of classification. If we drop the terms employed and rearrange the groups of phenomena with which the fourfold classification deals, application of the author's own principle, *viz.*, the classification of social activities according to the stimuli from which they spring, we shall find in his own specifications groupings of social activities according to the objective stimuli which produced them. These groups so rearranged very closely approach the classification which I believe to be logical and adequate. The author combines in his schedule what I have called the health stimulus with that which I call the wealth stimulus under the head the "economic stimulus." Otherwise his list of stimuli would be identical with that which I have proposed in the series—health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, righteousness. His account of the distinction between "moral" and "religious" activity is inglorious repetition of conventionality. There is no sign of independent examination of the phenomena.

Two passages interested me particularly as unintended commentaries on Professor Giddings' amiable fiction "consciousness of kind." The first is in development of a proposition already quoted (62): "Both social and unsocial tendencies are at work in each stage of social development." The second is in the chapter on "Causes of Social Activity." The first cause specified is "need of food" (94). The second (98) is "need of protection against fellowmen." Under this head the author observes:

The second original social stimulus is the need of protection against one's

fellow-beings. . . . The worst foe of man is man himself. Under peculiar circumstances some savage races have lived in such small and fluid groups that on the whole they have succeeded in avoiding each other. . . . Many savage tribes only unite in the presence of a common danger, and fear is always a potent force in developing functional bonds of union.

I shall hope to learn whether this author concludes that he is wrong and that Professor Giddings is right.

If space permitted, I might comment at length on some of the crudenesses which the book betrays. Examples would be the notion of biology implied on page 15; the harmony (?) of the logical and the chronological (pp. 14, 15); the resurrection of the bugaboo "biological organism" (p. 32 *et passim*); the solemn rejection of the term "social cohesion" (p. 64), and then the extended exploitation of the parallel term "natural selection" (221-264). A brief conference with any intelligent biologist would inform our author that "natural selection" is today a problem not a solution. Sociology is, therefore, simply pointed to unexplored facts by either of the contrasted phrases.

The chapter which seems to me most successful is that on "The Social Mind." It is more objective and therefore more valuable than the chapter under the same title in Professor Giddings' book.

In spite of the reservations expressed and implied above I welcome the book and heartily recommend it to beginners and teachers of beginners in sociology.

ALBION W. SMALL.

Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers. VON DR. A. SCHÄFFLE. Zweite Auflage. Erster Band; Allgemeine Sociologie, pp. xiv+571: M. 12. Zweiter Band; Spezielle Sociologie, pp. vii+656: M. 12. Tübingen, 1896. Verlag der H^{ch} Laupp'schen Buchhandlung.

THE first edition of this work is known by name to everybody in this country who has pretended to study sociology. It would surprise me to receive proof that twenty people in the United States have a first-hand acquaintance with the substance of the four volumes. Just enough is known about them to permit wholesale misunderstanding and misrepresentation. Since the present edition is compressed, in two volumes, to about half the bulk of its predecessor, and since the impression has been gaining ground that it may, after all, be worth

while to understand Schäffle, it is likely that he will presently get from Americans the attention that he deserves. To this end it is to be hoped that an English translation of the new edition will soon appear.

The most striking change in treatment in this second edition is in withdrawal of physiological analogies and terminology. To such extent has this been carried that it will doubtless be hailed as an admission of former error by many who have made Schäffle the target of their ridicule. On the contrary, the author himself says that he has not changed his general conception of sociology in the slightest during the twenty years since he published his first edition. I predict that *Bau und Leben* will be a second time epoch-making. It first, along with Lilienfeld's *Gedanken über die Socialwissenschaft der Zukunft*, compelled attention to organic analogies. It will now teach what Schäffle and his friends have incessantly asserted, viz., that the tracing of these analogies is not the essence of sociology, but merely the most vivid method of presenting the phenomena of society in such form that the actual problems of sociology will appear. The analogies and terms suggested by them are tools of research and report, not solutions of problems. More than this, it will be seen before long that the men who have been accused of trying to found sociology on biology, because they have made more or less use of Schäffle's method of physiological expression, have really been more consistent in leaving biology to its proper sphere than many of their critics who have been scandalized by alleged attempts to make society a zoölogical species. The metaphors emphasize obvious analogies between social relations and physiological relations. They are used as spurs to scientific curiosity, so as to facilitate discovery of the limits of analogy, and thus of the distinctively social phenomena. Is this more dangerous than assumption of immature, unsanctioned, and even discredited biological conclusions as safe premises for sociological deductions? A large amount of pseudo-biology has been exploited of late by sociological prudes who credit themselves with prodigious virtue for straining out the gnat of organic metaphor while they swallow whole caravans of condemned biological camels. Men of Schäffle's school have been more willing than many of their critics to wait until biologists have been agreed among themselves about biological facts. The critics have often not only tried to graft sociology upon what they supposed to be biology, but they have tried to sprout that biology out of their own unfertilized brains. I believe that candid study of this new edition of *Bau und Leben* will do

much to end unedifying contentions about things upon which there is more radical and general agreement than the disputants imagine. After a terminology peculiarly and literally appropriate to social relations shall have been invented, it will be found that none can adopt that language with less modification of anything essential in their former conceptions than Schäffle and those who owe most to his leadership. If the men who feel free to condemn him had read his first edition they would have found in his own explanations anticipation of everything important in the criticisms of his enemies. Since these externalities are of no essential value in his own estimate, and since he has now put his analysis in more matter-of-fact form, it is to be hoped that the sociologists who have disposed of him so summarily hitherto will realize that they may possibly learn something by looking at the world for a while through his eyes.

In a few paragraphs¹ Schäffle makes his programme perfectly clear. Sociology, in his view, has for its task the construction of a philosophy of the special social sciences. The completion of this task obviously waits on the completion of those special sciences. This almost self-evident proposition is still denied by the speculative sociologists. The denial involves the naïve assumption that generalizations of the second power, so to speak, can be positive, although generalizations of the first power, out of which they are derived, may still be hypothetical, or even if the simpler generalizations have not been reached. Schäffle's position, if I understand it, might be illustrated in this way. If discoverable factors in a given social condition are, first, an economic impulse, second, a conscious political purpose, third, certain racial affinities or antipathies, fourth, definite ethical tradition; acquaintance with the characteristic action of each of these factors is a condition of solving the problem of their combined action. By how much more is a general theory of social reactions dependent upon knowledge of the elements of those reactions!

Schäffle replies at the outset to three leading objections; first, there is no *need* of a science of society, in addition to psychology, *i. e.*, to the science of the psychical life of the individual; second, a general sociology implicitly rejects the claims of the special social sciences; third, a philosophy of the totality of special social sciences is superfluous. The answers are, in brief, first, the human individual detached from community with others is unthinkable; in all probability individual

¹ Vol. I, Book I, Sec. 1.

reason is in a true sense a social product. Conversely society is by no means merely the product of the individual mind. The solemnity with which variations of this perception have been heralded as newly found correctives of errors in sociological doctrine, is like nothing so much as the pompousness of a precocious chicken cackling over a nest egg which she mistakes for her own production. Schäffle has been so inconsiderate as to have made commonplace for twenty years some of the most pretentious recent *original* contributions to psychological sociology. Second, the men who are most interested in developing general sociology are most intelligent and efficient in encouraging further development of the special sciences. Third, instead of being a superfluity, a general philosophy of society is proved to be necessary by the undeniable provincialism of each of the special social sciences, in default of the general philosophy in which they might find correlation.

Social observation must be guided, according to Schäffle, under two categories, "one which considers the social body and its functions apart from the facts of continuous change, growth, and decay, and accordingly attempts to gain a general morphology, physiology, and psychology of society." To be sure the author at this point drops into biological metaphor, but he means simply the forms and processes displayed in continuous human association. With these metaphors he imports nothing into the facts which is not recognized, for example, by Dr. Simmel in his societary geometry or crystallography, and by Dr. Ross in his analysis of social control. The second category is that of development, which considers the social body and its functions in the process of evolution, both past and future, and which founds a doctrine of social evolution.

Both conceptions modify Schäffle's procedure, not only in the general part (Vol. I), but also in the special analysis of divisions of social life in Volume II. The general portion of the work is accordingly divided into two main divisions; first, a general analysis of existing social structure; second, an historical analysis of the most significant phenomena of social evolution. In the special part of the work each chief division of social phenomena is considered in this double aspect, so far as the author's knowledge permits.

The explanation contained in the section already quoted concludes substantially as follows: "Obviously sociology cannot succeed completely in the first attempt. The treasures of the separate and special

social sciences are at present so far from philosophic concentration according to empirically constructive methods, they are to such extent still subordinate to speculation, that similar and unified treatment of the material of all the special sciences is at present impossible. This by no means precludes attempting a preliminary unified survey of the whole, as an impulse to more complete and symmetrical attainment of the end. This is undertaken in the first or general part of the work." Nor does Schäffle regard himself as estopped from attempting further, in the special part, to show the position within the whole which belongs to the phenomena appropriate to each particular science. More than this, he attempts to draw somewhat in detail the specifications of those groups of phenomena (economic and administrative) with which he is technically familiar. He thus proposes a method of coöperation by which specialists may combine to construct their analyses of abstracted portions of social reality into an objectively true representation of the totality of social activities. At the same time he furnishes a salutary object lesson to those provincials who are devoted to a fraction of social knowledge, and proclaim for that fraction exclusive right to the name sociology.

The contrast between Schäffle's method and the speculative method should be emphasized in this connection. Schäffle would have the phenomena of individual psychology expounded by psychologists, the phenomena of ethnic development by the ethnologists, the phenomena of ethical tradition by specialists in comparative ethics, the phenomena of artistic development by experts in æsthetic history and philosophy, the phenomena of religion by investigators of comparative religion, etc. Whatever be the classifications of social activities finally adopted, it will be the business of some sociologists to work out the problems of actual interrelation between the forces abstracted from the concrete whole in consideration of these distinguishable elements of reality. The speculative method assumes the general equation, and proceeds to deduce from it facts and formulas of special phenomena which investigators in these fields can neither observe nor verify.

It is customary with a certain order of critics to say of Schäffle: "After all he has only described social phenomena." These wise folks would have science interpret phenomena without first describing them. To their minds a beginning of setting social facts in order, in their real relations, is an achievement of so mean merit that it may be passed over with contempt in the haste for final results. All the maturer sciences

have had to grow by educating investigators out of this unscientific prejudice. Schäffle will be held in higher honor when sociology has enlisted its share of investigators who understand the importance of correct beginnings.

ALBION W. SMALL.

Annales de L'Institut International de Sociologie, Publiées sous la direction de RENÉ WORMS, Secrétaire Général. II, *Travaux du Second Congrès*, tenu à Paris en Sep.-Oct., 1895. Paris, V. Giard et E. Brière. Pp. 462. 7 fr.

THE contents of this second volume compare very favorably with those of the first. Nearly every paper is valuable and the condensed remarks of extemporaneous critics occasionally contain nuggets of wisdom. The chief titles are: The Different Conceptions of Sociology, René Worms; The Method of Sociology, S. R. Steinmetz; The Language of Sociology, G. Combes de Lestrade; Individualism and the Forms of Marriage, M. Abrikossoff; The Matriarchate, Ed. Westermarck; The Family, its Genesis and Evolution, Louis Gumplowicz; The Historical Transition from Collective Property to Individual Property, Maxime Kovalewsky; Is there a Law of the Evolution of Political Forms? Paul de Lilienfeld; The Evolution of the Idea of Aristocracy, Raoul de la Grasserie; The Law of Revolutionary Retrospection, in Comparison with Tarde's Theory of Imitation, C. De Krauz; The Origin of Races and the Division of Labor, Mécislas Golberg; and finally a notable symposium upon Crime as a Social Phenomenon, by MM. Ferdinand Toennies, Enrico Ferri, R. Garofalo, J. J. Tavares de Madeiros, and F. Puglia.

In the course of his paper and in closing the discussion (p. 75) M. Tarde takes the hopeful view that the differences in terms and classifications do not amount to as radical and serious disagreement about the scope and method of sociology as would appear. M. Piche (p. 67) proposes the term *Societology* (Sociétologie) to denote the natural history of societies, and would apply the term *sociology* to "the science of social forms, the laws of which are to be derived by experimentation" and subsequently applied. Dr. Steinmetz compresses into four pages (77-80) some very sensible remarks which it would be worth while for every sociologist in the United States to consider. They remind me of criticisms which Professor Powers has made on several occasions; the

general and a part of the special appropriateness of which I acknowledge, with the suggestion that searchings of heart might induce confessions in other quarters. "We sociologists," says Dr. Steinmetz, "talk too much about the character of our researches, about what we are going to do and even of what we are not going to do, of the limits of our discipline,—but we forget to make our science, and a science is made only by discoveries of truths, small or great. We have no need whatever of grand, premature schemes, general hypotheses, original discoveries without a shadow of proof. Our young science is prolific of them. The man of science has no business to build these grand but fragile structures, he has no business to astonish the rabble with his bold ideas, it is his duty to discover some small portion of solid truth, to push his inquiries as far as possible, never forgetting that in science the most humble truth well established is worth a hundred times more than the most striking fantasy."

ALBION W. SMALL.

The Child and Childhood in Folk-Thought. By ALEXANDER FRANCIS CHAMBERLAIN. Macmillan & Co., 1896. 8vo, 464 pp. \$3.

THIS interesting volume is a compilation of usages, ceremonies, superstitions, and proverbs concerning children. Ethnology, folk-lore and modern pedagogy, and, it may be added, polite literature, contribute the data used by Mr. Chamberlain, who states that his object is "to treat of the child from a point of view hitherto entirely neglected, to exhibit what the world owes to childhood and the motherhood and the fatherhood which it occasions, to indicate the position of the child in the march of civilization among the various races of men, and to estimate the influence which the child-idea and its accompaniments have had upon sociology, mythology, religion, language." As a matter of fact, however, Mr. Chamberlain does not devote the bulk of his book to an estimate of the influence of the presence of the child upon the course of social development, immediately upon the family and mediately upon society, but oddly enough magnifies the fact that children "have figured in the world's history and its folk-lore as *magi* and medicine-men, as priests and oracle-keepers, as physicians and healers, as teachers and judges, as saints, heroes, discoverers, and inventors, as musicians and poets, actors and laborers in many fields," . . . assuming, apparently, that *qua* priest, *et cetera*, the child has contributed to the

growth of society, whereas the child in the relations enumerated was merely, in common with other objects, associated with this or that superstition. The great influence of the child in culture does not lie in this direction, but in the modification wrought by its presence on the affective nature and the forms of activity of the parent. The volume displays very well the status of the child in the thought of different races, but it would have been a very acceptable service if the author had constructed more conclusions from the materials which his admirable knowledge has enabled him to bring together—even at a sacrifice of some of the literary quotations. Excellent indexes and a valuable bibliography are provided.

W. I. THOMAS.

Woman under Monasticism : Chapters on Saint-Lore and Convent Life between A.D. 500 and A.D. 1500. By LINA ECKENSTEIN. Macmillan & Co. (Cambridge Press), 1896. 8vo, 496 pp. \$4.

A BOOK from the Cambridge Press bearing the title, *Woman under Monasticism*, naturally arouses all the interest of the student of sociology, who expects to find here set forth the influence of the mediæval church upon womankind. The present volume, however, does not deal primarily with the influence of monastic upon domestic institutions, but is rather a history of those women who devoted themselves to the church, and of the convents in which they resided. It is consequently designed as a contribution to church history rather than sociology. It is nevertheless not only a most admirable work of its kind, but one of the most valuable books accessible to the student of the social meaning of sex.

W. I. THOMAS.

History of the Young Men's Christian Association. Vol. I. By L. L. DOGGETT, PH.D. New York : The International Committee of Young Men's Christian Association. 1896.

THIS volume is the outgrowth of studies in the department of sociology in the University of Leipsic. The materials are taken from original sources ; the method is scholarly ; the bibliography is fairly complete ; and the result is highly satisfactory. The author shows the place of a particular institution in the history of the age and in relation to the important movements of the time. The first volume gives the his-

tory of the Association during the introductory period, 1844-1855. Other volumes will describe the two later phases of the history. Chapters are devoted to the beginnings of the British Association, the American movement, the founding of the Continental Association, and the formation of the World's Alliance. C. R. HENDERSON.

The Attitude of the Church to Some of the Social Problems of Town Life. By W. MOORE EDE. Pp. 131. Imported by the Macmillan Company.

THIS book is made up of the Hulsean Lectures for 1895. The purpose of the work is to show how the church can perform its social function and yet not trespass upon the field of other institutions. The position taken is substantially that urged by Canon Barnett, that the church is to quicken social conscience and urge men to promote common welfare in the line of their special knowledge or calling. The church ought not to have a specific programme. The author has been, as an English rector, in close touch with the poor and with various movements to help them. The particular problems discussed are the Unemployed, the Homes of the People, and the Vices of Towns. The definition of the church gives the author's standpoint: "The New Testament idea of the Christian church is that of a body of men bound together by their belief in the character of God and the laws of God for social service." Under such a conception the defense of a theological system or an ecclesiastical organization occupies a secondary place, the service of humanity takes highest rank. The author urges that the education of the ministry should give large place to preparation for this service.

C. R. HENDERSON.

The Expansion of Religion. Six lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute. By E. WINCHESTER DONALD. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1896. Pp. 298.

RELIGION is defined in a broad way as "sensitiveness and responsiveness to the Divine." "It employs organization, it does not require it. It admits of statement, but lives without it. It welcomes the symbol, but refuses to be bound by symbol." In our age the doctrinal forms of theology may be neglected, forms, rites, and ecclesiastical institutions

may be often deserted. Religion as a separate interest is not valued; but in reality it is a wider and deeper power than ever. It flows beyond the boundaries of churches. It reappears in athletics and in hospitals, in all the social efforts to help men to live a perfect human life. It cares for culture and for righteousness, and it builds schools and inspires civic reforms. The movements on behalf of workingmen are limited by economical barriers, but their energy is a religious conviction of the worth of man. Religion does not deny but respects the value of special sciences, and it accepts their verdict as to the wisest way of enlarging and beautifying human life. In this service the school, the press, the theater, the state are coöperating factors, but none of these can take the place of the church. Each institution has its function and its honor. As organized religion comes frankly to accept its social ministry as the educator and inspirer of conscience, and as it more fully recognizes the religious quality of all conduct which perfects personality, the church will more deserve and receive the help of earnest men. The book is a strong and typical work by one who occupies an honorable and influential pulpit where once stood Phillips Brooks.

C. R. HENDERSON.

The American Conference on International Arbitration held in Washington, April, 1896. New York: The Baker and Taylor Co., 1896.

THIS valuable report presents the ideals, arguments, and practical proposals of the friends of the peace movement in the United States. The documentary history of the movement is given; the details of the business of the Conference, the speeches of Carl Schurz, Edward Atkinson, James B. Angell, J. B. Moore, Merrill Edwards Gates, and many others. One of the best parts of this excellent volume is the "Historical Notes on Arbitration," by John Bassett Moore, in the appendix.

C. R. HENDERSON.

THE PERIODICAL LITERATURE OF SOCIOLOGY.

III. POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW.

The facts for most of the characterizations below were obtained from the editors. The characterizations of those periodicals for which no such information has been received are based mainly on inspection of the files. Characterizations of the latter class are bracketed.

The classification of periodicals into Technical Sociology, Political Economy, etc., is necessarily only approximately correct; but this defect will be remedied by the index of journals in the last number of each volume and by a full alphabetical list of journals characterized when the list is completed.

La Administracion:—[First number, 1894. Monthly. 6 numbers per vol., 864 pp. Present vol. (July 1896) is No. 3. 18 pesetas. Imp. y Lit. del Asilo de Huerfanos del Sagrado Corazon de Jesus, Juan Bravo, 5, Madrid. Edited by Francisco Silvela and others. Deals largely with matters of administration and law; also some articles on political economy, etc.]

American Law Review:—First number, 1866. Has absorbed the Southern Law Review and the Western Jurist. Bi-monthly at present. Began as a monthly and for a few years was a quarterly. 6 numbers per vol., 1000 pp. Present vol. is No. 30. \$5. Review Publishing Co., St. Louis, Mo. Edited by Lyman D. Thompson and Leonard A. Jones. Editor's estimate: Deals with live topics of law. Valuable for its leading articles by able writers, its editorial notes and its book reviews.

American Magazine of Civics:—First number, July 1892. Down to 1895 known as the American Journal of Politics. Monthly. 6 numbers per vol., 672 pp. Present vol. (July 1896) is No. 9. \$3. 38 Park Row, N. Y. Back numbers complete. Edited by Andrew J. Palm and Henry Randall Waite. Editor's estimate: Is the organ of the American Institute of Civics. Deals with current questions of reform and political topics. Its department, The Civic Outlook, giving the points and progress of civic reform in the United States, is a valuable feature.

Annals de L'Ecole libre des Sciences politiques:—[First number, 1886. Bi-monthly. 6 numbers per vol., 1056 pp. Present vol. is No. 11. 19 fr. F. Alcan, Paris. Back numbers complete. Edited by Emile Boutmy, director of the School, R. Stourm and others. Editor's estimate: Its field embraces all the subjects covered in the programme of the school, and, as the representative of the school, it has much influence in France and abroad.]

Archiv für öffentliches Recht:—First number, 1886. Quarterly. 4 numbers per vol., 640 pp. Present vol. (July 1896) is No. 12. M. 16. J. C. B. Mohr, Leipzig. Back numbers complete. Edited by Paul Laband (Strassburg) and Felix Stoerk (Griefswald). Editor's estimate: Its field, all branches of law; also politics. A scientific periodical, especially concerned with civil, business, and criminal law, and law of procedure.

Archiv für sociale Gesetzgebung und Statistik:—First number, April 1888. Quarterly. 4 numbers per vol., 700 pp. Present vol. (July 1896) is No. 9. M. 12. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Berlin. Back numbers complete. Edited by Heinrich Braun. Editor's estimate: Independent as regards university, political party, or scientific clique. Strictly scientific, aims to survey and criticise the social legislation of all countries and to collect and analyze social statistics.

Harvard Law Review :—First number April 15, 1887. Monthly (excepting July, August, September and October); 8 numbers per year. 8 numbers per vol., 515 pp. Present vol. (July 1896) is No. 10. \$2.50. Harvard Law Review, Cambridge, Mass. A few of the back numbers cannot be supplied. As the board of editors is chosen from the Harvard Law School, it is subject to change each year. Editor's estimate: Deals with general legal subjects.

Journal de Droit international privé et de Jurisprudence comparée :—First number, January 1874. Bi-monthly. 6 numbers per vol. Present vol. (July 1896) is No. 23. 22 fr. Marchal & Billard, Place Dauphine, 27, Paris. Edited by Ed. Clunet, but managed entirely by the publishers. Editor's estimate: Its sphere well indicated by its title. Numbers among its contributors the most eminent authorities in France and abroad. Articles distinguished by breadth and exactness of information.

Law Quarterly Review :—First number, 1885. Quarterly. 4 numbers per vol., 400 pp. Present vol. (July 1896) is No. 10. 12s. 6d. Stevens & Sons, 119 Chancery Lane, London, W. C. Back numbers complete. Edited by Frederick Pollock. Formerly belonged to a syndicate representing chiefly Oxford Law School. Now owned by the publisher, although the old connection still practically continues. Editor's estimate: Devoted to law as a whole and open to all schools of legal and philosophical opinion. Insists on a high standard of technical and literary work. Endeavors to secure contributors from America, and otherwise to maintain friendly relations.

Political Science Quarterly :—First number, March 1886. Quarterly. 4 numbers per vol., 780 pp. Present vol. (July 1896) is No. 11. \$3. Ginn & Co., 7-13 Tremont Place, N. Y. Back numbers complete. Edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University. Aims to cover the field of political science in the broadest sense, including economics and law. Valuable for reviews of new books in its field. For editor's estimate in detail see *A Retrospect* in issue of December 1895.

Publications of the Michigan Political Science Association :—[First number, May 1893. Irregular. 6 numbers in Vol. I. Present vol. is No. 2. Numbers are sold separately at from 25 to 75 cts. each. Charles H. Cooley, Treasurer of the Association, Ann Arbor, Mich. Articles deal mostly with the various phases of political science.]

Revue de Droit international et de Législation comparée :—First number, 1869. Bi-monthly. 6 numbers per vol., 700 pp. Present vol. (July 1896) is No. 28. 18 fr. Bureau de la Revue, 161, Avenue Louis, Brussels. Editor-in-chief: Edouard Rolin. Directors: T.-M.-C. Asser, Rolin-Jacquemyns, J. Westlake, Alphonse Rivier, and Ernest Nys. General secretary: Paul Hymans. Editor's estimate: Aims especially to maintain impartiality. In the discussion of questions which cannot be impartially treated, space is given to articles showing the different views.

Revue politique et parlementaire :—First number, July 1894. Monthly. 3 numbers per vol., 600 pp. Present vol. (July 1896) is No. 8. 30 fr. Colin & Cie, 5, rue de Mezières, Paris. Back numbers complete. Edited by Marcel Fournier. Editor's estimate: Concerns itself especially with parliamentary, legislative, and political matters; but also with the discussion of economic and social questions. Its departments devoted to a résumé of the political and parliamentary life of all countries constitute a valuable feature.

Staats- und sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen :—[First number, 1878. Irregular; each number forms a complete monograph. 4 or 5 numbers per vol. Present vol. is No. 14. No fixed price. Duncker & Humblot, Leipzig. Edited by Professor G. Schmoller. Editor's estimate: Its field political and social science. Historical, and realistic in its tendency.]

Vierteljahrschrift für Staats- und Volkswirtschaft, für Litteratur und Geschichte der Staatswissenschaften aller Länder:—[Down to 1896 was called *Zeitschrift für Litteratur und Geschichte der Staatswissenschaften*. First number, 1893. Quarterly. 4 numbers per vol. Present vol. is No. 5. M. 20. J. B. Hirschfeld, Leipzig. Edited by Kuno Frankenstein. A valuable publication. Each issue contains about 40 pages of bibliography, listing the most important publications in all branches of political science. The rest of the magazine is devoted to scientific articles on practical questions in political science, economics, and sociology.]

Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft:—[First number, 1844. Quarterly. 4 numbers per vol., 760 pp. Present vol. is No. 52. M. 18. H. Laupp, Tübingen. Edited by A. Schäffle. The numbers of this review during the last few years have been largely given up to the discussion of practical social questions of the day, especially those connected with the labor problem. But its articles on the theoretical side are also valuable.]

Zeitschrift für das private und öffentliche Recht der Gegenwart:—[First number, 1874. Quarterly. 4 numbers per vol., 800 pp. Present vol. is No. 23. 22 m. Alfred Hölder, Rothenurmstrasse, 15. Wien. Edited by C. S. Grünhut (Wien) with the coöperation of the Law Faculty of the University. Mostly devoted to the comparative study of public and private law.]

Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft:—First number, 1878. Irregular, 2 or 3 numbers per year. 3 numbers per vol., 400 pp. Present vol. (July 1896) is No. 12. 15 m. Ferdinand Enke, Stuttgart. Back numbers complete. Edited by Franz Bernhoft (Rostock), George Cohn (Zürich), and J. Kohler (Berlin). Editor's estimate: Devoted to comparative and ethnographic jurisprudence of the past as well as the present, with some special attention to Roman law.

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

CONDUCTED BY J. D. FORREST AND PAUL MONROE.

Ethical Aspects of Social Science.—True moral progress, thus far at least, has been due to only a limited extent to moral teaching, but stands in such relation to material progress as an effect to its cause. The *new ethics* will have for its aim the increase of human happiness. The ethical is the useful, and all science has an ethical basis. Pleasure and pain furnish the only tests of moral quality. Man cannot wrong the inorganic world; for sensibility to pain is all that makes a moral question possible. The field of ethics is that of human conduct which is one species of action; its essence is *restraint* to prevent collisions among men. Moral progress consists in a series of steps to reduce that friction. A knowledge of psychic and social forces constitutes the basis of the new ethics which must belong to social science. This science, instead of condemning the so-called evil propensities of human nature, deals with them as natural forces, not diminishing, but increasing their effect. When destructive elements are not atavistic, they are the products of cramped social environment. It is the function of social science to remove these cramping conditions. The sociological, as opposed to the ethical method is to liberate instead of restrain human activity. This positive ethics cannot consume itself, like the negative ethics, which must die when all preventable evil disappears. The dynamic agencies of society will not become unmanageable because they will be directed by reason. The requisite social machinery will be devised for the minimizing of social friction and the utilization of social energy.—Lester F. Ward, *International Journal of Ethics*, July 1896.

Psychology of Artistic Creation.—The purely sociological explanation of artistic production must be rejected, and an explanation stated in bio-psychological terms. It is fallacious to read into earlier stages of any process of development our knowledge of its results. At the beginning of an artistic development there is a feeling of dissatisfaction, which leads to a vague striving after novelty, at first taking only a tentative form. In the end this vague striving satisfies itself in some definite way, and the artistic revolution is completed. Fr. Carstanjen, "Ein Versuch zur Psychologie des künstlerischen Schaffens"—first paper on "Entwicklungsfaktoren der niederländischen Frührenaissance," *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, Erstes Heft, 1896.

Rights and Duties.—Man at least is a teleological animal, guided by the idea of an end; and the struggle is more for *rights* than for *existence*. Consciousness of justice is one of the most important elements in making a people strong. Man struggles partly to live, but much more to live well, which means to develop an infinity of relations with the world. The ethical end is best described as the realization of a rational universe. There is no other injustice than to be balked in efforts towards the full development of capabilities by any other cause than the limitations of nature or the claim of other men to a similar development. When the objects to which we relate ourselves are other human beings, we have a right to certain services from them, they have a corresponding right to services from us. From our standpoint, the former are rights, the latter duties. A claim which any individual possesses may be regarded as conveying with it an obligation upon that individual himself. Rights and duties are two aspects of our powers, but they depend not only on our own powers, but on the nature of the things to which our powers are related. The power of ruling gives no

right, if there is nothing that wants to be ruled over. There are no natural rights or duties. They are progressive in nature. No man can leap to the goal of human perfection singly. He must take the world with him; and the world moves slowly, making the stages of its advance by establishing definite laws and customs. If these are taken merely as representing the solid part of what has hitherto been done, we may use it as a basis for further work. In criticising rights and obligations, it should be presupposed that the world is not altogether a fool. Little that is found in law or morals which has stood the strain of centuries of human activity is without some firm foundation in the nature of man. But boldness should be shown in such criticism; for we possess in ourselves the criterion of reason. Nothing can be accepted as a right or a duty if it cannot be made clear to us that it is an essential element in the development of a full and perfect humanity.—J. S. Mackenzie, *International Journal of Ethics*, July 1896.

Morality the Last of Dogmas.—Reflecting on the disappearance of religious dogmas which long held undisputed authority, there seems no presumption in inquiring whether morality itself is not an untenable dogma, the remnant of old superstitions. There is at present a tendency to place *right* in the foreground and *duty* in the background. Actions ultimately depend upon the feelings, not upon judgment; and feelings which, through the experiences and mental associations of the race or the individual, have become like an organic element of the mind, cannot be suddenly eliminated, when it is discovered that their promptings are contrary to reason. A constant recurrence of the same feeling through a series of generations, or a long period of individual life, produces organic alterations in the nervous centers, which it requires the reaction of an opposite feeling or of a corrected judgment for a long time to retransform. While the process of reorganization is going on, judgment will be overruled by feeling, even though the legitimacy of the authority of the latter is denied by the subject who obeys it. But evidently a feeling will finally be organized corresponding to the judgment, and the opposite feeling will disappear. Morality, with its machinery of obligation and conscience, being based on feelings originated in an inadequate and unscientific conception of the world, is doomed to vanish under pressure of enlightened reason. Conscience is mainly an abstract feeling of fear of punishment, and is an exclusively egoistic feeling, inasmuch as it is a painful state experienced by the individual exclusively on his own account. It is impossible that conscience and allied feelings will continue after their illusory foundation has been exposed.—Antonio Llano, *Philosophical Review*, July 1896.

Ethics from a Practical Standpoint.—The method of hedonism is the only one that will prove effective when used by the moral teacher. In making calculations with regard to our future lives, we cannot have a distinct idea as to how far our feelings will be altered; yet we are aware that a certain change may be expected, and may frequently force it. Calculations in respect of general happiness take into account only general lines of conduct, and are hence possible. Although hedonic calculations are difficult and uncertain, we have no rival ethical road that leads to more certain conclusions. "Self-realization" is no solution whatever. Muirhead's definition of self-realization as "loyalty to the duties of the good parent and honest citizen," supplies no workable method, because of the endless disputes as to what constitutes the good parent and honest citizen. According to Spencer's plan we should have to encounter all the difficulties involved in formulating the details of the absolute ethics, along with the uncertainty of decisions on the nearest approximations suited to the time when the formulation is taking place. If we should dispense with a direct estimation of happiness and misery, we should fetter the human intellect; for it is only by our being able to apply the utilitarian test, that we can preserve ethical freedom of thought. Hedonic instruction should include an enumeration of probable good and bad consequences of our actions, particularly as they affect others, and a description of the formation of habits and their reaction upon our associates, showing how the type of society affects the individual and individual action the social type.—Mrs. Bain, *Mind*, July 1896.

Factory Legislation for the Protection of Women and Children in Italy.

—In 1396 Venice passed a law placing all children employed in factories under care of state and protecting them against the arbitrary will of the manufacturers. Similar laws were passed by all the Italian republics that had attained a certain grade of industrial development. The decay of industries and the rigid regulations of trade guilds removed all occasion for legislation until the present century. Between 1838 and 1844 the rise of industries led certain philanthropists to consider the subject. In 1863, the viceroy of the Lombard-Venetian kingdom issued an order prohibiting the employment of children under nine years of age in factories, and, where the work was dangerous, under fourteen years. Children, before being placed in factories, were required to have had two years of instruction in the elementary schools. After the political unrest of the Unification, writers began to press the subject upon the public for consideration. By the census of 1881, it was shown that 292,265 children between the ages of nine and fourteen were employed in factories, some for very long hours. A law passed in 1886 regulating the employment of children in all places using mechanical motors and employing ten or more persons. Children under nine are not to be employed in such places, and none under fifteen are to be employed in dangerous occupations. Those under fifteen must present physician's certificates that they are fit for the work in question. None under fifteen can be employed to manage or polish machinery in motion. The hours of labor per day may not exceed eight. The force of inspectors is inadequate, and but 544 visits were made July 1, 1889—December 31, 1892. After that, the judicial police were ordered to assist the inspectors, and the supervision became adequate; but still the most important question is that of supervision of the execution of the present law. A law is now pending for a corps of inspectors. In 1891, 220 establishments employed 5830 children. Of these 1.8 per cent. were between nine and ten years of age, and about 10 per cent. between ten and twelve. In 1892 the proportion of those between nine and ten had fallen to .82 per cent. In 1892, out of 11,159 boys employed in quarries and mines, 3.2 per cent. were under ten, while in 1893, out of 8121, only 1.24 per cent. were below that age. The bill of M. Barazzuli, reported in 1895, which is likely to become a law, provides that the age at which children may be employed shall be raised to ten, and prohibits the employment of women and children under twelve in underground work. Night work of children under twelve and women under twenty-one is also prohibited. Mothers are not to return to work within one week of child-birth. Hours of labor are to be limited as follows: Six to eight hours for children under twelve; ten hours for children from twelve to fifteen; twelve hours for women from fifteen to twenty-one.—R. B. D'Ajano, *Journal of Political Economy*, June 1896.

Crime and Punishment.—From present indications, there is no prospects of crime either being reduced to a vanishing point, or of even being reduced to a considerable extent. It is impossible to say even that compulsory education has had much effect in this respect. Conclusions of criminologists based upon a study of Italian stabbers could not be applied to ordinary English burglars. It has not been shown that a distinct criminal type exists. In Lombroso's "La Donna Delinquente," figures are given based on the examination of 1033 female offenders, 176 skulls of this class, 685 skulls of prostitutes, and 255 normal women. But even these few observations were made at different times by different people, and apparently in different ways. For such conclusions an immense multitude of facts is demanded, and until we have them, it will be safer to act on the old supposition that a criminal is like the rest of the race, and swayed by the same motives. It is not the born criminals, the extraordinary offenders, that give rise to the problem of crime, but the commonplace pickpockets and swindlers. English legislators, therefore, do not have to deal with moral monsters, but with men whose passions are a little stronger and wills a little weaker than those of their respectable fellow-citizens. The current tendency to attach most importance to the reformation of the criminal as a means of preventing crime seems least likely to secure that result. Thus far science has failed to discover any mode of treatment which can be regarded as effective for reformation. A man's behavior in prison is no criterion by which to judge his character, for the way of life there is altogether different from

the way of the outside world. Where the tests of reformation are largely educational tests, the clever scoundrel can easily act his part. Yet no more satisfactory test is proposed in Dr. Wine's argument in favor of the Elmira system. Where industry and good behavior shorten the term of imprisonment, no one can suppose they are a test of reformation. Change in character requires long training; and Elmira methods cannot be expected to succeed with old offenders. Even young people and adults who have just fallen into crime must receive long sentences for the first offense. To simply inspire a man with a desire for honesty, while he is suffering the penalty for crime, is comparatively easy, but is not reformation.—H. B. SIMPSON, *Contemporary Review*, July 1896.

Beginnings of Town Life in the Middle Ages.—A brief account is given of the four leading theories of German scholars accounting for the origin of mediæval towns, followed by a critical examination of the recent contributions to the subject by Flach, Varges, Pirenne, and Keutgen. It is concluded that, while many towns must have grown out of villages, those arising from the ruins of the old cities must have been inhabited by men whose occupations were not very different from those of the men of the country manor. There is no evidence of the existence of free, autonomous townships in the period of the rise of the towns. The latest investigations into mediæval industry render it clear that the craftsman worked at first on the materials of an individual customer, often at the customer's house. After a time, many craftsmen manufactured wares for the general market out of their own materials. This produced friction with the merchant guilds which were composed of those who had formerly been the only traders.—W. J. ASHLEY, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, July 1896.

Social Darwinism.—Many of the social applications of Darwinism have been most pernicious. It is held that through restrained competition victory comes to the strongest and most capable, and social progress is maintained. But the economic struggle is essentially different from the biological. While animals struggle for food necessary to their maintenance, the economic struggle is between proprietors and non-proprietors, the end of the former being to secure a quantity of wealth by means of the labor of the latter. This is comparable not to a struggle between independent organisms, but to the biological phenomena of parasitism. The parasite which triumphs is feebler than its prey; and, unlike the struggle between independent organisms, the destruction of the parasite must result from the destruction of its so-called competitor. In the economic struggle the victory is with the proprietors; but it is not true that the workingmen are the feebler. On the contrary they represent the vital element, the *action opiniâtre* of man against the resistance of matter. Thus the economic conflict is a powerful cause of the retrogression of the species. Admitting that the first proprietors were the most capable, the later struggle still assumes the parasitic character because of the purely human device of inheritance of wealth. Degenerates inherit victory with wealth. Among proprietors the most sordid element triumphs; for fraud rather than talent wins. Likewise the marriage of the rich with the rich modifies sexual selection. Among workingmen, the feebler defeat the capable, as when the Chinese displace Americans, or women and children drive men from the factories. So while unrestrained conflict may be the necessary condition of the beginning of the social evolution, it is not possible to apply the theory to the phenomena of the moral world. In that sphere alliance must be substituted for conflict, and the state must intervene in favor of the poor.—ACHILLE LORIA, "Darwinisme Social," *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, June 1896.

Exclusion of Married Women from the Factory (Continued).—Data are given in continuation of the exhibit of the first article. The following conclusion is reached: The ideal arrangement would be the exclusion from the factory of all married women and widows and divorced women having children under 14 years of age. The attempt to exclude mothers of illegitimate children would be impracticable as it might lead to infanticide. A vast benefit was secured to labor through the exclusion of children under 14 years of age from factories; but such children now need the care of mothers even more than when they were working. In 1890 there were 130,000 married women

in German factories, exclusive of widows and divorced women; at present there are 170,000 married, widowed, and divorced women employed. They cannot be excluded except by state action. Even in England, the unions are not strong enough to secure their exclusion. Where the factory unions are strongest, married women are members, and resist excluding laws. The obstacles in the way of such legislation are the facts that numberless families would be rendered destitute where the husband is thrown out of work; that means of accumulating savings would be removed; and that, where women earn more than men, families would be deprived of more than half of their income. In countries where wages are higher this change would bring less immediate disaster; and the increase of real wages about 100 per cent. in the last fifty years in Germany, gives hope that steps can be taken even there before long. Much could be done now, if compulsory insurance for loss of work prevailed, and if insurance for widows and orphans could likewise be made obligatory. Until such systems of insurance are perfected, German legislation in this direction will be impossible.—RUDOLF MARTIN, "Die Ausschliessung der verheirateten Frauen aus der Fabrik," *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, Drittes Heft.

Epidemics of Hysteria.—There is a widespread opinion that nervous diseases, especially hysteria, and the social movements growing out of these, are phenomena of recent occurrence. This is supposed to characterize every class of society, but especially the educated, higher class. Max Nordeau is the protagonist of this widespread opinion. Hysteria has from the earliest times attacked the masses in the form of epidemics, and so become of the highest significance and importance for the life of society as a whole. Religious enthusiasm and proneness to the mystic and the occult formed an important factor in ancient religions. But hysteria never found a more fertile soil than in the middle ages of northern Europe. The devil-delusion, the great hysteria in convents, and various other delusions of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are examples. These hysteria exercised a wonderful influence upon the whole metaphysics, or view of the universe of that times. The principal causes of the spread of epidemics of insanity are suggestibility, emotionalism, the impulse to mimicry, and the tendency to mysticism.—DR. WILLIAM HIRSCH in *Popular Science Monthly* for August 1896.

Human Welfare and the Social Question (Third article).—V. *The Idea of Labor.* Labor is a movement whose object lies outside of the self. Labor as labor is undesirable. Only desire is the ultimate end of human endeavor. An effort which it not itself a final end, as walking is, cannot be desired; desire arises only through the expected results. Labor must be regulated by a useful product. Useful is only what has value in use; and only a product whose consumption produces immediate or mediate pleasure has value. The reward of labor is found not alone in material goods. It is to the interest of ethics and political economy to create more and more immaterial rewards for labor; for a society in which the chief motive to labor is in material goods must soon sink to an animal existence. VI. *The Idea of Capital.* Capital is usually defined as the product of former work for future production. A product is consumed either in immediate use or further production. But the enjoyment of eating or theater-going may make new power for work. The definitions of capital usually reckon it as only that which is stored for new production, and exclude the spiritual products which are of greater use in the new production. Enjoyment which makes the work which follows it more intensive is capital. Both the material products which are consumed and the human power for work belong to capital. The concept depends on either subjective or historical considerations. The former are the individual elements, while the social are determined by the historical means of the development of society. The mass of knowledge is necessary in order to transform the product in hand to another form. State control of production and consumption destroys the stimulus to activity. VII. *The Idea of Value.* It is often held that value is found only by comparison; but a good may be determined as valuable without determining in every case a definite measure of its value. Every value stands against "unvalue," as love against hate. Every value rests upon pleasure, and every unvalue upon pain. We determine in one moment the

value of goods according to the positive or negative pleasure we expect to derive from them. Pleasure *is* value; the means to it *have* value. Negative value is—(1) freedom from pain, (2) discomfort as a means to pleasure, (3) useless discomfort. As spiritual and sensual pleasure are never separated, so spiritual and sensual value run into each other. The psycho-ethical value cannot be separated from the economic value. The two kinds of value are two sides of the same thing. Agreement of the inner and outer cannot be found in the social realm alone; for the individual must seek his own welfare. The subjective value may be determined *a priori* in so far as it is true for all men at all times. When not, the historical and economic determination of the objective value is necessary. The *need* which rarity makes for a good determines its inner value. The *want* which leads to the production of any good determines its outer value. The need is the total sum of subjective power. Subjective power is the will energy necessary to determine an end. The inner and outer value stand in different relations to one another to different persons. Negative value of goods is relatively greater for the poor than for the rich. The value of goods may differ to two classes though the price remains the same.—DR. VON SCHUBERT-SÖLDERN, "Das menschliche Glück und die soziale Frage," *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, Drittes Heft, 1896.

Crime and Punishment.—The practical problem presented to every student of crime is this: All efforts have entirely failed in exterminating crime or in even largely reducing it; are further efforts conducted on normal lines likely to succeed? The latest general attempt has been that of compulsory education. The latest theory advanced is that of the criminal anthropologists who hold that criminals do not live under ordinary social and biological conditions; but that crime is the product of anomalous biological conditions as well as adverse social circumstances. Their contention is true to this extent; there are born criminals in the sense that some men are born with stronger passions or weaker wills than the majority of their fellows, or in the sense that the moral average of the criminal class is much below that of others, or even rarely in the sense that from birth certain persons are devoid of social instincts and the moral instincts and scruples which keep men within the law. These latter, however, are very rare and form an insignificant proportion of the persons convicted of crime. It is not moral monsters that our legislators and administrators have to consider, but men whose passions are a little stronger and whose wills are a little weaker than those of their respectable fellow citizens. Under the modern theory of punishment vindictiveness is wholly inadmissible. The preventive purpose is alone allowed. This can be done by deterring, by reforming, or by coercing the offender, or by deterring others or by fostering a detestation of the offense. The real problem is, which method will secure better results in the diminution of crime. The Elmira system best represents the reformatory method. Its effect is to diminish the deterring effects and to encourage hypocrisy, self-deceit and priggishness among criminals. Neither the prisoner's conduct while under prison discipline nor his professed amendment, nor yet his educational and intellectual progress are efficient tests, but merely the will and the power he exhibits, when at liberty, to keep the law and live an honest life. However, the material at present available is not sufficient to afford a solution of the problem.—H. B. SIMPSON in *The Contemporary Review*, July 1896.

Is Poverty Diminishing—The conclusions reached by Mr. Hobson (summarized in this department in the July issue) are combated by Mr. W. H. Mallock. The underlying assumption of Mr. Mallock's article is, that from the beginning of the capitalistic régime the incomes of the poor generally show a percentage of increase larger than the incomes of the wealthy and that the diminution of individual poverty, has been greater than the growth of individual riches. In the first place Mr. Hobson admits the correctness of the contention that there has been a general rise of wages, and objects to Mr. Giffen's conclusions on one point only, that the "real residuum" or the "submerged tenth" is decreasing absolutely, though he admits that it is decreasing relatively. In the second place, Mr. Hobson's contention that there has been no rise of real wages, that the commodities which are necessary to life have, generally speaking,

decreased in value, is without foundation. Mr. Hobson's third contention that physiological poverty and psychological poverty are increasing is false as to the first, and meaningless as to the second. This subjective poverty does not depend upon the ratio between a man's income and his theoretical needs, but on the fact of a man's cherishing personal ambitions which he has not the character, the will, or the intellect to satisfy. This does not show that the present economic system is at fault, but that the educational system is at fault. This doctrine proves, if it proves anything, that real poverty rises as economic poverty declines, that the higher the workman's wages the more miserable he becomes. Finally, Mr. Hobson's contention that pauperism is not so much due to sickness, incapacity and moral defect as to "the barriers of external environment and the influences they exercise upon the efficiency of effort" is true only of a very small percentage. The statistics of The Charity Organization Societies and of the Salvation Army show that at least 75 per cent. of pauperism is due to personal causes.—W. H. MALLOCK in *Contemporary Review*, June 1896.

Substitutes for the Saloon.—The results of a preliminary investigation of the Committee of Fifty, appointed to study the liquor problem in the United States, are given in an article by Professor F. T. Peabody, in *The Forum* for July. The accompanying table gives the facts. The writer reaches the following conclusions:

"The saloon is a degrading form of social enjoyment, but it is a real form. It offers so much to the life of the poor that at least one skilled observer in Boston remarked in the course of this investigation, that if it were a question between the saloon and no poor man's club he would wish the saloon to stay. The substitute for the saloon, in order to survive, must give more resources of sociability than the saloon gives, and compete with it on its own terms. There must be no hint of patronage or of missionary zeal. There must be the same tone that prevails in the rich man's club—a sense of proprietorship, a comfort which tempts to patronage, resources of athletic life, games which are of real interest, literature which is not discarded rubbish of the benevolent, light and liberty, and self government; and for this form of institution there are already among the working classes obvious and often pathetic signs of long suffering, expectation and desire.

SUBSTITUTES FOR THE SALOON IN THE CITY OF BOSTON. 1895.

Police Divisions	Population (Approx)	Number of Saloons	Daily Patronage	Arrests Drunks Daily	Pool Rooms	Daily Patronage	Coffee Rooms	Daily Patronage	Lunch Rooms	Daily Patronage	Reading Rooms	Daily Patronage	Clubs	Daily Patronage
1	22,288	99	36,600	18	21	2,000	20	6,000	4	300	4	175
2	10,970	72	39,240	2.5	11	1,800	3	7,650	35	15,225
3	25,070	63	21,385	11	17	1,500	3	2,400	14	3,200	1	..	?	2 115
4	12,244	89	36,045	13	28	2,500	4	3,200	27	9,965	3	1,800
5	52,809	63	28,350	4.5	49	3,900	4	1,200	20	3,350	4	320	14	700
6	29,555	53	15,260	5	15	2,200	9	100	3	300	1	50
7	39,995	27	7,020	4	12	1,000	2	350	35	1,375	2	120	10	550
8	2,600	<i>Harbor Police, No Report.</i>									
9	51,798	23	6,875	3.5	7	750	10	1,200	2	50	5	220
10	44,171	50	16,000	7	23	2,700	1	50	49	5,500	4	150	2	200
11	42,004	3	600	1.5	5	700	4	175	5	125
12	35,828	14	4,350	2	6	500	3	200	1	35
13	36,116	6	900	1	3	450	2	60	2	55
14	15,001	6	900	2	1	150	1	50	3	150	4	100
15	40,304	38	13,227	5	26	2,500	3	428	10	1,200	2	150	7	225
16	36,167	?	3	7,500
Total	496,920	606	226,752	80	225	22,650	29	15,378	227	47,565	35	10,825	56	2,500

Proudhon and the Principles of the Exchange Bank.—Proudhon thought the social question one of the distribution and circulation of wealth which were one and inseparable. Under the present system there is a surplus over the cost of production (labor expended) which goes to the capitalist class, to the manufacturers, land-owners, and usurers. This makes two classes in society, the laborers and the capitalists, the interests of each class being opposed to those of the other class. The problem is to find how these two classes may be reduced to one, all having the same interests, all enjoying and exercising the functions of laborer and capitalist. His solution was to do away with "hard" money in exchange, and to issue "labor-checks" for articles produced based upon the time required for their production. These checks should be full legal-tender. He recognizes the elements of skill and industry in production saying that they should enter into the calculation of the time required for production. With this system of "labor-checks" the laborer would get all he produced. The question of the distribution of wealth would be solved. Being issued for goods already produced there would be no occasion for interest. Wealth distributed to each according to his production and tribute no longer paid to one class, the two classes of society would become one. But later Proudhon saw it was necessary for a man in business to have credit, so he also demanded that a government bank should be established, which should make loans upon good security. As a result of Proudhon's agitation many coöperative societies were formed in Paris and the Provinces in which his system of "labor-checks" was used. Proudhon, however, was soon imprisoned for agitating and this broke up these societies. His system never had a fair trial but it probably would have done good. H. DENIS in *Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Socialpolitik und Verwaltung*.

The Matriarchal Family System.—The matriarchal family system is not, as was thought by MacLennan and his followers, based upon a loose sexual relation. Succession in the female line did not take place because the father was unknown or in doubt. Such ignorance in regard to parents is not found among the animals from which man springs. The maternal system developed out of the paternal at a later stage of development. It came with exogamous marriage which does not develop until two tribes see the benefits of mutual help and seek to bring it about through closer relations obtained by intermarriage between them. In such marriages the husband may go to the wife's tribe, or the wife may go to the husband's tribe. In the former case the family is maternal, in the latter paternal. Self-interest is the cause of the maternal system. The tribe wants to get more men into it in order to strengthen it. This is the reason for the prevalence of the matriarchal system in a certain type of communities. The maternal family does not persist, however, because there is always the tendency to revert back to the paternal form found in lower life, and because the man, owing to his strength, is the natural head of the family.—E. B. TYLOR in *Nineteenth Century*, July 1896.

The Miners of Mariemont, Belgium.—It is of interest to us to see how this mining company at Mariemont has settled the labor question for its 6500 employés. It is all the more interesting owing to the fact that the solution has been very satisfactory for twenty-five years. The plan of the company was to build up patronage institutions and voluntary organizations on the part of the employees so as to solve the question of poverty and to make the men more "business-like" and economical. So these institutions are of two kinds, those introduced by the company (patronage institutions), and those organized by the workmen themselves. Nearly all of the institutions have been in successful operation for twenty-five years.

The patronage institutions are a "precautionary fund," a "maturity fund," an "aid fund," and "medical help." These funds are all managed by commissions, the majority of their members representing the employés. The "precautionary fund" provides in case of accident or sickness. It is obtained by putting away .75 of one per cent. of the amount of wages, and the fines. One half of this .75 of one per cent. is deducted from the wages, the other half is given by the company. In case of injury the employé for three months receives a sum equal to thirty per cent. of his wages, and

after that a pension fixed by the commission having the fund in charge. In case of sickness it begins with twenty-two per cent. of his wages and gradually decreases to seven and one-half per cent. during the eighth month when it ceases. Widows of employés are also pensioned from this fund. Employés between the ages of twenty and forty may provide for old age pensions by paying two per cent. of their wages. To this the company adds a sum equal to about one and one-half per cent. of the wages. An initiation fee graduated according to age is charged. The pension in case of permanent disability is \$4.00 per month; in case of sickness \$3.00 per month. The "aid fund" is given by the company for pensions and for temporary relief of distress. The company has a corps of physicians and pharmacists who are furnished a family upon the payment of twenty cents per month.

The company also looks after the housing of its employés. 550 five-room houses with cellars have been built upon two and one-half acre lots. These lots are used as gardens. A house and garden rents for \$1.50 per month. If a man wants to build his own house, money is loaned him interest free, and deductions are made from his wages until the amount is repaid. The company does not employ married women at all. It helps to support a manual training school which the children of the village attend, provides free lectures, concerts, and libraries.

The workmen have organized three institutions, viz., a benefit society, a coöperative store, and a savings-bank. This benefit society in return for small dues gives benefits in case of sickness. The coöperative store furnishes everything, mining tools, powder, etc., included, at wholesale prices. The savings-bank receives about \$10,000 annually upon deposit.

The company has tried to solve the wage question by the "scale-wage," and difficulties between the company and its employés by a council of arbitration. The employés are paid by the ton of coal mined and the price per ton varies with the price of coal and the amount mined by the individual employé. The council of arbitration consists of twelve men, six delegates from the laborers and six from the company, and has power to decide all differences. Its decision on any question is final for three months.—J. H. GORE in *Catholic World*, July 1896.

Factory Inspection in Austria.—The factory inspectors in Austria have a double function. They make reports which not only give evidence as to particular cases in which there was trouble, but also give information concerning labor in general. Thousands of industries in different parts of the country are examined annually and the information gained is invaluable. The inspectors also examine and try to settle cases which come in conflict with the law. In this their power is only advisory. They take evidence, examine, judge, and advise, but do not have the power to enforce their decisions. This lack of police power greatly hinders the efficiency of the work. So the inspectors should be given police power. The system of reports should be extended so as to furnish more information and this information should be better disseminated. The efficiency of the work depends upon the work of the individual inspectors. Their districts should be smaller so that they may do their work more thoroughly. More inspectors should be added. Then, too, in order to secure the greatest efficiency of the work, the whole work should be clearly separated from that of the Department of Manufactures to which it is now bound. A reform law providing for these points is needed.—E. MISCHLER in *Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Socialpolitik, und Verwaltung*.

Labor Unions in Germany and their Regulation.—Labor unions were introduced into Germany about 1860 and were from the first of two kinds, the Hirsch-Duncker or non-political, and the socialist-democratic, which were political. The former had a rapid growth up to 1870 when owing to the introduction of coöperative associations and benefit societies, their numbers fell off until 1876, when their funds were secured by law. Then they began creating funds and giving various kinds of benefits, and, as a result, had a rapid growth. The socialist-democratic unions had a more rapid growth up to 1878 when they were suppressed on account of their agitation. They were gradually reorganized upon a non-political basis and have done

more in the way of mutual help than have the other unions. But they still have their socialistic political flavor. In 1895 the Hirsch-Duncker unions had 69,000 members while the other had in 1894 about 221,500 members. In 1894 the former spent 73,050 marks while the latter spent relatively far more. Both have agitated for and founded many coöperative associations. Both carry on a great educational work. Besides this direct mutual help to the members, the unions also perform a function in determining the conditions under which their members shall work. They have in a great many cases provided councils of arbitration. But in this whole work they are hindered by not having a legal status. The state should confer this status upon them and then regulate their action. Bills having this in view have been presented to the Reichsstadt but have not been passed upon favorably. Just now, however, it seems that such a measure will soon be made into law.—K. FRANKENSTEIN in *Vierteljahrsschrift für Staats- und Volkswirtschaft*.

Industrial Arbitration and Its Limitations.—Unlike many the author of this article thinks the labor question is becoming less serious and, especially, less menacing. This is true because manufacturers are recognizing the rights of their employés, and they have too much capital invested to permit strikes and so lose the use of it. The laboring men, too, are becoming more intelligent and more considerate of the rights of their employers. There is a community of interest as the basis of our modern industry. Public opinion is affecting the actions of both employer and employé. For these several reasons a peaceable means is sought by all for the solution of the labor problem and all have turned to some form of arbitration. Then what kinds of arbitration do we find and what are its limits?

There are two kinds of differences between employers and employés. One is a question of wages or conditions of labor, the other a question of principle. Within certain limits the former question can be arbitrated, and arbitration has done much in settling such questions. But a question of principle, upon the other hand, cannot be arbitrated, there is no compromise. So arbitration is limited to certain questions concerning wages. What form of arbitration is best? England has one form resting upon the voluntary formation of boards of arbitration, while in the United States we have made it a state function. From an examination of the work in this country he asserts that the work would be done very much better by boards as they exist in England. Our boards are distrusted by both sides and are not often used. Further, the members of the board have not the technical information necessary to make a wise decision. In England, where the boards are composed of an equal number of representatives of the employer and the employés of the particular institution where the case to be arbitrated is, the members are well acquainted with the whole situation and the board being equally divided between the factions, the right wins, and so the board is trusted by both factions. This is the kind of arbitration we should have. The state should not be appealed to for "this is one of those questions that should be left to work out its own solution by natural selection."—S. D. NORTH in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, July 1896.

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- The presidential outlook as Europeans view it, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, F., JI.
- The West & the East, C. S. Gleed, F., Ag.
- Imperative reasons for Republican control, J. S. Morrill, F., Ag.
- The Chicago platform, GM., Ag.
- The Republican convention, GM., JI.
- La machine politique en France, Leon Poinard, SS., Je.
- (For summary of politics, national, international, see DR., RPP., RRA.)
- Population: Movement of population in France, C. W. Chancellor, S., JI.
- Psychology: The holiness of instinct, Woods Hutchinson, M., JI.
- On musical memory, AJP., JI.
- On mental fatigue & recovery, W. H. R. Rivers, JMS., JI.
- Railroads: State ownership of railroads, GM., JI.
- The turning point in railway reforms, M. E. Ingalls, EM., JI.
- Religion: Catholic missions in Africa, J. T. Murphy, ACQ., JI.
- Rome or naturalism, ACQ., JI.
- Is there another life? Goldwin Smith, T., JI.
- Sanitary Science: The science of change of air, Louis Robinson, M.D., National Review, JI.
- Science: Early years of the American Association, Wm. H. Hale, PSM., Ag.
- Science at the University of Pennsylvania, L. R. Harley, PSM., Ag.
- A century's progress in science, John Fiske, Atlantic Monthly, JI.
- Science & faith, II, Paul Topinard, M., JI.
- Settlements: A social settlement, Annie L. Muzzey, A., Ag.
- Socialism: Le socialisme dans les colonies australiennes, Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, RefS., Je. 15.
- Beiträge zur Geschichte des Sozialismus und des Kommunismus, H. Dietzel, VSV.
- Le socialisme en 1896, G. du Puyrnode, JEC., Je. 15.
- Le socialisme municipal en Angleterre, G. Franco, JEC., Je. 15. (See also biography.)
- Social movements: (For social movements see RefS., RIS., RIS., SS.)
- Social organism: L'organisme social, R. P. Antoine, AC., Je. JI.
- Societies: La société d'économie sociale et les Unions en 1895-96. A. Delaire, RefS., JI. (For information as to the meetings of educational and scientific societies see Sc., Nt.)
- Sociology. Philosophie sociale, Ch. Delron, AC., JI.
- Music from the standpoint of sociology, Chautauquan, JI.
- La géographie sociale de la France, Edmond Demoulin, SS., JI.
- Darwinisme social, Achille Loria, RQS., Je.
- Die soziale Metaphysik, G. Fiamingo, VSV.
- Ethical aspects of social science, L. F. Ward, IJE., JI.
- Sweating system. Sweating system in New York city, J. M. Mayers, GM., Ag.
- Taxation. Principles of Taxation, D. A. Wells, PSM., Ag.
- History of taxation in Connecticut, JHS., Ag.
- Land taxation in Japan, GM., JI.
- L'imposta progressiva, Francesco Suvrea, RISS, Je.
- United States. The United States and the Anglo-Saxon future, G. B. Adams, Atlantic Monthly, Je.
- Water supply. The filtration of municipal water supplies, EM., JI.
- Purification of public water supplies, G. W. Rohe, S., JI.
- Wealth. Le rôle de la richesse dans la vie sociale, L. Delron, AC., Je.
- Women. The women movement in Germany, Mrs. Bertrand Russell, NC., JI.
- Women in society today, AEU Hilles, A., JI.
- A group of eminent American women, Eugene L. Didier, Chautauqua, JI.

ABBREVIATIONS OF MAGAZINE TITLES USED IN THE INDEX.

[The titles of articles selected from periodicals not in this list will be followed by name of periodical in full.]

A.	Arena.	JHS.	Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science.
AA.	American Anthropologist.	JMS.	Journal of Mental Science.
AAC.	Archives d'Anthropologie Criminelle.	JNS.	Jahrbücher für National-Oekonomie und Statistik.
A.AE.	Archivo per l'Antropologia e la Etnologia.	JPE.	Journal of Political Economy.
AAP.	Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.	LG.	Labor Gazette.
AC.	L'Association Catholique.	LH.	Lend a Hand.
ACQ.	American Catholic Quarterly Review.	LoQR.	London Quarterly Review.
AE.	Archiv für Eisenbahnenwesen.	LQR.	Law Quarterly Review.
AGP.	Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.	M.	Monist.
AH.	Archive für Hygiene.	MHM.	Mansfield House Magazine.
AHR.	American Historical Review.	Mi.	Mind.
AIS.	Annals de l'Institut de Science Sociale.	MIM.	Monatschrift für innere Mission.
AJM.	American Journal of Medical Sciences.	NA.	Nuova Antologia.
AJP.	American Journal of Psychology.	NAR.	North American Review.
AJS.	American Journal of Sociology.	NC.	Nineteenth Century.
AK.	Arbeiter-Kolonie.	NS.	Natural Science.
ALR.	American Law Review.	Nt.	Nature.
ALRR.	American Law Register and Review.	NW.	New World.
AMC.	American Magazine of Civics.	NZ.	Neue Zeit.
AMP.	Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, Séances.	PhR.	Philosophical Review.
AN.	American Naturalist.	PSM.	Popular Science Monthly.
Ant.	L'Anthropologie.	PSQ.	Political Science Quarterly.
AOR.	Archiv für öffentliches Recht.	PsR.	Psychological Review.
Ar.	Arbeiterfreund.	QJE.	Quarterly Journal of Economics.
ASA.	American Statistical Association, Publications.	QR.	Quarterly Review.
ASAR.	Allgemeine Statistisches Archiv.	RCS.	Revue Christianisme sociale.
ASG.	Archive für Sociale Gesetzgebung und Statistik.	RDI.	Revue de Droit internationale.
ASP.	Archiv für Systematische Philosophie.	RDM.	Revue des deux mondes.
BDL.	Bulletin of the Department of Labor.	REA.	Revue mensuelle l'Ecole d'Anthropologie de Paris.
BG.	Blätter für Gefängnisskunde.	Ref. S.	Reforme sociale.
BML.	Banker's Magazine, London.	ReS.	Revue Socialiste.
BMN.	Banker's Magazine, New York.	RH.	Revue historique.
BOT.	Bulletin de l'Office du Travail.	RHD.	Revue d'Histoire diplomatique.
BR.	Bond Record.	RIF.	Rivista italiana di Filosofia.
BS.	Bibliotheca Sacra.	RIS.	Rivista di Sociologia.
BSt.	Bulletin de Statistique et de Legislation Comparee.	RIS.	Revue internationale de Sociologie.
BUI.	Bulletin de l'Union Internationale de Droit Penale.	RISS.	Rivista internazionale di Scienze Sociali.
ChOR.	Charity Organisation Review.	RMM.	Revue Metaphysique et de Morale.
Chr.	Charities Review.	KP.	Revue de Paris.
CoR.	Contemporary Review.	RPe.	Revue penitentiaire.
DR.	Deutsche Revue.	RPh.	Revue philosophique.
DRu.	Deutsche Rundschau.	RPP.	Revue politique et parlementaire.
DZG.	Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft.	RRL.	Review of Reviews, London.
EcJ.	Economic Journal.	RRN.	Review of Reviews, New York.
EcR.	Economic Review.	RSI.	Rivista Storica italiana.
Ed.	Education.	RSP.	Revue sociale et politique.
EdR.	Educational Review.	RT.	Revue du Travail.
EHR.	English Historical Review.	S.	Sanitarian.
EM.	Engineering Magazine.	Sc.	Science.
EMo.	La España Moderna.	SP.	Science Progress.
F.	Forum.	SR.	School Review.
FR.	Fortnightly Review.	SS.	Science Sociale.
Gec.	Giornale degli Economisti.	VSV.	Vierteljahrschrift für Staats- und Volkswirtschaft.
GM.	Guntton's Magazine.	VWP.	Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie.
HLR.	Harvard Law Review.	YR.	Yale Review.
HR.	Hygienische Rundschau.	ZE.	Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.
HZ.	Historische Zeitschrift.	ZGS.	Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaften.
IAE.	Internationales Archiv für Ethnographie.	ZPK.	Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik.
IJE.	International Journal of Ethics.	ZPO.	Zeitschrift für das private und öffentliche Recht.
IR.	Investor's Review.	ZPP.	Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane.
JAI.	Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland.	ZVR.	Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.
JEc.	Journal des Economistes.	ZVS.	Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Socialpolitik und Verwaltung.
JFI.	Journal of the Franklin Institute.		
JGV.	Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft.		

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ABSTRACT AND PRACTICAL ETHICS.

THIS paper is meant as a reply to a criticism that was recently made in public on the method of the London Ethical Society and kindred organizations. The method in question, so far as I understand it, is to assist practice by popularizing, through public lectures and printed papers, the best results of the systematic study of ethics. But now we are told that "these results are 'abstract' and, as such, irrelevant to the problems which the practical reformer has to face. At a time when the chief duty of the moralist, who is more than a mere student of ethical theories, is to touch the conscience and stimulate to active service in the cause of social justice, it is a species of solemn trifling to invite people to academic discussions upon the nature of the good and kindred topics." In opposition to this view I wish to show that the method of studying moral and social problems which we here aim at encouraging is not so far removed from everyday life as might at first be supposed, and that the kind of ideas for which we stand, so far from being "abstract" in any sense that is opposed to practice, are the only kind that are really practical.

I.

I shall begin with a definition of our terms. What is meant by "abstract" and "practical" ethics, respectively?

By abstract ethics would usually be meant the theoretic dis-

cussion of the nature of human conduct and the elements of human well-being. As an example of such a discussion we might take the controversy that has raged from the beginning among moralists as to whether the end is happiness or perfection. But this definition would not be sufficient to distinguish "abstract" from any other kind of ethics. For all ethics is abstract in this sense. It is a system of thoughts and judgments and all thoughts are abstract in the sense that they are "of" or "about" an object; they are not the object itself.

But if we look closer we shall see that there is an intelligible sense in which we may speak of an ethics which is abstract and contrast it with an ethics which is not. For while ethics has to do with thoughts or ideas, and all ideas are abstract, yet there are abstractions within abstractions. Among ideas of an object we must recognize a distinction between the idea which is abstract in the sense that it is one-sided and partial and the idea which, by holding together different sides or aspects of the thing, aims at becoming concrete as the object itself is concrete. In the sense first mentioned, thoughts or ideas are by their nature abstract. It is no reproach to them that they are so. In the latter sense of the term abstract, it is a radical defect of our thoughts to remain abstract when they might be concrete.

If now with this distinction in mind we ask who is it who thinks abstractly? we are apt to get an answer that throws a curious light on the antithesis with which we started, between the abstract thinker and the practical man. For we are apt to find that the so-called practical and matter-of-fact people, instead of being those who have the firmest hold upon the concrete in the sense above defined, are just the people who are most likely to become the victims of abstractions. People, on the other hand, who are sometimes thought of as idealists and dreamers may be just the people who are most likely to be free of them.

This, at any rate, was the conclusion at which the philosopher Hegel arrived when in a well-known pamphlet he addressed himself to this question. "Who" he asked, "thinks abstractly?" And he answers "Not the man of culture, far less the philoso-

pher, but the uneducated and the so-called practical man." His examples are so vivid and so aptly illustrate what is here meant by an abstract idea that I make no apology for quoting them.

A murderer is being dragged to execution. The multitude see only the criminal in him and follow him with their curses. Some fine ladies remark what a powerful, handsome, interesting man he is. The bystanders are scandalized that anyone should be so lost to propriety as to find good looks in a murderer. A priest who stands by and understands the heart explains that it all comes of the corruption of the upper classes. This illustrates one abstraction. These people see only the murderer in the prisoner. They take no account of his upbringing, the traits of character he has inherited, the previous harsh sentence for some trivial offence that embittered him against society. But, besides the common-sense practical people among the crowd, there are the idealists and sentimentalists. They see nothing of the murderer in the unhappy man, but only the scapegoat of an unjust society. They shout in his honor and would fain throw bouquets on the cart that carries him. This illustrates the opposite abstraction. These people see only what may be alleged in justification of the individual. The outrage on social institutions escapes them. Finally there is an old woman from the poor-house who is overheard to say as the sunlight strikes upon the prisoner: "See how sweetly God's gracious sunshine falls upon poor Binder's head." She means it in allusion to the German proverb that a worthless man does not deserve the sun. That was the multitude's view of Binder. God thought otherwise and the old woman recognizes it. She does not, like the sentimentalist, simply cancel his guilt. On the other hand, she does not see in him merely the accursed murderer. He is going to pay—perhaps rightly—the last penalty to human law, but in the judgment passed by society upon him, society itself is judged. This is *concrete* thinking. The different sides or aspects of the event have *grown together* or *coalesced* in a higher and a truer view.

What we are called upon to notice in all this is that the "abstract" idea is not the more remote and difficult to reach, but

the first view that strikes us—which is necessarily superficial and onesided. Its opposite is the concrete idea, which in turn is not what first occurs to us, but is further away and is only to be reached by a gift of insight, as in the case of the old woman, or as in the case of most of us by a strenuous effort of comprehensive thought. Employed as descriptions of different species of ethics we shall call that kind abstract which is in such a hurry to be practical that it turns in distaste from the labor of impartial thinking, and is content with seeing human life in a light which may be as narrow and one-sided as you please, so long as it affords justification for energetic action. That ethics, on the other hand, is concrete which is determined at all costs to understand before it undertakes and is content to postpone practical results in favor of a clear and comprehensive view of the end that it is sought to attain. It remains to be shown that the latter kind instead of being hostile to practice is really, and in the long run, the more practical of the two.

But before attempting to show this, let us ask, secondly, in what sense we are to take the word "practical." What is meant by "practical ethics?" The sense that is in the mind of our critic is clear. Practical ethics are ethics which lay down some practical end as a moral duty and exhort to its pursuit. But this overlooks the fact that such ends may be practical in a twofold sense. They may be practical in the sense that they are proposed as aims of conduct. In this sense any idea may be practical. Any idea may be made a motive of action. I have an idea of a world in which everyone is rich and happy, and this idea may become practical in being made an end of action. But clearly amongst such ends there will be a difference between those that are really practical and those which are not, between those that we are justified in believing will be realized and those which never can be. However active and enthusiastic a man might be in pursuit of the latter kind, it would require a stretch of language to call him a practical man. The conclusion is that by practical ethics we ought to mean not simply the ethics which exhorts to practice, but the ethics

which sets before us as worthy ends ideas which are *really* practical in the sense that they are in harmony with the moral aspirations of mankind at large, and must sooner or later be realized in the actual relations of human society. How are we to describe such ideas in terms of the distinction already drawn? Are they abstract or are they concrete? If the kind we called abstract are the kind that are really practical, then the man who wishes to be practical will do well to suspect the gifts of the ethical society. If, on the other hand, I can succeed in showing that to be practical we must be concrete, I shall have established a presumption in favor of their utility. Let us see.

II.

There is undoubtedly a common prejudice that the ideas that can be realized in practice must be of the kind I have called abstract. We cannot drive six abreast through Temple Bar and we cannot get everything that we wish. We must cut our coat according to our cloth and the cloth is never enough for the pattern we should like to cut. It is in the nature of things that we should be content with partial success. Practice is made up of compromises, and blessed is the man who does not expect too much.

Now compromise is a large subject and I do not propose to enter on it here. It is sufficient to point out that it is one thing to accept the conditions under which our ideal of what is best must be realized, it is another to give up the hope of ever realizing it and settling down contentedly to live from hand to mouth. The former is compromise in one sense. The Greeks would have called it practical wisdom. The latter is compromise in another. Modern politicians call it opportunism. The admission that in practical policy we must go a step at a time is therefore in no wise inconsistent with the contention that no noble and lasting work was ever done except under the inspiration of some distant and for the present unrealizable idea. And such an ideal, if the work is to be really noble and lasting, must be of the kind for which I am contending: it must be a concrete ideal taking in all the

elements of the problem to be solved. Anything else, however feasible at the time it may appear, must turn out in the end to be impracticable. The forces of reality are leagued against it. However favorable to it the circumstances may seem to be, there is no sure footing for it in the actual world. With the concrete idea all this is reversed. Let a man but have hold of such an idea, the whole world may be against him; in the end it will come round to him. As Emerson would have said, he has hitched his chariot to a star. He may *seem* to fail. He may die without seeing the fruit of his labor. But the idea lives and he may rest in peace. In such an idea he has the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.

History will serve us best in illustration. It exhibits abstractions on a large scale. I take one or two almost at random. Everyone is familiar with the part played in the course of the French Revolution by "abstract ideas." Issuing from the brain of that prince of abstract thinkers, Jean Jacques Rousseau, they controlled the whole movement and had a splendid chance. Founded on the historical examples of Greece and Rome, preached with all the eloquence of the greatest prose writer of his time, dominating a great national uprising, accepted as the creed of the party that finally triumphed over the storm, here, if anywhere, abstract ideas might be expected to succeed. And yet it might with truth be said that not one of Rousseau's positive proposals succeeded in establishing itself as an actual institution.

Equally striking is the example of the idea that dominated the succeeding decade—the idea of a French Empire founded on the ruins of national liberty in Europe. Every circumstance seemed to combine to favor its realization. Yet the whole power of the greatest military genius the world has ever seen was insufficient to establish the Napoleonic abstraction in the face of the forces that concrete reality had at its disposal to oppose it. These ideas failed because they did not correspond to the actual wants of the time. They were not in the line of actual progress. There was no place for them in the moral order that was then on the point of establishing itself among the nations of Europe.

If on the other hand you desire an example of the power of a concrete idea, you may go to Professor Seeley's life of Stein who was Napoleon's contemporary. From the very first the great Prussian minister was in contact with reality. He had conceived the idea of nationality in all its depth and complexity as the living moral force of the time. He was almost alone among the leading men in Europe in his belief in it. Even to Goethe with his magnificent humanitarianism it seemed but a thin abstraction. Everything was against it. The national rising in Spain was a miserable failure. Austria showed no response to it. Russia was cold. Yet Stein stuck doggedly to it and in the long run, in spite of incredible discouragement and opposition, so far succeeded in organizing the national feeling in Prussia as to prepare the way for the fall of Napoleon and lay the foundation of the modern German Empire and modern German civilization. Whether the evil influence of abstract ideas may not be overruled and in the long run turned to good, as it has been asserted that the despotism of Napoleon was turned to good in that it roused the spirit of freedom in the nations of Europe, is another question. To the individual, at any rate, and especially to the individual who thirsts to be practical, it is a poor consolation to recognize that the good has triumphed and the world got its way in spite of, or even because of, his efforts to oppose it.

These illustrations are from politics. In ethics and philosophy the autobiography of John Stuart Mill offers an historical illustration. Mill, it will be remembered, was brought up by his father in the strictest sect of the pleasure philosophy. He was trained from his youth up to look for all the law and the prophets to the utilitarian school, especially to its great founder Jeremy Bentham. Bentham's contribution to ethics (as is well known) was not his theory that happiness is the end, but that the happiness-giving properties of objects and actions may be reduced to scientific measurement and that the art of life consists in the just appreciation of the pleasure value of objects of desire. As a devout Benthamite, Mill sought to perfect himself

in this art and to become a kind of professor of it. But the more of an adept he became in this moral arithmetic, the further he seemed to be from the promised happiness. Measuring all objects of pursuit by their capacity to give positive pleasure, the interest in the objects themselves seemed to evaporate and life to appear sordid and empty. He has described the period of moral depression which supervened upon this discovery in one of the most interesting passages in philosophical biography. He only finally succeeded in escaping from it by casting aside the pleasure-calculus as a guide to happiness, and throwing himself into the concrete interests of life. He explained his experience as an instance of what he called the paradox of Hedonism: the paradox, namely, that to obtain happiness you must cease to aim at it as an end, "to get it you must forget it." The explanation sufficed to save the credit of the school among the followers of Mill, but it could not be expected that it would satisfy anyone else. The true explanation, of course, is that pleasure is only one element in well-being, and only by a confusion could be mistaken for the whole of it. The idea that it was the whole was an abstract idea in the sense for which I have contended and it revealed its abstractness the moment that a consistent attempt was made to apply it to practice, by refusing to work at all.

The bearing of these examples on the present argument is plain. If in order to be practical in the best sense ideas must be concrete, and if concrete ideas cannot, as a rule, be had without serious intellectual effort, there is at least a presumption in favor of an institution one of whose professed objects is to offer a hand to anyone who is willing to make the effort required.

III.

I have tried to establish a general presumption in favor of the "abstract" study of ethics. But this is not all that may be said: it may be pleaded also that rising out of the special character of the time in which we live there is at present a special need for such a study.

Our age, we are often told, is an age of transition. This

means among other things that on many subjects that concern the life and destiny of human beings, we no longer stand where we used to. The old maxims and the old authorities that existed to enforce them no longer suffice us. New ideas of individual life are opening up to us, new types of character appeal to us. The center of authority has shifted from the pulpit to the press.

And what is true of individual is still more obviously true of social life. For a century or more we have ceased to see any special sacredness in established forms of government or indeed in any of the fixed forms of social or industrial life. Prescription is no defence. Every one of them is called upon to submit itself to the test of reason and experience. By its utility it must stand or fall.

The consequence of all this is that people who are in earnest about individual or public duty are beset by perplexities that did not trouble an earlier generation. They have lost faith in the precedents and authorities to which it would have appealed with the result that they are thrown upon their own private judgment in many matters that would have been settled for them in another age. Under these circumstances it need hardly be said that there is danger of mistake where formerly there was none. What precisely the danger is and whence it arises is a more difficult question. The answer will bring us to our point. We shall prepare the way for it if we consider for a moment the nature and origin of the forms we are leaving behind us and the kind of service they performed for our ancestors.

Take first the religious formulæ of the ages of faith. With all their crudity these continue to impress us with the richness and many-sidedness of their contents. And this becomes comprehensible when we remember that these forms obtained their hold upon mankind because they represented many streams of thought and aspiration. The theological doctrines we find epitomized in our articles of religion and confessions of faith were the issue of an earnest attempt on the part of their framers to grasp the meaning of life in all its manifold relations. It was only natural, accordingly, that so long as they were acquiesced

in they should exercise a double influence over human thought. In some respects undoubtedly they were repressive. This is the side of them that is now commonly emphasized. But in another respect they were expansive and in the strictest sense educative. To understand them called for an effort in the believer—too great an effort as we now think, considering the amount of truth that they contained, yet an effort which had its reward in a dignified and comprehensive view of human nature.¹ Similarly the catechisms professed to expound the whole duty of man and present us with an ideal of character which we must admit was conceived with extraordinary breadth and insight.

What is true of moral and religious formulæ is true also of the older forms of social, industrial, and political organization. They did not, of course, leave room for wants that are of recent development, but so far as they went they represented in broad outline the organic requirements of human life. In the times when they are generally accepted there was not much danger that essential elements in human nature should fail to have justice done them.

But they are no longer accepted. We have outgrown the forms that have hitherto served us. New needs have developed. New classes claim to share the provision that was made for the old ones. The younger generation is knocking at the door. Here and there it is ready to pull down the house if admission be refused it. All this lays a new obligation upon those whose special duty it is as leaders of opinion to recognize those new demands and to point out how they are to be satisfied consistently with the maintenance of the conditions of order and progress in human society. Such persons are called to a new task which can only be adequately performed on the basis of a comprehensive review of the elements of the problem, involving nothing short of the attempt to reconstruct in thought the whole scheme of social life, and to justify to the

¹ This was what led F. D. Maurice into his paradoxical defence of the Thirty-nine Articles as "guiding the student of humanity and divinity into a pathway of truth, and pointing out to him the different forms of truth"—*Life*, Vol. I, p. 524.

reason forms and institutions that have hitherto rested on instinct or interest. This, it will be admitted, is a hard enough task under any circumstances. But the difficulty is greatly increased under the circumstances of pressing practical need, in which, as we have seen, it has to be attempted.

It is precisely here that the above-mentioned danger comes in. The danger is lest in our haste to formulate the new ethical creeds and the new programmes of political reform we overlook fundamental elements in human nature and ignore organic needs. Expressed in the terms this paper has tried to make familiar, it is lest, overborne by the clamor of those who "know in part and prophesy in part," we betray the trust we have received from the time in which we live, and resign the call "to see life steadily and see it whole."

That this danger is not an imaginary one is seen in the conflict of opinion that exists among would-be leaders on many of the most fundamental questions of social life. Many of these illustrate what we mean by an abstraction in the field of politics, and may be taken as typical of the leading forms of abstract ideas in general.

First we have those who may be said to be abstract thinkers because they see the whole without seeing the parts. An important species under this class are the people who see the end without seeing the means. As a rule they are people who have a high ideal of what human life may be, but they are apt to have little or no idea of how their ideal is to be realized. The better type of anarchist is an extreme instance here. The anarchist is a man who looks forward to a time when the law of life shall be the law of liberty, when the cumbrous apparatus of law, with its class bias, its blunders, and its incitements to crime, will no longer exist, when no man shall say, "Know the Lord," for all shall know him, and when force and compulsion shall be things of the past. He is an extreme type, but to the same brotherhood belong all those who, confining themselves to less sudden and sweeping changes, set down all our troubles, moral and social, to some single economic abomination or group of

abominations. They have the same ideal as the anarchist, it may be, but it is not law and government themselves, but rent, or interest, or profit, or all of them together under the general head of the individual ownership of capital, that is to blame. They are the kind of people who stand as "independent" candidates and go to make up independent parties. What they may do or become in the future, when they have got into touch with fact, it would be vain to prophesy. In the meantime they strike one often as impractical, and sometimes as worse. And the reason is that they are abstract thinkers in the sense described. Their ideas are not in touch with reality at any point at which force may be profitably exercised with a view to improving upon it in the direction of their ideal. They have too great a contempt for what actually exists to hold parley with it at any point. "Things are all wrong." The whole established fabric of society is rotten. There is not even a sound plank on which they can stand to begin the task of setting it right, and so they are apt either to fall back into the ranks of the unemployed politician, the writer, and agitator and do nothing at all; or, if they set their hand to what other people are doing, to be an incalculable and unreliable element, the despair of their friends and the derision of their enemies.

Shakespeare, who knew everything, knew of this type and the trouble they might be to themselves and others in the pursuit of their ends.

"Fie on't, O fie," says Hamlet, "'tis an unweeded garden
That grows to seed; things rank and gross in nature
Possess it merely."

"The time is out of joint; O cursed spite
That ever I was born to set it right."

A great deal has been written and said about the source of Hamlet's ineffectiveness. Some have attributed it to his "native irresolution," others to a deep-rooted pessimism, others to his so-called madness. In this difference of learned opinion, perhaps I may be permitted to claim him as a case of an abstract thinker of the kind I am speaking of. He has noble views of things in

general, but is lamentably out of touch with the particular. It is not that he has been at college too long and has thought too much. He has really left it too soon and has thought too little. A little thought, like a little knowledge, is a dangerous thing. With Hamlet the consequence is that he halts and hesitates in action, and when he does act seems to abandon himself to the impulse of the moment and to be the victim of mere caprice. And so, instead of setting anything right, he sets everything wrong.

The moral is that our duty to the world is never to set everything right, for things are never all wrong. If they were, it would be a hopeless task to set about improvement in any form. Mr. Punch has made us laugh at the anarchist who appeals to the British policeman when he has got himself into trouble, but the caricature contains the profounder suggestion that it is, after all, to the *status quo* that the revolutionist must appeal as the foundation for the state of things which he hopes to establish. It is not only that he relies on human nature as it now is—itself the product of the old order—as the root from which the new order is to spring, but he uses present laws and institutions, a free press and public platforms, posts and railways, parliaments and policemen, as the means of propagating the knowledge of it and preparing the way for its acceptance. This criticism is not, of course, meant to justify obstruction or indifference to progress. Though all can never be wrong—the existence of even one faithful soul to recognize it as wrong or to protest against it means that something, at least, is right—yet there is always something wrong somewhere, which each of us probably was born to set right. But the point to notice is that it is always a very definite thing, whether a defect in our own character or a defect in our neighbor's drains. When we examine it, moreover, we shall probably find that it is not something wholly new which we are required to do, but something in the line of what has been already done, developing and extending to a new case a principle already recognized.

A second type which is even commoner than the man who sees the whole without seeing the parts, the end without the means, is the man who contrariwise sees the part without seeing the whole.

As an example of this abstraction, we may take the man who sees one thing wrong here, another there, but has no clear idea of what is right as a whole or of the direction in which progress ought to move. He sees marks of social disease at this point or at that, but has no articulate conception of what social *health* in the long run means. And so when he sets to work upon a remedy he is apt to be like the doctor who treats the symptoms instead of the disease. As the former type may usually be known by their contempt for law and government, the people I am now speaking of may usually be recognized by their exaggerated faith in the mechanism of parliament. They aim rather at altering the law than at altering the law-giver. Mr. Herbert Spencer is in bad odor with the newer school of philosophical radicals. He has been roundly and, as I think, rightly denounced on account of his abstract and doctrinaire individualism. And yet there is this of truth at the bottom of his denunciation of laws and law-givers, that hasty legislation dealing with isolated evils is not unlikely in suppressing one only to create another. Mr. Spencer draws the conclusion that since we are so likely to do mischief by legislation we had much better cease to legislate altogether. The argument does not, of course, support this conclusion, but it is a forcible reminder of the obligation politicians are under to make sure before they proceed to legislate that they have as concrete a view as possible of the purpose for which the new act is devised and the circumstances under which it works.

IV.

One or two difficulties raised by the above contention remain to be considered. After the example just quoted, it may suggest itself to some that my indictment is, after all, not against these particular extremes of tendency alone, but against all

party or sectional action whatsoever. For is not every party and every opinion that has a name at all marked with the same one-sidedness? Do not all the names by which leading schools of moralists and reformers are known conceal such abstractions as we have been speaking of? Are not one set of abstractions indicated by individualist, conservative, moderate, another by socialist, liberal, progressive? One set by realist, utilitarian, naturalist, another by idealist, mystic, supernaturalist? And if this is so, will it not be safer for us to keep clear of them altogether, and refuse to call ourselves by any of them?

The fact is undoubtedly true. These names strictly taken do conceal abstractions. But it is to be noted that the defect in question attaches not to names of schools of moralists and politicians alone, but to names of any kind. Logic, as we all know, divides names into concrete names and abstract names, but the truth is that all names are abstract. It is of the nature of names to be abstract, for they all indicate only one side or aspect of the thing they denote. If, therefore, we are going to wait till we can find a name which will express everything we are before we consent to call ourselves anything, we shall have to be content to remain nameless. The one-sidedness of a name is in reality no reason why we should refuse to call ourselves by it, if we find ourselves in general sympathy with the party which adopts it. It is, on the other hand, a very good reason why we should be on our guard against the one-sidedness of thought which the name suggests. The penalty that attaches to the neglect of this precaution illustrates a peculiar attribute of abstractions which has often been pointed out. I have already said that abstract ideas are impractical ideas. Circumstances are sure to defeat them. But this is not all. It requires to be added that they defeat themselves. For abstractions are a kind of extreme and like extremes they tend to meet. It is impossible for me at this stage in my paper to illustrate this property of abstractions with any fullness. I may, however, in passing refer to a familiar example of it. We shall all admit that there is such a thing as extreme individualism. One of the

marks of it is that it is chiefly effective in promoting socialism. The extreme individualist stands in practice and theory by the rights of property in the most exclusive sense. But the effect of this on the general public is merely to undermine the respect for property, on which all the so-called rights must ultimately rest, and so to play into the hands of the socialist. And the same is true in another way of extreme socialism. What is more common than to see ardent socialists advocating as a cure for starvation-wages communistic palliatives, which, if widely applied, could only have the effect of weakening the general movement in the direction of better pay, and so playing into the hands of the individualist?

This paper will not have been addressed to an English audience if it has not suggested to some, as a final objection to the contention it urges, that it is after all the merest commonplace. "You are only elaborating with a great deal of unnecessary flourish the truism that we must look at both sides of the shield, and consider all questions that come before us from every available point of view. In life and politics, especially, we have to remember that we have to do with all sorts and conditions of men, and with all varieties of taste. We must be prepared, then, for a little of everything—a little realism and a little idealism, a little socialism and a little individualism, a touch of optimism to give dignity and a touch of pessimism and of the devil to give a relish to our opinions. We are to go a certain way with the advocates of all these doctrines, but 'not too far.'" Well, perhaps I do mean partly this, but I mean a good deal more. For it is possible to look at both sides of the shield without seeing them both as sides of the same shield, and it is possible to see many aspects of a question and to see how people might differ upon it without seeing how the different aspects complement one another in the whole that is broken up between them. It is this *comprehensive* view for which I have been putting in a plea. In this view we not only see the various sides, we *unite* them. In order to do so we must not merely go round and round, we must take our stand at the center. And

this center in morals and politics, as I have tried to show, is nothing else than human character itself.

In advocating the importance of taking such a stand with a view to effective practice, I must not, of course, be understood to be requiring that all would-be reformers should leave the platform and the committee room and devote themselves to an arduous course of moral philosophy. In reform, as elsewhere, we must have division of labor; and those who are the best thinkers may likely enough be unfitted for effective action. My contention is that *if* they are it will be for other reasons than the nature of their ideas, and that those whose profession it is to carry ideas into practice will not be the worse but in every way the better for possessing themselves by every means in their power of the results of the best thinking on the subject of the ends and ideals of human life.

Ethical societies aim, as I understand them, at bringing these results within the reach of busy people so that he who runs may read. In pursuing this aim they may require to have recourse to propositions of a high degree of generality—if you like, of abstractness. In this respect their teaching will be colorless and forbidding. “Philosophy,” says Hegel, “paints her grey in grey,” and this is not less true of ethical philosophy than of philosophy in general. But in stating its formulæ and calling upon thinking people to understand them, ethics is not forsaking reality and losing touch with practice. On the contrary, its most recent formulæ represent the attempt to rise above the half-truths of current reflection, to embrace more of reality, and so by setting man’s life in a truer perspective to give it greater significance. So far from its being a matter of indifference to practice with what ideas we approach the problems of individual and social life, it is this that makes all the difference. “Conception,” says Walter Pater, “fundamental brain-work—that is what makes all the difference in art.” And what is true of the fine arts is, I venture to think, equally true of that finest of all the arts, the art of life.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

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THE WORKING BOY.

THE essential point to be kept in mind in the discussion of trade and technical education is this, that ours is the epoch of industrial instability, by reason of which the working boy of today needs not so much any one trade, as that combination of qualities which will enable him to turn with facility from one occupation to another as each, in turn, is supplanted in the course of the industrial evolution.

The epoch of trades was the epoch of industrial stability. When the apprentice married the master's daughter and inherited the stock and goodwill, and everything went on from generation to generation as in the case of the Elzevirs, whose craft descended from father to son, to grandson, to great-grandson, it was well worth while for the lad to leave school early and pursue the "three R's" only in the intervals of gaining his daily bread. His future was assured.

Ours being the epoch of industrial instability, of shifting and change, the point is to recognize the law of change and adapt our scheme of education to it, so that the processes of industrial evolution may no longer bring surprise and disaster. Nay, more, the problem of the schools today is, so to equip the children that they not only meet unharmed the changes which will surely make up their industrial life, but contribute their share to render these changes beneficent. This our present education fails to do; and the introduction of new machinery, therefore, brings unmeasured harm to tens of thousands of skilled workmen and their families. By way of illustration, it is only necessary to point to the compositors, the railway engineers, and the tailors.

The introduction of the linotype into the newspaper offices of Chicago, while it increased the size of the great dailies, threw a large number of skilled workmen out of employment. Many

compositors were obliged to leave the city. Others found work in the job printing and other branches of the trade, where they, in turn, contributed to overstock the labor market. Compositors, however, are relatively versatile men, better able to help themselves than men usually are in a trade requiring a less degree of intelligence. They form an apt illustration of the contention that the need of today is not so much skill as facility in acquiring skill and adapting oneself to the conditions of a new occupation.

What has befallen the compositors during the past two years is looming large upon the horizon of the locomotive engineers in the present year. These engineers have long been recognized as one of the most responsible bodies of skilled labor in the world. But the motorman is with us now, and he merely touches the button and the motor does all the rest. He is rapidly and surely undermining the suburban engineer, working 365 days in the year, his wages ranging from \$1 to \$1.35 per day of twelve to sixteen hours. Indeed, all that saves the great body of skilled railroad engineers today is the fact that the motor, thus far, is confined to suburban traffic; but no one is so fatuous as to believe that this restriction is a permanent one.

Most disheartening is the situation of the tailors. The introduction of the steam-cutting knife has enabled the American Clothing Trust to reduce the skilled cutters to the level of precariousness of work and pay of the sweaters' victims. Some of the cutters being able men, and, like the compositors, relatively versatile, have developed into designers, traveling men, merchant tailors and sweaters on a small scale. These, however, are the chosen few; while the general level of work and pay has suffered a deterioration from which there is not likely to be any recovery.

The custom-tailor, in turn, sees himself confronted with the sweater in the custom trade, and with the introduction of steam into the sweatshop, followed by the inevitable little girl at the machine. Moreover, the invention of an improved buttonhole machine enables a girl who can neither read, write, nor sew a sim-

ple seam, to make a thousand gross of buttonholes in a single season.

The sweaters' victims are, perhaps, the least versatile of all the indoor-trades employés. For them, being crowded out of their narrow groove by a technical improvement means actual starvation. In Chicago, during the present season, the suicide of a tailor has been a matter of almost daily occurrence and scarcely elicits more than a passing newspaper comment. And for one suicide there are many paupers.

It may be said that the occupations cited are exceptional, that the old fundamental trades of the builder of houses and the baker of bread cannot be supplanted, or are, at least, in no immediate danger of it; that the mason, the carpenter, and the baker are here to stay. To this it must be replied that the sash-door-and-blind factory is enabling the stupidest little boy to turn out more carpenter work, of certain kinds, than the best graduate of the best trade school could do twenty years ago. The new steel-frame construction is transferring to the girder-molder and the structural iron worker the task which fell to the mason from the days of the pyramids to the close of the Civil War. And, finally, one of the most persistent and urgent duties of factory inspectors is finding and removing the little boys who get into the bakeries under the legal age of work and there, with the help of the perfected equipment of the American Biscuit Trust, do that work of breadmaking which once fell to the housewife, but now escapes, day by day, from the adult baker to the little boy at the machine.

We are sending shoes, harnesses, chairs, bicycles and watches from Chicago to London, there to compete successfully, under the conditions of free trade, with the finest manufactured product of all the world. Now these shoes, harnesses, chairs, bicycles and watches are in no case made by one all-round, skilled worker, but by the finest machinery to be found in the respective branches of manufacture. The only skill required is that of the narrowest specialist; and this specialist can be replaced by a boy or a machine more easily than he can learn all the

knacks to which the various parts of his trade have been reduced. Thus the evolution of the machine, while it rescues our product from the old charge of crudity, narrows both our men and our trades to the point at which any one trade is hardly worth having.

Accepting this shrinkage in the scope of the individual trade as inevitable at this stage of the industrial evolution, the question is, What, if anything, may be done by education to counterbalance its effects?

The policy of training boys for one narrow trade cannot permanently commend itself to thinking men and women, in an epoch of industrial change. On the contrary, the more specialized the processes of commerce and manufacture become, the more must we insist on the education of all the thinking powers of all the workers. The more stupefyingly monotonous the manipulation which the machine prescribes, the more must all stress be laid upon variety and thoroughness in the training of mind, as well as hand, of all who are to tend machines. The greater the probability that the boy will be a motorman, merely pressing a button; that the compositor will be supplanted by the linotype and the tailor by the little girl at the machine, the more must the school do for all three that which their occupations can no longer do for them, namely, teach them to think and live, and use all their faculties. The more precarious the position of the skilled man, the more must we demand of the schools versatility, thoroughness, and the effort to make valuable people of the whole body of children.

One thing the present situation does demand, a combination of alertness, adaptability, and self-reliance. Whoever watches any machine must have quick attention and avoid Blue Monday; and when the occupation gives out, he must have enterprise to find or make another opportunity.

We shall all agree that education can do much to meet the need of the working boy, now that the old apprenticeship is gone and the new mechanical industry is in full swing. It is only when we come to the question of methods of education

that we shall disagree; for some will be content with a good provision for a corporal's guard, and others will maintain that the industrial army can best be made available only by educating the whole body of troops, thinking any scheme which looks to fitting a few hundred older boys for a limited number of occupations of little value to the nation or to the boys themselves.

At two points an attempt at adaptation has been made, neither of which, however, touches the boy under discussion. For the boy who is to be a captain of industry we have the technical school in some variety, from the Massachusetts School of Technology to the Armour Institute. At the other end of the educational chain we have the kindergarten, which postulates the truth that the child, as such, needs to have his fashioning faculties developed and proceeds to do this for purely pedagogical reasons. Between these two extremes there remain, however, several missing links; and it is to this middle ground, between six and sixteen years, that attention needs to be directed, for it is here that the problem of the education of the artisan must be solved.

In these years, between six and sixteen, appears the great army of working boys, numbering 20,000 in Illinois alone, and rising in some states to 50,000. For the larger number of children still attending school, not yet at work, there is little attempt at direct preparation for the life of an industrial nation. Except in the Workingmen's School in New York, and the Jewish Manual Training School in Chicago, there is little evidence, in any curriculum, of thought for the future of the working boy.

For the majority of American children there is no school life after twelve or thirteen years of age. The old apprenticeship is gone, but the old tradition lingers, according to which the working-class child at the age of confirmation is ready to become the working boy.

Many children fall out of school early from sheer lack of interest in the purely scholarly course which, alone, is offered them; and some parents, chiefly inexperienced immigrants,

approve, really believing that the children will learn a trade when they enter a factory.

In the public schools, wherever a primary is in a building by itself, as it very frequently is, parents and children are prone to assume that the end of the primary is the end of school. This impression is strengthened by the policy of the Boards of Education, which nowhere supply as many seats in the upper grades as in the lower ones. Especially is this true of manufacturing districts of the great cities. This whole policy of the Boards of Education, of supplying diminishing accommodations in the ascending grades, shows that the public mind is still dominated by the tradition that the workingman's child is ready at the age of confirmation to enter the industrial army.

From parish schools, both Catholic and Lutheran, boys eleven and twelve years old have carried letters of recommendation stating that the bearer is a worthy boy and has finished his education. The bearer can usually write his name, but he cannot always write more than that, nor always spell the name of his city, state, and nation, nor the name of the street in which he lives. When the bearer presents his letter to a law-abiding manufacturer he is told, of course, that he cannot go to work until he is fourteen years old. But he replies that he has finished school and graduated and been confirmed. Such a child does not go back to school. He merely finds work in some occupation which does not fall under the factory law. Children sent out from public and parish schools, during the past fifteen years, under the legal age for work, constitute today a heavy burden upon every manufacturing community.

A most promising deviation from the established policy of the Boards of Education has been undertaken by way of experiment, in Chicago, at the suggestion of Mr. Thomas Cusack, a member of the board, representing a large manufacturing district. An unusually fine schoolhouse has been built to contain all the grades including kindergarten and high school, with manual training in every grade and ample provision for teaching cooking. The University of Chicago grants scholarships every

year to the two graduates having the best records throughout the school. The kindergarten and primary pupils are stimulated to remain in school, for they see, every day, the high school boys and girls in the same building with them. In its first years, 1894-5 and 1895-6, this school showed an unusually large percentage of children advancing from primary to grammar grades, and from grammar to high school. It cannot be known how much of this was due to the manual training and how much to the presence of all the grades in one schoolhouse. The result of the combination, however, commends itself to all who are interested in prolonging the school life of working-class children. It is the more brilliant because the schoolhouse stands in the very heart of the great Bohemian colony of wage-earners.

Contrast with the advantages offered by this model school, typifying the ideal unity of the school system, the plight of the boy who goes to work at fourteen, even under the cheerful assumption, rarely borne out by the facts, that he is reasonably well instructed according to the methods of today. The trades unions will do something to limit his opportunity to learn a trade, but their power in this direction is trivial compared with the extinguishing influence of the industrial evolution. The automatic self-feeder is everywhere, and machines are made by machines. Whether the raw recruit wraps caramels, or carries boards from the buzz-saw to the board pile, or pastes labels on tin cans, or performs any one of the stupefyingly simple manipulations which fall to the lot of the children, his occupation teaches him little else than instability; and he comes to manhood a worthless wight with all the energy and hope gone out of him and no skill acquired in any direction.

It is children who have "grewed" in this way who form, all through life, the rank and file of the great army of the unskilled. They are the last to be taken on and the most wretchedly paid in good times; in bad times they are the first to be discharged. It is for such as they that we go to the expense of woodyards in winter. They are always on the mind of the friendly visitor, for they are always on the verge of pauperism; from time to

time they fall into the abyss. Many of them end as tramps, beginning their career as little children roaming the streets of the great cities in search of a dozen different occupations in a year.

This nation will be what the children make it; and they will be very largely what the schools make them. Today they are growing up industrially incompetent; and they will continue to do so until we make the schools as democratic for the years from ten to sixteen as they are now for the years from six to ten.

In the interest of the national welfare this horde of incompetents should be checked. And to this end I plead for the occupancy with manual training of the years from six to sixteen. As the industrial life becomes inadequate to its old function of making the craftsman it behooves the nation to widen its conception of the public schools to embrace this task.

Instead of working all head and no hands in the primary school, and all hands and no head forever after in some wretched, brainless manipulation, let us have every child using both head and hands in every grade from kindergarten to high school. Let us make the tool as much at home in the schoolroom as the pen and pencil. Let the boys work at woods and metals as they now read books and write letters, learning the qualities of materials by handling them constructively. Let us have the girls as intelligent concerning the nutritive qualities of foods and the perils of drinking-waters as they are concerning the American Revolution.

When the school library and school workshop are coördinate parts of the public school system the Fourth of July floods of oratory concerning the dignity of labor may, perhaps, be safely dammed into narrower channels; for the dignity of labor will then form a part of the daily experience of the boys and girls. Today their experience teaches them that this nation believes that there should be scientific and literary education at the cost of the community, extending over several years, for one set of children; while for another and much larger set there are at most four years of meager reading, writing, and arithmetic, fol-

lowed by entrance upon the work of life in early childhood, with no previous preparation for it and no unity whatever between the school and work.

It may be said that there are already schools having manual training classes; but this does not alter the fact that, taking the whole country into consideration, it is the sons of the business and professional men who receive manual training and the son of the artisan who gets none. The workingman who knows his trade only as a trade, and not as an art or a craft, aspires to work his boy into commerce or a profession; but the man of assured position wishes for his son the continued advantages of the manual training begun in the kindergarten, and he gets them. It is one of the many anomalies of the present educational situation that manual training is chiefly fostered in communities which, from the industrial point of view, need it far less than do the manufacturing centers. This is evidence of the acknowledged pedagogical value of this training; but it is proof, also, that we have not yet recognized its industrial and social value. At a stage of industrial development in which every waste product of the material world is scrupulously utilized, the precious latent talent of the working-class children is recklessly left out of account in our general scheme of education for the years from six to sixteen.

It is not the purpose of this paper to urge any one scheme of manual training. We may find, with growing experience, that there are certain pedagogical principles underlying given forms of work, as we have already found that drawing possesses a distinct pedagogical value, besides serving the children subsequently in industrial ways. Sloyd is still in so incipient a state that its teaching savors of the amateur, though the use of the knife may be the beginning of greater things. This is not the place, however, for discussing the relative merits of this or that branch of instruction, but rather to urge the adoption of the principle of extending manual training to all the grades of all the schools, not merely at the option of the high school boy. While this principle is reaching adoption, and provision making

for carrying it into effect, pedagogues may dispute among themselves as to which form of work is best adapted to each part of the country and each age of the child. The wisest cannot foretell what the ideal school will be when child study has gone farther in this direction.

There will, doubtless, always be a need for special schools, to fit boys for work in special industries, such as the woodworking schools of Northern Michigan and the Textile School of Philadelphia. These schools of arts and crafts are maintained to meet the need, in some one branch of manufacture, for employes versed in its technicalities. Admirable for their purpose, these schools do not, are not intended to, reach the private in the industrial army. They cannot, therefore, touch in any vital way the education of the working boy.

These schools of arts and crafts bear a certain analogy to the artillery, the commissary, or the scouts, of an army. They fit a small number of pupils for a special service. They do not draft a corporal's guard, drill them, and send them into disastrous competition with the less favored battalions of the rank and file. This the trades schools are accused of doing.

The energy manifest in the movement for trades schools justifies the twofold comment, that the old trades themselves have become very precarious; and that the absorbent power of each trade is limited. If boys are fitted for a trade which is already being supplanted, surely no service is rendered them. If trades-school graduates are poured into the narrow channels of the few remaining skilled trades, there is danger of overfilling the channels disastrously.

If, on the contrary, the public schools turn out thousands of youths with facile hands and trained judgment, the danger of overcrowding should be reduced to a minimum, for the versatility of the boys should enable them to meet all the industrial needs of the moment, to avail themselves of every sort of industrial opportunity as it presents itself. It is much to be hoped that the energy now directed to the foundation of trades schools may be won for this larger field of endeavor.

It was the idea of the early advocates of the public schools that the child must be taught the three R's to enable him to perform intelligently his duties as a citizen. Slowly we have come to realize that the political life rests upon the industrial life, and that we cannot make the boy a worthy citizen unless we make him a self-supporting man, versatile, self-reliant; equipped, so far as education can achieve this, for any change in the conditions of his occupation. We have still to recognize that this work for the boy cannot be done in the years from six to twelve, that it demands greater maturity in the boy, and more time for the teacher. We must draft our army of working boys back into the public school, offering them manual training in all the grades. This is the reverse of a class measure, for it presupposes that the workingman's child is not going on in a rut. It aims to discern all the latent talent in all the children, not to drill a corporal's guard for a vanishing trade or one already overcrowded.

It has taken long time and hard work to make the schools as good and as general as they are now; and the nation is more adequate to the task before it than it has ever been. We were never so rich in money and equipment; there were never so many well and wisely trained teachers. It is only our ideals that are mean. Let us broaden them to embrace all the children and fit them for the whole of life.

FLORENCE KELLEY,

Chief Inspector Illinois Factories and Workshops

CHICAGO.

IMMIGRATION AND CRIME.

THE article on "Delinquents" by Mr. F. W. Hewes, in the *Outlook* of March 7, 1896, was in strict accordance with the apparent facts, as shown by the census of 1890, and was doubtless intended to be correct in its conclusions; yet so far as it bears upon the subject of Immigration and Crime it is misleading at every point save one.

Mr. Hewes says: (*a*) "Of each ten thousand white persons born in this country, a little less than nine (8.82) were imprisoned as criminals; while of each ten thousand white persons born in foreign countries nearly twice as many (17.44) were convicts." He says: (*b*) "Few criminals—six (6.12) to each ten thousand—would be found among our white population if they were all born of parents both of whom were born here. . . . Were all our native-born population of mixed parentage" (*i. e.* one parent native and one parent foreign) "it would still furnish but a moderate ratio of criminals—eight (8.42) to each ten thousand." He says (*c*) (after comparing the foreign-born criminals, and those whose parents were foreign born, with the general population): "It appears, therefore, that foreign immigration of the character of that before 1890 gave a ratio of criminals in our white population of over ten (10.42) in each ten thousand persons, as against six (6.12) in each ten thousand if there had been no immigration."

In the present article it will be shown: (*a*) That as a matter of fact the foreign-born population furnishes only two-thirds as many criminals in proportion as the native born; (*b*) that while it is true that the native-born children of foreign-born parents as a whole furnish more criminals proportionately than those whose parents are native born, yet in more than half of the states the showing is in favor of the children of the foreign born. (*c*) That the combined ratio of prisoners of foreign birth and

those born of foreign-born parents to the same classes in the community at large is only 84 per cent. of the ratio of native-born prisoners to the same class in the community at large.

It is true that these propositions are contrary to the popular impressions, and contrary to the apparent showing of the census on a superficial view ; but they can be established to the satisfaction of any candid student.

Mr. Hewes has followed the lead of most writers on this subject, and has committed the error of comparing the criminal population, foreign and native, with the whole of the general population, foreign and native. The young children of the community furnish practically no prisoners, and nearly all of these children are native born, whether the parents are native born or not. The consequence is that Mr. Hewes has not only given the native population credit for its own children, who are not criminals, but has taken the native-born children of foreign parents, adding them to the native-born population and counting them against their own parents. The result can easily be illustrated : suppose that we were to take one hundred native-born adults, and one hundred foreign-born adults and should find that out of each hundred ten were in prison. This would give us a ratio of 10 per cent. in each case. Suppose now that we find that the one hundred foreign-born adults have two hundred minor children, and the one hundred native-born adults have two hundred minor children, but that one hundred and fifty of the children of the foreign-born parents were born in this country. We now have a population of six hundred people of whom twenty are in prison, giving a ratio of $3\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. Of these six hundred, one hundred and fifty are foreign born, of whom ten are criminals, showing a ratio of 6.7 per cent., and four hundred and fifty are native born, of whom ten are criminals, giving a ratio of 2.2 per cent. By this method the foreign-born people would appear to have three times the ratio of the native-born people, when as a matter of fact they ought to have just the same.

Of the prisoners of the United States 98.5 per cent. are above

the age of sixteen years ; 95 per cent. are above the age of eighteen years ; and 84 per cent. are above the age of twenty-one years. The native-born population of the United States in 1890 numbered 53,390,600 ; the native-born prisoners, 65,977 ; ratio 1235 in a million. The foreign-born population numbered 9,231,381 ; the foreign-born prisoners 16,352 ; ratio 1744 in a million ; an apparent excess of foreigners over natives of 41 per cent. But the number of native-born males of voting age was 12,591,852 ; native-born male prisoners 61,637 ; ratio 4895 in a million. The number of foreign-born males of voting age was 4,348,459 ; foreign-born male prisoners 14,287 ; ratio 3285 ; showing an actual excess of natives over foreigners of 50 per cent.

The comparison of the criminal population with the general population works injustice not only to the foreign population but also to the general population, especially in those states where there is an excess of adult males. For example : by comparison of prisoners with the general population Idaho is the eighth state in her ratio of criminals, Oregon eleventh and Washington fifteenth ; but by comparison of male prisoners with males of voting age Idaho stands twelfth, Oregon sixteenth and Washington twenty-first. On the other hand, by comparison of prisoners with the general population, Kansas stands thirteenth, Utah fourteenth and Pennsylvania seventeenth ; but by comparison of male prisoners with males of voting age Kansas stands ninth, Utah tenth and Pennsylvania fifteenth.

In the present article the female population is left out of the account, for the reason that the census does not give the necessary information with reference to the nationality of women ; but as only 9 per cent. of all of the prisoners are women the result will not be seriously affected.

After showing the facts with reference to the whole United States, the details with reference to the northern states only are given ; the southern states being excluded for two reasons : (1) because they contain only 7.5 per cent. of the foreign-born prisoners in the United States, and of these more than half are found

in the state of Texas alone ; (2) because as Mr. Hewes has pointed out the disproportionate number of colored prisoners would affect the results disproportionately. Had the southern states been included, the showing would have been less favorable for the native-born population, as is indicated by the ratios shown for the entire United States.

It is, proposed, therefore, to compare the total number of male prisoners in the northern states with the total number of males of voting age in those states. To be perfectly exact the comparison should have been between the male inhabitants of voting age and the male prisoners of voting age; but this was impossible for the reason that the census does not show the facts as to the nationality of the prisoners of voting age. A careful examination proved, however, that the results would be relatively the same in considering the whole number of prisoners or the prisoners of voting age, for the reason that the distribution of prisoners as to nationality is almost exactly the same for the total number as for those of voting age.

The table on page 373 exhibits the ratios above mentioned for the United States, the northern states, the northern divisions and each of the northern states.

It will be seen from the table on page 373 that the men of foreign birth furnish fewer prisoners proportionately than those of native birth in each division of the northern states, as follows (see columns 2 and 3 of the table):

NUMBER OF MALE PRISONERS IN EACH MILLION MALES OF
VOTING AGE.

	Foreign Born	Native Born
Northern States - - - - -	3240	4445
North Central Division - - - - -	1915	3550
North Atlantic Division - - - - -	4615	5205
Western Division - - - - -	4360	6410

By reference to the table it will be seen that the showing is in favor of the foreign born in every northern state and territory except Maine, New Hampshire, Arizona, and New Mexico. While the showing is more favorable to the native born in the

NUMBER OF MALE PRISONERS TO EACH MILLION MALES OF
VOTING AGE IN THE NORTHERN UNITED STATES.

	All Classes	Foreign Born	Native alone		
			Total Nat. Born	Parents For. Born	Parents Nat. Born
The United States	4480	3285	4895	5475	4775
Northern States	4045	3240	4445	5665	4075
North Atlantic Division	4920	4360	5205	8510	4135
Maine	2380	4525	2000	6200	1615
New Hampshire	2515	3345	2285	8475	1730
Vermont	1880	2130	1815	2550	1680
Massachusetts	6735	5865	7285	16200	4390
Rhode Island	4790	3475	5685	10400	4060
Connecticut	4195	3700	4460	9035	3170
New York	5615	4310	6440	8165	5580
New Jersey	5285	4600	5655	8135	4860
Pennsylvania	4035	3765	4135	5940	3675
North Central Division	3045	1915	3550	3005	3715
Ohio	2640	1550	2940	2825	2975
Indiana	3155	1935	3325	2620	3440
Illinois	3470	2330	4120	4340	4045
Michigan	3300	2270	4000	3790	4060
Wisconsin	2325	1735	2990	2090	3970
Minnesota	2660	1735	3990	3200	4575
Iowa	1795	995	2300	1570	2530
Missouri	3810	2180	4145	3495	4265
North Dakota	1680	935	3060	3280	2940
South Dakota	1800	1000	2435	2175	2550
Nebraska	2135	1125	2590	1010	2960
Kansas	4940	4255	5095	3165	5400
Western Division	5660	4615	6410	7645	6050
Montana	6440	4300	8335	12050	7400
Wyoming	2740	980	3635	1610	4300
Colorado	5330	4240	5820	8570	5200
New Mexico	4250	6065	3928	4260	3895
Arizona	10420	12700	8780	6205	9480
Utah	4810	3920	5535	3655	6865
Nevada	7160	5105	9330	7665	9945
Idaho	4760	4960	4650	3825	4925
Washington	3050	2415	3460	4765	3135
Oregon	3920	3340	4210	6000	3920
California	7075	5295	8880	9700	8580

northern states than for the whole country, the ratio of the native-born criminals is still 37 per cent. larger than that of the foreign born.

If we compare the foreign born with the pure native born, *i. e.*, the native born of native parents, the showing is more favorable to the native stock. (See columns 2 and 5 of the table).

NUMBER OF PRISONERS TO EACH MILLION MALES OF
VOTING AGE.

	Foreign Born	Native Born of Native Parents
Northern States - - - -	3240	4075
North Atlantic Division - - - -	4360	4135
North Central Division - - - -	1915	3715
Western Division - - - -	4615	6050



In the North Atlantic Division alone the ratio of foreign-born prisoners exceeds that of the pure native born. This excess is found in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania; but in Rhode Island, New York, and New Jersey the showing is in favor of the foreign born. In the Central and Western Divisions the record is in favor of the foreign born in every case except Arizona and New Mexico.

If we compare native born with native born the result is as follows:

NUMBER OF PRISONERS TO EACH MILLION MALES OF
VOTING AGE.

	Total Native Born	Native Born Parents Foreign	Native Born One or Both Parents Native
Northern States - - - -	4445	5665	4075
North Atlantic Division - - - -	5205	8510	4135
North Central Division - - - -	3550	3005	3715
Western Division - - - -	6410	7645	6050

Here there is a marked diversity between the different sections of the country. The children of native-born parents show about the same ratio of criminals in the North Atlantic and the



North Central states; but the children of foreign parents show nearly three times as high a ratio in the North Atlantic states as in the North Central states. In every one of the North Atlantic states the showing is against the children of foreign-born parents; but in every one of the North Central states, except Illinois and North Dakota, the showing is in favor of the children of foreign-born parents. Of the western states, five show against the native born and six against the foreign born. These facts are very remarkable and call for a discriminating study of the elements of the foreign population, which will be attempted in a later article.

The accompanying diagrams on page 375 illustrate the difference between the method of comparison followed by Mr. Hewes and that followed in the present article. An examination of the diagrams will reveal the fact that the ratio of foreign prisoners, which was 67 per cent. greater than the average by Mr. Hewes' method, is 20 per cent. less than the average by the method followed in this article; that the ratio of native-born prisoners, which is 15 per cent. less than the average by the first method, is 10 per cent. more than the average by the second method; while that of native-born children, having both parents foreign born, is 50 per cent. more than the average by the first method and 40 per cent. more than the average by the second method.

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NOTE.—For the benefit of any student who may wish to verify the figures here given, the method of computing them is stated, as follows:

By reference to the Census Compendium, Part 1, page 764, the number of males of voting age for the North Atlantic Division is seen to be 5,055,239; column 2 shows the total number of native born to be 3,375,389; column 3 shows the total number of foreign born to be 1,679,850. By reference to column 7, the number of natives having parents foreign is seen to be 823,422; deducting this number from the total native born in column 2, we have 2,551,967 natives born of native parents.

By reference to the census volume on Crime, Pauperism and Benevolence, Part II, page 4, column 1, the total number of male prisoners in the

North Atlantic Division is seen to be 24,883; the number of whites, foreign born, shown by column 9, is 7307. Adding the Chinese and Japanese in columns 15 and 16, the total number of foreign-born prisoners is 7322; deducting from the aggregate in column 1, we have 17,561 native born. By reference to column 7, the number of natives having both parents foreign is seen to be 7006, leaving 10,555 native born of native parents.

Dividing the total number of male prisoners (24,883) by the total number of male inhabitants of voting age (5,055,239), we obtain .4920 as the ratio to a million, as shown in column 1 of the table.

The ratios for each class and for each state are obtained in the same way. The number of males of voting age and the number of prisoners for the "Northern States" is obtained by adding the "North Atlantic," "North Central," and "Western" Divisions.

METHODS OF DETERMINING THE ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY OF MUNICIPAL ENTERPRISES.¹

THIS topic must be defined and limited before it can be profitably discussed. Obviously it does not cover all municipal enterprises. No practical object would be gained by a discussion of the economic productivity of roads or parks or sewers or police. They all have an economic side, and might be justified from that standpoint. But it is needless to justify what everyone accepts. On the other hand there are classes of municipal enterprises the economic productivity of which is a matter of controversy. Means of transportation within the municipality, or public docks, may serve as examples. It is to enterprises of this character that the subject may be considered as limited. The question, therefore, presents itself: By what test may municipal enterprises of this class be distinguished from other municipal enterprises? The best test is probably to be found in a consideration of the main purpose of the enterprise. If it aims primarily at rendering an economic service it may fairly be tested by its economic productivity, but otherwise not. For example, a sewerage system is economically productive. By improving the health of citizens and lengthening their lives it increases their productive power. But life and health are higher aims than production. We produce to live rather than live to produce. Hence the benefit of a sewerage system should be measured in terms of decreased mortality rather than in terms of increased productivity. An example nearer the division line is found in the case of a water supply. Where the population is crowded the water supply is second only to the sewerage system as a means to life and health. Under such conditions the economic advantages are not the

¹ Paper read by request before the American Social Science Association, September 1, 1896.

final or proper test to apply. But with a sparser population the question of health may sink into the background and the superior convenience or cheapness of water in pipes over water in cisterns, wells, or springs may become the more important consideration. A last example may be permitted. Public lights were introduced as a means of increasing public safety and decreasing crime. They still are of much importance for that end. But the entire lighting, heating, and power system, of which the public lights are usually but a small part, can hardly be said to exist primarily for the prevention of crime. The economic service it renders to the community is probably greater than its service as a substitute for the police. Accordingly a municipal enterprise of this character may be tested by its economic productivity.

The question, then, may be limited to the methods of determining the economic productivity of such municipal enterprises as aim primarily at economical production. Certain municipal enterprises are merely or mainly devices for rendering economic services cheaply and well. Their efficiency must be determined by comparing them with other devices for rendering equivalent services. The latter may be divided into private enterprises regulated mainly by competition, and private enterprises regulated both by competition and by governmental interference. This leads to a final limitation of the question, viz., the methods of comparing the economic productivity of municipal enterprises aiming at economic production with private enterprises rendering similar services and more or less subject to governmental control.

It may be noticed in passing that the final decision upon the wisdom or folly of such municipal enterprises must be influenced by many considerations besides the economic productivity of the ventures. The general theory of our law and political science is adverse to a wide extension of the functions of municipalities in such directions. The not infrequent corruption and the more frequent incompetency of our city governments are practical arguments in favor of the same position. The tend-

ency of such changes is often considered to be towards undermining those powers of private initiative and of voluntary coöperation which are our Saxon birthright. On the contrary, the high-handed procedure of many corporations holding public franchises, the excessive profits they often actually secure and more often are firmly believed to secure, the power exercised by such corporations in municipal or even in state affairs, when their interests are at stake, are arguments entirely aside from the present phase of the subject, and yet of great, perhaps of decisive, weight in forming the final conclusion.

It must, I think, be admitted that it is not a function of government, whether state or municipal, to undertake enterprises for profit. Some other end more clearly within the range of governmental action must be found in order to warrant the proposed extension of powers, but, that found, the profit or lack of profit may have a practical, argumentative force. For example, the recent legislation in South Carolina on the liquor traffic cannot be justified merely by showing the state management to be profitable, but its profits, if permanent and large, will have a tendency to convince the taxpayer of the wisdom of the change.

After merely noting that such considerations are here irrelevant, I pass to the central question: How may the economic productivity of municipal and private enterprises be measured and compared?

In the first place the method must be statistical. While in the natural sciences various methods of measurement are employed, in the social sciences all methods of measurement are statistical. Social phenomena are so variable in time and place that we never meet the same concrete condition twice, as we do in the natural sciences. Hence no unvarying units are possible. On the contrary, the variations are usually wide and often inexplicable. But if any trustworthy generalizations are to be obtained, they must come through the elimination of these variations. This is secured by the so-called law of large numbers, the basis of statistics. It rests on an arbitrary division of

the causes at work in any case into two classes, the accidental or disturbing or varying causes, and the essential or primary or fundamental causes, and affirms that if a sufficiently large number of instances be observed and the results averaged, the first group of causes will be more or less completely eliminated, and the effects of the second group thereby made obvious. If, for example, a sufficiently large number of electric-light plants all agreeing in the one characteristic of being conducted by the municipality, and another series all agreeing in the one characteristic of being under private control, be carefully observed and the results averaged, it is assumed by this law that the numerous differences of the members of each series among themselves would cancel in the averages, and that the difference between the two averages would express the difference of effect resulting from the one constant difference, viz., that in the mode of management.

But it is, perhaps, erroneous to speak of the statistical method. There is rather a series of methods all possessing the common characteristic just described and therefore statistical, but differing in many of their details. A student familiar with one group of these methods, as I am somewhat familiar with the methods of population statistics, is not thereby constituted a good guide through the mazes of another group, *e. g.*, financial statistics. I must confine myself, therefore, to certain general statements and not attempt to enter into details.

A fundamental and much neglected requisite of sound statistical work is that of careful definition. In this respect the European statisticians are in advance of us. For reasons which it would be tedious to state here definition is far more important in studying such phenomena than it is in the field of the natural sciences. It is the only way in which we can avoid the difficulties involved in the constant flux of social phenomena and be certain that we mean the same thing from moment to moment. For each form of municipal enterprises investigated a whole series of more or less familiar terms will be found, the exact meaning of which for that investigation should be fixed, and

whenever after in the course of the study that term is used it should be only with the agreed significance.

The economic productivity of municipal enterprises may be measured only by comparing their efficiency with that of similar private enterprises. But the two have diverse ends in view. The aim of a municipal enterprise is to satisfy the voters; the aim of a private plant is to earn money for the corporation. Hence they are not likely to render the same service except occasionally and by accident. To be sure, one most important means of pleasing the voters is by convincing them that their money is being saved and their taxes reduced. But the facts may readily be so presented as to convey a false impression to the public and perhaps as many voters would be influenced by a policy of generous or lavish display as by a favorable balance sheet. So, too, a most important means of earning money for a corporation is by pleasing not necessarily all the voters, but the patrons and possible patrons. The fact remains, however, that the primary object in the two cases is different and that we cannot compare the economics of the two systems until one or the other of these ends or some intermediate one is made our standard. Perhaps we may say that the primary end is to protect the capital invested, whether private or public, and, if it be private, to secure a reasonable return upon what has been necessarily and legitimately expended, and that the further end is to render a satisfactory service to the consumers, who may often be substantially the entire public. If this be admitted, it follows that the true end is not that of the ordinary corporation or of the ordinary municipal enterprise, and that the former is likely to neglect the interests of the consumers and the latter to risk the capital of the taxpayers.

Furthermore, the consumers may be grouped into two classes, the municipality as a body and the private citizens as individuals, and the balance must be held between these two interests which are often antagonistic. It is not, I believe, uncommon for a private corporation seeking a contract or franchise to offer unduly favorable terms to the municipality

and recoup itself for losses thus incurred by unduly high prices to individual patrons. Municipal enterprises, on the contrary, are tempted to close contracts with private patrons at a losing figure and let the municipality as a whole make up the losses. The true end of such a service, then, whether municipal or private, is, first, to guard the capital invested and secure it, if private, a fair return, and then to render the best possible service to all classes of consumers at the lowest remunerative rates.

It is unnecessary to argue here that in the fields under discussion competition is an inadequate controller of price and so an unsatisfactory defense of the consumer. The various forms and degrees of governmental control and also governmental ownership are devices to secure the results obtained in other fields through competition. These devices have been introduced as the conviction has been forced upon the community that competition was here ineffective. Hence it would seem to be reasonable that the study, following the sequence of events, should start with an analysis of earlier methods and proceed from unregulated private control through the various forms of governmental regulation or supervision to governmental management. The American people, I believe, are averse to governmental ventures into industrial fields, although that aversion may be decreasing. At the same time they can hardly approve of the results of unrestricted freedom in the field of natural monopolies.

If a comparison between municipal and private enterprises is to be instituted, the facts of importance must be ascertainable in a form admitting of comparison. It is doubtful that this requisite can be satisfied with regard to the majority of private enterprises, and the doubt is strengthened by the fact that the officials who prepared and published the Eleventh Census of the United States were unable to secure returns from one-fourth of the gas companies of the country including many large establishments, and published returns regarding electric lighting only for New York state, the District of Columbia, and the city of St. Louis. Probably a larger proportion of the companies would

refuse to answer the inquiries of private individuals who were seeking to test their efficiency as compared with municipal plants. While the facts touching municipal plants are usually published, they are not presented in a lucid fashion or with the explanations needed for their proper interpretation. Neither are the facts for different cities given according to any uniform method. An investigator in this field can hardly escape blunders in the chaos of municipal finances, and the suspicion is sometimes aroused that the figures are made deceptive with intent to mislead the public. At the best their being open to question is as fatal as their being intentionally misleading. Therefore there is little hope for a trustworthy answer to the question under discussion until both private and public corporations are compelled to keep their books by a uniform prescribed method and to publish the important facts annually. Such a law would be hard to pass and harder to enforce, but without it all methods must be tentative and imperfect. It may be in place here to mention that at a convention of the officials of the Bureaus of Statistics of Labor held at Albany last June it was unanimously voted to undertake a coöperative investigation of the municipal ownership of water, gas, and electric-light plants and a committee of experienced statisticians was appointed to prepare a uniform schedule or schedules of questions. It will be of interest to see how far these officials succeed in securing the desired information in form admitting the institution of comparisons and the induction of inferences.

Again the student of any particular form of municipal enterprise must be or become familiar with its technical processes. Like a lawyer he must get up his case carefully and thoroughly, if his analysis and criticism are to be of value. Much popular discussion of municipal enterprises for profit has been valueless or inconclusive, because of failure to conform to this elementary requirement. As no one can become an expert in all these fields, the need of competent advice upon all technical processes and accounts is obvious.

The arguments upon the profitableness of municipal owner-

ship differ so widely in the various enterprises, that a statistical examination must lose in thoroughness and range if it seeks to include several classes under a single investigation. From the point of view of method, therefore, it would seem better to make a separate statistical study for each industry affording the requisite information. While administrative considerations may have prevented, it would seem theoretically better had the bureaus of labor decided to make one report upon private and municipal water works and a second upon private and municipal lighting.

Since the methods to be employed must differ in detail with the various enterprises, it seems best to limit the further discussion to a single industry which may be deemed typical. For this purpose gas lighting has been chosen as the one upon which the greatest amount of trustworthy information is available.

If private and municipal gas plants are to be compared with reference to their economic productivity, certain units of measurement should be fixed at the start. Now it is of the essence of a scientific unit that for the purpose in hand one unit should be the approximate equivalent of any other. Yet in popular discussions this prime requisite of sound statistical work is often neglected. Thus a ton of coal is a unit frequently employed, but to the gas manufacturer it is grossly inaccurate, because the quality of the coal—its gas-yielding power, and the character of the residuals—is extremely variable and is almost as important to him as its quantity, but far less susceptible of measurement. So, too, a thousand cubic feet of illuminating gas is a popular unit, but the quality of the gas—its constituents, candle power, and degree of purity—is almost as variable as that of coal.

In discussions of the economic productivity of municipally owned gas works a comparison of the present condition of municipal and private plants should be held subordinate to a study of the changes that are in progress and the tendencies to change which are inherent in the various systems. The emphasis has often but wrongly been laid upon a comparison of the present condition, partly because that is the more easily made,

but partly, also, I am convinced, because the fact has been ignored that no system is a stable one, but that, on the contrary, every system is steadily undergoing modifications so far reaching as to be of greater moment than the present conditions. These changes are complex and often elusive. Many must escape the notice of the student. But certain ones may be pointed out. The facts regarding the gas companies of Massachusetts have been gathered now for ten years, and evidence of certain changes may be derived from a collation of the facts contained in the eleven annual reports of the board of gas and electric light commissioners of that state.

The manufacture of coal gas has increased with great rapidity from 2,624,570,655 cubic feet in the year ending June 30, 1886, to 4,810,048,617 cubic feet in the year ending June 30, 1895, an increase of over two and one-sixth billion cubic feet or 83.3 per cent. in nine years.

While the output of coal gas has thus nearly doubled, the manufacture of water gas has sprung up from almost nothing. In the year ending June 30, 1887, only 28,354,300 cubic feet of water gas were made, but eight years later the reported output was over eighty-five times as great, 2,413,265,558 cubic feet, almost exactly one-half the amount of coal gas produced the same year. The system of electric lighting has also developed from almost nothing during the same period. Yet notwithstanding these powerful rivals and competitors, the output of coal gas increased about five-sixths in nine years.

Still the gas unaccounted for and presumably lost through leakage has remained nearly stationary, increasing in eight years (1887-95) less than 6 per cent. (5.9 per cent.), or perhaps one-twelfth as fast as the total product. The proportion of unaccounted-for coal gas to the total output was about one-twelfth (8.44 per cent.) in 1886-7, and but little over one-twentieth (5.14 per cent.) in 1894-5. The following table gives the figures for all the companies which produced over fifty million cubic feet of gas in 1894-5 and for which the facts are published:

PER CENT. OF GAS UNACCOUNTED FOR.

Company	1885-1886	1894-1895	Decrease	Increase
Boston.....	6.4	3.4	3.0
Brookline.....	15.7	7.2	8.5
Lowell.....	6.1	4.5	1.6
Roxbury.....	4.7	2.9	1.8
Cambridge.....	11.1	8.1	3.0
Worcester.....	7.9	8.12
Dorchester.....	11.8	5.9	5.9
Springfield.....	7.0	8.5	1.5
Charlestown.....	11.5	6.9	4.6
South Boston.....	9.5	8.3	1.2
Lawrence.....	11.2	8.6	2.6
Newton.....	10.4	7.7	2.7
Haverhill.....	4.4	6.6	2.2
Fall River.....	13.0	6.7	6.3
Jamaica Plain.....	17.4	14.1	3.3

As will be seen from the preceding, twelve of the fifteen largest companies showed a decrease in the proportion of gas unaccounted for varying between 1.2 and 8.5, while only three showed an increase. The average increase of the three was only about one-third of the average decrease of the twelve.

While the output of gas has been rapidly increasing and the loss by leakage has fallen off, the quality of the gas has been improving. Quality is tested partly by the illuminating power of the gas in units of the illuminating power of standard sperm candles and partly by the number of grains of various impurities found in 100 cubic feet of gas. The average candle power of the coal gas in Massachusetts has risen from 17.6 in 1885 to 19.3 in 1895, and the illuminating power of the gas produced by the largest companies has increased yet faster. The following table gives the increase of candle power in ten years for each company producing over one hundred million cubic feet of gas in 1895.

Boston	-	-	-	5.4	Cambridge	-	-	-	.7
Brookline	-	-	-	9.5	Worcester	-	-	-	1.6
Lowell	-	-	-	3.0	Dorchester	-	-	-	7.2
Roxbury	-	-	-	5.6	Lynn	-	-	-	.7

The average increase of these large companies was 4.2 candle

power, or about two and one-half times the average for the entire state. Meanwhile the two impurities, sulphur and ammonia, referred to in the reports of the gas commissioners, have been decreasing perceptibly although irregularly.

The average amount of gas taken by each consumer has not materially changed during the eight years, 1887-95. The averages for the state are not obtainable, but twenty-six companies show an increase and thirty a decrease of this average. This, however, is consistent with an increase in the average amount taken by small consumers offset by a withdrawal of patronage by certain large consumers. What the facts may be the reports do not indicate.

During the same eight years the number of high-power gas lamps (Lungren, Albo-Carbon, and Welsbach) has risen from 1116 to 12,489, and the greatest amount of that increase has come in the last year, during which the increase was 4700 or 63 per cent.

The number of gas stoves reported as in use is also growing with great rapidity. Between 1894 and 1895 it rose from 15,877 to 42,412, an increase of 167 per cent.

The notable increase in the consumption of coal gas has gone on in the face of the competition of the electric lights. How keen that competition has been in Massachusetts is apparently indicated by the steady decrease, year by year, in the number of public lights burning coal gas. It diminished from 19,802 in 1885-6 to 11,946 in 1894-5, a falling off of nearly two-fifths (39.6 per cent.) in nine years.

These changes, whereby the municipalities take a smaller proportion of the coal gas and private consumers more, may affect materially the theoretical arguments concerning municipal ownership of gas, but with those this paper is not concerned.

Closely related to the foregoing modifications is one more important to the general consumer, viz., the reduction in price. The Massachusetts gas commissioners divide the coal gas companies by implication into two classes, large and small, and draw the line between them at an annual output of thirty million cubic

feet of gas. This makes three classes, the large coal gas companies, the small coal gas companies, and the oil gas companies. For each of these the average price of gas per thousand cubic feet has been reported for each year since 1887. The facts are collated in the following table:

Date	Average Price of Coal Gas		Average Price of Oil Gas
	Large Companies	Small Companies	
1887.....	\$1.59	\$2.17	\$4.13
1888.....	1.50	2.26	4.26
1889.....	1.45	1.93	4.16
1890.....	1.39	2.02	3.81
1891.....	1.31	1.96	3.76
1892.....	1.32	2.01	3.75
1893.....	1.27	1.94	3.74
1894.....	1.20	1.79	3.81
1895.....	1.03	1.74	3.90

The large companies sold gas in 1895 on the average 56 cents cheaper per thousand cubic feet than they did in 1887, the smaller companies sold it 43 cents cheaper, and the oil gas companies sold it 23 cents cheaper. But, as the prices of the smaller companies were originally much higher, the reductions made by the large companies involved a fall of 35 per cent. from the price in 1887, that of the small companies a fall of 20 per cent., and that of the oil gas companies of only $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

These reductions in price must have been affected by the prices of coal, but upon that point, unfortunately, the reports of the gas commissioners are silent, and I have not been able to secure the facts elsewhere. One important change, however, may be traced through the reports, and that is an increasing income from the sale of the residuals. For each year the companies report the percentage of the cost of their coal which was obtained for their residual products. It has quite uniformly increased. Between 1886 and 1895 thirty-eight companies showed an increase and only five a decrease. The results are not given in such a form as to make the average for the entire state obtainable from them, but the facts for all the companies

producing over fifty million cubic feet of gas in 1895 are included in the following table :

Companies in Order of Size	Per cent. of cost of coal obtained from sale of residuals in		Increase	Decrease
	1885-1886	1894-1895		
Brookline	29.9	60.5 ('93-'4)	30.6
Lowell	53.6	55.6	2.0
Cambridge	33.3	62.3	29.0
Worcester	26.6	24.3	2.3
Lynn	35.3	59.7	24.4
Springfield	37.2	48.5	11.3
Charlestown	45.8	54.5	8.7
Lawrence	43.0	84.0	41.0
Newton	29.4	54.0	24.6
Jamaica Plain	31.0	49.5	18.5
Holyoke	37.1	44.0	6.9

If an average of the preceding percentages be taken without regard to the varying amount of gas produced, it appears that in 1886 these large companies received 36.6 per cent. of the cost of their coal from the sale of residuals, and in 1895 they received 54.5 per cent., the improvement being thus equal to over one-sixth of the cost of the coal.

I may briefly recapitulate the changes which by way of extended illustration have been shown to have occurred, and presumably to be still progressing in Massachusetts, and not improbably elsewhere under the system of private control subject to state supervision.

(1) The manufacture of coal gas increased five-sixths in nine years.

(2) The proportion of this gas unaccounted for and so attributable to leakage has fallen to about three-fifths of what it was eight years ago.

(3) The quality of the gas has improved, especially in the case of the larger companies.

(4) The number of high-power gas lamps and of gas stoves has been rapidly increasing.

(5) Meanwhile the number of public gas lights has fallen about two-fifths.

(6) The price of gas has been falling, especially among the larger companies.

(7) The proportion of the cost of coal obtained from the sale of residuals has been rising.

Now the point upon which emphasis is to be laid is that the changes to which every sort of enterprise is subject and of which the foregoing are illustrations, are of far greater importance in the determination of its real economic productivity than the condition of that business at any point of time. Assume for the moment that all these gas companies had been managed for the last decade as municipal enterprises, would the same changes have taken place? If not, would those that did occur have resulted in a greater or in a less economic productivity? Such questions, it appears to me, are speculative and will be answered by everyone in accordance with preconceived ideas or theoretical arguments. I see no way in which to wring a conclusive answer to them from experience. Accordingly the answer which as a statistician rather than a theorist I am compelled to make to the question at issue is, in the first place, that until municipal enterprises have had a longer history, and the facts have been gathered and presented in a shape suitable for comparison, no method of determining their economic productivity will give convincing results, and that, secondly, when the facts are obtainable, the conclusions must be drawn from the changes which are fostered by the various systems, and that the conditions prevailing under any one at a particular time must be deemed of subsidiary importance.

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SUPERIORITY AND SUBORDINATION AS SUBJECT-MATTER OF SOCIOLOGY. II.

IN the case of subordination to a numerous superior, of which I have so far spoken, the separate elements of this superior order are coördinated with each other—or at least they work, in the relation that comes here into view, as though they were coördinated. New appearances occur so soon as the numerous superior ceases to act as a unity of similar elements. In this event the superiors may be either opposed to each other or they may compose a series in which the superior is in his turn subordinate to a higher. I will now consider the former case, which may have very different consequences for the subordinates.

When it occurs that one is totally subject to a number of mutually opposed persons or groups, that is, in such manner that the subject brings no spontaneity into the relation, but rather is completely dependent upon each of the superiors, he will suffer severely under their opposition. In the first place, each of the superiors will demand his entire strength and service, and on the other hand will hold him as responsible for everything which he does under the compulsion of the others as though it were of his own motion. This is the typical situation of him who "serves two masters." It is to be seen in the case of children whose parents are inharmonious, and likewise in that of a petty state which is equally dependent on two powerful neighbors, and consequently in the event of conflict between the superiors the inferior will be held responsible by the one for that to which it was forced by its inferiority to the other. If this conflict of the individuals or groups is completely subjectified in the inferior, if the contestants operate as ideal moral forces which set up their demands within the inferior person, the case is "a conflict of duties." Here, as in those external cases

which still compose the type for the latter, a smooth solution of the difficulty is in most cases out of the question. On the contrary the subordinate will often enough be crushed between the colliding interests of his superiors.

This result, as was said, presupposes that the subordinate himself exercises no spontaneity in the relation, but is entirely dependent. A wholly contrasted result appears so soon as the subordinate himself has any power to exert in the relation, with any degree of freedom in its application. Then occurs the case of such extreme sociological significance—*duobus litigantibus tertius gaudet*. In departments of activity concerned with the most widely different material interests, in the most manifold often concealed combinations, the significance of the *tertius gaudens* comes into effect. It is one of the typical forms of the attitude of human beings toward each other. It becomes actual equally in connection with the most wildly contrasted provinces of interests. I call attention merely to the power of small states and small parties, derived from the fact that larger powers, each of which is unquestionably in itself superior to the third, come into conflict with each other. If the powers of these opponents are equal, an element which in itself is weak may, by attaching itself to the one or the other, determine the contest in the interest of the power which it favors. Through the competition of the rivals for its aid this minor element acquires an importance which it would never have gained if the attitude of the two greater powers toward each other had been peaceable. History presents countless quite transparent cases of this constellation.

A somewhat more complicated form presents itself in the fact that until recently the majority of English laborers did not feel the need of organizing a distinct labor party. The competition of the great existing parties for their support, in consequence of which they so often gave the victory to the one or the other, gives them larger political influence than a separate party organization could command. The latter alternative would involve the adoption of an independent party programme. It would consequently take from them the advantage of being able

at each moment, without any prejudice, to play the rôle of *tertius gaudens* toward the parties, both of which in themselves are far superior in strength to the intermediate element.

When subordination means not merely inferiority in power, but direct obligation to obey, this position between opposed superiors, so soon at least as the slightest independence in relation to the latter exists, may lead to entire emancipation from inferiority. An essential difference between the mediæval "unfree" men and the vassals consisted in the fact that the former had and could have only one master, while the latter could accept land from different lords and could take the oath of fealty to each. By reason of this possibility of placing themselves in the feudal relation to several persons the vassals won strong security and independence against the individual lords. The inferiority of the position of vassalage was thereby to a considerable degree equalized.

Finally, this consequence may result not alone from the opposition of contemporary superior powers, but also from that of unlike powers that supersede each other. The growth of the democratic consciousness in France has been traced in part to the fact that since the fall of Napoleon I. changing administrations have followed each other rapidly, each inefficient, insecure, courting the favor of the masses, whereby in consequence the consciousness of his social importance was effectively impressed upon each citizen. Although he was subordinate to each of these governments in itself, nevertheless he had a sense of personal strength, because he was the permanent element in all the change and contrast of the governments. The progress is formally the same—*i. e.*, the growing independence (*Verselbständigung*) of the subordinate through the position as *tertius gaudens*—the difference being that the superiors are not contemporary but successive.

Equally different consequences for the inferior result in the second case, *viz.*, when the superiors themselves stand in the relation of superiority and inferiority. In this case the decisive consideration is whether the subordinate possesses an immediate

relation to the highest in rank of his superiors, or whether the intermediate authority, which while superior to the subordinate is also inferior to the highest in rank, separates the subordinate in question from the supreme authority, and thus *de facto* alone represents the superior elements over against that particular subordinate. Feudalism furnished cases of the first sort, since he who was subject to a superior at the same time remained subject to the highest ruling house. A very distinct picture of this is furnished by English feudalism at the time of William the Conqueror. Stubbs describes it as follows:

All men continued to be primarily the king's men, and the public peace to be his peace. Their lords might demand their service to fulfill their own obligations, but the king could call them to the fyrd, summon them to his courts, and tax them without the intervention of their lords; and to the king they could look for protection against all foes.

Thus the lot of an inferior with reference to a superior is a favorable one, if this superior in turn is inferior to a higher authority to whom the lowest in rank has recourse. This is also the peculiar natural consequence of the sociological configuration here under discussion. Since as a rule some sort of rivalry and conflict of authority arises between contiguous elements in the scale of superiority, the intermediate is often in conflict with the higher as well as with the lower in rank. Common opposition is however a strong bond of union—one of the most typical of formal rules, which applies in all existing departments of social life. Through this relation a coalition is established between the highest element of this series and the lowest, and this connection affords to the latter a strong security against his immediate superior. Thus we see, times without number, that the struggles of the lower classes against the aristocracy have had the assistance of the monarch.

If however this direct connection is interrupted, if the intermediate stratum has inserted itself so extensively and powerfully between the higher and the lower strata that all initiative of the highest in favor of the lowest can be mediated only through the middle stratum, there result conversely very unfavorable con-

sequences for the inferior. Thus in case the organization consists of three elements, a highest central power, an extended lowest stratum, and a middle stratum, which exercises toward the lowest stratum a portion of the governmental functions, either from original and free right, or by virtue of transference from the supreme power—then is the working of this middle stratum not so much a connection as a separation of the two others. So long as subordination defined by relations to landed estates (*Gutsunterthänigkeit*) continued, the noble was a bearer of the administrative organization of the state. He exercised toward his subordinates judicial, economic and fiscal functions without which the state of that period could not have existed, and he certainly in this wise bound the subordinate masses to this general interest and the supreme power. Since, however, the noble has also private interests, in pursuance of which he wants to use the peasant for his own purposes, it comes about that he employs to this end his position as a part of the administrative organization between government and peasants, and he annuls in fact for a long time those measures and laws through which the government sought to be of immediate assistance to the peasantry—something which for a long time is possible only through the mediation of the nobility.

→ This combination, the erection of different superiors the one above the other, exhibits a very important sociological formation: elements which are at once superior and inferior. This is the characteristic form of the hierarchy, upon which every highly elaborated organization of a group is based. Wherever the realization of an objective purpose is concerned, the personal coöperation of the elements which are to produce the result will take place for the most part in the form of a stratified numerously articulated superiority and inferiority. Accordingly the Roman slave family was precisely and numerously graded, from the *villicus* and *procurator* who managed independently whole branches of production in the great slave industries, down through all possible classifications to the foremen of groups of ten laborers. I would refer to the constitution of every factory, of every enterprise on

a large scale, and especially of every army. That through the simultaneous superiority and inferiority of each element in the hierarchy, its position, both with reference to the higher and the lower elements, is accurately defined, must lead the individual to a high degree of stability in his feeling about life (*Lebensgefühl*), in so far as this is at all socially determinable. It must thereby assure to the whole organization a much closer coherence than if the individual regards himself as either exclusively superior or exclusively inferior.

In case very numerous and energetic superiorities and inferiorities are present in a group, whether in the form of the hierarchic structure or in parallel collocation, the group as a whole will derive its character essentially from subordination, as appears with special distinctness in the case of bureaucratically ruled states, like Russia for example. This results from the fact that the strata extend themselves downward in rapid progression, so that the quantitatively preponderant is always the subordinate, and consequently the whole produces the impression of universal subordination. If we take a purely æsthetic view of the case we may, to be sure, through quite special combinations, get the impression of universal superiority in a group. The Spaniards' pride and contempt for labor developed from the fact that for a long time they had the subjugated Moors for their laborers. After they had subsequently either annihilated or expelled these and the Jews, there still remained to them indeed the appearance of superiors, because there was no longer any inferior who could constitute the necessary correlate. In general, however, the antithesis of universal subordination appears to be not so much universal superiority as universal freedom. If we look closer it appears almost always that liberation from inferiority means at the same time the gain of a superiority, either over against the hitherto superior, or to a stratum henceforth destined to more definite inferiority.

The consequence of the French Revolution for the third estate—apparently its mere liberation from the privileges of the favored classes—signified both things. In the first place the third

estate, by means of its economic resources, made the formerly superior estates dependent upon it. In the second place, however, the third estate and its whole emancipation was of meaning and consequence only because of the fact that a fourth estate existed or built itself up in the course of like progress. The third estate could exploit the fourth and raise itself above it. Consequently we can by no means draw the simple analogy that the fourth estate wants to do today precisely what the third did one hundred years ago, for the freedom from subordination which the latter achieved was, as remarked, closely united with the gain of superiority over the fourth estate. Likewise is it to be observed that the "freedom of the church" is apt to be by no means merely a liberation from superior secular powers, but it usually means at the same time the acquisition of control over the same. Thus, for example, the "ecclesiastical freedom of teaching" (*Lehrfreiheit der Kirche*) means that the state contains citizens who stand under the suggestion of the church, who are impressed by it, and thereby the state has often enough passed under the control of the church.¹

Moreover this sociological type, viz., that liberation from inferiority at once enlarges itself by effort after or gain of superiority — exhibits itself in somewhat more complicated manifestations. In case the whole lowest strata sought to gain an absolute elevation of their position, a lessening of the quantum of their inferiority, the consequence has often been that a certain portion of the group uniformly seeking elevation reaches the higher plane, which, however, only means that these become a part of the previously superior strata, while the rest remain inferior. This is especially the case, and very naturally, wherever within the aspiring strata there is already a division of superiors and inferiors. In this case, after the end of the rebellion against the stratum which is superior to them all, the difference between the rebels, which during the commotion fell into the background, will at once appear again, and will bring it to pass that the formerly more eminent now assimilate themselves to that higher stratum, while

¹ Cf. my *Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft*, II, p. 254.

their former associates in effort become so much the more degraded. A part of the English labor revolution of 1830 conforms to this type. In order to win for themselves the right of voting for members of parliament the laborers combined with the reform party and the middle classes. The consequence was the passage of a law which gave the suffrage to all classes *except the laborers*. Precisely the same thing occurred in the Bohemian revolution of 1848. Here the peasants abolished the last remnants of serfdom in the constitution. This was no sooner done than the differences in the situation of the peasants made themselves effective. Before and during the revolutionary agitation these differences were kept from view by the fact of common subjection. The lower classes of the rural population demanded now a division of the common lands. This at once aroused in the more prosperous peasants all their conservative instincts, and they set themselves against the demands of the rural proletariat in conjunction with whom they had first triumphed over the lords, precisely as the lords had just resisted the peasants' demands. From consideration of this type many Austrian politicians who are friends of the workingman have recently raised objections to the workingmen's committees (*Arbeiterausschüsse*), by means of which it is hoped that the bondage and oppression of the laboring classes may be modified. It is feared that these committees may become an aristocracy of labor, which on account of its position of influence nearer to the employer may the easier be drawn over to his interest, and thus the rest of the laborers by this apparent progress may be the more abandoned.

Both socialism and anarchism will allege that liberation from inferiority will no longer thus enlarge itself by immediate endeavor after superiority, so soon as social organization in general is no longer effected in the form of superiority and inferiority, and these gradations are no more to be encountered at any point. Both theories contradict the above emphasized significance of the hierarchy for associated production, and they presuppose the belief that economy is possible in the life and activity of the group along with complete coördination of its

members. For so long in the future as prevision can reach, however, we may contest the possibility of a social constitution without superiority and inferiority, just as we may assert that the natural differences between human beings, which no common education can remove, will press for expression in external gradations of ranks, in differences of superordination and subordination. A tendency of culture is nevertheless thinkable which, in spite of the persistence of superordination and subordination, approximates in result to that which socialism and anarchism want to reach by doing away with social ranks. The way to this would be through such psychical development that the individual's consciousness of life (*Lebensgefühl*) would become less dependent upon external activity and the position assigned to the individual within the same. It is quite conceivable that in the progress of civilization productive activity may become more and more technique, and may at last lose practically all its consequences for that which is essential and personal in man. As a matter of fact we find the approach to this separation as the sociological type of numerous phases of development. While personality and performance (*Leistung*) were in the beginning closely mingled, the division of labor and the production of commodities for the market, *i. e.*, for wholly unknown and indifferent consumers, brings it about that personality tends to withdraw from industrial performance and to find recourse in itself. This tendency is promoted by advances in technique, in consequence of which productive activity is constantly acquiring a more mechanical and objective character. Evolution in many departments of industry, particularly in connection with the transition from hand labor to machine labor, has followed this scheme. It is accordingly thinkable that this isolation of labor, in contradistinction from the consciousness of life and personality (*Lebens- und Persönlichkeitsgefühl*), might lead to making superordination and subordination merely a technicality in the organization of society. By means of this differentiation, this converting of superiority and inferiority into a mere technicality, detached from every-

thing really essential to the person, the end would be gained which socialism and anarchism seek by repudiating this form of coöperation. This follows because the end in question cannot be other than a psychical one, viz., the removal of the feelings of sorrow, humiliation, oppression, which are today connected with subordination under others.

Evolution might approach this end by another course, which discloses to us a broader and more important type of superordination and subordination as sociological form. Proudhon, as is well known, would abolish all superiority and inferiority by dissolving all those ruling structures which have differentiated themselves out of the reciprocal operation of individuals as bearers of the social forces. He would then base all order and all coherence upon immediate reciprocity (*Wechselwirkung*) between free, coördinate individuals. But such coördination is perhaps to be reached along with continuation of superordination and subordination, *provided only that these relations are interchangeable*. This was the case with reference to certain persons or circles in group formations discussed above, in which each was at the same time superior and inferior. We may go beyond this and think of an ideal constitution, in which in one respect or at one time A is superior to B; in another respect or at another time, however, B is superior to A. In such case the value of superordination and subordination as elements of organization would be preserved, while their oppressiveness, one-sidedness and injustice would disappear. In point of fact there are very many phenomena of life in society in which this form-type is realized, although it may be in partial, mangled and obscured fashion. An example on a narrow scale is a productive association of laborers, in an enterprise for which they choose a manager and superintendent. While in the processes of the business the associated laborers are subordinate to the manager, yet in respect to the general conduct and outcome of the enterprise they are his superiors. All groups in which the leader changes, either through frequent choice or according to regular term, down to the case of chairman of a social union, seek in this way

to gain the technical advantage of superiority and subordination while avoiding its personal disadvantages. Simultaneous superordination and subordination is one of the most decisive forms of reciprocity, and, if properly disposed throughout the various departments of activity, may, by virtue of this very intimate reciprocity which it signifies, constitute a most powerful bond between individuals. The matrimonial relation owes its external and internal stability (*Festigkeit*), at least in part, to the fact that it encompasses a great number of departments of interest, with reference to many of which the one party is superior, while with respect to many others the other party is foremost. There arises from this fact a growing together (*Ineinanderwachsen*), a oneness, and at the same time such essential vitality of the relation as is hardly to be attained in the case of other sociological forms. What we call "equality of right" between husband and wife in marriage will doubtless turn out to be such an alternating superordination and subordination. At least this would be a much more organic and centripetal relation than would result from a mechanical equality in the immediate sense of the word.

This form of relationship constituted also one of the firmest bonds for the army of Cromwell. The same soldier who in military relations rendered blind obedience to his superior in rank frequently made himself in the conventicle a preacher of morals to this same superior. A corporal might conduct the devotions in which his captain participated on the same level with the privates. The army which followed its leader without reserve, when once a political purpose had been accepted, nevertheless previously came to political determinations of its own, to which the leaders had to subordinate themselves. Through this interchangeableness of superiority and inferiority the Puritan army, so long as it held together, derived extraordinary stability.

It must be observed further that this advantageous consequence of the form of association under discussion depends upon provision that the sphere within which the one social element is superior is very accurately and unequivocally delimited from those spheres in which the other is superior. Whenever this is

not the case conflicts of authority will incessantly arise, and the consequence will be not strengthening but weakening of the relationship. Especially in the event that one who is generally subordinate by some peculiar turn of affairs reaches a superiority which remains within the province of his previous inferiority, it follows that partly through the character of rebellion which the condition will then usually bear, partly through the inadequate qualification of the always subordinate for superiority in the same sphere, the stability of the group will suffer. Accordingly at the time of the supremacy of Spain, the Spanish army, for example in the Netherlands, broke out in periodical rebellions. Although it was held together in the beginning by terrific discipline, yet every now and then an irrepressible democratic energy manifested itself. At certain almost calculable intervals the soldiers rose against the officers, removed them, put them under strict control, and chose other officers of their own, who, however, were subject to the supervision of the soldiers, and were allowed to do nothing which was not approved by all their subordinates. The harmfulness of such intermixture of superiority and inferiority in one and the same sphere needs no discussion.

A case of quite similar sociological form, with entirely different content, was presented by the serious embarrassments which arose at the beginning of this century in the American Episcopal Church. The ecclesiastical bodies were often seized with a feverish passion for exercising control over the clergy, while the latter were installed for the very purpose of exerting moral and ecclesiastical control over the membership. Substantially the same thing occurs in hierarchies of civil officials, where the one in authority is dependent in technicalities upon his subordinates. The superior official often lacks knowledge of the technical details or of the actual condition of affairs. The subordinate official passes his life as a rule within the same round of duties, and thereby acquires a detailed knowledge of his limited sphere which escapes him who rises rapidly through the different grades, while the decisions of the latter cannot be carried into

execution without this detailed knowledge. In Russia this is a prevailing condition, and it is especially encouraged by the method of filling offices which is followed there. Promotion occurs according to grade in the official hierarchy, but not necessarily within the same branch of the service. When, on the contrary, one has reached a certain official class, at his own wish or that of his superior he may be transferred with the same rank to an entirely different branch of the service. It is consequently a not infrequent occurrence that a graduated student, after six months of military service at the front, becomes an officer, without further preparation; while an officer, on the other hand, by transfer into the civil grade corresponding with his military rank, may secure a more promising position in the civil service. How, without training for their new duties, they shall adapt themselves to the changed relations, is their own affair. With inevitable frequency, therefore, the higher official lacks technical knowledge appropriate to his position, and this makes him quite as inevitably dependent upon a subordinate and his knowledge of affairs. This reciprocity of superiority and inferiority often causes the one who is actually conducting the business to seem the subordinate, while he who only executes what the other directs seems the superior. The consequences are no less unfavorable to compactness of organization than appropriately apportioned alternation of superiority and inferiority would be productive of the same.

I come now to the discussion of a further characteristic of relations of superiority and inferiority, viz., that which is imparted to the group by subsidiary relations between the elements so connected. Whether the persons so connected are near to each other or far apart, whether they manifest likenesses or unlikenesses, imparts to the superiority and inferiority existing between them definite consequences and shadings. Thus among the essential distinguishing signs of sociological formations is whether a group preferably subordinates itself to a stranger or to one of its own members. Subordination to one who has emerged from the same circle, and is essentially no more than the equal of

those subordinated to him, is sometimes regarded as more tolerable, more useful, more desirable, and again as more oppressive, more obstructive, and more unworthy. In a precisely corresponding way is subordination to a stranger, or a person outside the group, contradictorily valued. In Germany in the Middle Ages the feudal lords at first had the right to name at will judges and leaders from abroad for the people attached to their estate. At length, however, the latter often won the concession that the official should be taken from within their own circle. At the same time Italian cities, on the contrary, followed the principle of procuring their judges from distant cities. This divergence, viz., estimate of control by a stranger, now as lighter, now as severer, than control by one who is nearer, has certain utilitarian justifications. The stranger is less partisan, the member of the group is more intelligent about its conditions. But these consciously rational grounds not only fail entirely in many cases, but, since they are in principle of equal value, the *decision between them* requires a higher ground, which is always instinctive. This is due to the fact that this question is a side issue of the great psychical dualism—the equality of both attraction and repulsion by like and by unlike. According as the one tendency or the other is psychically predominant, will the group prefer to subordinate itself to one of its own or to a stranger. As a matter of fact it is wholly an affair of feeling, which cannot be rationalized, whether one seems to himself more humiliated by subordination to one who is near or to one farther removed. In general we may say that the lower a group stands as a whole, the more each individual member is accustomed to subordination, the less willingly will they suffer themselves to be controlled by one of their own; the higher the group stands, the more likely it will be to subordinate itself to one of its peers alone. This feeling at its highest power has been exhibited by the House of Lords, which will not merely be recognized by every peer as his only judge, but in 1330 expressly repelled the insinuation that they wished to sit in judgment upon others than their *peers*. So decided is thus the tendency

to permit themselves to be judged only by their peers that it becomes retroactive—they are afraid of lowering themselves to the level of others by permitting themselves to become the judges of the latter. This is drawing the logically fallacious, but for the psychological basis of social formation very significant conclusion, that since only our equals are to be judged by us, therefore everyone upon whom we pass a judicial verdict is to a certain degree our equal.

Just as in this case a relation of such definite inferiority as that of an accused to his judge may still be regarded as placing the two upon a certain level of equality, so on the contrary may equality be sometimes regarded as subordination. Sir Henry Maine once said that the principle of nationality, as it is often presented, appears to assert that men of one race suffer an invasion of their rights, if they are obliged to have political arrangements in common with men of another race. Thus if two different social characters are in consideration, A and B, A appears to be subordinated to B, so soon as a constitution is thought of for the former like that belonging to the latter; although this constitution may contain nothing which connotes such lower standing or subordination. Thus, in the case of the Lords just cited, subordination seemed coördination; here coördination seems to be subordination.

Finally there belongs under this rubric the very important observation that subordination under a somewhat remotely stationed personage seems to be most serviceable when the group itself consists of heterogeneous and dissimilar elements. In this case the members of a group that is subordinated to a superior personage are related to each other precisely as the particular representations, which go to make up a general conception, are related to each other. That is to say, this conception must be the higher and the more abstract, in other words it must stand at the greater distance from each particular representation, the more unlike each other these latter are, which the general conception must comprehend. The most familiar and typical case of this sort, which recurs with formal similarity in a thousand

spheres, is that of rival parties that come together for the purpose of choosing an arbiter, and very properly fix their choice upon one who is standing completely apart from both. The more the latter is the case the more willingly will both submit to his decision. It is to be kept in mind as decisive in this case that the contending parties must be coördinate, if the type is to appear in its purity. If there already rules between them any sort of superiority and inferiority, this will all too easily create a special connection of the judge with the one party, and to that extent non-partisanship will be destroyed. Even when the referee is quite removed from either contestant's circle of specific interests, he will often nevertheless bring to his judgment a prejudice in favor of the superior, in many cases also in favor of the inferior. From the other point of view the nomination of an unpartisan arbiter is, for the reason just mentioned, a sign that the contestants concede to each other a certain coördination. Thus when in England at the present time, in the case of conflicts between laborers and employés, arbitrations frequently occur, an incident of which is mutual agreement to submit to a non-partisan—who must be neither laborer nor employer—it is evident that only recognized coördination between the contestants could induce the employers to give up participation of their own class in the arbitration, and to admit a wholly outside party.

Accordingly a further example, altogether different in material, may teach us that the common relation of many elements to a superior, whatever be the contained differences, the more certainly presupposes or produces coördination among their elements, the higher the superior power stands above them. To specify:—it is obviously very weighty for the socializing significance of the religion of wide circles that the Divinity is to be found at a certain distance from the believers. The immediate local proximity, so to speak, to the devotees, which is presumed in the case of the divine principles of all totemistic or fetichistic religions, and of the God of the ancient Jews as well, makes these religions entirely unfit to control wide areas. The

extreme loftiness of the Christian conception of God (which was directly demonstrated in the idea of the necessity of the propitiatory death of Christ) at last made equality before God possible. Distance from Him was so immeasurable that differences between men vanished before it. It was necessary that the divine principle should be withdrawn to this height in order that it should suffice to reconcile the endless differences of believers.

I come now to the last sociological problem which I will connect with the fact of superiority and inferiority. On the one hand superiority and inferiority constitute a form of the objective organization of society. On the other hand they are an expression of differences in the personal quality of men. What now is the relation of these two determinations to each other, and how is the form of socialization affected by the variations of this relation?

In the beginning of social development superordination of one person over others must have been the adequate expression and consequence of personal superiority. There is no visible reason why, in a social condition without firm organization which *a priori* assigns to the individual his station, anybody should subordinate himself to another, unless force, piety, mental superiority, suggestion, in short the relation of his personal qualities to those of the other, determined him to such submission. From this origin of superordination and subordination, which of course is at every moment operative within society, and continually founds new relations, there develop permanent organizations of superordination and subordination into which individuals are born, or in which they gain specific positions on the ground of quite other qualities than those which established in the first place the superordination and subordination in question. While at first there were simply human beings with their peculiarities, and their relations grew out of these, later the relations themselves were given as objective forms, "stations," empty spaces and boundaries as it were, thenceforth to be "filled out" by individuals. The more firmly

and technically the organization of the group is elaborated, the more objectively and formally will the schemes of superordination and subordination present themselves. Then, as a supplementary matter, the proper persons are selected for these relationships, or they are filled out by the mere accidents of birth and other chances. In this connection we are by no means to think merely of the hierarchy of civil positions. Financial economy creates within the spheres of its control a wholly similar formation of society. Possession or lack of a determined sum of money signifies a determined social station almost entirely independent of the personal qualities of the individual concerned. This is thrown out into bold relief by the fact that money is a possession not in any necessary connection with personality, but possible to everyone who may earn or inherit it. People traverse the positions corresponding with possession of determined sums of money, just as purely fortuitous substances find their way through rigidly fixed forms. To whatever extent socialism may condemn this blind accidental relation between the objective gradation of positions and the qualifications of persons, its proposals for organization end with the same sociological formation. This is evident when we consider that socialism demands an absolutely centralized, that is of necessity a firmly articulated and hierarchical constitution and administration. It, however, assumes *a priori* the equal fitness of all individuals to occupy any position in this hierarchy whatsoever. According to the ideal of consistent socialism, in the state of the future the same person who today performs the most menial work may tomorrow turn the scale upon the most weighty political questions. Herewith has the formal demand for superordination and subordination become completely master over the subjective qualities from which the demand has its source.

This analysis brings us to a sociological perception of the very highest significance: that superordination and subordination are a formal structural (*organisatorische*) necessity for the continuance of the group. In comparison with this necessity, what persons shall be the superiors or inferiors is a secondary question. As a

demand of social self-preservation this necessity confronts us in very primitive conditions. At the time when in Germany the earliest constitution of complete personal and property equality within the community had become obsolete, the landless man found himself without the active rights of a freeman. If he did not wish to remain without any connection with the community, it was necessary for him to attach himself to a lord, in order thus, as entitled to protection (*Schutzgenosse*), to participate indirectly in the public associations. The community had an interest in his doing this, for it could not tolerate an unattached man within its circuit; consequently Anglo-Saxon law expressly made it the duty of the landless man to attach himself to a lord. Likewise in mediæval England the interest of the community demanded that the stranger should place himself under a protecting lord. From such very simple points of departure the conviction grew that men must in general be governed—better by unfit persons than not at all—that in general only the group must assume the form of superordination and subordination, so that it is consequently only a desirable accident if, in the objectively necessary position, the subjectively suitable individual has his place. As explanations or justifications of this order, which is supposed to be immanent in the nature of social beings, all the theories appear which, since Aristotle, teach that there are φύσει δοῦλοι who in general could not bear another kind of life than that of subordination, and that the organization of society after the form of superordination and subordination is merely an expression of this fact. At the same time the converse possibility is often overlooked, viz., that the actual subordination, resting upon quite other grounds than personal qualifications, has led to an adaptation of individuals and classes to this condition, *i. e.*, to the now evidently actual quality and disposition for subordination.

Two lines of thought stand here over against each other, each of which may cite for itself a long series of facts from every department of social life, so that each represents a significant sociological formation.

In consideration of the actual unlikeness in the qualities of

human beings—to be removed only in a Utopia—the aristocracy of the best is surely the sort of constitution in which the external relationship between men is the most exact and efficient expression of their subjective relation. But an aristocracy of the best, such as Plato wanted, can never be fully realized, because there is no infallible means of recognizing the best. Even if it could be realized it would not exist permanently, since the possession of power unquestionably corrupts not always individuals but corporate bodies and classes. The aristocracy of the best lies therefore in close proximity to the aristocracy of the worst. Consequently the condition of universal equality seems to be the *lesser evil*, which may gradually attain to the dignity of an absolutely good condition. The peculiar difficulties then which the formal fact of superordination entails, produce the advantage of an external constitution which stands in direct antithesis with the subjective qualifications of the individuals.

And yet, the corresponding pessimistic temper may deny the necessity of this result, and may hold that which here appears the lesser evil to be the greater. This may be plausible from the point of view that, should rigid superordination and subordination disappear, there would go with it the compulsion, which human nature now at all events needs, to avoid falling into complete aimlessness and formlessness of conduct. Thus for many historical epochs one may cite the advantage of established hereditary despotism, which forces wide territories together in unity, in comparison with free federation of the same. There is the same presumption in favor of despotism that there is in favor of marriage as contrasted with "free love." Marriage often holds the parties together by force, when from passion, or anger or indifference they would separate if they could. But what blessing there is in this compulsion! How it helps over disturbances of the relation, to which it would be irreparable injury to yield. Only subordination could accomplish this—either to a person or to a law. It is as though there existed in our soul two strata or tendencies, differentiated from each other in principle; the one bearing the real meaning and purpose and substance of our

lives, while the other is made up of momentary impulses and isolated irritations. The latter would still oftener conquer the former if the inconsistencies and perversities in its variations were not broken up by objective regularities, through which the abiding undercurrent repeatedly recovers its power. Since now the objective and ideal constraint must, as a rule, be borne by superordinated persons, so in the most complicated relations, those of the family, of the class (*ständischen*), of politics, of the church, of social intercourse in the restricted sense (*geselligen*)—personal superordination seems to be the necessary form of coherence of the elements. Here also adaptation of the superordinated or subordinated position to the individual qualification is not a necessary element. It is only the universally human qualification which, in the sociological form of organized constraint, finds its adequate expression.

More than this, such correspondence of personal qualifications and social position in the series of superordinations and subordinations is *in general and on principle impossible*, no matter what sort of organization may be proposed for this purpose. With this perception we encounter the last and most radical complication which connects itself with the problem of the correspondence of these factors. It consists in the fact that there are always more persons qualified for superior positions than there are positions of that order. Of the millions subject to a prince there are surely a great number who would be equally good and perhaps better princes. Of the workmen in a factory there are many who would be equally good managers or at least foremen. Among the common soldiers of an army are many who possess full, though perhaps latent, qualifications to be officers. This unquestioned fact is not done away with by the contrasted fact that there are also many people in superior positions who do not possess sufficient qualifications for the same. In the first place such an occurrence is very conspicuous. Incapacity in a position from which others must be led is less easily concealed than other incapacities. It consequently seems to occur with special frequency, precisely *because* so many others

really fitted for the superior station occupy contiguous inferior positions. As a matter of fact the purely individual incompetency of the persons in controlling positions is relatively infrequent. A German proverb says, "When God gives an office he gives the brains for it."¹ The truth of the observation herein contained rests upon the fact that the intelligence requisite for occupancy of superior positions exists in many people, but it may exert and develop and reveal itself only when they assume the position. When we think of the ridiculous and uncontrollable accidents by which men in all departments of life reach their positions, it would seem a miracle that the number of incompetents in responsible positions is so small, if we were not obliged to assume that latent qualifications for the positions are very extensively present.

This incommensurability between the quantum of qualification for superior stations and the quantum of their possible exercise is perhaps to be explained by the difference between the character of men as members of groups and as individuals. The group as such is low and in need of guidance. The peculiarities which the group develops as simply common characteristics of the group are only those of subordination. So soon, however, as combinations of groups occur, that is, a formation of larger circles comes into being, it is necessary for the whole mass to organize itself in the form of subordination to a few. This does not prevent the possession of higher and finer characteristics by each person in this mass. These, however, are individual. In *various* respects they extend beyond the common possession, and consequently they do not raise from their low plane those qualities which are common to the members of the group as such. From this relation it follows, on the one hand, that the group as a whole needs a leader, and there must be many subordinate and few superiors; on the other hand, however, each individual of the group is more highly qualified, that is, as element of the group and as subordinate.

This enormous difficulty, which presents the sting and the

¹ Wem Gott ein Amt giebt, dem giebt er auch den Verstand dazu.

most radical incommensurability in all social formations, this antinomy between the just claim to superior relation and the technical impossibility of satisfying it, is overcome in the sociological respect by the principle of rank (*ständische Princip*), and the existing social order, by erecting classes pyramidally one above the other, with constantly diminishing numbers of members, and thereby *a priori* diminishing the number of those "qualified" for leading positions. Since in case of the equal right of all to all positions it would be impossible to satisfy every legitimate claim, the social order which includes ranks and classes provides at the outset for a limiting selection which pays no attention to the individual, but rather on the contrary determines the individual. In a multitude *a priori* equal, it is impossible to bring each to a suitable position; consequently this social arrangement might be considered as an attempt, on the contrary, from the point of view of the previously determined position, to discipline men for this preordained station. Whether a socialistic constitution, without such a prejudice for superordination and subordination, could fulfill its promises is to me doubtful. Under socialism, on the one hand, with removal of every accidental chance, only talent shall determine the attainment of position. On the other hand every talent shall find its appropriate station; that is, shall bring its highest potency to development, in consequence of which, according to the above explanations, there must be more superiors than inferiors, more to give orders than to execute them. By no means political organizations alone, but group formations of every kind and of every content labor under this difficulty, which rests in the last analysis upon the conflict between the individual totality of men and their character as an element of the group. The inferiority (*Niedrigkeit*) of the latter (group element) in comparison with the former (total individual) brings about the necessity that there shall be many subordinates and few superiors. The eminence of the former (total individual) in comparison with the latter (group element) amounts to necessity that there shall be incomparably more persons essentially and

potentially qualified for superior positions than there are such positions to be filled.

These specifications are intended to serve as an example of the peculiar process of abstraction upon which, according to my view, the claim of sociology to existence as a separate science must be based. The desideratum is to discern in the countless historical groupings the principles of group formation as such, in order that we may approximate the laws of the influences which human beings exert upon each other in their reciprocal contacts, — laws which in themselves are not affected by the material causes or purposes of these contacts, although the different contents of socialization will, of course, lead to various combinations, different degrees of strength, and different courses of development in these forms of contact. And as we reach a science of religion by turning our attention away from all other interests of life except religion, or at least by treating them merely as accidents; as we gain a science of language by abstracting language and its immediate psychological conditions from everything that lies beyond, although as a matter of fact there would never have been utterance without the excluded concrete motives, so we shall gain a sociology by seeking to recognize the laws, forms and developments of socialization (*Vergesellschaftung*) which to be sure in reality determine life only together with other functions and forces, which nevertheless can constitute the subject-matter of a distinct science only in abstraction from these other factors.¹

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CHRISTIAN SOCIOLOGY. VIII.¹

THE PROCESS OF SOCIAL REGENERATION.

THIS, then, is the core of the social doctrine of Jesus—divine sonship and consequent human brotherliness. This it is that gives unity to his varied teachings, and, with all the moral force it involves, is that upon which he believed could be based the development of his kingdom. Nay, may we not say, the moral force generated by the revelation of this new divine and human relationship could be trusted itself to work out reforms? If this were the position of Jesus it would in large measure explain how it came about that, except as already indicated, he gave so few detailed directions as to specific reforms. Was he indifferent to the process of regeneration? Or did he in the case of both individual and society anticipate if not the details, at least the general character of those struggles and developments that have resulted from the workings of Christianity? To put the question in another form. Has Christianity in its attempts to regenerate humanity followed the programme of Jesus or of some other man?

I.

It is by no means impossible that one should have agreed with the presentation thus far made of the teaching of Jesus and yet hesitate to believe that the future of the kingdom as he conceived of it involved either universality or even appreciable progress. Even Wendt seems to commit Jesus to the belief that the new kingdom was to be hardly more than an extended Israel into which a few Gentiles might be admitted.² That an unknown, uninfluential Jew like Jesus should have had

¹ This paper concludes the present series.

² *Teaching of Jesus*, II, 350-51. See also his commentary on Acts (10:1; 15:1) in the Meyer series.

visions of a universal empire does, it must be granted, seem somewhat remarkable. Yet no one can read the words that he spoke during the latter part of his career¹ without being convinced that in his expectations the process of regeneration was not one to be limited by either geographical or political boundaries. Nor, even if it be granted as altogether probable that he did not foresee the astonishing changes wrought within Christendom, does a complete synthesis of his words permit the view that this ignorance extended to the general nature of the process that was to lead to the end of one age and the full establishment of that new social order in which God and righteousness and love were to be supreme. If it be objected that Jesus declared that few found the strait gate and the narrow path,² it will be enough to reply that such a remark applied to the immediate circle of his hearers and must be correlated with the other sayings in which he anticipates the evangelization and conquest of the world. Similarly, in ascribing due weight to those sayings of his in which he spoke of his contemporaries' seeing the fulfilment of his prophecies of the coming kingdom,³ one must remember that this coming was a progression whose inauguration in the new opportunities arising from the fall of the Jewish state might come suddenly, but whose completion was lost in the depths of omniscience itself.⁴ In fact, if we are to regard the "great commission"⁵ as representing in any faintest way a thought of Jesus, the conclusion cannot be avoided that he was concerned with the evangelization of the world quite as much as with that of Judea and Galilee. The fact that he himself seems deliberately to have declined such wider labors⁶ is to be explained as a part of a well-ordered plan in which his own

¹ Thus John 12:30: I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me; Luke 13:29: They shall come from the east and the west and shall sit down in the kingdom of God. Cf. John 17:18, 20. It cannot escape notice that Wendt's position depends largely upon his belief that Jesus expected that the kingdom would be completely established during the lifetime of his own generation. *Teaching of Jesus*, II, 345.

² Matt. 7:13, 14.

³ Matt. 24:34.

⁴ Matt. 24:36.

⁵ Matt. 28:19.

⁶ John 12:20-32. The well-known correspondence between Abgarus, king of Edessa, and Jesus, though undoubtedly apocryphal, expresses correctly, perhaps through

evangelistic work consisted fundamentally in the gathering of a few devoted followers who should be so imbued with his own spirit as to become at once the instructors and the nucleus of a new society. The audacity of Jesus in assuming that a group of such men had within it the possibility of indefinite expansion is equaled only by the superb optimism that saw possibilities of infinite good in humanity. In both lay his philosophy of the growth of the new social order. If his teaching had been less human and humanity less capable of moral rebirth he would have been but one of the motley crew of Christs who have so often appeared only to delude and destroy.

II.

There is disappointment in store for the man who looks to Jesus for specific teachings as to reform. He was singularly unconcerned with those specific injunctions with which the system of Moses teems. There was no lack of vices within the Roman Empire—not yet feeling the weakly revivifying touch of poverty and philosophy—against which he might have thundered, to say nothing of those larger questions that might be expected to engage the attention of a developing society. Yet with none of these did he concern himself. The gospel was to be no new collection of moral precepts to be forced upon a world already surfeited with good advice, but a power that should make towards righteousness. The process of the new birth of the Jewish and heathen world was not to be that of a new subjection to law, be it never so inspired, but that of a growth that showed itself through such institutions as the process of evolution might show necessary. The symbol of the new society was not to be that of stones, graven though they might be by the hand of God, but the seed which, planted in the field, grows, one knows not how, and in proper season produces the blade, and the ear, and the full corn in the ear.¹

some tradition, the attitude of Jesus: "I must fulfill all the ends of my mission in this country."

¹ Mark 4: 26-28.

Thus the general nature of this progress is described by Jesus as an evolution, although it could not be expected that he would use the word.

1. It is to be the transformation of existing powers. This does not mean to commit Jesus to the belief that all that is necessary for the attainment of a perfect ideal of social life is simply the development of a godless sociability. As has already appeared, Jesus looked upon the religious capacity of men as just as truly normal and human as any other of the capacities of human life. Accordingly, when he trusted to humanity to develop into something like normal living it was because he had recognized the religious forces resident in human nature which were capable themselves of great development and which possessed the power of transforming character. The world, or the existing social environment in which the new society found itself, was to be won over to the Christian conceptions of social relations by virtue of the fact that it contained within it material which might be regenerated through an apprehended God. Jesus was no Christ for animals but for men. Because the world was evil did not argue that it was unsavable. If the leaven was to leaven the lump it must have been because the lump was leavenable. Out from the seething mass of men and women so largely under the control of evil purposes and unbrotherly ideals,¹ there was to be formed a body whose ideals were to be noble and fraternal. They were to be the same individuals, but transformed; no longer the enemies one of another, but brothers, each looking not alone to his own affairs but also in the spirit of helpfulness to the affairs of another.

2. This process is by analogy organic. The kingdom does not depend upon accretion for its growth, but upon the assimilation of new material won from the environment in which it may find itself. It is indeed surprising to see how frequently

¹"The foreigner is a wolf" was altogether a more characteristic social conception of the ancient world than the noble words of an Epictetus. One has but to read the *Golden Ass* of Apuleius to see how, in the midst of a well-developed commercial system, there lingered a conception of travelers hardly higher than that held by brigands.

Jesus recurs to biological analogies in describing the future progress of his kingdom. One can hardly with safety revert at this point to the important figure of the leaven, since its biological content could hardly have been explicitly in the mind of Jesus. But within the sphere of observable organic growth Jesus saw in the life of plants repeated analogies of the growth of that which he did but inaugurate. Now the progress of the kingdom is like that of the mustard seed;¹ now of the seed sown on soils which by their different natures condition the size of the harvest;² again it is like the seed that must grow if once it be planted, since the earth itself compels it—a most instructive analogy.³ From a somewhat different point of view, the history of the kingdom in the world seemed to be like that of a field in which tares and grain grew side by side until the harvest;⁴ and, most beautiful and suggestive of all, the efficiency of the members of the new family was distinctly taught to depend upon the closeness of their union with himself, as branch with vine.⁵ Such a habit of thought can hardly be said to have been fortuitous. It is too nearly akin to the conception of the new kingdom as a family to permit the interpretation that Jesus did not intend to emphasize the truth that back of any permanent social growth there must be, first of all, a sympathy in purpose and similarity in capacity, such as can be compared alone to the apprehension and the assimilation of parts of its environment by the living organism. Indeed, when once Jesus' conception of "the world" is clearly gained the analogy becomes altogether striking. The kingdom of a few men, filled with the might that comes from the experience of a newly revealed sonship of God and brotherhood with each other, is seen set down in the midst of societies full of opposite forces, yet composed of convertible men. Out from this social environment the little group is to select and convert and assimilate whom it can, and what institutions it can. Through these newly acquired elements it will grow, ever more capable of fur-

¹ Matt. 13: 31.³ Mark 4: 27.⁵ John 15: 4 sq.² Mark 4: 3 sq.⁴ Matt. 13: 24-30.

ther growth, like the seed in the ground nourished and made great by the surroundings within which it finds itself.

But at one point the analogy fails. Jesus never for an instant thought of the kingdom as ultimately merely a world within a world. The plant can never make the earth from which it grows wholly its own and itself, but there was to be no such dualism in the case of society. With the modification to be considered presently, Jesus expected the new society to be at last coextensive with all society; or, more truly, he expected that at last the world would be so thoroughly transformed into the kingdom as to cease to be distinct from it. The three measures of meal would all be leavened. The prince of this world had already been judged,¹ the twelve were to sit as judges of the new Israel,² the Son of Man was at last to come in the glory of an undisputed ruler.³

3. But evidently this process of assimilation must be preceded by a transformation that is moral.⁴ Evil men are not to share in the joys of this new society. It is not enough with Jesus to improve the conditions of human life. The mere conquest of matter, the exploitation of natural resources, as seen clearly enough today, need not of necessity imply any essential advance in civilization. To clothe a man and to feed him well, to enable him to build up great buildings and establish large businesses, to enable an entire people so to develop its land and its mineral deposits as to become rich, may be the furthest possible from building that person or that people into a more fraternal life. To each alike comes the warning of Jesus: "Thou fool, this night thy soul shall be demanded of thee."⁵ But to bring the constructive forces of a man or a nation into subjection to lofty ideals; to make that which is wrong hated and that which is good loved; so to transform and improve and ennoble a man that instead of seeking his own selfish interests he will find his life by spontaneously losing it in the society of other lives about him; to develop a love for men because one is one's self a child of God; in a word, to make normal

¹ John 16: 11.

² Matt. 16: 27; 19: 28; 25: 31.

² Matt. 19: 28.

⁴ Matt. 12: 33; 7: 17, 18; 12: 34, 35.

⁵ Luke 12: 20.

social life depend upon goodness—this is the fundamental position of Jesus. One does not need to be reminded that in this he stands by no means in the same class with many other would-be reformers. To give large wages, to make the home more comfortable and happy, to see that the sanitary arrangements of the city and community are perfect, to provide a fair income, healthful food, good amusements, and all the other requirements of respectable life today; to do this and let evolution do the rest—this is the position of more than one social teacher.

But the imperfection that must needs be corrected, in the estimation of Jesus, was no chance of birth or occupation in life. The Pharisee was quite as ill as the harlot and the publican.¹ The cause of all inequality and lack of fraternity is moral; it is sin. Men cannot reach that divine sonship in which fraternal love becomes natural so long as the spirit of selfishness rules them. A corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit.² The world can become the kingdom only by a repentance and a moral change on the part of its members that replaces the spirit of revolt against goodness and a loving God with the spirit of sonship.³

And Jesus saw aright. A perfect society cannot be created from imperfect people. That which stands in the way of the realization of many a man's ideal for society has not been its own logical inconsistency, but its failure to find or to produce the right sort of men upon which to work. The plan of the house called for marble and the only material at hand was mud. Jesus proposes to furnish good material as well as a noble plan.

4. Such a moral transformation of humanity's sinful but potentially noble nature must of necessity be gradual. It cannot be accomplished in a generation. An impatient man with a passion for hastening his benefactions would have failed to see this necessity. At the outset of his public life Jesus had wrestled with the temptation to hurry the conquest of the world,⁴ but as he stood at the end of his ministry and saw the months of earnest effort that lay behind him, and judged of the future, the prog-

¹ Matt. 21:31.

³ John 3:3.

² Matt. 7:17.

⁴ Matt. 4:8-10; Luke 4:5-8.

ress of his kingdom appeared not as a thing to be accomplished by social cataclysms,¹ but rather as the steady growth of a tiny seed into a great tree.²

It is in the course of this gradual development of a fraternity that attempts to assimilate an unregenerate society that we must especially look to find Jesus conception of the process by which his kingdom was to reach its completion.

III.

Is this process to be institutional and national, or is it to be individualistic? Is society or are men first to be regenerate? It is a thought that finds frequent expression that Christianity introduced individualism. So indeed did Christianity, if by individualism is not meant an atomism. For the Christian doctrine of society is not that of an aggregation of individuals made repellant through uncompromising demands for rights. The only sense in which Christianity can claim to be individualistic is in its elevation of the worth of each human life. But the real worth of every life consists not in separate existence, but rather in the identification of its interests with the interests of others in the exercise of that fraternal love which was both the ideal and the practice of Jesus himself.

Yet a society must be composed of individuals, and therefore it was that Jesus devoted himself so largely to the individual. Reformations do not proceed *en masse*. There must be the successive winning of one man after another until there be developed something like a nucleus of a more perfect social life. The method, therefore, of Jesus in the founding of the kingdom was not the wholesale righting of political or economic or religious wrongs, although when this was necessary he did not hesitate to give vent to his righteous indignation against men who persisted in perpetuating them.

Rather was his method the successive winning of separate souls, now a Philip and now a Peter, until at last he had dis-

¹ John 18: 30.

² Cf. Matt. 13: 31-33 — two of the best authenticated of Jesus' sayings.

covered and won to himself a few men and women who were so far imbued with his own spirit of fraternity as to be ready to inaugurate and evangel a higher and more perfect social life. Loyola never followed more persistently or more successfully a Xavier, John, a fugitive robber, than did Jesus the humble fishermen with whom his lot was cast. Once let the spirit of such brotherliness become regnant, and all the horrid brood of vices that spring from its opposite will vanish. Men may need to incorporate this spirit in special laws, but this must be done by each age and community for itself. Jesus gives a constitution; men can frame statutes.

And yet it can be objected, and with truth, that, as the term is commonly used, good men will not of necessity make a good society. It is possible to develop virtue in such a fashion as to make its possessors unattractive, and, if not self-centered, at least incapable of aggressive work for the helping of surrounding lives. If this were the legitimate result of Christian teaching, one could well despair of a Christian society. But it is sufficient answer to the objection to point to the life of Jesus. In him we see a perfect incarnation of his teachings, and no man can study his life without feeling that a society composed of Christs would be a perfect fraternity. No man feels the same in regard to Socrates. A thousand men of his ilk would constitute a very uncomfortable community within which to live. The same is true of societies composed of ascetic or semi-ascetic reformers. But so normal was Jesus' life, so judiciously devoted to the welfare of others, so regardful of the conventionalities which experience begets as regulators of social life, that he stands as a representative of an individual who has found his completest mission in the identification of his life with that of other men. Indeed, precisely in the same proportion that a man reaches Jesus' conception of the individual does he help establish Jesus' fraternal society.

IV.

The expanding Christian society, therefore, will consist of groups of individuals each possessed of the same spirit and

method of life as that taught by their Master. These little groups of individuals Jesus likened to leaven which was thrown into the meal and there remained until it had leavened the meal. Though they are not of the world, yet they are to stay in it.¹ Conquest, not flight, is to be their watchword. The progress of Christian society in the world will depend upon the power which each nucleus of Christian individuals gathered into a society will have upon the surrounding social life. It can expand only by transforming and assimilating to itself this environment. As the process is not one of mere instruction but of the impartation of new life, Jesus must have had in mind certain means by which this impartation could be accomplished. And these means we should expect would be such as would render especially easy the bringing of individuals under the influence of those forces which would make him fraternal by making him Christlike. Does Jesus specify or imply any such?

First. In the larger sphere of life Jesus seems indirectly to recognize the power of public opinion in modifying environment. There is, it must be granted, a certain Christianization of society going on unconsciously. The life of genuine members of the kingdom has an influence upon those who are outside its professed members that is as real as it is unmeasurable. For do they not contribute something to the formative ideals and opinions of their society? Through the influence of individuals who have come under the influence of Jesus others are constantly forced to adopt higher standards in at least conventional morality. Yet the force of public opinion, so far as Jesus recognizes it, appears at first glance, largely evil. His apostles were not to be of the leaven of the Pharisee;² they were not to pattern themselves after the habits of the hypocrite;³ they were not, to use the Pauline expression, to "conform to the present world."⁴ But it is not difficult to see that such a vitiated public opinion must be replaced by a new and better as soon as hypocrites are replaced by honest men. If one is not

¹ John 17:15.

³ Matt. 6:2, 5, 16.

² Matt. 16:11; Mark 8:15; Luke 12:1.

⁴ Rom. 12:2.

to conform to a bad social standard it is certainly incumbent upon him to erect a new.

Second. The earliest attempts which the primitive Christians made towards the incorporation of the kingdom of God were, like those of their Master, in the line of philanthropic effort. Peter and John healed the lame man in lieu of alms,¹ and within the little body of believers themselves one of the first expressions of the new social spirit was in the sharing of wealth among the brethren.² In charity there has always been a point of contact between the Christian society and the world that has been of the greatest service. Charity is of necessity not a permanent need of the world, if ever the kingdom of God is to be realized, but as social life is constituted today Jesus saw that it was of the very utmost importance. He worked out the details of the social obligations of men of wealth with deliberation and firm touch. In giving dinners they are to treat poor people as their equals, even though they cannot expect equivalent return for social favors.³ The buyer of land and oxen, as well as the new-made husband, are seen by Jesus to serve as the type of those who, because of their own indifference, are to be replaced at the king's supper by those of the highways and hedges.⁴ And if wealth is to be devoted to social purposes it must be with no sense of superiority or unaccompanied by the giver's sympathy and love. The poor widow, he said, gave more than the rich, though she gave but two mites,⁵ and the neighborliness of the good Samaritan was certainly seen less in his expenditure of money than in his services to the unfortunate traveler.⁶ As Paul later so finely said, if one were to give all his goods to feed the poor, and had not love, it would profit him nothing.⁷ One's own desires are to be the measure of acts that affect others.⁸ Accordingly, the frequent reference to almsgiving⁹ can have little other meaning than that it may serve as a means of furthering

¹ Acts 3:1 *sq.*

⁵ Mark 12:41-44.

⁸ Matt. 7:12.

² Acts 2:44.

⁶ Luke 10:30 *sq.*

⁹ Matt. 5:42; 6:2-4; Luke 12:33.

³ Luke 14:13.

⁷ 1 Cor. 13:3.

⁴ Matt. 22:1-10; Luke 14:16-24.

the reign of fraternity. It is not an end in itself; like all other good deeds it must cause its beholders to glorify the Father in heaven.¹ Through it the attention and good will of men might be gathered, one foundation of the new social order, brotherly love, made more manifest, and thus many brought to a union with older believers whose fellowship was with the Father and with his Son Jesus Christ.²

Third. But probably the most effective and historically about the only appreciable force that has been at work in the regeneration of society has been the church. According to one's conception of this body will one regard it as coextensive with or less in extent than the kingdom itself.³ If one, however, takes thought only of Jesus, it becomes reasonably clear that he was little concerned with founding a religious institution. In the one of the two instances in which he speaks of the church⁴ it is evident that it is a means to the maintenance of brotherliness; and in the other instance the formula, "binding and loosing," that is, the right to teach authoritatively, was entrusted not to the church, but to that member of the kingdom upon whom the church was to be built.⁵ Indeed, it almost seems as if in the mind of Jesus the church was simply the religious phase of the life of the kingdom. As the kingdom was to be fundamentally social the state is simply the new fraternity in its political aspect. In the same way the church expresses the combination of the members of the fraternity for the purpose of special philanthropic and religious effort. So indifferent was Jesus to the church as an institution that he never spoke of its organization, and left practically no directions for anything like a ceremonial. He founded not a church but a kingdom. Nevertheless, as society stands today, there can be little doubt that the chief points of contact between those who are endeavoring to incorpo-

¹ Matt. 5:16, cf. Luke 19:8.

² 1 John 1:3.

³ In the former sense we understand the word to be used by FREEMANTLE, *The World as the Subject of Redemption*.

⁴ Matt. 18:17.

⁵ Matt. 16:18. It is by no means impossible that this text, as well as Matt. 18:17, was not contained in the earlier Logia. See WENDT, *Lehre Jesu*, I, 155 sq.

rate the teachings of Jesus in their lives, and those who are not so endeavoring, are the organizations known as the churches. In the same proportion as each church develops in its appreciation of Jesus and in its endeavor to emphasize the social necessities of a perfect individual life, will its influence be felt in transforming the environment in which it is placed.

Further, it is clear that the progress of the Christian transformation of society must proceed, precisely as in the method of Jesus, along the line of conversion or, more exactly, the regeneration of the individual. At this point he who seeks to inaugurate a greater Christian society has the invaluable aid of the church's effort. For generations churches of all shades of evangelical faith have been endeavoring to lay deep this foundation of a progressive social regeneration. It has often happened that such a programme has seemed ineffectual; men have often endeavored to substitute a system of ethics for the dynamics of a personal faith in God. But such efforts have generally resulted from or preceded a weakening of conventional morals and a degeneracy in society as a whole. The test of a Christian society's *morale* has seldom been the utterances of its ethical teachers, but the religious fervor of its masses. Strip from the England of the seventeenth century the burning zeal of the Separatist and Puritan, and we have the Restoration and the Court Preachers. Concerts and kindergartens are very necessary as complements of revivals and mission halls, but as saviors of a nation's civilization and purity they are as grass before the storm. No thoughtful man will underestimate or antagonize the remarkable combination of professional and amateur philanthropy that has within a few years burst forth in social settlements and institutional churches. But, so far as one can at present judge, such forms of social effort, profoundly Christian as they are, can never remove the need for the older and more permanent work of the missionary. No civilization can be Christian that balks at the fact of divine sonship. No social reform will be thoroughgoing and lasting that stops before endeavoring to bring every human being into the righteousness and fraternal love that spring

from religious experience. Evangelizing effort on the part of the church, therefore, is to be urged not merely on the ground of the benefit brought to the individual who is turned from evil to righteousness, but on the ground of its profound significance and helpfulness in all matters of social advance. It cannot be too often emphasized that social regeneration according to the conception of Christ cannot proceed on any other line than that of the replacing of bad men by good men. And this above all others is the function of the church. For the Christian ideal is not that of the monk but of the Christ. To aid in the regeneration of a man is to aid in the regeneration of society.

V.

It is evident that such transformation of an imperfect world into the perfect family Jesus anticipated must, if this process is to be followed, require much time. So Jesus foresaw. To those people who expected that the kingdom of God would come immediately he spoke the parable of the nobleman who went into a far country.¹ Indeed, the entire completion of the transforming process was not to be reached until the end of the age—an event of such indefinite date that in regard to it he professed himself to be in ignorance. And not only was it to be slow, but it was to be full of struggle and anguish for those men who attempted to better humanity and human society. Jesus would, indeed, have been wonderfully lacking in foresight if his own experience had not taught him that his followers must expect bitter opposition. The master had been called Beelzebub and had been persecuted, and should the disciples expect to be above their lord in escaping like treatment? It was enough for the disciple to be like his master.² Helpful as the new doctrine might be, Jesus saw that it was such as might well be judged revolutionary by those whom its insistence upon equality and fraternity might alienate. His was not a mission wholly of peace.³ He came to bring both sword and fire into social life.⁴ The members of the new propaganda were

¹ Luke 19: 11 *sq.*

² Matt. 10: 24, 25.

³ Matt. 10: 34.

⁴ Luke 12: 49.

to expect severe treatment at the hand of Roman and Jew alike. They were to go forth as sheep among wolves.¹ Political power and ecclesiasticism would equally set themselves against them.² But there was to be no compromise. He who would be saved must endure to the end.³ That which they heard in the ear they were to tell on the housetop.⁴ They were to be cities on hills, lamps uncovered by bushels, salt that had not lost its savor.⁵ There was nothing hidden except that it should be revealed.⁶ And still no members of the kingdom were to yield to revengeful feelings and lead revolution. On the contrary their arms were to be prayer and benediction.⁷ As the forces upon which he had counted for success were peaceful, so as far as his followers were concerned, was to be the process by which the unwilling world would be transformed into the kingdom.⁸

Yet a startling thing in this calm anticipation of a slow and painful process is his recognition of the possibility of a time when the forces of human nature should be insufficient; when the new social order would be so far established as to have transformed and assimilated all of the transformable material it found in its environment. Until that time, of necessity the two opposing worlds must have existed side by side.⁹ Like tares and wheat growing in the same field men were to grow together until good and bad alike had exhausted the possibilities of growth. Then, through some exercise of the supreme power of the heavenly Father and King, the agony and the transformation were to cease together. As tares are separated from the wheat, those incorrigible men who refused to share in the new sonship and fraternity would be removed, and thereafter the

¹ Matt. 10: 16.

⁴ Matt. 10: 26 *sq.*, Mark 4: 21 *sq.*

² Matt. 10: 17; 23: 34; Luke 12: 11; 21: 12.

⁵ Matt. 5: 13-15.

³ Matt. 10: 22.

⁶ Mark 4: 22; Luke 8: 17.

⁷ Luke 6: 38.

⁸ One should not overlook, however, the balance in Jesus' mind throughout all this dark forecast of the future. He cautions his followers against quixotic adventures. They were not to cast their pearls before swine (Matt. 7: 6). Because of the dangers to which they were to be exposed, while as harmless as doves, they were to be as wise as serpents (Matt. 10: 16).

⁹ Matt. 13: 24-30.

righteous were to shine like the sun in the kingdom of their Father.¹

As to when this supplementing of growth by cataclysm shall come, Jesus gives us no information. But that he should have seen the necessity of it is a tribute to his sense of reality. Men of persistent anti-filial and anti-fraternal disposition can never be made into loving brethren. Their removal is the only hope of a permanently peaceful fraternity. Just what Jesus meant by the striking imagery in which he clothed this thought we cannot clearly see. That it may mean revolution or some other tremendous political change is not clear and yet not to be absolutely denied in the light of his references to the destruction of Jerusalem. But, whatever it may be, it will mark the triumph of the new social order. Penal action will reach its consummation in the isolation of offenders. Individual and institutional life will no longer testify to the reign of even an enlightened selfishness. The world will, by virtue of man's endeavor and God's regenerating power, have been transformed into the kingdom. And the triumph of this new and perfected humanity, this eternal fraternity which he described and instituted and for which centuries have travailed—this is the coming of the Lord.

"There remaineth, therefore, a Sabbath rest for the people of God." So wrote the author of the epistle to the Hebrews as he looked back upon a restless, defeated theocracy, and forward towards the future of the true Judaism.² So, too, many a weary one, beaten back in his endeavor to bring to an unwilling world Christ's blessing of brotherliness and love has looked toward the East, hoping that through the darkness of the sin and misery and social inequality of the world in which he lived there might break the dawn of that great Sabbath. And through the ages full many another crushed down by circumstance has listened for the "I come quickly" of his Lord, eager to cry out in welcome, "Amen! Even so come, Lord Jesus." For it is no dream or unintelligible apocalypse that meets us in the words

¹ Matt. 13: 43.

² Heb. 4: 9.

and life of Jesus, but rather a teaching the embodiment of which is well worth an effort. And he who today most deeply feels humanity's need, and appreciates the crisis in which the world is gripped, will not rashly push one side the ideals and powers that He revealed who spake as never man spake, and lived as never man lived, and has already rewrought civilizations as has no man or teaching.

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SOCIAL CONTROL. V.

RELIGION.

THE influencing of the *will* by rewards and punishments—legal, social, and supernatural—and by social suggestion has been described. We now pass on to that ascendancy which society gains by working on the *feelings* of its members.

In this form of social control the feelings of men toward objects or experiences are changed in direction or force. In order to lessen anti-social conduct the desire for the ends thereby gained is changed into indifference or aversion, or else interest in rival aims is stimulated. For example, a desolating greed leading to fraud and venality may be controlled by holding riches up to contempt or by fostering interest in sports, scholarship, culture, or public affairs. In order to procure social conduct, indifference or repugnance to the implied ends is changed into liking, or the zest for competing aims is killed. For instance, patriotic sacrifices may be obtained by dwelling on the thrill of battle and the joy of victory, or by depreciating the rewards of peace, such as domestic happiness, comfort, wealth, or fame.

Among the means for the orientation of the feelings of the individual to the advantage of society, we shall first of all consider religion.

The reader is warned that the word is here used in a very restricted sense. Undoubtedly the main trunk of what is called "religion" is an evolution of beliefs taking their rise from ultimate questions respecting the nature and meaning of the world and of man, and calling up feelings of fear, wonder, reverence, dependence, gratitude, or love. These beliefs are by no means devoid of social value,¹ but their ethical yield is not such as to

¹ Of the mystic Tarde says: "Le sentiment illusoire ou non de cette co-possession du moi par son non-moi intime, qu'il appelle son Dieu, et réciproquement, est la

make them important instruments of social control. But from the main stem branch off lines of belief that may be called ethical because of their aid in stimulating men to social conduct. One of these offshoots has already been considered in the paper entitled "Belief." I shall now examine another branch for which it has seemed best to reserve the word "religion." Be it understood from the outset that any historical religion, such as Buddhism or Judaism, contains several elements of ethical value other than the two just mentioned.

For the purposes of this paper, therefore, I take the social standpoint and define religion as the *conviction of an ideal bond between the members of a society and the feelings that arise in consequence of that conviction.*

The beginnings of this social religion carry us far back in the history of societies. Even in the most primitive groups, besides the restraints on one's self due to a prudent regard for consequences, there are other restraints imposed by fellow feeling. A natural basis for this feeling is afforded by long association from earliest childhood. Even carnivora of the same litter are gentle to each other, and the heart of primitive man is softened by companionship. From the intercourse of housemates spring toleration, delight in each other's presence, comprehension, consciousness of likeness, sympathy. But as such association is usually realized only in the case of brothers and sisters, blood kinship soon becomes identified with kindness in the reflections of early men. In consequence the feeling that springs up spontaneously among associates is transferred to all recognized kin.

This is conventionalized and becomes the basis of the first stable groups. By the blood covenant and the fiction of adoption this primitive tie is made elastic enough for practical purposes. "The commingling of blood by which two men become brothers or two kins allies, and the fiction of adoption by which

source d'un étrange amour qui rejaillit souvent sur l'universalité des créatures." Often in the ecstasy or *yoga* "il est poussé par ses voix et ses joies intérieures à un dévouement fécond envers ses frères, à une conception plus large de la famille humaine."—*La Logique Sociale*, pp. 283, 284.

a tribesman was feigned to be the veritable son of a member of a tribe, are both evidences of the highest value that the Arabs were incapable of conceiving any absolute social obligation or social unity which was not based on kinship."¹

When kinship was the sole firm bond between men it would not do to admit gradations. "Nothing can be clearer than that the original doctrine of kinship recognized no difference of degree."² Blood relationship was so conceived as to appear everywhere equally absolute, and thus to unite all the members of the group in equal bonds. It is only after social feeling acquires other props that there is suffered to prevail a rationalistic view of kinship recognizing degrees of remoteness and of obligation. "All people who think of counting degrees, instead of considering the whole *hayy* as a single unity of blood, are the men who break up the old society and bring in that growing chaos which made the prophet's (Mohammed's) new law a welcome reformation."³

The virtue of kinship lay not in recognition of common descent, but in a realizing sense of identity. "A kin was a group of persons whose lives were so bound up together, in what must be called a physical unity, that they could be treated as parts of one common life. The members of one kindred looked upon themselves as one living whole, a single animated mass of blood, flesh, and bones, of which no member could be touched without all the members suffering."⁴ Both fellowship and morality run along these lines. "Under such a system there can be no inviolable fellowship except between men of the same blood"⁵ . . . "no binding precepts of conduct except those that rest on the principle of kinship."⁶ "No life and no obligation was sacred unless it was brought within the charmed circle of the kindred blood."⁶

A close connection between morality and the conviction of identity of life is witnessed by the blood covenant, where the

¹ ROBERTSON SMITH, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, p. 51.

² *Kinship and Marriage*, p. 53.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

⁴ ROBERTSON SMITH, *Religion of the Semites*, p. 255.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 269.

parties make a life-and-death compact by tasting the blood, either of each other or of some animal, by the tie of milk which unites the foster child to the kin of the foster mother,¹ by the ceremony of adoption, by the significance attached to the taking of food together,² by the invention of eponymous heroes to cement alliance of kindreds, and by the prevalence of the sacrificial meal for the purpose of confirming fellowship between a god and his worshippers.³

Could we look into the heart of the primitive men who were put to such symbols and fictions in the quest for a firm basis of association, we should see a strange interplay of belief and feeling, of fear and sympathy. The sentiment natural to those who have suckled at the same breast and lived in the same tent had to be greatly altered before it could hold men together in large groups. There had to grow up a *theory* which should conduct regard for others along certain lines whether it tended that way of itself or not. To the old spontaneity succeeded a set of fellowship feelings more or less artificial. As impulsive sympathy failed often to answer the summons of theory, the blood bond must be so conceived as to inspire awe. It might, moreover, be fortified by superstitious fears and dread of the spirits or gods. So far as these make the tie effective we have the control already considered under the term "belief."

How far the conviction of a common physical life could of itself incline men to fellowship it is hard to say. But for the local associating and coöperating group this conviction must have aided in confirming, extending, and making durable whatever spontaneous affection already existed. Lasting order between men required that the fitfulness of natural feeling be corrected by the stability of those feelings associated with beliefs.

The crude early ideas of relationship seem to have been supported by totemism. Here "the belief that all members of a tribe are of one blood is associated with a conviction, more or less religious in character, that the life of the tribe is in some mysterious way derived from an animal, a plant, or some other

¹ *Religion of the Semites*, p. 257.

² *Ibid.*, p. 252.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

natural object.”¹ This hypothesis does justice “to the intimate relation between religion and the fundamental structure of society which is so characteristic of the ancient world.”² In the passage to larger groups “the totem first becomes an animal god, and then comes to be thought of as the divine ancestor more or less completely anthropomorphic.”³

Whatever the primitive tie may have been when the curtain rises on the Aryan race the bond is not now blood but worship. Sympathy and obligation have passed from the plane of physical relationship to the mystic relationship existing between the co-worshippers of the same god. “The tie of blood did not of itself alone constitute the family; the tie of the common worship had to be added.”⁴ “The foundation of relationship was not birth; it was worship.”⁵ “The notion of identity does not hold with the Hindoos, Greeks, and Latins the place it did with the Semites, but the bond is still an ideal one. The dead are the cement that unites men. To have the same gods, to be watched, loved, and protected by the same deities, to be destined to join the same unseen company at death—these created fellowship. In the family natural affection reinforced by this ideal bond becomes piety; in the state the feeling for fellow citizens becomes a narrow and intense patriotism.

From an outward relation to ancestral deities religion was destined to return to the old basis of brotherhood. But now, so much has society enlarged, the assertion of physical kinship is impracticable. It was the mission of the religion of Jesus to proclaim the union of all men in the bonds of an ideal brotherhood.

The social contribution of Jesus is bound up with his doctrine of man. According to him man is both body and soul—the former lying in the chain of heredity and affording a faint race kinship useless for practical purposes; the latter descending directly from God, the common source of all souls. The body is but dust and will perish, but the soul is immortal, indestruc-

¹ *Kinship and Marriage*, p. 186.

² *Ibid.*, p. 230.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

⁵ DE COULANGES, *The Ancient City*, p. 64.

tible, and destined to union with its source. "Capacity to merge his life with that of similar beings," *i. e.*, social life, is a characteristic of man. He alone is sane, natural, normal, who is in union with his fellows. "In failing to follow the fundamental instincts and capacities of his nature, a man becomes at once selfish, sinful, and unsocial."¹ "He loses those powers by which he might become a member of God's family and of the brotherhood of man."¹ Man realizes his true and complete self only in social life. Selfishness is abnormal and degenerate, and shuts one out from those experiences in which alone there is fullness of life. The "tat-twam asi" (this is thyself) of esoteric Brahmanism—the affirmation of the One below the many and of identity in the midst of change—became in the teaching of Jesus an aspiration, an ideal, a goal of effort and therefore of vast regenerating power.

This doctrine of man requires a religious philosophy that shall afford the requisite substratum for the mystical brotherhood. This is provided in the idea of an All-Father having those social qualities—love, goodness, mercy, truthfulness, faithfulness—which characterize the soul in its perfect state. He is at once source and goal of man's life. Men are brothers because they are his sons. The vine and its branches symbolize the ideal relation that is possible between men and the Father. To identify this All-Father with the creator, sustainer, or first cause, arrived at in the non-social development of belief regarding the universe, is not difficult. More trouble is met in identifying Him with the stern lawgiver, judge and punisher, evolved in the development of "control by belief." The struggle between "justice" and "mercy," between hell fire and love, marks simply the interference of the two great orders of transcendental ideas by which society has sought to control its members.

If our interpretation is correct, human brotherhood and divine fatherhood in order to comprehend this brotherhood constitute

¹ PROFESSOR SHAILER MATHEWS, in AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, September 1895, p. 192.

the religion of Jesus. This humanitarian character Christianity retained for three centuries. Then with the union of the church with the state, the corruption by heathenism, the decay of civil authority and the ascent to temporal power, this element retreated to the background and supernaturalism coming to the front gained and kept control of Christianity for centuries. While there have always been individuals and sects to keep alive in the church the sacred flame of pure human sympathy, the recovery of the primitive traditions and the extensive reorganization of Christian doctrine in line with the social affirmation of Jesus is the achievement of the latter half of this century. The religious thought of Freemantle, Westcott, Farrar, Fairbairn, Hyde, Brooks and Gladden cuts loose from a sickly supernaturalism and lays all stress on the two great wholesome doctrines of the religion of Jesus—the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God.

How far can the conviction of ideal brotherhood inspire sympathy between men? Some there are who doubt if the feelings respond much to beliefs. Yet there are many evidences that they do. Schopenhauer ascribes the Hindoo gentleness toward brutes to the religious doctrine that asserts relationship between men and animals. The degree of sympathy men feel for women, it is everywhere recognized, depends greatly on inherited ideas. The docility with which, in the main, the feeling between the sexes consents to run in the conjugal channels grooved out for it is surprising. The power of caste, national and race differences to dry up the natural springs of human pity is the lament of moralists of all ages.

That, apart from the charm of Jesus himself, his doctrine of brotherhood became from the very first a great socializing force there is no doubt. Says Lecky, "The first aspect in which Christianity presented itself to the world was as a declaration of the fraternity of men in Christ. . . . From this notion grew up the eminently Christian idea of the sanctity of all human life." "Besides quickening greatly our benevolent affections it

¹ LECKY, *History of European Morals*, Vol. II, pp. 17 and 18.

definitely and dogmatically asserted the sinfulness of all destruction of human life as a matter of amusement, or of simple convenience, and thereby formed a new standard higher than any which then existed in the world."¹ "This minute and scrupulous care for human life and human virtue in the humblest forms, in the slave, the gladiator, the savage, or the infant, . . . is the distinguishing and transcendent characteristic of every society into which the spirit of Christianity has passed."² "The high conception that has been formed of the sanctity of human life, the protection of infancy, the elevation and final emancipation of the slave classes, the suppression of barbarous games, the creation of a vast and multifarious organization of charity, and the education of the imagination by the Christian type, constitute together a movement of philanthropy which has never been paralleled or approached in the pagan world."³

It would be a mistake to regard the spread of religion as the growing resort to a convenient instrument of social control. Law and the doctrine of future punishment, I have pointed out, are to be explained entirely in the light of their usefulness for regulation. But religion has independent roots. Even if it were not countenanced, furthered, and favored by society in recognition of its services to social peace, it would perpetually renew itself in the hearts of men. For while sympathy is the offspring of the conviction of relationship, it is no less true that the conviction of relationship is the offspring of sympathy. The unexpected energy of fellow feeling at the time suggests to the reflective mind an ideal bond between ourselves and others. In the absence of a theory of the origin of the social sentiments, they cannot but seem to deny our visible separateness and to intimate an unseen relationship between men. A religious philosophy, therefore, tends perpetually to spring up afresh wherever there is a flow of warm human sympathy.

What now is the moral gain from the conviction that men stand to each other in a relation best described by the term, "brotherhood."

¹ LECKY, *History of European Morals*, Vol. II, p. 20. ² *Ibid.*, p. 34. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

It is one thing to recognize the manifold interactions of men in social life and to act accordingly; it is quite another thing to believe that apart from, and prior to, the bonds of interdependence, trust, or affection that grow up in the social mechanism, there is a unity of essence that calls for justice and sympathy between men. The mere perception of likeness fosters sympathy, but the conviction of underlying oneness does more. It destroys the ego-centric world which each unreflecting creature builds for itself under the spur of the self-preservative instinct. It opposes to spontaneous selfishness the growing authority of reason.¹ It makes egoism appear as denial of the ideal bond, therefore itself untrue. It fosters respect for others by putting them in the eyes of reason on the same footing with ourselves.² It lessens our willingness to use them as means to our own ends.

The growing disgust with that self-abasement and fawning servility that tickles the vanity of a savage potentate, the growing levelness of speech of superior to inferior, the swelling tide of sentiment that bespatters the criminal while uplifting the slave, the serf, and the woman; the prompt indignation on behalf of the oppressed and put-upon, the increasing sanctity of human life, the reverential treatment everywhere accorded the dead—these, if traced down to their tap root will be found to spring not from belief in God or immortality, but from something still deeper, viz., the conviction of our fundamental identity in nature and destiny. This is the modern counterpart of the old blood bond and may perhaps be as much to our social union as that tie was to the primitive Semites.

We have but to perceive that the real belief-basis of our characteristic forms of ethical feeling is idealistic,² but not necessarily theological, to understand the persistence of conscious and systematic goodness, despite the wreck of dogma and

¹ See HYDE, *Outlines of Social Theology*, p. 75.

² The keen vision of the anti-social Nietzsche recognizes this. "The idealist, precisely like the priest," sees "the 'understanding,' the 'senses,' 'honors,' 'good-living,' and 'science' under him, as injurious and seductive forces, over which 'spirit' soars in pure being-by-itself."—*The Case against Wagner*, p. 244.

the crash of creed. It is a mistake to suppose that our slowly won altruism is bound up with the church, historic Christianity, theism, or any set of propositions that came into being at a stated time and place. On the other hand, it is still more mistaken to imagine that the goodness we actually see has its roots within the modern man, that it springs from a rapidly improved and socialized human nature instead of from that vast transmitted culture in which we are bathed from earliest childhood and by which we are insensibly tinged. The family may dispense with religion and rely on pure natural affection, but society is very far from being able to dispense with a belief-basis for altruism. Dogma after dogma may be surrendered, but not the idealistic anthropology that utters itself at one time in the teachings of Jesus, the theology of St. Paul, or the meditations of Marcus Aurelius, and at another in the democracy of Rousseau or Mazzini, the philosophy of Schopenhauer, or the poetry of Walt Whitman.

All-human, then, is the ultimate affirmation that is the corner stone of social religion. Not the doctrine about the gods but the doctrine about men is the thing to be conserved. Higher criticism, or comparative mythology, or Darwinism may endanger concrete forms of religious belief, but religion has a power to enter new forms. The only persistent foe of religious anthropology is the positive or scientific way of regarding men.

The cool observation of science discloses no bonds between men other than those adjustments of feeling due to natural selection and that mutuality of interest arising in the organization of actual society. The likeness of men is to be attributed to a common descent. Whatever unity there is lies behind, not before them. Men are separate monads, and there is no limit to the degree to which the happiness or perfection of one man may surpass that of another. Fellows they are, but only so far as fellowship is felt. Beyond this their paths need not cross. If one takes up the burden of another's destiny, let him look for result in his own feelings, for other fact there is none. And the time comes when all the burden-bearing is as if it had not been.

"Therefore," so might the inference run, "look to thyself and to those that hold thy heart strings, but trouble not thyself about the rest!"

Such is the result when the study of man is pursued with the methods that have proved so successful in geology or zoölogy or philology. And the certitude seems no less in the one case than in the others. Probably as science finds man *so is he*.

But while expanding geology may clash with Genesis, or expanding zoölogy with the special-creation hypothesis, thus provoking a conflict with religion, which soon ceases, however, by religion surrendering needless dogmas, it is otherwise with anthropology. Between the individualistic interpretation and the social interpretation of man the opposition is complete. The one rests on fact, the other on faith. The one is positive, the other idealistic. The one weakens social control, the other strengthens it. Here is a conflict between science and religion which is real, and which we may be very sure will last for a long time to come. So long as so much precious and indispensable social emotion is bound up with certain convictions as to what we are and what we may become to each other, society will find means to renew their vitality. The profound truth which sociologists are just bringing to light that, whatever be the ultimate ground of association, society at a given moment is held together by beliefs rather than by interests,¹ opposes the confident optimism of men of science, and justifies in a measure the contention of those who have insisted on the indispensableness of religion to society.²

¹"General beliefs are the indispensable pillars of civilizations; they determine the trend of ideas, they alone are capable of inspiring faith and creating a sense of duty."—LE BON, *The Crowd*, p. 150.

"It is not by reason, but most often in spite of it, that are created those sentiments that are the main springs of all civilizations—sentiments such as honor, self-sacrifice, religious faith, patriotism, and love of glory."—*Ibid.*, p. 116.

"Every civilization is as it were a dream of a thousand years, in which heaven and earth, nature and history, appear to men illumined by fantastic light and representing a drama which is nothing but a projection of the soul itself, influenced by some intoxication—I was going to say hallucination—or other."—AMIEL, *Journal Intime*, Dec. 8, 1869.

²Of "naturalism," which takes what I call a *positive* view of man's nature, life,

But while the affirmation of brotherhood will persist, and with it a religious philosophy to support it, we cannot ignore the steady growth of the scientific temper. From every field of investigation theology, with its supernatural causes, seems likely to be driven. The geologist finds no "flood," the biologist admits no special creation, the anthropologist ignores the "fall," the archæologist discovers no Eden, the meteorologist records no prayer-won weather, the psychologist will not hear of witchcraft, the alienist ridicules "possession," the physician puts no faith in miraculous healing, the philologist needs no Babel, the historian discerns no divine guidance or special providence in national affairs, the sociologist will not avail himself of "divinely implanted conscience" or "conversion" in order to account for righteousness. Every investigator, whatever his faith, recognizes no supernatural intrusions in his own field, and, however perplexing the unexplained phenomena that still confront him, he is confident that some day he will be able to explain them by natural causes. However much he grants to the supernatural elsewhere, he stubbornly resists every attempt to graft it upon his own particular science.

This unanimity is significant. Man's thirst for truth and order is such that he will not rest content till the vast web of cause and effect spread out in space and time be faithfully reflected in human consciousness. Unsightly breaks or balks in the fabric of knowledge, due to the intrusion of the pseudo-explanations of theology or metaphysics, will not always be tolerated. Less and less will certain stretches of phenomena be suffered to remain in the stone age of explanation; and social religion, if

and destiny, Mr. Balfour says: "If it is to be in harmony with principles like these that the child is to be taught at the mother's knee and the young man is to build up the ideals of his life, then, unless I greatly mistake, it will be found that the inner discord which exists, and which must gradually declare itself, between the emotions proper to naturalism and those which have actually grown up under the shadow of traditional convictions will at no distant date most unpleasantly translate itself into practice."—*The Foundations of Belief*, p. 86.

This able book argues that "naturalism" is unfavorable to morality, therefore *untrue*. What is shown is that it is unsuitable for purposes of social control, therefore at present *unsafe*.

it endures, will come to rest not on a special cosmogony, but rather on a transcendental interpretation of the course of things.

Such a shifting, if it comes, will close the warfare between religious philosophy and science. It is one thing to blur with legends and providential interferences the faithful picture of reality science is trying to achieve. It is quite another thing to let fall upon this picture the rose or violet light of religious idealism. The latter may call up an emotion-tone unknown to the white light of science, but it does not confuse proportions and relations.

In some such fashion may religion persist without getting in the way of truth. As its postulates become fewer in number and less concrete, they will cease to offer rivalry to the scientific account of the universe, and will become merely elements of a humanitarian faith. If the attenuation of belief proceeds still farther, control by religion passes over into control by ideals, which forms the subject of the next chapter.

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THE PURPOSE OF SOCIOLOGY.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. IX.

THE three concluding papers of this series will treat respectively of the three phases of social dynamics enumerated in the tabular scheme placed at the end of the paper on "The Mechanics of Society," in the last number of this JOURNAL, page 254, viz.; 1, "Social Genesis;" 2, "Individual Telesis;" and 3, "Collective Telesis." Before passing, however, to the more detailed examination of these topics it was thought best to introduce the very important subject of the purpose, need, occasion, or *raison d'être* of sociology. The object of this is not to formulate an answer to those who deny the existence of a social science. To such no answer would probably be satisfactory. But it is becoming more and more apparent that among those who acknowledge the possibility of the science, and who are actually contributing to its development, there are two fairly distinct schools, not only in the world at large but even in America, and, indeed, they have already become as clearly differentiated in this country as they are abroad. While none of the adherents of either of these schools have definitely formulated any of the doctrines that distinguish them, their writings differ in certain fundamental respects that are sufficient to warrant their rough classification as above stated. The fundamental difference has primarily to do with just this question as to the utility, and especially the object or purpose of sociology.

It is difficult to select terms that will clearly indicate this difference. They might be characterized respectively as the Static and the Dynamic schools. The objection to these terms is that both recognize dynamic phenomena, although one of them devotes little attention to it. More correctly speaking, it

recognizes social movements, but pays little attention to the forces that cause these movements. One writer has expressly objected to the term *dynamic*, and proposed to substitute *kinetic*, as not connoting force. There is no objection to the use of the name *Dynamic* for the other school, as its distinguishing characteristic is the emphasis it places on the conception of forces in society, and it also recognizes conscious as well as unconscious social forces. The statico-kinetic school might also with considerable propriety be called the Spencerian school, since Mr. Spencer's sociology is marked by substantially the same characteristics, and the American writers are virtually disciples of Spencer. No one of the dynamic writers, however, would be willing to be called Comtean, because, although Comte treated of both social statics and social dynamics, and clearly differentiated them, still he can scarcely be said to have recognized social forces, and certainly never defined their nature.

The statico-kinetic or Spencerian school does not think the time has come to attempt to indicate what the effect of social science is likely to be. It treats it simply as a branch of any one's education, as explaining the facts, phenomena and laws of a certain field of knowledge, and trusts to the natural influence that all knowledge necessarily has in sobering opinion and modifying action. In a word, it regards sociology as a pure science and deprecates all attempts to apply its principles. At least it impliedly denies the ability of sociologists, either as teachers or writers, to point out its applications either to students or readers, and would leave this wholly to practical men, whether in the business world or in politics.

The dynamic school, on the contrary, clearly perceiving the chaotic condition of both the industrial and the political world, and recognizing that most of the evils of society result from a lack of scientific knowledge on the part of the so-called practical men, claims the right and feels the obligation to accompany the statement of facts and the definition of laws and principles with an indication of their significance and their necessary bearing upon social affairs and movements. It is only

occasionally possible to apply sociological principles to the current problems of the day. These are usually only special cases of some large class that comes under some broad principle, and about all that can be done is to make the application of the principle to the class. If this is understood the special cases will take care of themselves. There is therefore very little danger that the teacher of sociology will take sides on current questions and defend this or that public policy. He cares little for such questions because he sees that if the underlying principles are understood they will settle themselves. But if it chance that public questions arise that are broad enough to come directly under any sociological law there is no reason why he should hesitate in such cases any more than in any other to make the application. Still, if he finds that deep students of sociology differ as to the application, this should be a warning to him to refrain from hastily deciding what the principle really teaches in the particular case. The sociologist always sees the application of laws to current questions. They are all grouped in his mind under the laws, and may be used as illustrations, but they are usually so superficial that he can make little use of them. He prefers to take his illustrations from past history and from the various special social and even physical sciences that furnish the data of sociology.

The distinction of the two schools as pure and applied sociology, therefore, would be convenient if it were not that the dynamic school accepts the pure stage as fully as the static school. The real difference is that the former carries the science farther than the latter. From a merely passive science it pushes it forward into an active science. It renders it constructive.

In addition to the above reasons for introducing into this series a paper on the purpose of sociology, there is a personal one which it seems necessary to state in order to make my own position clear. In *Dynamic Sociology* I of course placed myself squarely upon the constructive ground. The advanced position there taken was open to criticism, as I expected it to

be, but in addition to adverse criticism, which I desired and courted, I observed some tendency to make too much of the doctrines I advanced. This was especially the case with the principle of conscious social action. I had repeatedly stated that society thus far must be regarded as in the main unconscious, and therefore the whole idea of social action for the sake of improvement was an ideal which simply followed from the assumption of such a train of conditions as are described in Vol. II of that work. I did not wish to lay too great stress upon it as a present or early future possibility. When, therefore, in an article on "Static and Dynamic Sociology," which appeared in the *Political Science Quarterly* for June, 1895, I sought to draw a clear line between these two kinds of sociology, I purposely omitted all reference to what I now call collective teleosis, because the distinction could be made equally clear without it, and its introduction would have weakened my argument in the minds of just those persons to whom I desired to appeal.

To this omission and my general disinclination to push this part of my social philosophy, as manifested in other popular articles, I have attributed the impression that I have observed among contemporary sociological writers that I had to some extent abandoned that doctrine. The clearest expression of this that I can readily refer to is contained in Professor Vincent's exhaustive paper on the "Province of Sociology" that appeared in the *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY* for January, 1896, p. 487. Under "(c) The 'constructive' theory, or the projection of social tendencies into ideals for guidance," he says: "Small stands for this as one of the functions of sociology, and Ward in his early work distinctly advanced this view. Judged by his recent articles the latter has apparently modified his position." In 1893, or ten years after the appearance of *Dynamic Sociology*, this doctrine was as distinctly reaffirmed as in the "early work." Professor Vincent does not refer to my *Psychic Factors of Civilization* in which (Part III) this was done, and the inference seems plain that he was unacquainted with it.

It may be said that after the paper on the "Mechanics of

Society" in the last number of this JOURNAL this explanation was unnecessary. It certainly will be rendered so by the concluding paper of this series (No. 12, on "Collective Telesis"), but it can have done no harm to disabuse in advance the minds of any who may think that I have abandoned the position originally taken, however little sanguine I may have been and still am of rapid progress toward such an ideal.

It may seem absurd to ask what is the purpose of any science. No one would claim that the purpose of astronomy is to assist navigation, or that the purpose of biology is to facilitate the cultivation of plants and the domestication of animals. Science is supposed to be pursued for its own sake, to increase the sum of knowledge. There is a vague idea that it is somehow a good thing to have knowledge increased, while poets and philosophers have perceived that "knowledge is power," but no one has pointed out specifically in what way knowledge operates as a power. A general comparison of peoples without science with peoples that possess science shows that science must have something to do with what we call civilization, and yet it is insisted that science is not to be pursued for any practical purpose. Indeed, the practical view of science is generally condemned, and numerous illustrations are adduced of the most important practical results flowing from studies that seemed to be perfectly useless. These cases are calculated to inspire faith in the general utility of all knowledge and have thus accomplished great good. It is of course clear to all that mathematics, physics, and chemistry have an immediate practical value in the affairs of life, but most of the other sciences—geology, botany, zoölogy, ethnology, psychology, etc.—are looked upon mainly in the light of culture, like history, literature, fine art, etc. Anatomy and physiology constitute exceptions, as having a direct bearing upon health.

In general it may be said that as long as, and in proportion as nature is regarded as anthropocentric the knowledge of nature will not be looked upon as of any special practical use to man. The truth that is gradually taking the place of this two-

fold error is that instead of nature being anthropocentric and science indifferent, nature is indifferent and science is anthropocentric. It is true that every step in the advance of knowledge has resulted in practical benefit to man morally or materially, and both the philosophic ken and the popular instinct as to the usefulness of knowledge are correct. The knowledge generally understood as scientific is the most useful and practical of all kinds of knowledge. Scientific knowledge is the knowledge of nature, *i. e.*, of natural things and natural laws. In short it is a knowledge of the environment, and the reason why it is so useful is because it is his relations to his environment that man chiefly needs to know.

The environment is not wholly objective, although there is nothing that may not be contemplated objectively. The subjective environment is in some respects more important to know than the objective. Notwithstanding the old Greek maxim, "Know thyself," it is only in recent times that any adequate idea has been gained of the meaning of that maxim, and although Pope said that "the proper study of mankind is man," still it is only since man began to be studied as a social being and as a being subject to laws as uniform as those that prevail in other departments of nature, that any useful knowledge has been acquired relative to the true nature of man. Man had been supposed to be a "free agent," which meant that there were no laws to which his activities were subject. There could therefore be no science of man, and hence no science of society. Many still so hold, and for such there is no sociology. But those who accept a science of sociology as resting like other sciences on uniform and determinable laws are able to see immense possibilities in this science from a practical point of view. The laws of nature have always proved capable of being turned to man's advantage in proportion as they have been made known, and there is no reason to suppose that those of human nature and of society will form an exception. But it is admitted that they are more complex and difficult to understand, and therefore sociology requires more study than any other science.

There are two ways in which any science may be studied, the speculative and the practical, but the sciences differ among themselves with respect to the extent to which the one or the other of these methods should be carried. As already shown, astronomy and biology, from their inherent nature, do not readily lend themselves to the practical method, but are mainly pursued for the purpose of acquiring a knowledge of these great fields of nature. This is so specially true of botany and zoölogy that on a former occasion I used these sciences as representing that method and called it the "natural history method."¹ In the natural history method the only *purpose* is to learn the natural history of the organism in question. This method is the one chiefly employed in nearly all the departments of anthropology, which is treated as a branch of zoölogy for the study of the human organism. Many who claim to be sociologists are accustomed to look upon human society from this point of view, and their sociology is scarcely anything but anthropology.

The science formerly called political economy, but now generally known as economics, has had a somewhat different history. Its cultivators from the first conceived it as a domain of law, but they carried this principle too far and only recognized animal impulses as actuating man in his industrial relations. These are so comparatively simple that the ruder types of men have had no difficulty in perceiving these laws sufficiently well to utilize them in the domestication of animals. This was done empirically, and what science there is on the subject has been of late development. If human activities had been equally simple the political economy based on it would have been almost as exact as solar astronomy. What actually took place, expressed in the language of dynamic sociology, was that while the early political economists recognized the dynamic agent they neglected the directive agent and its influence in causing *perturbations* in human activity. Or, expressed in the language of social mechanics, as set forth in the last paper of this series, they recognized social genesis and founded a science of social

¹ Publications of the *Am. Econ. Assoc.*, Vol. VI, p. 102.

genetics, but they failed to take account of individual telesis as modifying this process. That which has been aptly called "astronomical economics," therefore failed, and it was discovered by the Newton of biology that the Malthusian principle was a fundamental principle of biology.¹ As soon as attention began to be directed to wide classes of facts it was seen that this law required to be modified in so many respects before it could be applied to man as to amount almost to a reversal of it.² While the philosophers were ignoring one half of mind—the feelings—the economists were ignoring the other half—the intellect—and both of these great movements were limping along in this fashion. It has remained for sociology, whether calling itself by that name or not, to recognize the psychologic basis of human activities and to found a science upon all the faculties of the mind.

The fact that the defective political economy described necessarily led to a gloomy view of human life, gaining for it Carlyle's name of the "dismal science," has given birth to the erroneous impression that the early writers were cold, hard-hearted men, who looked upon the laborer as simply a machine to be run until it breaks down, and who had no hope that the conditions they described could ever in the nature of things be altered or improved. The fact is that those writers were all humane and enlightened men with warm sympathies. Adam Smith is now ranked among the founders of utilitarianism, which is an essentially melioristic doctrine. It is a curious fact, rarely referred to, that the very title of the great work of Malthus which is regarded as the most pessimistic of all that class of writings, contains a clear declaration of his humanitarian purpose. Even in the first edition the title reads: *An Essay on the Principle of Population as it affects the future Improvement of Society*. The first seven words remained the same in all editions, but in the second edition the remainder reads: *or a review of*

¹ See Darwin's Autobiography in *Life and Letters*, Vol. I, p. 68.

² See *The Psychologic Basis of Social Economics*, *Proc. A. A. A. S.*, Vol. XLI, pp. 301-321.

its past and present effects on human happiness. In the seventh edition (I have not been able to consult intermediate ones) these words are added to the last: *with an inquiry into our prospects respecting the future removal or mitigation of the evils which it occasions.*

This clearly shows that even Malthus wrote for a *purpose*, and that a humanitarian one. The same might be proved for many of the earlier works on political economy. A modern writer, Mr. William Cunningham, makes the following frank confession:

"Economic science is wholly practical, it has no *raison d'être* except as directing conduct towards a given end: it studies the means leading towards that end not merely for the sake of knowledge, but in the hope of guiding men so that they may pursue that end in the most appropriate way: it is not content to describe the principles that have actuated human conduct, but desires to look at these principles in the light of after events, and thus to put forward the means that are best adapted for attaining the end in view."¹

Is there any good reason why sociology may not have a purpose as well as economics? The character which chiefly distinguishes it from the physical sciences, viz., greater complexity of the phenomena to be studied, scarcely differs in these two sciences. I am myself inclined to regard Mr. Cunningham's language as somewhat too strong. I should say that economics should be studied from both points of view, first for the purpose of learning the laws of industrial activity, and secondly with a view to directing conduct to a given end. In other words, I would concede to that science, as to mathematics, physics, and chemistry, both a pure and an applied stage. But I make the same claim and no more for sociology. That science should also be studied first for the sake of information relating to the laws of human association and coöperative action, and finally

¹ *Politics and Economics: An Essay on the Nature of the Principles of Political Economy, together with a Survey of Recent Legislation*, by WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM, London, 1885, p. 12.

for the purpose of determining in what ways and to what extent social phenomena may, with a knowledge of their laws, be modified and directed towards social ideals. This last is what I understand by Dr. Small's "idealics." The supreme purpose is the betterment of society. The knowledge is the important thing. The action will then take care of itself. But an important part of the knowledge is that action is its object. It was shown in the last paper that the greater part of the action of civilized men is telic, or results from purpose and not from mere impulse. The study of sociology is calculated to enlighten the individual purposes of men and harmonize them with the good of society. It will tend to unify action, to combine the innumerable streams of individual effort and pour their contents into one great river of social welfare. Individual teleosis thus verges into collective teleosis. In a democracy every citizen is a legislator and government simply becomes the exponent of the social will and purpose. This becomes more and more true as the constituent members of society see things in their true light. Society can only act upon those things with regard to which there is a substantial unity of opinion. There is no more false dogma than that it is necessary for individuals to work at cross purposes. So long as many of the prevailing notions in society are false divisions and dissensions will occur, and these, I grant, are educating in the school of experience. But the greater part of them are unnecessary and disappear as communities become enlightened. The purpose of sociology is to enlighten communities and put an end to useless and expensive dissensions. It is true that as the simpler questions are settled higher and more complicated ones will arise in society, but this very elevation of the plane of public discussion is one of the true marks of social advance. Those who regard partisan struggles as salutary to the intellectual vigor and independence of the people need have no fear. There are questions and questions. What the sociologist demands is simply that every question capable of definitive settlement be put out of the public arena, and that wrangling about anything that *anybody knows* cease. There will

still remain problems that the wisest cannot solve, and upon these men will divide and debate and reflect and experiment until one by one they, too, reach their solution and give way to still subtler, more delicate and more ennobling subjects of discussion and emulation.

But if the purpose of sociology is the betterment of society it becomes necessary to inquire what constitutes social betterment. This may at first sound puerile, because everybody is supposed to know. But let anyone undertake to formulate it and he will not find it so easy. When we specify civilization, enlightenment, morality, progress, etc., as the criteria of social improvement we only multiply the number of terms requiring definition. There is really only one test of the comparative goodness, *i. e.*, the better or worse, in anything, and that is what may be called the ethical test, *viz.*, the degree of satisfaction that it yields. One thing is better than another if it yields a greater amount of satisfaction. It comes down to the agreeable and the disagreeable as the positive and negative states. What is more agreeable is better. What is more disagreeable is worse. The agreeable is the good. The disagreeable is the bad. Looking at the condition of society as a whole we see that this is the test of utility and the basis of economics. The positive social state is the "pleasure economy" of Patten. The "end in view" of Cunningham is the "greatest happiness" of Bentham. Social betterment is the passage out of a pain economy into a pleasure economy, or from an economy that yields only the satisfaction of physical needs to one that fills out the higher spiritual aspirations. Social progress is that which results in social betterment as thus defined, and all the other supposed ends are either simply means to this end or they are names for the various aspects of it.

Now, "social evolution" is the term commonly employed for the general spontaneous movement in the direction above indicated. There may be races that have degenerated. Empires have declined and fallen. But new races and new empires in other parts of the world, usually recruited from the *élite* of the

effete ones, have simultaneously risen far higher than the first. Thus far in human history the series has been upon the whole an ascending one, and man has slowly but rhythmically, and somewhat fitfully advanced. He has done this without the aid of either economics or sociology, in ways which it will be the purpose of the next paper to point out. The question may therefore present itself to some minds: If social evolution goes on without science, what is the need of science except for its own sake? This question is precisely similar to another that is still sometimes asked. Recognizing the great restorative powers of the human system and the fact that under normal conditions nature tends toward health and not toward disease, what is the use of the healing art, and why not leave all to the *vis medicatrix naturæ*? The answer to both questions is generically the same, that so long as the laws of nature, either physiological or social, are not scientifically understood there is no virtue in any form of therapeutics, but so soon as these laws in either department become scientifically known it is possible, and in strict proportion to that knowledge, to "assist nature" in its struggle against all the powers of a hostile environment. The real answer, then, to the question as to the purpose of sociology is: *to accelerate social evolution.*

In thus stating the purpose of sociology, however, I shall not, I trust, be misunderstood by being supposed to confound the purpose of the science itself with the purpose of the student in studying it. By the purpose of the science is meant the general beneficial effect that it is expected to exert upon society at large. It is difficult to estimate the power of a body of knowledge which has once become the common property of a whole people. It is not expected that any great proportion even of the most enlightened public will have actually been at any time students of sociology at any institution of learning. The more there are of such the better, but scientific truth can happily make its way very far into the lives of all classes although received at first hand into the minds of a very few. The power of *established truth* is immense. This is chiefly because no one wants to be found ignorant of, or opposed to, that which has

been proved to be true. A mere theory will make little headway because no one will feel any humiliation in either not knowing it or not accepting it. But when the indications fairly set in that it is something scientifically demonstrated, ignorance becomes a disgrace and non-acceptance a proof of ignorance. A rivalry springs up both to know and to embrace, and thousands who have only the most meager acquaintance with such truths openly defend them.

The history of science is full of illustrations. The profound impression which any great cosmic truth makes even upon the least instructed portion of the public is well exemplified in the discovery, or rather rediscovery, of the heliocentric system by Copernicus and Galileo. Although at first antagonized by the church as contrary to Holy Writ, it was soon universally accepted and came to constitute a part of the stock of knowledge of millions who could not follow out the simplest mathematical demonstration, clearly showing that it is not necessary to be an astronomer or a mathematician to understand laws that have taxed the brains of the ablest astronomers and mathematicians to demonstrate.

Passing to physics, not to speak of the discovery of the law of gravitation which is so closely connected with the heliocentric system, but which everybody now understands in a certain way, we may note the social effect of the establishment of the law of the conservation of energy. How profoundly it influences the life and even the conduct of all but the very lowest classes of society. Everybody realizes that the invisible powers around him have been rescued from a state of chaos and reduced to a condition of law. Add to this the inspiration it has lent to invention and the condition it has furnished for the recent strides in engineering and mechanic art.

The march of geological truth has not been less prolific of social results. The knowledge of the world that has resulted from the researches of Werner, Blumenbach, Hutton and Lyell has exerted a moral influence that penetrates into the lowest strata of society. It has also led to the development of the resources of the earth as nothing else could have done.

The last great epoch-making truth has come through biology. The law of animal and vegetal development, of the derivation of the higher types from the lower, of organic advance through the ages, has probably influenced the thought and action of the world in a higher degree than any other one cause. The progress of this idea is also the best illustration of the way great truths work, of the manner in which thought waves propagate themselves through the social media and light up the darkest corners of the world.

Finally of all these truths there has now been a synthesis; a wider law has been discovered that embraces them all, and the whole universe, from the nebulae and remotest stars to mankind and human society, is seen to be evolving and rolling on toward some unknown goal. The law of evolution has been disclosed. Where is the eddy so hidden and sequestered in social life that it has not felt some seismic jar from this vast psychic earthquake?

But progress in unfolding the truths of the universe has taken place in the order of their remoteness from human interests. The ones earliest brought to light were farthest from man and least useful to him. Astronomical truth was less valuable than physical, and physical than vital.

There are two great domains in which scarcely any wide discoveries have yet been made. These are the domains of mind and society. Psychic and social truth, when it shall begin to be revealed, will be far more practical than even biologic truth. The leading propositions in both these fields are today chiefly in the stage of theory. To exert an influence they must be *established*. Sociologists must agree upon those that are capable of demonstration and recognize them according to their value. In the present state of the science each one is so intent on his own discoveries, or supposed discoveries, that he can scarcely take time to acquaint himself with the views of others. But society has a right to demand that everything that is true shall be made public property. The teacher in particular is bound to weigh all results impartially and to give the student an opportunity to do the same. In this way what is not true will be eliminated

and what is true will be classified and each truth assigned its place in a general system.

If the great law of the conservation of energy and the correlation of forces, which has brought order out of chaos in the physical world, can be extended to the psychic and social world, at whatever sacrifice of false pride, the gain must be stupendous. If there can really be established a "dynamics of mind"¹ and a "mechanics of society," the era of speculation in these fields is over and the era of science has begun. An age of psychic and social invention and discovery must follow, ushering in an age of social machinery. The general acceptance of such a truth, if it be a truth (and if it be not there is no social science), might ultimately have the effect to transform and unify the entire system of human government by substituting, as has been done in the physical world, the laws and powers of nature for those of man.

While I cannot but regard this as by far the most important of all sociological principles, I freely admit that there are many others of high utilitarian rank that simply require verification, elucidation and elaboration. Once established they should be fully recognized, no matter how humble or obscure the source from which they may have emanated, and speedily added to the common stock of knowledge.

But aside entirely from all extravagant claims for any system, independently of the question whether any of the alleged social principles are sound, it is still safe to assert that there must be elements for a science of society, and that when these elements are detected, collated and reduced to law such a science will be established; and it is further beyond question that when the true science of society shall be established and accepted as other sciences are accepted, its influence on the interests of man and the destiny of the race will be as much greater than that of the simpler sciences as sociology is nearer to man and more intimately bound up with all that concerns his welfare.

LESTER F. WARD.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

¹ *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, chap. XV.

REVIEWS.

L'Éthique.—Le Bien et le Mal; Essai sur la Morale considérée comme Sociologie Première. PAR E. DE ROBERTY. Paris, Felix Alcan, Editeur, 1896. Pages xxiv + 237, 8vo.

ONE of the most hopeful indications for sociology is the manner in which the class who formerly devoted their energies to ethics are rallying under the standard of social science. Many of them had long felt that the current ethics presented a barrier to their expansion in the direction of their inclinations, and therefore hailed the new science as affording free scope to their altruistic proclivities. There is a disposition to consider sociology as a sort of scientific ethics, an ethics which recognizes the law of causation in conduct, and therefore holds out some hope of being some time able to bring it under the domain of law.

Professor E. de Roberty de la Cerda, author of a work on sociology and half a dozen others on various philosophical subjects, has openly espoused this new point of view and begins with the present volume a series of works on Ethics. In adopting the name "L'Éthique" for the general designation of the whole series he admits that he does so for the sake of brevity, and that his conception is best expressed as "Prolegomena of an Ethics in process of formation." He hopes to complete the work in four or five volumes, but has already laid it out under nine heads. These titles sufficiently indicate the originality of the scheme. Among them we find the following: "Social Psychism;" "The Constitution of Ethics transformed into Elementary Sociology;" "The Intellectual Series of the Future Amoralité." This last term amoralité" is a sort of keynote to the entire movement voiced in this work. It may be the first use of the word itself, but the thought had been expressed before. On page 114 of *Psychic Factors of Civilization* occurs the following passage: "To remove the obstacles to free social activity is to abolish the so-called science of ethics. The avowed purpose of ethics is to abolish itself. The highest ethics is no ethics. Ideally moral conduct is wholly unmoral conduct. Or, more correctly

stated, the highest ideal of a moral state is one in which there will exist nothing that can be called moral." That work appeared in 1893, but the idea was more fully elaborated in an article on "Ethical Aspects of Social Science" in the *International Journal of Ethics* for July 1896, which had for its thesis the same principle as that defended by Roberty, viz., that ethics, in so far as it is a science, is sociology. In the article on "The Mechanics of Society" in the last number of this JOURNAL (page 250), written before the present work had reached my hands, the action of man in subjugating inanimate nature was spoken of as "innocent or *unmoral* (*amoral* or *anethical*)."

To show that this way of looking at human action in these days of incipient sociology is widespread and a part of the intellectual atmosphere, let me draw attention to a remarkable article by Antonio Llano in the *Philosophical Review* for July 1896, entitled "Morality the Last of Dogmas." On page 374 occurs this passage: "As we pass no moral or condemnatory judgments on the bloody struggles of our animal and savage progenitors, reflection might lead us to look with equanimity upon the probable *amoral* (if I may coin this word) condition of our remote descendants." The fact that Mr. Llano supposes that he is using this word for the first time shows that he is not familiar with the sociological discussion of the question and reached the principle independently and from the standpoint of psychology and philosophy.

Professor Roberty has already gone over the ground of the present volume and of the whole series announced, in a course of lectures delivered at the Institut des Hautes Études in the Université Nouvelle at Brussels, of which the eminent sociologist, Dr. G. De Greef, is the rector and ruling spirit. Everybody knows that that institution was founded as a revolt from the narrow and reactionary tendencies of the traditional university teaching, which claims to possess all the morality of the age, and stifles all originality.¹ His characterization of this spirit is at once so happy and so refreshing that it ought to be reproduced in America:

"The scientific world knows and appreciates at its true value this excellent school, which completes and crowns the work of regeneration of the higher university instruction, due to the happy initiative of an *élite* of noble spirits. Disheartened by the daily and almost universal spectacle in Europe, of sickening pusillanimity, of low jealousies, of mercenary claims to the monopoly of truth, of narrow and sacerdotal

¹ Cf. *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, p. 106.

intolerance, and, in a word, of the unfathomable (*insondable*) mediocrity of the old teaching bodies, maintained in complete dependence upon the classes in power; disgusted and rebellious, but not discouraged, these truly superior minds founded the Université Nouvelle, which, from the manner of its origin, from its principles, from its international character, from the instruction free from all unscientific preoccupation that has been given there for two years, is striving to deserve its early reputation as a great intellectual focus and a sure asylum for the complete liberty of research."

The work is divided into twelve chapters which approach the problem as above stated from as many distinct points of view. The main contention is that the whole of scientific morality is summed up in *sociality*, that the two are one and cannot be kept separate. He insists, and correctly, as I believe from a prolonged study of the *Politique Positive*, that Comte virtually taught this. In adding morals to his hierarchy, as the latest and highest term of the series, he was therefore simply expanding his conception of sociology, which formed the highest term in his *Philosophie Positive*. Viewed in this light the chief criticism upon this action of his falls to the ground. By morality or ethics he means an entirely different thing from the popular conception. He means the principle of association, as distinguished from the facts, phenomena, and history of association. He means the *force* that draws men together, the principle of cohesion, which in its developed aspects becomes the humanitarian sentiment, the love of man for man—"amour pour principe." Those, therefore, who have supposed that the founder of sociology had in his later writings given a subordinate place to that science, may now see that all he did was to subdivide that science and call its active principle by another name. Altruism is only the most advanced stage of the socializing process. The collective idea comes to predominate to so great a degree that the original motive of self-protection is lost sight of.

It is only possible to point out here this one leading characteristic of this work. The reader will find much of special interest to sociology in every chapter. The author is profoundly learned and widely read in all the broad subjects of the age. He has laid under tribute not only all the sociologists, but the philosophers of all ages from Plato to Nietzsche, and the notes appended to the work carry the reader into a wide range of collateral discussion. No sociologist should be deterred by the title from acquainting himself with the work, and it is almost

to be regretted, in the interest of sociology, that the title had not been limited to its last two words: Sociologie Première.

LESTER F. WARD.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

The History of the Last Quarter Century in the United States. By E. BENJAMIN ANDREWS, 2 vols., pp. xxii + 390 and xxi + 409. Three hundred and fifty illustrations. \$6. Charles Scribner's Sons.

THE history which is hardest to understand is that nearest to the student. Precisely this contemporary history is of most consequence to the sociologist who believes that his science should be able to interpret their own times to men of action. The difficulties of writing contemporary history can hardly be more justly and clearly expressed than in President Andrews' preface. The volumes do not profess to contain the final word upon the social reactions of the last twenty-five years in our country. They are recitals of events which seem to a man of keen historical instinct the most significant. President Andrews has little in common with the historical microscopists. He knows the value of details so well that he can subordinate them properly to the general effect, and still present more truth by his method than the sifters of historical diamond dust are apt to reach. In these volumes he is not writing for philosophers, but he is telling a story which ought to fascinate all intelligent Americans. He has frequently chosen to speak of the picturesque instead of the vitally essential occurrences, but in general he has recorded events in which controlling tendencies are betrayed. Although the work will entertain like fiction those who want to read it simply for diversion, I regard it as a most suitable preparation for systematic knowledge of our own times. The author has discounted the inevitable inadequacies of such an attempt, by the qualifications in his preface. He need have no doubt, however, about the fulfillment of his wish "that prospectors traversing this forest hereafter may get on better for our toil in blazing the path."

The two volumes contain much material besides that which originally appeared in Scribner's. The author's well-known views upon the utility of silver as a money metal color his account of the monetary legislation of 1873, and subsequent years, but, in justice to him and to ourselves, it must be admitted by fair-minded men that the argument

for reconsideration of our currency system will by no means be exhausted when the 16 to 1 scheme is defeated. The accounts of the agrarian and labor movement are decidedly helpful, though but fragmentary. The same is true of the American Protective Association, the Salvation Army, the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, the progress of the colored population, and the history of important measures in connection with the careers of leaders, Blaine, Cleveland, Conkling, Garfield, Grant, Greeley, Harrison, Hayes, Sherman, etc.

While the volumes are primarily popular, both in style and matter, no student who wants to understand American social movements during the twenty-five years just past, can afford to miss the help which their vivid realism will afford.

ALBION W. SMALL.

The Coming Individualism. By A. EGMONT HAKE and O. E. WESSLAU. Archibald Constable & Co. (Westminster), 1895. Imported by The Macmillan Co. Pp. 347. \$4.

THIS volume is so handsome that as one proceeds to examine it the idea is suggested that the motive for producing it must have been largely æsthetic. This remark is not intended to suggest that the motive was not also economic, or that the British publishers did not know what they were about in producing such a book; on the contrary, there is not lacking evidence that Mr. A. Egmont Hake is a man of large means, for we know from the advertisement that he has previously published a number of books, and we may therefore take for granted that he has established his pecuniary responsibility to the satisfaction of his publishers. Nevertheless, we feel some surprise that the Macmillan Co. should have imported the book. Although he would not advise anyone to follow his example, the reviewer has conscientiously read every word of the ten chapters written by Messrs. Hake and Wesslau, as well as the essay on "Municipal Government," by Mr. Francis Fletcher-Vane, which is bound with this work, although no mention of it appears on the title-page. The subjects discussed are interesting and the style is bright and animated, but the book is honeycombed with absurdities which are the more noticeable because of the author's pretentious rationalism, and so far as the reviewer can judge there is no fresh thought in the work to justify its existence, unless we except the admirable presentation of the scope of operation

and the benefits of unregulated banks of issue conducted on the plan of the Scottish banks. The reviewer's acquaintance with the literature of banking is so limited that he speaks with hesitation, but he feels bound to say for the authors that he has never come across a better exposition of certain advantages of the unregulated bank of issue than is here given, although he is under the necessity of adding that the body of the chapter in which this exposition occurs contains almost as much confused thinking and unsound argument as does the rest of the book.

Like their great countryman, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and like the thousands of other individualists of the generation that has now almost passed away, the authors of this book have certain theories as to the philosophy of the state, and certain traditional prejudices as to the actual conduct of the affairs of life, and they try, vainly, to combine them. They fail to see that the only logical principle which is absolutely inconsistent with a certain degree of state regulation of industry is one which requires anarchy, pure and simple, and that unless they are willing to subscribe to this (and they are not) they have no *a priori* bulwark against a greater socialization of industry. They may be entirely right in their opposition to any particular proposal of the collectivists; but in all such cases the issue is one of fact, it is a question of expediency, to be determined by an examination of the circumstances of the individual case, not by a dogmatic appeal to some one *a priori* principle. Many socialists profess (and with some show of reason) to believe in individualism as much as Messrs. Spencer, Hake and company do, they simply differ from the latter as to how individualism is to be best attained. And there are others—not socialists, but men who believe that industry should be somewhat more largely socialized than it is at present—who have no quarrel with the individualist's formulation of his fundamental principle, but who feel that it is too much like the Delphic oracle to be all-sufficient for practical guidance, and who object to that arbitrary, dogmatic use of it which distinguishes its professed votaries, and which brings to mind a certain popular definition of orthodoxy—to wit, "*my doxy.*" When in the volume before us Mr. Fletcher-Vane presents his own idea of what a municipal programme should be, he makes a contribution to the solution of one of the problems of the day which is entitled to be judged upon its merits, and which, in fact, seems to the reviewer to be neither better nor worse than many another: but it is absurd to claim

that his scheme has any special sanction from the natural law of equal freedom; and when he lays down the rule that "the play which has for its hero a pickpocket" should be "forbidden public exhibition" (see p. 327), as *one of the corollaries of individualism*, he becomes grotesque. And so, when (on page 303 and elsewhere) our authors write in favor of the compulsory opening of the ports of the British colonies to duty-free goods, and the compulsory imposition upon them of "free competition in the supply of capital to labor," they may or may not be advocating a wise policy; in either case they have a right to express their opinion — yet when their advocacy of the use of the army and navy for this purpose is put forth as a part of the great gospel of individual liberty — a gospel which requires (see p. 295) that a father shall in no wise be prevented from "bringing up a family as he likes, and from regulating his household according to his own notions," regardless of the effect upon the other members of the family of the "notions" of an ignorant and brutal parent — and when in support of their compulsory freedom they say that "to compel people to be prosperous cannot be called oppression," and coolly remark (p. 151), in reference to the protests of those who do not wish to be coerced into adopting Messrs. Hake and Wesslau's view of what is good for them, that "the unreasonable we need not heed" — we are left in a state of uncertainty whether we should most admire our authors' logic or their sense of humor.

FREDERIC W. SANDERS.

The Law of Civilization and Decay. An Essay on History. By BROOKS ADAMS. viii+302. Price \$2.50. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., Lim. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1895.

MR. ADAMS is a fair example of a certain class of economic writers who have treated history somewhat as the old theologians used to treat the Scriptures — as a sort of rusty nail box out of which they selected odds and ends of broken nails or rusty screws in order to tack some framework of doctrine together, the likeness of which was never to be found in the thought of God or man. Mr. Adams not only has a theory, but as it used to be said about Matthew Henry's Commentary, that he made even the foxes' tails point to Christ, Mr. Adams makes all history point to his theory. If the facts do not fit his theory, he does not hesitate to cut off a foot now and then or stretch a joint.

Mr. Adams' theory, his "law of civilization and decay," as he styles it,—the dismalest product of the "dismal science" up to date,—is thus stated: "The law of force and energy is of universal application in nature. Animal life is one of the outlets through which solar energy is dissipated." Here, of course, Mr. Adams stands upon a generally accepted principle of physical science, and no issue is to be raised. But the next proposition presents only a half truth. "As human societies are forms of animal life, these societies must differ among themselves in energy in proportion as nature has endowed them more or less abundantly with energetic material."

With proper qualifications, exception could hardly be taken to this statement. But in his next proposition Mr. Adams appears as a thoroughgoing materialist.

"Thought is one of the manifestations of human energy, and among the earlier and simpler phases of thought two stand conspicuous—fear and greed. Fear, which by stimulating the imagination creates a belief in an invisible world, and ultimately develops a priesthood; and greed, which dissipates energy in war and trade" (preface, p. vii).

That is, Mr. Adams finds the source of all kinds of human activity, moral and spiritual—Mr. Adams will pardon the use of the word—as well as physical, in solar energy. This solar energy, under the delicate alchemy of "fear and greed" operating in the laboratory of the human breast, is transmuted into the myriad motives, activities, and results of modern civilization.

In applying these principles to the progress of civilization, Mr. Adams finds a series of constantly recurring cycles. In each cycle there is, *first*, a period of accumulation or hoarding. Among primitive men fear, operating upon the imagination, creates a belief in deity, while greed in those who represent deity enables them to plunder the superstitious and to amass vast hoards of wealth, represented in shrines, temples, cathedrals, and monastic establishments. Among more advanced people the martial spirit displaces the imagination. The soldier supplants the priest. Greed, however, determines the lines of activity, and martial energy expresses itself in centralization. Such vast agglomerations of power as are represented by the Roman Empire, or the monarchy of the Bourbons, are the results of greed amassing wealth through the martial spirit. In more advanced times the martial spirit gives way to the economic. The result is the same. The

weak are plundered by the strong. Wealth is centralized, that is, it is hoarded in a few hands, who are enabled thereby to control government and direct legislation, thus still farther to increase and perpetuate their power. A most pertinent example is to be found in the flagrant plundering of the gold-standard nations by the great banking firms of the nineteenth century (page 289). *Second*, the period of hoarding is followed by a period of plunder by violence, in which those who have not, plunder those who have. This period begins when the power of attack surpasses the power of defense. That is whenever the hoarders who control the police power are unable to protect their wealth. As illustrations, we have the plunder of the Orient by the Crusaders, of the Temple by Philip the Fair, of the monasteries by the Protestant reformers, and of India by the English.

Third, the period of plunder is followed by a period of economic activity. Greed now defies fear. Imagination, or the emotional nature, ceases to direct the energies of men. The era of faith, or "magic" as Mr. Adams calls it, ends. The first effect of "economic competition is to dissipate the energy that has been amassed by war." But as a wealthy class develops, diffusion is followed by concentration. The wealthy control legislation and exploit the energy of the productive classes. Economic society is crippled, and gradually ceases to produce wealth. The hoarded wealth of the few no longer seeks productive forms of activity, but is squandered upon luxuries and vices. A period of decline and decay sets in. The many are helpless because the few make the laws and control the police power. But at last the time comes again when hoarded wealth can no longer protect its own. Then the cycle is repeated. Thus there is no hope for society save in this endless labor of Sisyphus. The nations are doomed to go on toiling up the slope, only to find in their very prosperity the seeds of decay and ruin, which develop in obedience to laws irrevocable and irremediable.

Mr. Adams' metaphysical vagaries would be harmless enough did they not have a direct application to present issues. Some passages, in fact, sound very much like campaign literature.

"As the twentieth century approaches, the salient characteristic of the age is the ascendancy of the economic type of man. . . . Although the conventions of popular government are preserved, capital is at least as absolute as under the Cæsars, and, among capitalists, the money lenders form an aristocracy. Debtors are in reality powerless because

of the extension of that very system of credit which they invented to satisfy their needs. Although the volume of credit is gigantic, the basis upon which it rests is so narrow that it may be manipulated by a handful of men. That basis is gold. In gold debts must be paid; therefore when gold is withdrawn the debtor is helpless, and becomes the servant of his master" (p. 292).

On page 289 the "crime of '73" appears in a somewhat new light:

"These bankers conceived a policy unrivaled in brilliancy which made them masters of all commerce, industry, and trade. They engrossed the gold of the world, and then, by legislation, made it the sole measure of values. What Samuel Lloyd and his followers did to England in 1847 became possible for his successors to do to all the gold-standard nations in 1873. When the mints had been closed to silver, the currency being inelastic, the value of money could be manipulated like that of any article limited in quantity, and thus the human race became the subjects of the new aristocracy which represented the stored energy of mankind."

Mr. Adams does not follow his doctrine through to its application. He need not. The application lies on the surface. If we are at the culmination of an epoch of hoarding, and to the stringencies and distresses of the period there is to be no relief, save as we enter the period when those who have not take by violence from those who have the results of their spoliation, then it follows as a matter of duty, if the word might be allowed in Mr. Adams' system, we must hasten the era of redistribution, or, in other words, the new era of plunder. We must preach the Gospel of Plunder as the application of what Mr. Carlyle would call the "Gospel of Dirt."

These gloomy doctrines the author professes to draw from history, and if we once admit his method we may admit his results. He treats history as a sort of conjurer's hat, the capacity of which in producing startling effects is limited only by the fancy of the prestidigitator. There is, however, this interesting difference between the ordinary conjurer and Mr. Adams. The conjurer knows his hat. Mr. Adams does not. In the chapter on "Modern Centralization," in which the author recounts the succession of recent economic movements, however we may take issue with his deductions, in the statement of fact he is generally accurate. But in treating the Middle Ages the author's knowledge of facts appears not only superficial but limited. So long as he adheres to Mommsen, Fustel de Coulanges, or Luchaire he is safe

from the critic, but whenever he has the hardihood to leave these guides and speak from his own general knowledge of the subject in hand he is beyond his depth at once. The following sentence, selected at random, is a fair sample of the kind of history Mr. Adams writes when left to his own resources: "Probably the Greek Empire had culminated under Justinian, who was crowned in 527, about fifty years after Odoacer assumed the title of King of Italy." Of the same order is the remarkable characterization of the Vandal migration given on page 25. It is a pity that Mr. Adams did not consult at least the *Britannica* before writing up the Vandals. In the present progress of historic science it is safer than Gibbon. In general the range of authorities from whom the author has drawn his facts is exceedingly meager for a subject covering so vast a range as the *Law of Civilization and Decay*. The absolute dearth of untranslated German authorities, save one reference to an obscure sermon of Zwingli, leads to the conviction that the author has hobbled through his subject upon one crutch. In English history, besides the standard French and English economic works upon prices and corresponding subjects he cites largely from Froude and Macaulay. One misses Hume and Agnes Strickland. Of German history, either in German or any other language, the author is profoundly ignorant. His account of the "Canossa affair" (pp. 52-54) is simply delicious. One seldom meets outside of the old monastic biographers a finer piece of imaginary history.

The above sufficiently prepares the reader for the complete failure of the author to comprehend the great movements of the middle period out of which has arisen our modern civilization. The fact is the author sees with only one eye. He has lost the power of perspective. He sees everything flat. All human progress is to him the outworking of greed. The history of civilization is the record of a series of pirate raids. He fails to see the operation of any motives more noble than those which control the bloody wrangle of a bandit's camp over the division of spoil. Hence there is scarcely a movement in the past which he understands or presents fairly. The economic causes of the decline of the ancient classical civilization he has grasped correctly, but in endeavoring to make the most of his argument he has sadly distorted the proportions in ignoring other causes. Of the economic origin of feudalism he might have made more, greatly to the strengthening of his general argument, if he had known more about feudalism. When he comes to treat of the extension of Christianity,

the development of the ecclesiastical system, the Holy Roman Empire, the rise of monasticism, the Crusades, the Communes, the national monarchy, the Reformation, the author fails either to convince or to satisfy. No one of these movements was without wide-reaching and important economic results. But in his effort to prove his law the author has strangely misplaced cause and effect. The Reformation particularly is beyond him. He mistakes the slime and silt and froth and filth, the accompaniments of the flood, for the rising tide itself.

The book can do harm only in inexperienced hands. But unfortunately just at this time inexperienced hands are reaching out for such books, and witless heads are only too ready to accept anything that fans the prevailing discontent, or seems to justify the proscription of those who by their skill and energy and industry have enriched society.

BENJAMIN S. TERRY.

Classes and Masses. By W. H. MALLOCK. Imported by Macmillan & Co. Pp. 139.

A CLEVER writer is Mr. Mallock, and his sentences are transparent as crystal. He knows how to present the optimistic view of our industrial order to people who have never been hungry in a most satisfactory style. He knows how to sum up the results of a century of class struggle, of heroic sacrifice, of earnest philanthropy, of patriotic legislation, so as to make it all appear the "natural product" of forces outside human choice and effort. Wealth "distributes itself." The minimum of humane living is determined by the amount which can be produced on the poorest acres of cultivable land. The actual rate of wages depends on what consumers are willing to pay for goods, not on what the workmen demand. The census shows that the condition of the great majority of the people is comfortable and is improving. The discussion aims to break the force of the socialistic demand for governmental help by showing that great and rapid advance is made without the interference of the slow and clumsy agency of the state with the delicate machinery of private enterprise.

The triumph of the book is too easy. Its success depends in part upon suppressing many notorious facts. One may be quite in sympathy with the purpose of the author, and believe that his statements are reliable as far as they go, and yet conclude that a deeper appreciation of the defects of our civilization would give the argument a more

permanent hold upon the convictions of instructed men. The style is admirable for its purpose of popular impression. There is nothing new for the student.

C. R. HENDERSON.

Strikes and Social Problems. By J. SHIELD NICHOLSON. Macmillan & Co. Pp. 226. \$1.25.

THE eminent British economist publishes in this volume a number of popular addresses and essays bearing on the conflict of capital and labor. The writer believes that trades unions have an important place in industrial life, especially in providing funds for various emergencies. But he warns against trusting organization to add to wages, and he is alarmed at the recent tendency to turn to state aid on every possible occasion. In spite of the slow progress of profit sharing Professor Nicholson looks for an increase of interest in this mode of industrial remuneration. He does not seem to have weighed the difficulties started by Schloss in his "Methods of Industrial Remuneration."

In the fourth lecture the writer joins issue with Mill in relation to the assertion that machinery has not lightened the burdens of working men, and he employs the materials collected by Giffen and others to show that wealth has not only greatly increased but is more equitably distributed than even before. There is an interesting chapter on "living capital," in which an estimate is made of the money value of an adult working man, based on the capitalized value of his cost of rearing and of his productive energy. He reaches the conclusion that this living capital is worth about five times the material wealth of the kingdom. The importance of this consideration is seen when it is proposed to help a certain class by burdening another; the suffering must fall on the majority of the population.

There is a plea for the classical economy and for industrial liberty, and an urgent attack upon all schemes of old age pensions.

In the plea for industrial liberty Professor Nicholson touches on a problem discussed by Professor H. C. Adams: On what principle may we determine what forms of industry should be left to private enterprise and what should be owned or controlled by the state? But no conclusion is reached beyond the presumption that when government and individual liberty are in competition we should give the benefit of the doubt to liberty. To support this conclusion two arguments are

used, the evil of governmental methods, and the advantages of personal liberty.

The author permits himself (p. 181) one not very complimentary allusion to the subject of this *Journal*: "In every view one of the greatest merits of the orthodox economists was the careful distinction they draw between economic and other social sciences. They refused to merge it in the misty regions of general sociology, and they excluded from its borders the rocks and quicksands as well as the green pastures of ethics and religions." This is what made Carlyle rave. The author does not indicate what is to be done with the very interesting and pressing social problems which are thus thrust out into that outer darkness which surrounds the luminous patch called economics. It is one thing to exclude a human interest from a single science, it is quite another to prevent it from absorbing the thought of human beings.

C. R. HENDERSON.

Our Industrial Utopia. By D. H. WHEELER. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co. 1895. Pp. 341.

A VERY clever defense of the standing order, pleasantly written. The argument is addressed to a popular audience and the rhetorical form is effective for its purpose—to slow the pulse of excited sentimentalists. "Set a philanthropist to buying and selling goods, and you will discover that he is a perfectly rational human being. . . . It is not the economic, but the immoral man who should be scourged. . . . Competition is only a rational effort to excel, exceed, and succeed." Mr. Lloyd's *Wealth Against Commonwealth* is called hysterics, and the trusts are praised for cheapening food, drink, and lights. The way to bring down sleeping-car fares is to sit up in the ordinary coach. Socialism is a reform against nature. From the claws judge what the animal may be.

C. R. HENDERSON.

America and Europe: A Study of International Relations. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1896.

THIS little volume is one of the "Questions of the Day" series, and consists of three reprints—a *North American Review* article on "The United States and Great Britain—Their True Governmental and

Commercial Relations," by Mr. David A. Welles; Mr. E. J. Phelps' address on "The Monroe Doctrine," delivered in Brooklyn in March 1896, and the address of Mr. Carl Schurz on "International Arbitration," given before the Washington conference in April 1896. The three are grouped as presenting a common body of doctrine relating to the proper foreign policy of the United States.

The name of Mr. Welles is sufficient perhaps to indicate his view of the question. He explains the enlightened liberality of British government, more particularly evidenced by its policy of free trade, by which the markets of the British Empire are open to the world on the same conditions as to British subjects; its extension of civilization in barbarous lands; its abolition of slavery; its beneficent rule of its dependencies. In all these respects Mr. Welles thinks the United States far inferior to Great Britain. He shows how much better it would be for the world if Hawaii should come under the British flag than under that of any other nation, and if British authority should control the Orinoco.

This last is the chief point of the article. It is the opinion of Mr. Welles that in defending Venezuela against Great Britain we are taking the part of barbarism against civilization. He admits that perhaps in the past Britain may have extended its possessions by violence, and may have acted in an unfriendly way towards the United States. But all this, he holds, is quite passed away. It is substantially his inference that we ought to be highly gratified to see British power in our hemisphere expand; that British policy is such a combination of benevolence and intelligence that it is really a shame for us to seek to check it.

There are some stubborn facts, however, which the writer seems to overlook. One is, that after all Great Britain and the United States are two nations, and not one. Another is that, whatever may have been the attitude of the people, the government of Great Britain never has been friendly to us when we have needed a friend. Still another is, that British good feeling for the republic has become conspicuous just about in the ratio of the republic's growth in material power. And again, a British policy of aggression in South America can hardly fail to lead to a similar policy among other European nations. God forbid that our country should ever again have a war with a civilized people. But inasmuch as the millennium has not yet come, the safest way of insuring peace may perhaps still be to prevent a further

extension of European power on this continent. We can hardly afford to see the partition of Africa repeated in South America.

The address of Mr. Phelps is a lawyer's plea for a strict construction of the Monroe Doctrine. He treats it about as if the doctrine in question were a statute, which he then skillfully proceeds to dissect out of existence. Mr. Welles writes very much in the tone of a tory of 1776 or of a high federalist of 1812, either of whom had great respect for England and little for the United States. Mr. Phelps is blind unless he looks through legal spectacles.

Mr. Schurz makes an eloquent plea for an arbitration treaty with Great Britain. Save, perhaps, that he is somewhat over sanguine, surely no one can take exception to a word that he says. If we can substitute courts for armies we shall take a long step forward in civilization.

HARRY PRATT JUDSON.

Proportional Representation. By JOHN R. COMMONS (Library of Economics and Politics, edited by Richard T. Ely, No. 8). Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. Pp. 298. \$1.75.

THIS is so good a piece of work that it is difficult to treat it fairly in a review. The practical importance of the subject and the excellence of Professor Commons' treatment of that subject might seem to entitle the book to an extended notice; and yet, just because the work is so well done, just because it is a model handbook, the best thing that can be said is: "Read the book for yourself. The subject is well worth the attention of every citizen of a free state, and Professor Commons has presented it in the most satisfactory manner." The author believes in the reform he discusses and frankly argues for it, making no pretense to an academic indifference he does not feel: yet, if not technically *judicial*, his tone is *judicious* throughout, and he fairly presents the difficulties as well as the benefits of proportional representation. The bibliography is not exhaustive, but is quite sufficient, and includes specific references to full bibliographies in other publications.

FREDERIC W. SANDERS.

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

CONDUCTED BY J. D. FORREST, A. T. FREEMAN, AND H. A. MILLIS.

Growth of the French Canadian Race in America.—The hypothesis of Malthus was not justified by the facts at his disposal. He was unable to discover a standard rate of increase of population. The French Canadians present all the conditions necessary for accurate observation. Regular enumerations of the people have been made ever since the English conquest, and before that time sixteen enumerations were made and parish registers were carefully kept. Since 1759 the French Canadians have lived in isolation, yet in a country where the largest expansion was possible. The Canadian censuses enumerate the French Canadians separately, whether found in Quebec or in the other provinces; and also differentiate them from the Acadian French. The United States census of 1890 gives the French Canadians and those whose parents were of that race now in the States. Allowing for Acadian French, we find in 1890 about 500,000 French Canadians in the United States. In 1891 there were 1,304,745 in Canada, making a total of 1,804,795. In 1765 there were 69,810 French in Canada. The resulting rate of increase per cent. per decade from 1765 to 1890-1 is 29.7, which gives the result that the French Canadian population has doubled itself every 27 years. Malthus accepted as his standard a doubling every 25 years. But the coincidence is purely accidental. The number of children born in a French Canadian family averages twelve, but the average size of a family in 1891 was 5.5, which was but little above the average for all Canada. The excessive death rate is due to neglect because of the large number of children, to excess of food, improper food, etc., but not to the counteracting causes given by Malthus—vice and poverty. The period covered by these statistics is 125 years of uninterrupted growth in peace and prosperity. The population studied is homogeneous and does not tend to mix with others. All the conditions necessary for securing the standard rate of increase are found in them as in no other race.—JOHN DAVIDSON, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, September 1896.

Primitive Democracy in British Trade-Unionism.—Trade unionists had to construct an administration able to perform its functions, yet fundamentally dependent on the continuous assent of the bulk of its members. Democracy was the only possible basis of association. In the early unions there was rapid rotation in office, and all matters were decided by vote of the members. The exigencies of warfare with employers caused the direction of affairs to pass into the hands of a responsible committee, self-constituted or representative. When the unions expanded, instead of a representative assembly, the referendum was used, and officers were elected by direct vote of the whole body. When national organizations were formed, the members in one town were charged with responsibility of conducting the current business of the whole society. When the secretary became a salaried officer, he was chosen by the whole organization, and soon became the only connecting link between the scattered branches. He soon became a very important and relatively permanent officer; and as he became better qualified for his place, the manual workers who composed the executive committee could exercise little control over his actions. The only check upon the salaried officials was by written constitution. When delegate meetings were held the delegates were simply to express the instructions of their unions, and were in no sense representatives. Later, for economy, the referendum superseded the delegate meetings. Along with the referendum, the initiative of unions was developed. The result was a wild rush of propositions and a tendency towards the disintegration of the societies.

The frequent propositions were checked by a revision of the rules. The attempt to secure the participation of every member in the management led to instability and financial weakness. Hence the general body lost all effective control of the government, and the power passed into the hands of salaried officials. Personal dictatorship has not resulted, but a closely combined bureaucracy. No real opportunity was given the ordinary member to participate in the central administration. The last twenty years have witnessed a change in the trade-union constitutions. Rotation in office is abandoned. Resort to the aggregate meeting diminishes in frequency and importance. The use of the initiative and referendum has been given up in complicated issues. The delegate is coming gradually to exercise the freedom of a representative. The elected representative assembly appoints and controls an executive committee under whose direction the permanent official staff performs its work.—SIDNEY and BEATRICE WEBB, *Political Science Quarterly*, September 1896.

* **Ethics from the Point of View of Sociology.**—*Characteristic phases of the formation of moral ideas.* In a former article it was shown that the domains of action and morality have the same extension. Science by abstraction removes itself from the true conditions of action. Our analysis explains the bond which unites the moral and social elements, and shows why the development of sociology ought to be considered as the point of departure of a renovation of science and morality. The only way to do this is to learn from history what the customs of each epoch and each social group have been. A. General characteristics of primitive morality. (a) It is a social function. The individual is a simple creation of the social life. The formation of the individual consciousness is constantly conditioned by society. (b) Diverse sociological interpretations of primitive morality. There are three different theories: (1) Sociology is frequently objective, and reduces morality to customs and habits of certain groups. (2) Other sociologists hold that customs reduce themselves to simple habits (Wundt, Spencer). (3) These two explanations have this common trait: that customs are imposed upon the individual from without. The first reduces morality to custom, and custom to simple mechanical reaction. The second accounts for the sentiments underlying moral laws by the sentiment of the supernatural. The first is based on anthropology; the second on history. The subjective and ideal elements are neglected by both. (4) The psychological theory gives place for subjective conditions, yet presents also the different forms. (5) All of these theories hold to the social character of primitive morality. Among all the expressions of social life, morality can least well be studied abstractly. (c) The chief characteristics of primitive morality. It is a social function inseparable from all others. It is always traditional. It is systematic and very rigid. It is incoherent, because it depends wholly upon exterior and occasional causes. (d) Conclusion. To reduce primitive morality to a simple statement of the customs of a certain epoch is to suppress the distinct element of morality. Yet it is true that the ideal element is subordinated. It is by examination of variations in consciousness of the ideal that we come to understand the ethical problem of today.—MARCEL BERNÈS, "Programme d'un cours de Sociologie générale: la Morale au point de vue sociologique (*suite*)," *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, August-September 1896.

Is the Family Declining?—There are fewer marriages in proportion to population than formerly; families are smaller; they are less coherent; they are less lasting. In England the marriage rate fell from 17.2 per cent. in 1851 to 15.2 per cent. in 1881, and from 1873 to 1888 the ages of men and women who married rose respectively from 25.6 and 24.2 to 26.3 and 24.7. The rise in the number of divorces 1860-1885 was universal. In 1871 England and Wales show 1 divorce to 1020.4 marriages; in 1879, 1 in 480.83. From 1867 to 1886 divorces in United States increased 157 per cent., while the population increased 60 per cent. One of the causes of change is the whole modern movement of liberation—of subjects from sovereigns, slaves from masters, wives from husbands, and children from parents. Another is the disappearance of the ecclesiastical view of marriage. A more special cause has been the growth of large cities, which completely alter the environment of the organism. Men become

less dependent on women for their home needs, and women have resources and interests which the simple life of the country denies them. Then, too, attachments formed on slight acquaintance of underlying traits of character are less likely to prove lasting. The number of marriages among women of higher education is less than among the uneducated. Of 1486 ex-students of the chief women's colleges of England only 208 married. The new economic opportunities for women of the middle class rival the domestic and social life which marriage offers, and also bring into the industrial market a class of competitors with whom the standard of wages is simply what is sufficient to support the individual. Among the working class marriages are not less frequent; but the home is apt to be less comfortable on account of the tendency of women to go out to work. In the light of these facts it is held by many that the monogamic family is a relic of a decaying form of civilization. The foundations on which it was based are sapped. Against this, it may be said that woman was not free in monogamous and polyandrous families; that in the early monogamic family the husband belonged as much to the family as the family did to him; and that the same is true today. There are ethical functions which the family performs for the children which cannot be taken over by the public nurse without loss. There is also a social advantage in making the parent responsible for the support of his own children. Under modern conditions this is more important than under primitive. The changes that are proceeding in the structure of society are capable of another interpretation than that given by the socialists. They are preparing the way for the reconstruction of the family on a higher plane of national and individual life. The fact that man's condition changed from status to contract rendered woman's subjection worse than it was before. It is this condition which is now being attacked. The claims of women are now for liberty—personal and economical, equality political and legal, and intellectual, social, and æsthetic fraternity. Will the family be able to adapt itself to these demands? Married women will doubtless be excluded from factories. The higher education of women will raise the standard of families. The enfranchisement of women will have the same effect, since it renders them less dependent upon marriage for social consideration. It is doubtful whether the education of women causes them to object to the responsibility of children, except in unlimited numbers. Thus the new family will be higher than the old. But it is not yet possible to state what general form the new structure will take. It may be taken for granted that the form will be monogamic. All the evidence indicates that the organism is able to transform itself to suit the new environment.—J. H. MUIRHEAD, *International Journal of Ethics*, October 1896.

Latest Results of Workers' Accident Insurance in Austria.—The Austrian compulsory insurance law passed in 1887 applies "to all employés in factories, smelting works, quarries, shipyards, places manufacturing or using explosives, establishments for carrying out building works, and all places where machinery is regularly used." In 1894 this law was extended to railway employés and other persons employed in internal transport. In 1894, 1,598,404 employés came under the law. In case of permanent disablement the employé receives 60 per cent. of his wages; in case of temporary disablement, 50 per cent. In case of death the widow gets 20 per cent., the children from 10 to 15 per cent., of the annual wage; 12,267 persons were receiving annuities at the end of 1894, and the amount spent during that year was about \$400,000 (£80,066). The insurance fund is borne nine-tenths by the employers and one-tenth by the employés. It is in the hands of commissions (one for each of the seven districts into which the country is divided) composed of eighteen members, six representing the employers, six the employés, and six being appointed by the government.—*The Labor Gazette*, September 1896.

The Standard Rate.—Trade unions insist on payment according to some definite standard, which is always a minimum, never a maximum. There is never an objection to payment above union rates. Yet the existence of a minimum tends to produce a greater equality of rates. The recognition of a standard rate is only arrived at by bargaining, with concessions on both sides. The workmen who could individu-

ally exact better terms make concessions for the benefit of their class. The unionists insist on a standard piecework rate, rather than a definite sum per hour, and therefore the income of the good workman far exceeds that of the poor one. The piecework rates of iron and steel workers, miners, and cotton operatives govern a third of the trade-union members of England, while tailors, shoemakers, compositors, coopers, basket makers, and many other trades have had schedules of piecework rates since the beginning of this century. In such cases the actual earnings of workmen cannot be equalized. Where a standard wage per hour prevails, as in bricklaying, plumbing, etc., the superior workman receives higher pay and is employed on the more particular work. The best carpenters, when not getting special rates for staircasing, etc., are employed on finer work in the shop, while the rougher workmen have to do the heavier mechanical tasks. The greater freedom from exposure, and employment on work of a diversified character, affording scope for individual initiative, constitute a real advantage. Yet the conviction among unionists that the slow, industrious mechanic deserves as much as his quicker fellow has led to serious objections to piecework. In Great Britain 49 unions with 573,000 members insist on piecework; 24 unions with 140,000 members willingly recognize both piece and time work; 38 unions with 290,000 members insist on time work. Unskilled laborers and transport workers are omitted from this enumeration. The most powerful unions are among trades of the first and second class. Among the third class, building trades always denounce piecework. By "speeding up" machinery, the work placed upon the cotton spinner may be steadily increased; hence the necessity of piece rates. Also, when improvements are made, decreasing the labor of workmen, the onus of decreasing their pay falls on the employer. But where the work of a skilled mechanic differs from job to job, as in a machine shop, the introduction of piecework implies a reversion to individual bargaining, when the price would be dictated by the employer. If an expert workman earns more than his neighbor, a reduction will then be made, until only the most expert is able to earn a bare living. Where piecework of this sort is permitted by the strong unions, it is provided that a standard time-rate shall be paid every workman, regardless of the amount done. Where both systems are willingly accepted, as by compositors, it is because, while some difference of work is found, the piecework is not inconsistent with collective bargaining, and where the workman cannot be speeded up by the foreman. Only where the system has been adapted to the nature of the work has collective bargaining survived. The objection to arbitrary fines and "truck" are based on a desire to maintain the standard rate. A fundamental article of trade-union faith is that it is impossible to prevent the degradation of the standard of life unless the conditions of labor are settled by a common standard.—SIDNEY and BEATRICE WEBB, *The Economic Journal*, September 1896.

The Man and the Machine : A Plea for Industrial Education.—During the last century our struggle has been to displace the man by the machine. Productive power has increased more than a thousandfold, and just now it seems that electricity is going to cause another great introduction of new machinery. With this increase in productive power the factor of individual capacity has decreased, and "every mechanical advance tends to further subordinate the individuality of the operative." The laborer has in many cases become a "machine-tender" instead of a master of his machine. But still it must be said with this individuality destroyed the laborer is far stronger and far better off than his ancestors. With greater material progress, education has become more general and new wants have been created and are being satisfied. But there is another side to this question. While many have lost their individuality and become "wheels in the industrial system," there is at the same time the greatest opportunity for the skilled mechanic. Intelligence now has its greatest opportunity. He says, "If the physical man sinks into nothingness beside the power of the machine, the brain of man has gained reinforcement akin to omnipotence." And the opportunity is going to be still greater. We have busied ourselves in producing a large quantity of goods. In the future it is the better quality that is going to be required. The artistic element is going to enter more and more into production. That we as a nation shall be able to develop along this line, and that more laborers shall be able to put their individuality into their

work, technological education must be had. The state's great duty now is to broaden her system of education so as to include technological instruction.—S. N. D. NORTH, in *Bulletin of the National Association of Wool Manufacturers*, September 1896.

The Future of the American Republic.—We have a blind optimism in regard to the future of this country. Everyone has a chance to rise, and the material condition is better than that found in any other country. "In America, as in no other country, it is possible for the average man to maintain a hopeful existence." But we find upon examination that everything is not so promising. Our government rests upon public opinion; "upon it also rests full responsibility for all the evils which exist among us." And in an examination of public opinion we find five dangers. The first one is connected with the blind optimism already referred to, which leads to an attitude of non-interference in public affairs. We think *somebody* coming from *somewhere* will *somehow* set things right, and in the meantime we let abuses remain. Then we have a false idea of liberty, too. We act as though liberty meant rights without corresponding duties. But in real liberty there is no right without a corresponding duty. Then, thirdly, we find a lack of respect for authority. An excellent example of this is found in lynching. Then we have a materialistic spirit. Our wealth getting has been carried so far that our patriotism, education, and culture are sacrificed. Lastly, there is a feebleness of the civic conscience. We do not realize our individual responsibility. We do not feel the solidarity of society. These are real dangers and the future of America depends upon how we meet them.—PROFESSOR GARRET W. THOMPSON, in *Arena*, September 1896.

Compulsory Arbitration a Practicable Remedy.—There are two objections to compulsory arbitration, (1) that it is impracticable, and (2) that it would work injustice. The author of this article believes "the plan can be modified so that these objections will be overcome, and so that the proposed remedy will at the same time be made applicable to all classes of employers—to individuals and associations as well as to corporations." It is said a court cannot settle such intricate problems as are involved in labor disputes. It is true that there would be many intricate problems, but there is still greater probability of a fair decision than if the matter is settled by the strike or the lockout. Then it is objected that whether the decision is just or unjust it cannot be enforced. It can. If not flagrantly unjust public opinion will enforce it. And then the self-interest of the parties concerned will compel its enforcement, too. The employer must carry out the decision or else stop his business, in which case he loses the interest upon his invested capital. So must the laborer, or else find other employment? And how about decisions working injustice? At most they can do nothing but stop the employer's business and thereby only costing him the loss of interest on his capital, or force the laborer to look elsewhere for employment. In any case it would not be so bad as a strike or a lockout. So the conclusion is that compulsory arbitration is practicable and far more just than the strike or the lockout.—NORMAN T. MASON in *Arena*, September 1896.

Five American Contributions to Civilization.—Every great nation has made its contributions to civilization. America has made five such. She has given the world arbitration, religious toleration, universal suffrage, recognition of the foreigner, and a lesson in "the diffusion of well-being among the population." We have relied on arbitration to settle our difficulties. This is shown by the fact that we have been a party to forty-seven arbitrations, more than half of those that have taken place in the modern world. As a result of this we have had little war, we have not developed those objectionable qualities growing out of a military career, we have not piled up a great war debt, we have not been compelled to have great armies and coast defenses. So have we given the world the most perfect form of religious freedom. No church, no faith, has been recognized by the government. As citizens, too, we are tolerant, and no denomination has tried to gain power. We were the first to develop a well-balanced and safe "universal" suffrage. We have demonstrated to the world that a democracy is possible, and that it can use government wisely. America has treated all equally,

has been a home for all. She has extended her rights fully to the foreigner and shown the world that under fit conditions the foreigner and the "lower classes" are not dangerous. Finally, we have shown the world an example of the diffusion of general well-being. It is shown in our school system, our homes, our high standard of living, our wonderful development of industry, and our great systems of transportation.—CHARLES W. ELIOT in the *Atlantic Monthly*, October 1896.

The Standard of Living of the American Workingman.—It is a well-known fact that the nominal wage is much higher in America than in England, France, and other European countries. But how is it with the real wage? Does the American wage mean more than that of the Englishman or the Frenchman? Yes, the author says, "In my estimation a family of working people, in their ordinary consumption, obtain with a certain sum of money as much in America as in England, and probably more than in France." Food is just as cheap in America as abroad. So is ready-made clothing, the clothing bought by the working people. The American does spend more for rent, but it is because of his better accommodations. Taking into consideration his accommodations his rents are no higher. So if the purchasing power of an American laborer's dollar is as great as that of the English or the French laborer, he gets the full benefit of his higher nominal wage. This gives the American a greater variety. That this is true is shown by the fact that he spends relatively less for food, and relatively more for clothing, rent, sundries, and amusements than the foreign laborer. True, the laborer has no surplus left, but this is because he has to spend more to maintain his rank, because his standard of living is high.—EMILE LEVASSEUR in *Yale Review*, August 1896.

The Problem of the Population.—The diminution of the fertility of civilized peoples is becoming more and more apparent. It is especially evident in France where the death rate exceeds the birth rate and the population is kept stationary only by immigration. The Malthusian theory does not afford an explanation of this phenomenon, for the wealth per capita among all nations is increasing much more rapidly than the population. Nor is the decrease in the birth rate due to physiological causes, but to two great social causes: first, increasing uncertainty of being able to give self and offspring defense against want; second, abolition of the right of primogeniture, entailing the dissipation of property in families in which there is more than one child. Under the capitalistic system life is difficult for the mass of mankind. A child is a burden. Thus of necessity reproduction is restrained. Fertility is high where large landed proprietorship is the rule; low where the soil is minutely divided. Fertility is in inverse ratio to the degree of divisibility of the soil. As but comparatively few can be large proprietors, the general fertility must remain low under the present system. Conclusion: Individual possession of land and the means of production is an obstacle to the reproduction of the race. This obstacle increases continually. Society must remove it or perish.—DÉSIRÉ DESCAMPS, *Revue Socialiste*, September 1896.

The Social-Evangelical Movement in Germany.—Wichern gave the first impulse by founding the Inner Mission. Victor-Aimé Huber insisted that economic reforms must be added to the private benevolence of Wichern's schemes, but these reforms must be brought about by coöperative clubs, and by the upper classes. Godt, with the New Testament as a criterion, secured fairer judgment for socialism by showing that its economical and political principles are not anti-Christian in essence, and that Christians should aim not only to save individual souls, but so to transform society by political and social reforms that it become truly the kingdom of God. Stöcker, court preacher, interested by Godt, founded the Christian Workmen's party in 1878. Ill-received by the press of all parties, even by the socialists, who were then violently attacking Christianity, the party at first gained many workmen, but gradually came to be made up of shopkeepers, clerks, students and a few officers. Their prejudices and the violent attacks of the liberal press, then in the hands of the Jews, made Stöcker and his party anti-Semitic. This again led toward conservatism, and the party and its

very name were transformed. Stöcker, like Godt, desired a popular movement, guided by the upper classes. This was a fatal defect. Fischer, a miner of Westphalia, succeeded much better in his Association of Protestant Workmen. At first rather religious than political, it turned in 1888 to practical social reforms. Weber, a pastor, much increased its membership but showed later a conservative tendency which divided the party. Naumann became leader of the other division. The great social-evangelical congress in 1890 brought together Stöcker and these men, with their adherents. The elements in the congress were too diverse for political action, but much was done in collecting information and planning work. At the present moment the movement is in a grave crisis. Each branch has internal divisions, all are opposed by the great political parties, the ecclesiastic and official world. The opposition has become active persecution which is frightening away timid adherents. The leaders of the movement believe that the ranks will close before the enemy, and that success is possible if they become a fully organized, hard-working party with journals, and representatives in the state assemblies. The party has now a journal, "*Die Hilfe*." It will soon have a representative in the Reichstag, Naumann.—J. PHILIP DE BARJEAU, *Revue du Christianisme Social*, September 1896.

Immigration and Crime.—The criminal influence of the alien with its steady increase can be traced back in the history of the United States for the last sixty years. From as early as 1820, when large immigration had just begun, shocking revelations of pauperism and crime were made, but belief in the cheap labor of the immigrant was so strong that the evil was not checked. It was shown before 1850 that the foreign population, comprising only one-eighth of the whole, furnished two thousand more paupers and a thousand more criminals than all the remaining seven-eighths of the people. The census of 1880, summarizing the relative proportions of the foreign population which were paupers and criminals as far back as 1850, shows that the foreigner in proportion to his numbers furnishes by far the greater part of pauperism and crime. The national census of 1890 shows the following proportions of prisoners among natives and foreigners:

Prisoners	Ratio per 1,000,000
Native white, - - - - -	882
Foreign white, - - - - -	1,747
Negro, - - - - -	3,250

Increase in the crime of homicide under the influence of foreigners is particularly apparent. The native white element of the population is 73.24 per cent. but it produces only 44 per cent. of the homicides.—SIDNEY G. FISHER, *Appleton's Popular Science Monthly*, September 1896.

The Ill and the Old in the Rural Mutual Aid Societies.—For forty years mutual aid societies have operated in France with more or less success in caring for members when ill, pensioning the old, and defraying funeral expenses. Their field has become particularly broad in the rural communities because of depopulation of the middle-aged, industrially effective people by removal to cities or by emigration, leaving an abnormal proportion of the old and young. The most feasible plan of operating pensions has been found to be the payment of five francs annually between the ages of twenty-five and sixty-five years, which then yields a pension of seventy-five francs or of 146 francs at the age of seventy years, which with the usual amount of work that the old still do is sufficient for their subsistence. The sinking funds of these associations have grown to considerable size, and thus assure their success against the strain of exceptional temporary demands. The reduction of expenses by large contracts is urged, especially permanent agreements with physicians for the care of the sick.—LOUIS DE GOY, *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, September 1896.

The Ethical Side of Socialism.—Sympathy is not the only motive of society. The individual who finds it useful to join his efforts with those of others develops in himself sympathy. United action becomes regular in proportion to its utility, and its

regular repetition increases sympathy. This sympathy is then founded on the desire for self-preservation, and is really egoistic. Some idealistic socialists claim that at a certain stage of economic-social development society will become altruistic; this is an hypothesis of ignorance. To be egoistic is every man's duty. Everyone obeys this law. Individual development becomes the basis of security of society.

Socialism is a movement of workingmen and seeks their class interests. The few socialists who are not of the working class are shrewd fellows, seeking the quickest way to obtain a halo of popularity. What does the party ask? The Belgian socialist press began in 1890 to demand government ownership of mines. Official statistics show that since 1851 wages in coal production have increased every year but one, while the profit of capital has decreased steadily and rapidly. If the state bought these works to give the workmen what they call for, the full product of their labor, their wages would be increased, at most, 6 per cent., and this only if state management proved no dearer than private management.

Socialists speak of renouncing individual for general progress. This would check the development of production. Suppose in Bellamy's state some one makes an invention producing yearly 45,000,000 francs. The share of the inventor would be one franc. Would a second fool be found to study long, to make tiresome experiments, to devote perhaps his whole life to get an addition of one franc to his yearly income? Socialism aims at an equality contrary to human nature, a robbery of the intellectually or physically strong for the weak and lazy. The Christian church, because it arose in a time of oppression, announces the same principle; so Chrysostom says: "The rich man is a thief." For further comfort to the poor and wretched was set up the dogma of personal immortality, the good to be rewarded, the wicked punished. The religion of Christ takes no care about earthly well-being, and the papacy opposes freedom. Some do not believe this. De Laveleye says, "I cannot understand what has misled the socialists to take up the theories of Darwin, which deny their claims, and to turn their backs on Christianity, which has the same path as they and which acknowledges their claims." So, too, a French bishop lately said, "The wishes and claims of the socialists are also those of the Christian religion. How can one, saddened by the great difference in men's circumstances, seeing the frightful abyss between rich and poor, help but accept a theory which recognizes and tries to reduce to action the principle of equality and the brotherhood of all as children of one Father." If De Laveleye and the bishop are right we must consider Christianity the gospel of socialism, a class religion, with a deadly hate of the well-to-do. The special weakness of socialist morality is that, led astray by more or less lasting class contrasts, it proposes to repress the intellectual and moral power of gifted individuals. It is artfully increasing the blind egoists who fancy that the way to be rich is to plunder the little store of the well-to-do. Socialism is the ideal of parasites.—GIUSEPPE FIAMINGO, *Deutsche Revue*, September 1896.

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THE SMOKY PILGRIMS.

It is a popular belief that large cities are the great centers of social corruption and the special causes of social degeneration, while rural districts and country towns are quite free from immoral influences. It is held that the tendency of social life in a large city is downward, and that of country life is upward. No doubt that the congregation of a large population in a city has a tendency to develop in a geometrical ratio certain criminal and pauper conditions which are in marked contrast to those of sparsely settled districts, where life moves less rapidly and overcrowding is less apparent. Yet the country has its own social evils and social residuum; for while an abundance of fresh air and sunshine may be in themselves redeeming features of social improvement, it takes something more than these to make a healthy social atmosphere. The limits of industry are as certain in the country as in the city, and if more seek labor than are able to find it there is a clear case of economic over-crowding. While this over-crowding is less marked, a man without a place in the world is as much crowded out when the broad fields are before him as in the large city, amidst the rush of hurrying industry. While the country has some advantages over the city in respect to the condition of the poor and unfortunate, it may appear after all that social degeneration in the country, if not quite in proportion to the decline in large cities, according to the population, moves with accelerating ratio.

In support of this suggestion it must be understood that the country has been constantly supplying the city with much of its best material, and thus building up the city population at its own expense. The population that joins the march to the city is upon the whole of superior character, while the vicious that go are comparatively few. The popular notion that all rogues go to London is not to be followed by the supposition that the country is the chief source of supply for city criminality and pauperism. The thorough investigation of Mr. Charles Booth, in London, shows that the country population is quite free from criminal conditions and characteristics for the first generation, and that it is only in the second generation, under the influences of bad economic and social conditions in which the fierce struggle for existence occurs, that social deterioration is noticeable.

In the peopling of the great West this struggle for existence, and, indeed, for place and position, has always been observable among the poorly equipped for life. There have marched, side by side, in the conquest of the West, the strongest, most energetic, and the best, along with the vicious, idle, and weak; in fact, with the worst of the race. The movement of populations always carries with it a social residuum. The constant shifting of population and of conditions tends to increase and make permanent this helpless class. While the pulsating life of the city may feel more quickly the evil results of a sudden economic change, the country is not free from its evil influences. As a rule the food supply is not lacking in the country, and seldom it is that people suffer from hunger; but the weakening conditions are there. Many suffer from under vitalization and lack of proper sanitation. The weakening tendency of isolation and monotony is as evident as are the effects of urban over-crowding.

If the city has its paupers and criminals, the country has its tramps and vagabonds. The tramp has become a perpetual hanger-on of town and country life. As a rule he likes the city environs best, but he can be found everywhere. The tramp family is of comparatively recent development. Everywhere in the West may be seen the covered wagon drawn by poor horses and conveying from place to place a family group that lives

chiefly by begging and by what it can pick up along the way. This is a different species from the family of movers that travels from place to place with a definite purpose; although the former class may be said to have come from the latter. They are a



FIG. 1.—Habitation No. 1.

product of the method of settlement of the West. Moving on and on, with ever repeated failures, they are finally outclassed in the race for land, and lose place in the ranks of self-support.

The towns and villages of the country all have their pauper families, which demand the constant care of the benevolently disposed to keep them supplied with food and clothing. Here, as in the city, indiscriminate charity and the lack of proper administration of local government tend to increase the pauper conditions. Hence it is easy for a pauper family to fasten itself upon a rural community, without hope of doing better, and with no other intention than to be fed and cared for by their neighbors. These pauper and semi-pauper families are found in every village, and, their life being largely without restraint, pauper and criminal characteristics develop quite rapidly. Just as typhoid and malarial fevers prevail to a greater extent in small towns than in large cities, on account of the difference in the care

exercised for sanitary and health measures, so under the loosely constructed governments of western villages pauperism tends to flourish. This lack of positive preventive measures or checks in the loose government of a small town has its results in the



FIG. 2.—Habitation No. 2.

growth of immorality among the boys, if they are permitted to run at large. Thousands of children having the freedom of the street grow up in idleness and viciousness. This could be readily remedied, and in some cases is, by proper restrictions, in the place of reliance upon the safety of a small town.

The farm is always considered the ideal place to rear a family. Perhaps the ideal farm is the best place for a family to be reared, but here, as elsewhere, we find the good mingled with the evil. The farm life has its dangers as well as the city. The isolated life, bad economic conditions, and the morbid states that arise therefrom bring about insanity and immorality. The farm hands are, many of them, substantial boys from neighboring families. But many of them form a group of irregular workers

of a vile nature. The lack of variety in life, the little time to be devoted to books and papers, and the destruction of all taste for the same bring the mind to a low status. Their spare time on the farm and when out of employment is spent in telling obscene stories, in which perpetual lying is necessary to keep up a variety in the conversation, and the use of vile language is habitual. All this tends to weakness of mind and the decline of bodily vigor and health. The youth who is so unfortunate as to listen to all this, and to be associated with such characters, is in danger of having his imagination polluted and his standard of life degraded. The crowd that gathers at the corner grocery may be of a different type from the city hoodlum, and less dangerous in some ways, but as a type of social degeneration it is little above imbecility itself. Its weakness and wickedness are evident. With ideals of life destroyed or of a very low grade, with the imagination polluted, with nothing elevating or moral for consideration, social degeneration may proceed as rapidly in the small town as in a large city where the ceaseless activity of life at least sharpens the wits of individuals and keeps them from stagnation. When boys come under these evil influences in the country their minds are vitiated by the contact, and their whole lives become modified thereby. These evidences show that the country has its dangers as well as the city.

Further consideration of these conditions is reserved for another paper. The present article is concerned with a single family group, that of a pauper family which has fastened itself upon a small town. The family, or tribe, though much smaller, resembles somewhat that of "The Jukes" or the "Tribe of Ishmael." It may be an extreme case, but is similar to a group of families found in nearly every town and village. It is characterized and classified as the family of decided pauper characteristics and weak criminal tendencies. It gives the same lessons in social degeneration which are enforced by the larger families alluded to above. It has been thought best to follow in detail the life and character of this group, rather than to attempt wider generalization of the subject of rural pauperism and criminality.

HABITATIONS.

In a sparsely settled portion of L——, Kansas, dwells, or stays, a family for more than twenty years well known to the benevolent people of the town. The house (Fig. 1) is made of loose boards and scraps of tin and sheet iron rudely patched together. In summer it is a hot and uncomfortable shed, in winter a cold and dreary hut. The main room or living room, 14 x 16, contains a meager supply of scanty furniture and soiled and even filthy bedding. A small shed or "lean-to" attached to this room serves as kitchen, storeroom and chicken house. One small window allows the light to show the scanty furniture of the room and to exhibit its untidy appearance. The walls of the room are decorated with cheap pictures and bits of brightly-colored papers. Among the larger pictures is that of Abraham Lincoln, which makes one pause for reflection, as his benign countenance beams upon the observer in these unpleasant surroundings. This small house is, or rather was until the number was increased as stated below, the home of seven individuals. For the use of the land on which the house stands they pay a nominal rental of twenty-five cents per month.

Another habitation (Fig. 2) used by a branch of the family is situated on P—— street. It is a board house of a single room 12 x 14, which is the home of three persons. This single room serves as living room, sleeping and cooking room, and for the entertainment of guests. The same scanty and cheap furniture is here as in the other habitation, and squalor and filth abound. The evidences of poverty and wretchedness characterize the surroundings. The rental paid for this habitation is \$1.25 per month. It protects from the heat of summer and the cold of winter somewhat better than does habitation No. 1, but otherwise it has much the same appearance in the interior. The difference in rent is an economic problem not completely solved. There is no drainage connection with either habitation, and no water supply. But of water the occupants apparently have little need. Between these two homes the various members of the two families pass daily to and fro.

FAMILY GROUPS.

To the family, now numbering but ten persons, living in these two habitations the name "Smoky Pilgrims" has been given; chiefly on account of their dusky color and their smoky and begrimed appearance. Possibly the sickly yellow color, on account of the negro blood in the veins of part of the family, may have suggested the name. By this name they are known to the people of the town. They represent a family or tribal group with loose habits of family association. They are known as people seeking odd jobs of work, with an air of fear lest possibly they may find them; as petty thieves, beggars, in part as prostitutes, and in general as shiftless, helpless, and beyond hope of reform. The mother of the tribe, who is of German or Dutch descent, was born in Ohio. When about sixteen years of age she married and with her husband



FIG. 3.—T——.

lived on a small farm near Columbus. Four children were born to them. Unfortunately when the youngest child was a small boy the husband and father died, leaving the mother to struggle against fate in a world of burdens. The home was sold to pay funeral expenses and the mother, perhaps unwisely, started "west" with her children, having in all about \$100 in cash as a representative of all her worldly possessions. By some means they reached the town of L——, where they have since remained, being absent at times for short intervals only. Here they have never been able to improve their economic condition and have gradually descended in the social scale.

The family is divided into three groups. The oldest girl married a colored man and lives with her husband and several children in the country on a farm. They live respectable and industrious lives so far as is known, and consequently are not to be included in this discussion. In habitation No. 1 live, with the mother of the tribe, her second daughter and four children, and her only son. In habitation No. 2 live the third daughter and her two children. These families visit back and forth every day and are very sociable. Indeed, sociability is one of the chief characteristics of the entire tribe. They are much of the time on the street, and show to a great extent an aimless, easy-go-lucky life, irregular of food, sleep, and shelter.

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS.

The mother of the tribe, whom we will call "T—," (Fig. 3) has industrious habits and still retains industrious notions. She still has an idea of giving something in return for what she receives. Since coming to L—— she has worked at odd jobs, principally washing, housekeeping, and cleaning. At one time she was called to care for a sick woman who subsequently died. After the death "T—" took charge of the home and cared for the husband of the deceased and subsequently married him. He was shiftless and improvident, and finally died and was buried at the expense of the county. At another time "T—" found a home for a time at the county poor farm, but preferring her present mode of existence she left the home prepared for the needy. At present she is just recovering from protracted sickness, and is too weak for any work. It is pitiable to think of a person confined to a bed of sickness for months in such a rude hovel, but it is the life she prefers rather than the one which a county provides for her. Were the other members of the tribe as much inclined to industry as this one, there might be some hope of bringing them back into the ranks of industrial society. "T—" deplores her present condition and considers her life a chain of misfortunes.

In habitation No. 1 is "B—," (Fig. 4) the only man of the tribe, an easy-going, good-natured fellow, whose intellect

seems to have been weakened by under-vitalization, laziness, idleness, and bad personal habits. While a strong intellect would not engage in the mode of life which he leads, the mode itself would weaken and degrade the strongest intellect. A glance at his picture reveals his principal characteristics. His eyes are weak, suspicious, and tell-tale. If he were to commit a crime or break the law it would be difficult for him to conceal it. He walks with a weak, shambling, doubtful gait. His very demeanor says that he has not a place in the world. His physical characteristics show persistent deterioration and a constant evolution downwards. He works but a trifle, steals a little, begs a little; but as none of these occupations are pursued with any vigor or determination, he does comparatively little harm to the community. He might work a little if he could be induced to try, but the person who em-



FIG. 4.—M—; B—.

ployed him would probably have a bad bargain. With poor physical structure, weakened mental condition, laziness, and shiftlessness becoming a disease, what chance is there for any reform in such a person? About all that can be said is that some day he will die and be buried and not be missed by the body of toilers.

The eldest daughter, "A—," (Fig. 5) is between thirty-six and forty years of age. Like "B—" she shows marked weakness of character, with low order of physical structure, decidedly weak mentality, and lack of energy of any kind. She constitutes an organization of low order due rather to habits of life and

social environment than to natal characteristics. Her face is ugly and repulsive, and her whole demeanor shows under-vitalization and degeneration on account of her mode of life. Some years ago she married a colored man named "B—," who subsequently died. She has four children, one white and three colored, each one having a different father. The oldest was born a long time before her marriage. The woman works a little, does considerable foraging and tramps the street much of the time, but is considered a harmless creature so far as social order is concerned. With her, as with all of the remainder, sexual relations are irregular.

"N—," (Fig. 6) the oldest son of "A—," is about eighteen years of age, and has a fair degree of physical strength. He is not much at home but remains most of the time in the portion of the town known as "the bad lands." Several times he has been apprehended for stealing. More recently he has done a little work. He has intellect enough and sufficient physical endurance to become a criminal if his mode of life is not changed. "N—" is supposed to be always "finding work."

"S—," the second child, (Fig. 7) is also a colored boy, about fourteen years of age. He is inclined to stupidity, but shows extreme good nature and is perfectly contented with a happy-go-lucky life. When questioned he shows a disposition to do something if he had a chance. But with a real test he is inclined to



FIG. 5.—G —; A—.

succumb to the influences of his home life. He has attended school but little and is now out "doin' nothin'," as he says. His schooling has been so irregular as to be of little service to him. Begging and idling in the streets is his occupation most of the time. His cousin goes with him to act as spokesman for the twain. They indulge in light pilfering and foraging, and have been before the police court for stealing.



FIG. 6.—N—; M—; B—.

The third child, "G—," (Fig. 7) is white and shows a degree of intelligence superior to the rest. With proper training he would make a bright, intelligent, and industrious boy. His eyes show lack of mental and moral strength, but not so great as to preclude the possibility of improvement. His father is the husband of "T—"’s sister. "G—," with the others, has been arrested for stealing small household utensils. With care he would make a good citizen, yet he has traits which if developed would make of him a dangerous criminal. At present he shows more of a disposition to attend school than formerly.

The fourth child, "M—," (Fig. 4) is a colored girl about seven or eight years of age. A bright appearing child, but dull in school and at everything requiring any direct mental effort. She, of all the children, bears the name of her mother's husband, although probably she is illegitimate. Special care has been taken to keep her in school, as she is the pet of the household. Day after day "B—" accompanies her to school and appears at the corner to await her return at the close of the session. If placed in a good home doubtless "M—" would make a respectable, self-supporting woman. There seems to be little hope for her unless something of this kind is done to remove her from the gypsy-like life of her family.



FIG. 7.—S—; G—.

In the habitation No. 2 lives "M— C—," the third daughter, aged about thirty-five, and her son "D—" and daughter "S—." The husband died about six years ago. "M— C—" is a hard-featured woman (Fig. 8) given to dissipation. She shows a vigorous mental condition and is very talkative. She knows how to use her tongue in a manner frightful to the modest and the timid. She does a little work,—chiefly washing,—but obtains her chief support from an immoral life. It is quite remarkable how these people do bits of washing for others but seem never to practice it for themselves, for their

clothing and personal appearance would seem to indicate that washing is one of the lost arts. "M— C—" believes in religion(!) and at times attends the Free Methodist church. She is very communicative, although the information gained by the questioner is quite likely to prove an estimate of what she

does not know. She shows a capacity for almost everything and is capable of being a much worse woman than she is. Drunkenness, disturbance of the peace, and prostitution are her known offenses against social order.

Of her two children "S—" (Fig. 7) is the elder and about twenty years of age. As a law-breaker she is the worst of the members of the tribe. She has been in jail several times for stealing and disturbing the peace. But her arrest is not thought desirable, as it only entails extra expense upon the city and accomplishes nothing, since fines are seldom paid. She spends most of her time upon the streets except when entertaining guests at home. Her features are regular, and if she kept herself tidy she would not be a bad-looking woman. But her career is downward, and it is only a matter of time when her life will end in destruction. Wretchedness and misery will be her future, while she is a menace to the town because of her evil deeds.¹



FIG. 8.—S—; M— C—.

The second child, "D—," (Fig. 9) is bright and interesting. Being photographed was an important occasion in his life, and in posing for his picture he somewhat distorted his usually bright countenance by an attempt to look serious. The other photographs are true to life. Indeed the one of "D—" is not a bad

¹ Since these data were collected "S—" met a sudden death in T——. She had been on a drunken carousal and was taken suddenly ill and died. This broke up habitation No. 2 and increased the inmates of habitation No. 1 to nine.

representation of him when his temper is on. Usually talkative and cheerful, at times he shows a morose disposition and a tendency to quarrel with his companions. He is perfectly fearless and is the chief beggar of the lot. It appears quite impossible for him to tell the truth except by accident; it is his custom to tell what he thinks will please his listeners. There is a possibility of making a respectable man out of "D—" by proper training. He attends school quite



FIG. 9.—D—.

regularly and makes a little progress, and on Sunday he attends a mission school at the courthouse. He nearly always appears to be perfectly happy, without a care in the world. If this happy disposition could be properly combined with his ability, possibly he would grow into a self-supporting man. He has within him more of the elements of self-support than the others. If these are rightly directed and applied, his character would yield to better influences.

Such are the meager records of this strange and irregular family. Only those who have had dealings with this class of people know how difficult it has been to ascertain this much truth. Only by approaches in every conceivable way, by different persons, and by carefully sifting the information and comparing notes, could anything definite be ascertained.¹ The lie is the only means of defense of weak people of this class, and they use it freely. After reviewing their chief traits the reader will readily characterize them as belonging to the pauper and weak

¹ Mr. Alonzo Bell and Miss Belle Spencer, students of sociology, have rendered valuable assistance in this investigation.

criminal class. Not essentially vicious in their fundamental character, they have reached their present status in consequence of bad economic conditions. Once thrown into the struggle for existence on a low plane, they have adapted their lives to a standard which has developed pauper and criminal tendencies.

But why has this family been permitted to live in this manner? Primarily because they have been placed, on account of misfortune, and on account of conditions and characteristics, in a helpless condition. That they have been permitted to live in this condition in one of the most respectable, substantial, and moral towns of the land gives evidence of a lack of earnest effort or else of an exercise of misguided efforts on the part of citizens. In this particular case the facts show that both of these causes have been prominent. Much has been done by the good people of L—— to relieve the distress of the members of the tribe, and much has been done unconsciously to help them onward in the road to ruin.

It will appear evident that no reform of any permanent character can obtain in this tribe without a change in their present mode of habitation. The home must be improved or entirely broken up. It is impossible to reorganize a group of this kind so long as they live in dirty hovels and lead a semi-gypsy life. The adults should be sent to the county poor farm and there be forced to earn a living. Unfortunately this is not easy, on account of the loose methods of administration of county almshouses, and from lack of compulsory acts to force unwilling inmates to remain. The older children should be sent to the reform school. This statement is met with two difficulties. The first, that a person can be committed to the Kansas reform school only upon sentence by the judge of a competent court on some specific charge. This is a difficult thing to obtain. Secondly, at present the reform school of Kansas is overcrowded, and if a person were committed he would be obliged to remain in a county jail until there was room for him. This would be worse than the present mode of existence, for our county jails are at present the most prolific breeders of crime in the land.'

It is seen at once that families of this class, although not considered particularly dangerous to a community, are the most difficult to deal with, because they have no place in the social life, and it is very difficult to make a place for them. Their influence can be bad in a general way only. However, with the concerted action of citizens much could be done to relieve the situation. In fact, since this investigation began there are some marks of improvement in the children of this group. They have attended school more regularly and seem inclined to be free from thieving. But let it be repeated, better home influences, which means a breaking up of the family group, steady enforced employment until the habits of life are changed and become fixed, are indispensable means of permanent improvement. The difficulty of the task appears when we consider that these people must be taught not only to earn money but to spend it properly; they must be taught to change their ideals of life as well as their practices. The arts of civilization must begin from the foundation. The warp and the woof of the whole fabric must be constructed. Their desires for a better life are not sufficiently persistent to make a foundation for individual and social reform. How difficult the task to create new desires in the minds of people of this nature! Considered in themselves, from the standpoint of individual improvement, they seem scarcely worth saving. But from social considerations it is necessary to save such people, that society may be perpetuated. The principle of social evolution is to make the strong stronger that the purposes of social life may be conserved, but to do this the weak must be cared for or they will eventually destroy or counteract the efforts of the strong. We need social sanitation, which is the ultimate aim of the study of social pathology.

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¹ Persons seeking the causes of increased criminality would do well to investigate the condition of the county jails.

AN AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LABOR PENSIONS AND INSURANCE.

THE two most ominous conditions confronting the laborer, acting as an incubus to his progressive efforts, are first the probability of loss of income through accident or sickness and second the certainty of a period of diminishing returns to labor at a period in life in which the laborer becomes more dependent, this diminution resulting finally in complete cessation of income if the normal span of life is given. Whether based upon justice, duty, sympathy, enlightened self-interest or the idea of self-realization, proposals for the amelioration of industrial evils are essentially attempts to solve these two great problems. But with this as with other efforts to secure rational progress by control of social forces, the problem as presented to one people has quite a different form from that presented to neighboring people, even though of the same type of civilization and belonging to the same ethnic group. Those efforts to mitigate industrial evils which are adapted to one society, and therein promise to be effective, are not so adapted to other societies even though the general industrial organization may be the same.

Compulsory state insurance and various paternalistic and socialistic efforts may be efficacious with the German people; profit-sharing and various forms of patronal institutions may succeed in France; in England coöperation, friendly societies and various forms of voluntary associations perform a somewhat similar service,—that of supplementing the individual efforts of the laborer in his handicapped struggle for existence. Yet none of these may be applicable to American conditions. Tradition, historical continuity, a strongly centralized bureaucracy, a people accustomed to await the collective initiative are all factors favoring the success of the compulsory insurance

system of Germany. The religious and general social system in France, despite the teachings of her social philosophers, are adapted to the continuance of such patronal relations between various social classes. Voluntary associations, if not indigenuous to the Anglo-Saxon soil, at least find their chosen habitat there. But the American not only scorns to await governmental initiative but he distrusts governmental activities,—for very good reasons it is to be feared. With him individual initiative and enterprise is not only a fundamental principle, it has become a fetish. Despite the developing socialistic sentiment, due largely to the governmental pension, public land, protective tariff and subsidy policies, such a system in an overt form will not be tolerated for many decades to come. Much less would the American people tolerate the patronal attitude. Nor have we the homogeneity of the English people that will permit that perfecting of voluntary associations which is attained with them. The volume and character of population and the extent of territory alike prevents it.

But little less evident is the need for some such institutions. Of the three general types mentioned the one most successful in France is least adapted to an American environment. All arrangements that are maintained out of generosity or betray the attitude of condescension upon the part of the employer are doomed to failure. All such endeavors savor of charity, and the American workman, if he is to receive charity, would rather be pauperized than patronized.

This suggests another consideration which must be borne in mind in all efforts for industrial amelioration in this country. We have inherited the traditional English attitude toward all collective assistance of the less fortunate members of society. For all such abnormal conditions the individual is to be held responsible, all collective assistance is regarded as some form of charity, and the fundamental principle of charity is that its acceptance must carry with it the mark of degradation. We have only escaped this attitude toward our vast national insurance or pension system by attaching to it a patriotic significance. Even

then it is doubtful whether the title "ward of the government" would carry the distinction that it does in most parts of our country were it not for the periodic worship of the politician.

Any method of industrial amelioration to be successful in America must avoid the bureaucratic form of German methods, the patronal form of French methods, and at the same time the evil of English methods—the degradation attaching to all recipients of collective relief in any form. Any such system must be founded upon the principles inherent in the Anglo-Saxon character, self-help and individual initiative. It must also be broader than this. It must include the German principle,—the collective responsibility for a large proportion of individual abnormality, whether of lack of employment, injury, ill-health, old age, or other forms of invalidity. In other words the principle of labor insurance, inclusive of pensions, offers a basis for the betterment of social conditions. This is but a continuation of the principle of mutual aid formerly operative throughout all industrial groups, but during the present century operative, if at all, in mutually exclusive groups. The insurance principle is the most prominent contemporary expression of social integration; and social integration is a chief factor in social progress.

The most valid objections to such propositions reduce themselves to the charge that such development may be at the expense of social differentiation; and it is not to be denied that in some respects various European projects are "returns to mediævalism." Those compulsory forms that would develop a common social type and repress all individual variations, that hamper the mobility of labor, that destroy vast systems of voluntary associations in the development of a bureaucracy are amenable to this charge. A condition of status is approximated and the future is heavily discounted. But this is not necessarily inherent even in compulsory forms, much less so in some modifications adaptable to American conditions.

This insecurity of livelihood of the laborer is responsible for the great mass of individual suffering and the non-progres-

siveness of social classes or of the individuals exposed to this insecurity. The belief that social customs and arrangements are largely responsible for this evil is coming more and more into popular acceptance. Relief from this insecurity must come either from individual efforts or from collective aid. The Anglo-Saxon antipathy to the latter method is based upon the belief that such evils spring from personal rather than from social causes. This belief is fostered by society for its own security or by the favored classes for their own benefit, with the confident assurance that the less favored classes can be educated in self-help by such means alone. Admitting that this is half the truth, the less obvious half now needs the greater emphasis. It is becoming evident that it is the impossibility of making adequate provision against this insecurity in its various forms, as well as the absence of opportunities and adequate knowledge of means of saving, that operates with large numbers if not with whole classes as a discouragement or even preventive to all saving. Under such circumstances collective aid is more likely to stimulate than to discourage thrift. Then again it is obvious that such thrift as would be required to make provision is utterly impossible with great numbers of those who are most in need of it. Such saving upon the part of these classes, even if possible, would lower the whole standard of life, a standard now implying a minimum of social welfare.

It is unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of the social value of insurance at this point; enough to point out the insufficiency of the individualistic solution. With all the benefits resulting from the multiplicity of commercial and mutual insurance companies, benevolent societies and trade organizations, it is evident that such efforts are wholly inadequate and do not affect the most serious of these evils.

A method based upon social solidarity will alone be efficient and sufficient. Do the continental methods of compulsory insurance afford this? Granting that they do for continental societies, it is evident that they are not applicable to Anglo-Saxon societies, at least in their present stage of development.

In the first place such systems require a regulation of labor that would not be tolerated. While to an extent such systems do bring about a freer, that is a fairer competition, by removing this handicap from the laborer, yet necessarily he is deprived of many privileges and much of the liberty that is so dear to the Anglo-Saxon. That such is the result is proved by the reaction toward the old guild system of industry in Germany. While the continental methods do not eliminate the factor of self-help, yet with those people less dependence has been placed upon this factor in the past than with the Anglo-Saxon. The immediate effect of such a system upon Anglo-Saxon population would unquestionably be a weakening of this principle to the detriment of society, an evil not entirely offset by the development of the principle of solidarity.

But fortunately there is an alternative. Social aid is not necessarily governmental aid. This alternative is social aid or obligation through trade or industry responsibility. There are many implicit recognitions of the validity of this principle. Employers' liability laws are such. Most of the trade associations and labor insurances are partially based upon this principle. Since the aid comes, however, from the laborer's efforts, it depends upon individual self-help rather than upon social responsibility. The railway insurance systems organized by several of the largest American railway corporations are similar implicit recognitions; though, as one would expect, the individual bears the brunt of this burden, and only to a slight extent does the industry acknowledge its responsibility, and then largely as a matter of financial protection. It is probable that most of the benevolent industrial schemes and not a few other variations of the usual method of industrial remuneration are based implicitly upon this principle, but because of their erroneous method fail utterly to accomplish this purpose. Coöperative enterprises, that are coöperative in reality as well as in name, are explicit recognitions of this principle. But these are few, their success questionable, and their application very limited. But fortunately there is an explicit trial of this

principle that has had a successful experience covering a score of years. Such an experience illustrates what an American system of labor pensions and insurance might accomplish. Reference is made to the system in operation in the extensive manufacturing enterprises of Alfred Dolge & Son at Dolgeville, New York. A brief account of its experience is instructive.

This firm employs 600 men in the manufacture of piano, organ and polishing felts, and felt shoes, together with piano sounding boards and musical instruments sundries. In certain products, due to their superiority, the firm has a monopoly of the American markets and a large export trade. The head of the firm, educated as an apprentice to the piano trade in Saxony, emigrated to New York in 1865, and there soon established himself in an independent business upon a small scale. In 1874, in answer to growing demands of trade, the business was moved to its present location in the foothills of the Adirondacks, finding there an unexcelled water power and lumber supply. The little hamlet of Brockett's Bridge, of 200 inhabitants, has grown to the small city of Dolgeville of more than 2000. But it is the firm's attitude toward its employés that is of especial interest, for the development of the industry finds its parallel in many an American locality. The town is not a "model" town; that is the firm does not seek to own the homes and control the little city. Many of the workmen own their own homes; and the firm assists them in doing this, building the houses upon plans selected by the workmen and advancing the capital at a low rate of interest. A clubhouse was built by the firm at a cost of \$10,000, and is maintained at an annual cost of \$400. This is the home of a flourishing Turn-Verein and contains besides the gymnasium a large public hall, library and reading room. A public park of 141 acres is maintained at an annual cost of \$1000. A school society was founded in 1886 and within five years \$40,000 was expended upon a school system. Three-fourths of this sum was paid by the firm, almost one-half of it being a free gift. The system is complete, including kindergarten and

academy. In addition a night school is maintained by the firm for its employés.

One of the first efforts of Mr. Dolge was the founding of a Mutual Aid Society among his workmen in 1881. To this the employer has contributed liberally, though its chief support is derived from membership dues. The firm also experimented with various forms of profit-sharing; and with two or three foremen this plan is still continued, the firm being bound to continue this as long as these men remain in its employ. But these plans were not satisfactory for many reasons. Mr. Dolge believes any such plan "wrong in principle and as a rule detrimental to the development of an enterprise;" that "any system which depends solely upon the will of the employer, and cannot be made an inseparable part of the wage-earning system is repulsive and therefore not worth considering." Dissatisfied with his experience in profit-sharing, Mr. Dolge turned to other experiments. In 1882 a system of pensions was introduced and four years later a system of life insurance. These various systems were combined in a general one in 1890, including pensions, life insurance and endowment, the latter being substituted directly for the profit-sharing schemes.

While the plan as thus reorganized has only been in operation for five years, yet the principle upon which it is based has had a test of twenty years. While the perfected plan is the result of experience, the fundamental principle is a conviction, and has always been the same. This principle is that the employer, the industry, should provide against the depreciation of the employés, and for their continuance and development, just as he does for the manufacturing plant; and as a certain percentage is set aside against this latter depreciation so a similar percentage on the wages fund should be set aside to be devoted to a similar service in respect to the employés. Twenty years' experience has demonstrated that in this business 1 per cent. of the wages fund will do this. Mr. Dodge holds that a business that cannot stand such an increase in expenses is so unstable as to be a menace rather than a benefit not only to its proprietor but also to society.

Such is the system in principle. In practice the firm sets aside each year a calculated amount on the profits of the business. Against this distribution account the amounts paid for life insurance under the provisions of the insurance system, and the amount necessary to maintain the pension fund are considered fixed charges. If in any business year the net profits are not sufficient to cover the amounts paid for life insurance and for pensions such deficiency is forwarded as a charge against the net earnings of the following year; the remainder, after the payment of such fixed charges, is dispensed under the provisions of the endowment fund.

The pension system provides that every male employé over twenty-one years and not over fifty years of age at the date of entering service shall be entitled, after ten years of continuous service, to a pension as follows: In case of partial or total inability to work, on account of accident, sickness or old age, an employé is entitled to 50 per cent. of the wages earned during the last year preceding the disability; 60 per cent. after thirteen years; 70 per cent. after sixteen years; 80 per cent. after nineteen years; 90 per cent. after twenty-two years; and 100 per cent. after twenty-five years of continuous service. In case of accident or sickness contracted while in the service of the house, previous to the completion of ten years' service, each employé is entitled to a pension of 50 per cent. of his wages earned during the year next preceding such accident. No pension is to exceed \$1000. That is, the highest schedule of pensions falling to employés who draw salary or earn wages to the amount of \$1000 a year or over, is as follows: After thirteen to sixteen years of service, a pension of \$600 while such disability may last; from sixteen to nineteen years of service, a pension of \$700; from nineteen to twenty-two years of service, a pension of \$800; from twenty-two to twenty-five years of service, a pension of \$900; after twenty-five years of continuous service, a pension of \$1000.

The life insurance system provides that every male employé, after five full years of continuous service, dating from the age

of twenty-one, is entitled to a life insurance policy of \$1000, and for every five years of continuous service thereafter, up to fifteen years, \$1000 additional; making for this class of employés a maximum insurance of \$3000. Employés entering the service at any time between twenty-two and twenty-six years of age, shall be entitled to not more than two policies of \$1000, one after five years and the other after ten years of continuous service. Employés entering the service at any time between twenty-seven years and forty years of age are entitled to policies of \$1000 after five years of continuous service. For all employés who enter the service after the age of forty years, and for all those rejected by the life insurance companies, the amount of \$35 is annually deposited, but in no case are principal and interest to exceed \$1000. In case of death the amount then to the credit of any employé is paid to his heirs and assigns, and all policies are made so payable.

The endowment system provides that every male employé over twenty-one years of age, after five years of continuous service, is entitled to an endowment account, upon which he is credited at the end of each year with the amount which the manufacturing record has shown to be earned over and above the wages paid him. If, through gross carelessness, the employé has caused the house a loss, such loss is charged against the above account. This fund is payable when the employé has arrived at the age of sixty years or upon his death. Interest at 6 per cent. is credited to the account. Should an employé quit the service of the house, interest ceases and the principal is paid as specified. Against this account any employé may obtain a loan not exceeding the amount to his credit by paying interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent., and by giving collateral security. This system replaces the profit-sharing system, and has no vital connection with the pension and endowment systems.

None of these systems impairs the right of the employer to discharge an employé, or the right of the employé to quit service at any time for any cause. There are various minor pro-

visions, including one for the distribution of any balance remaining in case of change of proprietorship.

The accurate records kept by this firm reveal one of the most striking phenomena connected with American industrial conditions, that is, the extremely mobile character of labor. This characteristic is a great impediment to the development of such a system, and in many cases is the cause of the unfortunate condition of laborers, though in many other cases it may be a means of advancement. For the twenty years preceding 1894 this firm had employed 2046 men. Of this number only 835 or 40 per cent., remained in service for one year or more. The number of exits during the second year of entry was 206; during the third year, 121; during the fourth year, 73; during the fifth year, 36. There remained on the roll 171 who had not completed five years' of continuous service. The entire number of those entering the earnings division account, having completed five years continuous service, was 224, or 10.8 per cent. of the entire number employed. Of this number 107 were left on the earnings division account as entitled to benefits on January 1, 1894. These formed 24 per cent. of the whole number of male employes at that time. Of these, ten had been in continuous service for more than fifteen years; twenty-nine additional for more than ten years to thirteen years; and sixty-eight additional for more than five to nine years.

Under the provisions for pensions nine men have received benefits. These pensions have varied in amount from \$100 to \$507. The total amount paid to the present year has been \$9735.36. Of this amount the oldest pensioner, having been upon the rolls since 1882, has drawn \$3915.50. Another workman, drawing the highest pension yet given, has received \$2513.88 since 1890. For the current year four employes are entitled to pensions at the following rates: \$507, \$396, \$312, \$280, a total of \$1495.

The contributions to the pension fund had amounted to \$31,367.75 at the opening of the present year. It is to be noted that the interest on this fund, now amounting to \$22,878.71 is

about equal to the annual pensions paid. Hence, for several of the past years there have been no annual contributions to this fund—a striking vindication of the system. Unless the number of the employes should greatly increase, no further contributions to this fund will be necessary. The experience of twenty years has proven that a contribution of \$4 per annum for each employé is ample to assure the security of the fund. The accompanying table shows the wages paid and the contributions to the pension fund during a period of twenty years.

TABLE OF WAGES PAID AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO PENSION FUND
COMPOUNDED AT 6 PER CENT.

Year	Number of males employed	Total annual wages	Average wages per employé	Pension contribution (1 per cent, total wages)	Amount compounded at 6 per cent.
1874.....	31	\$13,613.60	\$439.15	\$136.14	\$436.59
1875.....	39	13,473.00	345.46	134.73	407.69
1876.....	35	13,212.00	377.49	132.12	377.07
1877.....	38	14,100.00	371.05	141.00	379.71
1878.....	63	19,421.00	308.27	194.21	493.29
1879.....	79	23,930.00	302.91	239.30	573.60
1880.....	98	31,255.66	318.94	312.56	706.69
1881.....	149	56,971.75	382.36	569.72	1,215.21
1882.....	274	127,813.87	466.47	1,278.14	2,571.62
1883.....	240	90,473.40	376.97	904.73	1,717.19
1884.....	195	71,475.28	366.54	714.75	1,280.12
1885.....	201	93,619.47	465.77	936.19	1,581.23
1886.....	362	129,312.19	357.21	1,293.12	2,061.24
1887.....	352	158,033.08	448.96	1,580.33	2,376.82
1888.....	303	172,152.88	568.16	1,721.53	2,442.85
1889.....	297	161,807.83	544.80	1,618.08	2,164.99
1890.....	330	151,346.75	458.62	1,513.47	1,909.99
1891.....	338	173,548.18	484.77	1,735.48	2,066.96
1892.....	432	211,203.35	488.90	2,112.03	2,373.93
1893.....	443	208,012.76	469.56	2,080.13	2,204.94
		\$1,934,776.05		\$19,347.76	\$29,341.73

The life insurance system has been more general in its application. Premiums to the amount of \$36,505.65 have been paid. The face value of the policies now in force is \$182,000. In addition to these, several policies of \$1000 each were turned over to the firm which recently purchased the shoe manufacturing department of the enterprise. The families of five deceased

workmen have been benefited by the system, each receiving \$1000. The earliest one was paid in 1888. The premiums on the policies for the past year amounted to \$2010.38, and at the annual reunion nineteen new policies were distributed. Several policies have lapsed, because workmen leaving the employ of the firm have failed to continue payment of premiums. To avoid this loss, all policies taken out since 1890 have been the twenty-payment endowment policies. Previous to that time the policies had been the old form of straight life insurance. This makes the plan more expensive for the firm but much more advantageous for the insured.

There has been placed to the credit of employés on deposit account, in lieu of life insurance policies, by reason of rejection of eight applications by insurance companies, a total of \$486.26. There has been placed to the credit of twenty-one employés on deposit account, for those entering employ of the firm at thirty-six years of age and over, the sum of \$2849.40.

The endowment benefits plan was introduced in 1890. For that year the sum of \$1405 was distributed to thirty employés, an average of \$47 each. For the year 1891 \$2564 was distributed to forty-eight employés. For 1892 \$3025 was distributed to fifty-one employés. There was at the end of that year an aggregate of \$8169.65 due eighty-one employés. Of this amount \$1209.89 was due twenty men who had left the employ of the firm.

On account of the recent industrial depression, there has been no distribution under the endowment plan for several years.

Such a system is capable of indefinite extension, and, with slight modifications, is applicable to most industries. The plan has been adopted by Daniel Green & Co. and the C. F. Zimmerman Company, firms which have purchased some allied lines of manufacture developed by the Dolge firm. President O. D. Ashley, of the Wabash Railway, and the editor of the *Railway Review*, have advocated the application of this system to railways. They believe that "in that line of industry the evidence

in favor of applying a system of life insurance and pensions, dependent upon faithful and continuous service, is conclusive."

It is interesting to note that a plan very similar was developed quite independently by President J. M. Ashley, of the Toledo, Ann Arbor and North Michigan Railway, and adopted by that company in 1887.¹ While, on account of the financial condition of the road, this plan has been abandoned without anything resulting from it in the way of dividends, and at the same time the advantages to the employés are much less definite, yet the underlying principles are identical. These are, first, the right of the workman to a share in the industry which he has helped to create, and, second, that of trade or industry responsibility.

The Dolge plan, or some modification of it, fulfills all the considerations dwelt upon in the first half of this article. It is an application of coöperation, which is as pronounced an embodiment of the principle of mutuality as our industrial system will permit at its present stage of development. The significance of such individual enterprises is great. The extension of this plan is largely independent of the efforts of the laboring man himself. The laboring man can do much to help himself, but he cannot and should not be expected to do all. Improvement in industrial conditions depends not only upon the intelligence, industry, and foresight of the laborer, but upon the attitude of the employer as well. If the employer does not recognize his responsibility to his employés and to society, does not recognize that the cash nexus is not the only one, and that the employé has claims that cannot be commuted for immediate wage payments—in other words, that both the laborer and society as well have a right in the industry that cannot be abrogated, there are no hopes for betterment under the present system. For as Carlyle has said, "The leaders of industry, if industry ever is to be led, are virtually the captains of the world. If there be no nobleness in them there will never be an aristocracy."

¹ For particulars *vide*. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, May 1896, pp. 707-9.

This much the industry, in mediating social responsibility, owes the laborer. The function he performs is on one side a social function. The industry performs this function immediately, and the laborer is organically a part of the industry. The group, either in its larger or its narrower delimitations, owes to the individual in return for his life's energy not only a hand to mouth living, but also a guarantee against the possible evils of accident and sickness and the assured evils of diminishing returns. Since family solidarity, the last protection of the aged and the unfortunate, is now dissolving as former group and local solidarities have previously, the necessity for the recognition of some such principle is the more urgent.

While such a system as the one outlined does not insure against the great evil of lack of employment, it does affect all but this. Though it is true that these evils are only sporadic in America at the present, yet in the near future they may become as menacing as in older civilizations, and in fact are rapidly becoming so. Consequently the consideration of such innovations by the American people is entirely pertinent. In time such questions will become political questions, as they have upon the European continent and as they are now becoming in England. As Mr. John Morley has remarked, whether achieved in the one way or the other, the man or the party that solves the problem of preventing the man who has worked hard all his life in the support of his family from becoming in his old age a subject of charity deserves more glory than by winning many battles on the field.

PAUL MONROE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

ECCENTRIC OFFICIAL STATISTICS.

THE JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY for November 1895 contained a paper by the commissioner of labor, entitled "Contributions of the United States Government to Social Science." The article has thus far escaped due criticism. Colonel Wright very truly remarks: "The general welfare and blessings of liberty can neither be secured nor promoted without an intelligent understanding of all the conditions surrounding life." An inquiry, therefore, as to the influence of these contributions to social science, for which in so extended an article Colonel Wright finds only words of praise, seems the more necessary because his failure to give any word of warning as to their use can have no other effect than to strengthen public confidence in statistics which in large part seem worthy of no confidence whatever, and which instead of promoting an intelligent understanding of social conditions have chiefly served to mislead.

It would seem that no more conclusive proof of the deceptive and pernicious character of our census and other statistics could be adduced than the fact that they have not only grossly deceived those unused to statistical investigation but statisticians of the highest repute. In a speech upon the Wilson bill, the Honorable Thomas B. Reed quoted an article in the *Fortnightly Review* as showing what a foreign writer thought of the result of our tariff policy. This writer, Mr. J. Stephens Jeans, failing to comprehend the statistical methods of our census officials, says:

What, however, is probably most of all remarkable in the recent census returns of manufacturers, is the fact that between 1880 and 1890 the actual advance in wages paid in manufacturing industries had increased to a larger extent than the increase that took place in the previous thirty years. This appears to be so startling that it might be deemed to be altogether incredible were it not supported by the sober, unbiased testimony of a census report.

The noted and widely quoted English statistician, Mulhall, arrived at almost precisely the same erroneous conclusion in an

article in the *North American Review*.¹ Though these conclusions of Mulhall as to the increase of wealth and the increase of wages in the United States have been widely quoted and almost universally accepted, and though works of reference compiled from our census report containing similarly erroneous deductions, and also newspaper articles of like tenor have been widely circulated, we have heard from the census office no word of warning.^{2 3}

The error of Mr. Mulhall, and the very many who have arrived at similar conclusions, has been their failure to ascertain and comprehend the radical difference in the methods of compilation of the statistics between our earlier and more recent census reports. As the true character of these statistics may only be ascertained through an extended investigation, this error seems more excusable in others than in officials of our census bureau.

A fair specimen of the contributions of the United States government to social science is furnished in a contribution by one of these officials in the January number (1896) of the Bulletin of the Department of Labor: "The Wealth and Receipts and Expenditures of the United States Government," by Wm. M. Steuart. From Colonel Wright's letter of transmittal of the

¹ June 1895, "Wealth and Power of the United States."

² In the *Journal of Political Economy* (December 1895), the writer of the present article demonstrated the error of Mr. Mulhall's conclusions and the utter worthlessness of these census statistics for about the only purpose for which they are ever used, that of comparison.

³ For the satisfaction of readers who are inclined to accept authorities rather than the investigations of those occupying no official position, the writer presents the following letter from one who, besides being an able student of economic questions, occupies the high office of secretary of treasury:

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 23, 1896.

MR. H. L. BLISS, Chicago, Ill.,

My dear Sir:—I read your article on the "Use of Census Statistics" with a great deal of interest and fully agree with what you say upon the subject. In my opinion Mr. Mulhall is a very unreliable statistician and economist. I at one time commenced the preparation of a paper upon the same subject myself, but it was never completed and of course never published.

Very truly yours,

J. G. CARLISLE.

volumes of manufacturing statistics of the eleventh census, we learn that the tabulation and preparation of the text of these volumes was conducted by this gentleman, as chief of division. In this article it is stated that, "The total value of the products of productive industry, which include manufactures and farm, fishery, and mineral products, for the same year (1890), amounted to \$12,148,380,626." This sum being obtained by aggregating the values of all manufactured products, as reported at the eleventh census, together with the amount reported as the value of farm, fishery, and mineral products. This statement reminds one of the sailor's refrain in "The Yarn of the Nancy Bell." The sailor who had assisted in devouring every member of the shipwrecked crew until he was the only survivor, claimed to be not only himself but every other member of the crew. Just so with Mr. Steuart's totals, which include as still existing the value not only of finished products but of products consumed in their production. In this article we find the following tables, the figures of which may be contrasted with statistics presented in an article published in the November 1895 Labor Bulletin, by George K. Holmes, who, as special agent, had charge of the investigation of the eleventh census regarding "Farms, Homes and Mortgages." From Mr. Holmes' table we quote only his statistics of production, omitting those regarding debt and mortgages.

MR. STEUART'S TABLES.

POPULATION, WEALTH, VALUE OF PRODUCTS OF INDUSTRY, AND DEBT.

Census year	Population	Wealth	Value of manufactures, and farm, fishery, and mineral products	Total national debt less cash in treasury at end of fiscal year
1800	5,308,483			
1810	7,239,881			
1820	9,633,822			
1830	12,869,020			
1840	17,069,453			
1850	23,191,876	\$7,135,780,228	a \$1,029,106,798	
1860	31,443,321	16,159,616,068	a 1,898,785,768	\$59,964,402.01
1870	38,558,371	30,068,518,507	b 6,843,559,616	2,331,169,956.21
1880	50,155,783	43,642,000,000	c 7,974,097,438	1,919,326,747.75
1890	62,622,250	65,037,091,197	d 12,148,380,626	890,784,370.53

PER CAPITA WEALTH, VALUE OF PRODUCTS OF INDUSTRY, AND DEBT.

Census year	Wealth	Value of manufactures, and farm, fishery, and mineral products	Total national debt, less cash in treasury
1800			
1810			
1820			
1830			
1840			
1850	\$307.68	\$44.37	
1860	513.93	60.39	\$1.91
1870	779.82	177.49	60.46
1880	870.13	158.99	38.27
1890	<i>c</i> 1,036.01	193.99	14.22

PERCENTAGES OF INCREASE OF POPULATION, WEALTH, VALUE OF PRODUCTS OF INDUSTRY, AND DEBT.

Census year	Population	Wealth	Value of manufactures, and farm, fishery, and mineral products	Total national debt, less cash in treasury
1800				
1810	36.38			
1820	33.07			
1830	33.55			
1840	32.67			
1850	35.87			
1860	35.58	126.46	84.51	
1870	22.63	86.07	260.41	3,787.59
1880	30.08	45.14	16.52	<i>f</i> 17.67
1890	24.86	49.02	52.35	<i>f</i> 53.59

a Not including value of farm products.

b Value of farm products includes betterments and addition to stock.

c Certain duplications in statistics of manufacturers as published have been eliminated.

d Not including certain manufacturing industries not fully enumerated at prior censuses.

e Not including the values for Indian Territory.

f Decrease.

MR. HOLMES' STATISTICS OF PRODUCTION.

Products of manufacturers less cost of materials,	-	\$4,211,239,271
Product of farms,	-	2,460,107,454
Product of fisheries,	-	44,277,514
Product of mines and quarries,	-	587,230,662
Total products of productive industry,	-	\$7,302,854,901

The value of the products of industry as stated by Mr. Steuart is thus 66 per cent. greater than the value as stated by Mr. Holmes. As both statements are "official" and have the indorsement of the highest statistical authority, Colonel Wright, we must accept both statements as undoubtedly correct, and as equally illustrating the value of the contributions of the United States government to social science.

Regarding the foregoing tables of his article, Mr. Steuart remarks :

"The value of the products of industry shown for 1850 and 1860 do not include some elements that enter into the values for subsequent years. This fact, combined with the improvement in statistical methods and the greater care bestowed on the enumeration at subsequent censuses, will not permit of the use of percentages based on these figures or on the total wealth as indicating the exact increase." After explaining the greater accuracy of the figures regarding debt and expenses, Mr. Steuart farther remarks: "While, for the reasons given, the totals for wealth and values of products of industry can only be used in a general way for comparison, the totals for 1860 may be accepted as showing the conditions prevailing during the decade immediately preceding the Civil War and those for 1890 as indicating the conditions that prevailed during a decade after the direct effects of the war had disappeared. The two totals indicate normal conditions. Comparing the two years it appears that the total wealth per capita increased from \$513.93 to \$1,036.01 or 101.59 per cent., and the per capita value of the products of industry increased from \$60.39 to \$193.90 or 221.23 per cent."

Though in a footnote to his table Mr. Steuart admits that for 1860 the values of farm products are not included, he compares the statistics which he gives for 1860 and 1890 as indicating normal conditions in two periods, and as showing an increase in production per capita from \$60.39 to \$193.90.

Dividing the correct figures of the value of the products of 1890, as given by Mr. Holmes, by the population of that year, we find the per capita value of the products of productive industry for 1890 to have been \$116.61 instead of \$193.90.

If there be any considerable element of truth in the census showing of a large increase in the number of those engaged in manufacturing and mechanical industry, relative to population, and of an enormous increase in both the capital invested and the

value of the product, the agricultural product of 1860, which is omitted, must have been the most important element in the products of industry of that year. The statistics given for 1860 are, however, incomparable with those of 1890, not only because of the omission of the agricultural product, but because the value of the manufacturing product as reported was grossly inadequate. A comparison of the tables of occupation with those of manufacturing industry of the census of 1860 reveals a discrepancy which shows this conclusively. This is most noticeable in the hand trades. Regarding this matter General Francis A. Walker, Superintendent of both the ninth and tenth censuses, remarks in the ninth census:

The experience of the census in 1860 and 1870 with the production of four common and important mechanical trades will give an idea of the scope of omission resulting from this cause. A comparison of the tables of manufacture with those of occupation for 1860 exhibits the fact that of 51,695 painters the production of only 913 is accounted for among the products of industry; of 242,958 carpenters only 9006 appear in the tables of manufactures; of 112,357 blacksmiths only 15,720, and of 43,624 coopers only 13,750; that is of the first named industry only 1.8 per cent. of the artisans contributed to the reported production of their craft; of the second 3.7 per cent.; of the third 14 per cent.; of the fourth 32 per cent.; or to the aggregate of these figures, out of 450,634 artisans of the most efficient and best paid classes only 39,384 or 9 per cent. are accounted for in the statistics of manufactures. Had the 411,245 artisans not returned produced as much man for man as those who were embraced in the tables of production the gross products of industry would by the full representation of these four trades alone have been increased \$475,755,951 or a little over 25 per cent. of what was actually reported, while the net product, deducting, that is, cost of materials consumed, would have been increased in a still higher ratio, namely, by \$284,229,445 upon a total of 854,256,384 or as nearly as possible 33½ per cent.

Besides workers in other trades enumerated in the occupation tables and not in the tables of manufactures General Walker estimates that one-fourth of those enumerated in the former tables as laborers should also be included in the manufacturing returns. The fuller enumeration at the census of 1890 of the classes omitted at the earlier censuses from the manu-

facturing and mechanical returns results from a change in the law which provides for special agents for such enumeration, which at the earlier censuses was left with the marshals who collected the statistics of population. How much more thorough was this enumeration in the eleventh than even in the tenth census will be understood when it is stated that in five trades, painting and paperhanging, carpentry, masonry, plumbing, and plastering, the number returned was 265 per cent. greater in the later than in the former census.

In the ninth census, after allowing for the deficiency of both the eighth and the ninth censuses, General Walker estimated the actual increase in the value of manufactured products from 1860 to 1870 as 108 per cent. He also estimated that prices had risen 56 per cent. "That is that manufactured articles of the same quality (averaging all branches of production) which would have been \$1,000,000,000 in 1860 would have been worth \$1,560,000,000 in 1870." This would leave the increase of manufacturing production in the ten years to be represented by $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent.¹ As population increased nearly 23 per cent. the per capita increase would be less than 11 per cent., yet it may be noticed that Mr. Steuarts's table gives the per capita increase in production of this decade as 260 per cent. It is true Mr. Steuart remarks that percentages based on the figures given cannot be relied upon as indicating the "exact" increase. He however leaves it to be inferred that in a rough way they show the facts.

It seems incredible that so eminent a statistician as Colonel Wright should quote and compare these incomparable statistics to prove for instance that women are not taking the place of men in manufacturing industries. In an article contributed to the *Chicago Record* of July 20, 1894,² Colonel Wright says:

The discussion of the question therefore is interesting sociologically, but it is often conducted more from the standpoint of sentiment than from fact. The results of the eleventh census give the fact and show clearly the tendencies of the times in respect to the employment of the classes named. In this

¹ By what is evidently a clerical error stated in the text as 52 per cent.

² "Women and Children Work."

article I shall deal only with the women and children employed in the mechanical and manufacturing industries of the country, because this is sufficient for this time and purpose.

It does not seem that the tendencies of the times as to the employment of women and children can be shown by a comparison of statistics which take no account of the increasing number of both women and children employed in department stores, and of children who earn a precarious living as bootblacks and peddlers of newspapers. Blacking boots seems as much a mechanical industry as painting houses. The painters have, however, been included as engaged in manufacturing and mechanical industries, while the bootblacks have not, and these statistics are quoted as proving "conclusively" that the very general impression as to the increased employment of women and children is erroneous.

In this contribution to the Chicago *Record* Colonel Wright further says:

The total number of persons, men, women and children, engaged in the industries named was in 1890, 4,711,832, as against 2,732,595 in 1880, 2,053,996 in 1870 and 1,311,246 in 1860. Reduced to percentages these persons constituted in 1860 4.17 per cent of the whole population of the country, in 1870 5.33 per cent., in 1880 5.45 per cent., and in 1890 7.52 per cent. As a side fact from the one under discussion, I may remark that these figures show conclusively that a constantly increasing proportion of the total population is engaged in the mechanical and manufacturing industries of the country.

It is perhaps true that a larger proportion of our people are employed in these industries than formerly but can this be conclusively proved by these statistics? Our census statistics seem also to show that a larger proportion of our people are employed in gainful pursuits than formerly. Is this also true, and if so, does it indicate harder conditions; that the head of the family is less able to alone support the family than formerly.

Colonel Wright again says:

A more instructive comparison, however, is to be found in discussing the proportion of the total number of employes engaged in manufacturing industries. This comparison shows that in 1860 20.66 per cent. of all the persons

employed in manufacturing industries were females above fifteen years of age ;¹ in 1870 they constituted 15.76 per cent. of the total number employed ; in 1880 they were 19.45 per cent. and in 1890 they were 17.94 per cent. The relation, therefore, to the total number employed was quite stationary at the last three federal censuses and was only about 2 per cent. in 1879 over what it was 1870 and nearly 3 per cent. relatively less than in 1860. The women are therefore not crowding upon the men in mechanical industries.

In 1860 the manufacturing returns fully included the large factories in which the women formed a large proportion of the operatives, but failed to include carpenters, painters, and those employed in similar trades. In 1870 this was true to a less extent and a smaller proportion of women is shown. At the census of 1890, besides a very complete enumeration of trades in which men are almost exclusively employed, there are also included 461,009 employers, officers, and clerks, a class not previously fully included, less than 1 per cent. of whom are women. General Walker in the census of 1870 estimated that there were over 500,000 employés omitted that should have been included ; the class omitted he also declares were almost exclusively men. If we add these 500,000 men to the number of employés of the census of 1870 we find the percentage of females at that census to be 12.67 instead of 16.76 of the total operatives.

The number of women employed in manufacturing industries as given in Colonel Wright's article is : 1860, 270,897 ; 1870, 323,770 ; 1880, 531,639 ; 1890, 845,428. This shows an increase since 1870 of 160 per cent., but as census statistics show since 1880 a decrease of 60,727 in the number of children employed, Colonel Wright concludes that women are taking the place of the children and "are not crowding upon the men." As there was an increase in this decade of 313,879 in the number of women the figures do not seem to justify Colonel Wright's con-

¹ This is an error. The census of 1860 reports the average number of hands as 1,311,246 ; males, 1,040,349 ; females, 270,897. The number of females above fifteen years of age is not reported. The number of females reported therefore includes female children.

The census of 1870 correctly quotes the census of 1860, but the tenth and eleventh censuses both falsify it, and the eleventh census gives the erroneous percentages quoted by Col. Wright.

clusion unless it can be shown that it takes five women to do the work of one child. The decrease in the number of children seems gratifying, if true, or if it be not because women's work has become so cheap that it does not pay to employ children. Possibly the children have been driven into employments even less desirable than that of the factory. That this is the fact the writer does not assert only that the statistics presented by Colonel Wright do not, as he claims, "show clearly the tendencies of the times."

When statisticians so noted as Mr. Mulhall and Colonel Wright are so misled by our census it does not seem strange that those unused to statistical investigation are also deceived and that Colonel Wright finds it necessary to attempt explanation as follows:¹

During the past two or three years a statement purporting to give the relation of wages to cost of production, or the proportion of labor cost to the whole cost, has been going the rounds of the press. This statement has generally been in the following form:

"Mr. Carroll D. Wright, the national labor statistician, has figured out that the average rate of wages per year paid in the United States is \$347, and the average product of each laborer is valued at \$1888. This gives the employer 82.2 per cent. while the man who does the work and produces the results is allowed a paltry 17.8 per cent. In spite of our boasted free country and high wages the fact remains that the proportion of the proceeds of his labor paid to the American workman is smaller by far than that paid to any other workman in any civilized or uncivilized country on the globe."

. . . . The prominence given to this statement warrants its notice in the Bulletin. The figures themselves are in the main correct; they relate more particularly to the census of 1880 than to any other collection of data. Analysis of the figures and the facts underlying them shows the fallacy of the conclusion drawn from them.

If the aggregate wages paid in the manufacturing and mechanical industries of the United States, as shown by the census of 1880 be divided by the total number of employes to whom the wages were paid, the quotient will be 347, thus determining the average wages paid to the employes in the manufacturing and mechanical industries of the country as \$347. Dividing the aggregate value of all the products of manufacturing and mechanical industries by the number of employes engaged therein the quotient is 1965. Now, \$347 is

¹ Department of Labor Bulletin, March 1896.

17.7 per cent. of the gross value of the per capita product, as stated, leaving a balance of course of 82.3 per cent., or \$1618, which the originator of the statement quoted above assumes goes to the employer. The 82.3 per cent. of the total product, or \$1618 per capita, covers all expenses of production, cost of materials, miscellaneous items, profits, deterioration, interest — everything in fact, which can be counted as cost of production other than wages. Taking the eleventh census, that for 1890, it is found that the value of the gross product per capita for the number of employes engaged in manufacturing and mechanical industries was \$2204 and the average annual wages per employe, computed for 1890 as already computed for 1880, was \$445. The writer of the statement quoted above would assume, for the eleventh census, that while \$445 was paid to labor \$1759 went to the employer. As a matter of fact, of the total product per capita, 20.18 per cent. went to labor, 55.08 per cent. for materials, and 24.74 per cent. to miscellaneous expenses, salaries, interest, profits, etc.

All statements like that quoted above are fallacious in their application. While the figures in themselves are in the main fairly correct, and the percentages so, the balance, or 82.2 per cent., does not go to the employer, but, as shown, largely for raw materials; and of the amount paid for raw materials the bulk goes to labor for their production. That the statement emanates from the Commissioner of Labor is an assumption without any authority. From what sources the comparison with workingmen of other countries is secured is not known, but the concluding statement in the quoted article is undoubtedly as fallacious as the one which gives to the employer 82.2 per cent. of the value of the product.

C. D. W.

The error which Colonel Wright here seeks to correct is one into which Mulhall seems to have been betrayed. In his *History of Prices*, written in 1885, he says, "British operatives as a rule earn in wages from 30 to 33 per cent. of the value of the manufactures which they produce, but in the United States the workingman gets only 18 per cent." The error seems to consist in stating the sum of the products as the value of the products. This error is committed by Mr. Steuart in the article above quoted, and by Colonel Wright in his attempted explanation, in which he takes the gross product, or more properly the sum of the products, as the aggregate value of these products. As the value of every product consumed in producing other products was destroyed there could exist no value, aggregate or separate, save that of the finished product, which must include the value of the material consumed in its production.

The sum of the values of products at the census of 1880 was \$5,369,579,194, and the sum of the values of material consumed \$3,396,823,540, leaving \$1,972,755,644 as the total value produced in manufacturing industry in 1880.¹ Dividing this amount by the average number of employés we have \$721.90 as the value produced by an entire year's work. The average amount paid for an entire year's work was \$346.91.

It will be noticed that Colonel Wright claims to obtain the amount \$347 as the average earnings per operative by dividing the aggregate wages paid in 1880 by the total number of employés. The aggregate wages paid, as shown by the Census Report of 1880, was \$947,823,649, and "the average number of hands employed" 2,731,595. Dividing the former by the latter we have \$346.90, Colonel Wright's quotient. This, however, is the result of dividing by the average number and not by the whole number of hands employed. As will be seen by reference to the table from the reports of the eleventh census, which follows, the amount stated as the average wages in 1890 was also obtained by dividing the total wages by the average number of employés. Colonel Wright should understand that the total wages paid is the earnings of the whole number of employés, and that their average earnings cannot be ascertained by dividing by the average number of employés. In factories, where employment is constant, the difference may not be great, but in the building trades, where but a small proportion of the employés have work for the whole year, the difference is very material. By dividing by the average number the effect is to obtain as the average earnings what would be earned if every employé had constant employment.

In the building trades, in the busy season of the year, all have employment at the highest wages, but in the slack time but few have employment, and usually at a reduced rate of wages. In some of these trades employés have on the average

¹ The census furnishes no data from which may be ascertained the value of manufactured products, which, besides the value added in manufacturing, would include the value of products of the mine, field, forest, and fisheries, consumed in manufacturing industry.

employment little if any more than half the year. Because of this fact their wages are higher than wages in factories where employment is constant. The effect of including these trades more largely in the census of 1890 than previously, and dividing by the average number of employ  s instead of the whole number, cannot but largely increase the apparent average annual earnings at this census. To illustrate: an establishment in one of the building trades may employ 100 men 100 days at \$3 per day; 60 of these men another 100 days at \$2.50 per day, and 10 of them another 100 days at \$2 per day. This would make the total wages for the 300 days \$47,000 and the average number of employ  s $56\frac{2}{3}$. Dividing the total wages by the average number employed we have apparent average annual earnings of \$829. As, however, there are 100 employ  s, the correct average annual earnings would be \$470, which would make a very appreciable difference to the wage-earner if not to the statistician.¹

Mr. Steuart falls into the same error in his tabulation and remarks accompanying the tables of the manufacturing reports of the eleventh census. Presenting the annexed table Mr. Steuart remarks:

"The average annual earnings of employ  s as obtained from the total for 1880 was \$346.91, while the average obtained for all employ  s for 1890 was \$484.49, and for the employ  s exclusive of officers, firm members, and clerks, \$444.83. Owing to the difference in the form and scope of the inquiry of 1890, as compared with that of 1880, previously referred to, neither of these average annual earnings for 1890 should be accepted as the exact increase during the decade. While the number of employ  s reported for 1890 is, as nearly as possible, the true average number employed during the year, the result obtained by using this number as a divisor into the total wages must not be accepted as the actual annual wages per employ   for any particular class or occupation. The total number of employ  s and the total wages include not only officers, firm members, and clerks, and their salaries, but the number and wages of females, apprentices, children, and adults, employ  s working

¹ The writer has not undertaken in this illustration to show the fact as to the average employment in the building trades, but as one engaged in one of these trades he is confident from his own observation that the illustration is not far from the truth.

the entire year and those engaged for only short periods, also piece workers. The average annual earnings is also affected by the difference in the proportion of these different classes of employes, as well as by the condition prevailing in the different industries and in the different localities, some industries requiring a larger proportion of skilled and high-paid employes than others. With these cautions in accepting the figures, the following statement is presented which shows for the United States the average annual earnings for all employes for each class, and for the males, females, and children in each class."

AVERAGE ANNUAL EARNINGS BY CLASSES.

Classes	AGGREGATE			MALES ABOVE 16		
	Number	Wages	Average Annual Wages	Average Number	Wages	Average Annual Wages
Total	4,712,612	\$2,283,216,529	\$484	3,745,123	\$2,031,403,924	\$542
Officers, firm members, and clerks	461,009	391,988,208	850	418,081	372,169,441	90
Operatives, skilled and unskilled	3,492,029	1,590,516,997	455	2,831,795	1,436,482,387	498
Piece workers	759,584	300,711,324	396	445,247	222,752,096	500

Classes	FEMALES ABOVE 15 YEARS			CHILDREN		
	Average Number	Wages	Average Annual Earn'gs	Average Number	Wages	Average Annual Earn'gs
Total	846,614	\$235,186,742	\$278	120,885	\$16,625,802	\$138
Officers, firm members, and clerks	42,928	19,818,767	462
Operatives, skilled and unskilled	595,712	139,329,719	276	104,522	14,704,891	141
Piece workers	297,974	76,038,257	255	16,363	1,920,971	117

From the remark that the average obtained was for employes working for short periods as well as for the whole year, it might be inferred that the average annual earnings shown are less than would be the earnings for one employe the whole year, which would be the fact if the aggregate earnings were, as Colonel

Wright states in his editorial note, divided by the total number of employés. Dividing by the average number instead, the result is to give that which would be the average earning if every employé had constant employment.

On page 4, part 1 of the manufacturing statistics of the Eleventh Census we find a table of comparative statistics with the footnote referring to employés and wages for 1890: "Includes 461,009 officers, firm members, and clerks, and their wages amounting to \$381,988,208. These classes of employés were not reported separately at prior censuses."

A similar footnote accompanied the census bulletins of manufactures. This footnote seems calculated to conceal rather than to reveal the truth, for it can convey no other impression than that though these classes were not reported separately at prior censuses, they were included in the aggregate. That they were not so included at the eighth and ninth censuses is distinctly stated by General Walker in his remarks in the ninth census.

We find it remarked in the Eleventh Census: "The number of this class of wage-earners included in the reports of previous censuses, with the exception of two or three special inquiries at the census of 1880, were only those reported when the manufacturer considered that they should be included in answer to the general question as to the number of employés and the total amount of wages."

The schedules of no census prior to 1890 called for the enumeration of firm members and the estimated value of their services. Neither were there inquiries as to clerks and their salaries save the special inquiries in the census of 1880 referred to in the remarks quoted. In one of these industries, cotton goods, we find the employés reported under the heading, "operatives and officers," and the footnote, "From this number deduct 2115 officers and clerks, whose salaries are not computed in wages." Whether or not, in the other special industries reporting officers and clerks, the salaries are included in the wage account does not appear, nor has the writer been able to ascertain whether the number of officers and clerks reported in the cotton goods and other special inquiries are

included in the total average number of hands reported for all industries. That they are so included may perhaps be inferred from the following remark at the eleventh census: "The questions used in 1880 tended to obtain a number of employés that would be in excess of the true average, while it is believed the questions in 1890 have obtained as nearly as possible the average number." That the value of their services of this class was not included in the wage account, may also be inferred from the remark. "The questions for 1890 also tended to obtain a larger amount of wages as compared with 1880." As firm members and the value of their services were called for by the schedules of no other census than the eleventh, and as officers and clerks were called for only in two or three special inquiries, footnotes which lead investigators to suppose that these classes and the value of their services were fully included, though not separately, at prior censuses, can be properly characterized only as perversions of the truth.

It is true that in the volumes on manufactures recently given to the public may be found remarks showing that the statistics of the eleventh census are not strictly comparable with those of previous censuses, but they fail to indicate the extent of the incomparability. Whatever would have been their value if published at an earlier date, they count for little so long after the misleading tables have been given to the public in census bulletins and in the Statistical Abstract. The Statistical Abstract, published by the Bureau of Statistics, gives the statistics of manufactures without any accompanying remark showing their incomparability with the statistics of other censuses, just as it also gives census statistics of true value without a remark or footnote indicating the incomparability of the earlier and later estimates. As a result, and of the misleading comparisons by census officials which the writer here criticises, the public is not enlightened but deceived. The following table from the campaign text-book of the National Democratic party, undoubtedly published without purpose to deceive, shows the conclusion usually arrived at from our manufacturing statistics.

They (wage-earners) have learned that since the year 1860 wages have steadily increased; this is proved by the following table of figures compiled from the census reports and official statistics:

AVERAGE YEARLY WAGES IN THE U. S. IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES AS SHOWN BY CENSUS REPORTS.

Year	Population	Employés	Total Wages	Equivalent total wages in gold	Average annual wages in gold	Wages increased since previous census
1860	31,443,321	1,311,246	\$378,878,966	\$378,878,966	\$288	
1870	38,558,371	2,053,996	775,584,343	674,421,168	328	14 per cent.
1880	50,155,733	2,732,595	947,953,795	947,953,795	347	5.5 "
1890	62,831,900	4,712,622	2,283,216,529	2,283,216,529	484	39 "

In his debate with Mr. Harvey, Mr. Horr quoted similar statistics with the result of weakening with wage-earners the cause he advocated. While such statistics may deceive others and lead them to wonder at the discontent of wage-earners, they do not deceive that class, but excite their animosity against those who they believe juggle figures for the purpose of deceiving the public as to their wages.

While Colonel Wright calls attention to an error conveying the impression that wage-earners receive an almost insignificant proportion of the value which their labor produces, he strangely neglects to correct the more common erroneous impression of an enormous increase in wages.

H. L. BLISS.

CHICAGO.

SOCIAL GENESIS.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. X.

THE word *genesis*, unlike *telesis*, is in common use in most or all modern languages, although it is employed with different meanings. Derived from the obsolete Greek verb γένω, of which the reduplicate middle form γίγνομαι was the one chiefly in use by classic authors, it partakes of the radical signification of that verb, which is *to become*. It was probably this neuter signification which led the Greeks to prefer this middle form, and the possession by the Greek language of such a form constitutes one of its distinctive characteristics. It is something quite distinct from the passive, and the Latin *fieri* poorly represents the Greek word. A passive implies an active, and this an actor. This whole idea is wanting in the Greek middle, and a form of action is recognized which is not associated with any agent intelligent or unintelligent. It recognizes one of the most important truths in nature, that there are processes which go on independent of any external conditioning being or thing, that are self-active, and although the absence of adequate causes is not implied, those causes are conceived as inherent in the objects that are regarded as active, and the phenomena are contemplated as producing themselves. The progress of science has constantly contributed to confirm the legitimacy of this conception, and its great work has consisted in the steady transfer of one field of phenomena after another from a supposed active or passive condition to this independent middle condition, rescuing them from anthropomorphic conceptions and demonstrating the self-activity of the universe. This has gone so far that today all things are looked at from the standpoint of evolution, and evolution is only an expression for universal genesis.

Although genesis is sometimes translated *creation*, yet at bottom it is the precise opposite of creation (ποίησις). The Latin

language, as already said, imperfectly expressed this middle sense by various uses of the passive voice, but modern languages, developed more under the influence of scientific conceptions, have partly supplied the defect by the almost universal use of a reflective form. The Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, German, and Russian languages all make extensive use of this form, and the Russian, which has many of the elements of the Greek besides its characters, resorts to this method even more than the Romance languages. The English is perhaps the poorest of all modern languages in this respect, but there are many ways in which we are able to avoid the implication of an agent in natural phenomena. We borrow largely from other tongues and possess many terms to express simple becoming. Although there is no Anglo-Saxon equivalent in use in English for the strong German word *werden*, still the advance in scientific thought towards the conception of a self-existent, self-adjusting, and self-active universe has nowhere been greater than in English-speaking countries.

Progress in this direction has taken place somewhat in the order of the complexity of the phenomena considered, and the external agent conceived by Kepler was first eliminated from astronomical ideas. Somewhat later it disappeared from physical and chemical conceptions, and it has now nearly abandoned the field of vital activities. It still lingers in the realm of mind, and anthropomorphic conceptions are still dominant in social thinking. There is, however, in this last department, as was seen in the eighth paper of this series, and as will be more fully shown in the eleventh, a scientific basis for the idea, in conceiving man as an intelligent agent modifying his environment. In other words, while there is no more room in sociology than in any of the simpler sciences for a theo-teleology, there does exist an anthropo-teleology¹ which becomes an increasingly important factor as intelligence advances.

In the present paper it is proposed to ignore this factor as completely as possible, and to concentrate the attention upon

¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 29.

society as a pure becoming—as a strictly genetic product—as much so as the vegetable and animal forms on the earth's surface, or even as the world systems of space. Still, as society is an exclusive product of mind, the influence of mind cannot be omitted, and the only part of the psychic factor that can really be thought away is the social mind—the conscious agency of society itself intentionally modifying its own condition.

Dynamic sociology is the homologue in human society of development in biology. The *modus operandi* is not widely different from that of natural selection, and is, in fact, a sort of social selection. In it, however, the Lamarckian principle of individual effort is more prominent, only, as pointed out, instead of modifying to any great extent man's bodily structures, these efforts modify his environment. But the principal resemblance to which it is proposed to call attention in this paper is the common character of both processes of going on spontaneously, or without design or thought on the part of the beings that put forth these exertions and produce the effects. This is the quality which I distinguish by the term *genetic*, and the social progress that takes place in this manner does not differ from any of the other forms of evolution, not even from inorganic evolution. For although, as in animal development, psychic forces are the chief agents, these act spontaneously and in a sense unconsciously.

The treatment of this form of social progress I formerly denominated "passive or negative," as distinguished from "active or positive" dynamic sociology, which latter, instead of being genetic, I recognized as teleological, for which I now prefer the shorter form *telic*. The following is the definition which I then gave :

"Passive, or negative, progress contemplates the forces of society as operating in their natural freedom, subject only to the laws of evolution in general. Here society is regarded as passive in the sense of being simply acted upon by the forces that surround it and operate within it. It is conceived as negative from the absence of any force extraneous to these regular

natural forces operating in the direction of their limitation or modification. Such, it is believed, has been the nature of most of the progress thus far attained by society, as it is of all that which has taken place in the animal, vegetable, and inorganic kingdoms of nature."¹

The concluding chapter of that volume (chap. vii) containing over 250 pages, is chiefly devoted to this passive or negative aspect of social dynamics (see p. 456). In the present paper only a few of the most general principles can, of course, be treated. That work, as the name implies, was limited to this class of considerations. This was stated at the close of the volume cited:

"It has therefore been the *movement* rather than the *status* of society, which it has been sought to explain, the causes of social phenomena and social progress rather than the condition of society itself. The status, or condition, of society is to be learned by the consideration of the *indirect*, or *functional*, effects of what have been denominated the social forces. The study of the indirect effect of the preservative forces of society would lead to an acquaintance with the nature of the objects which have been employed by man as means of subsistence—a subject only touched upon in this chapter, because, if legitimate, manifestly too large for the limits of the work. The consideration of the indirect, or functional, results of the reproductive forces would lead to a discussion of the most important of all social institutions, the family—a subject which has already been ably treated by many writers. Still less could we afford to attempt a survey of the wide field of æsthetic art, the deep currents of human morals, or the intellectual condition of mankind in past ages, as would be required by a consideration of the indirect effects of the non-essential forces. These indirect, or consequential, results constitute what I have called the *objects of nature*, for securing which the desires and passions of men have been developed by the law of natural selection. As already remarked, they have no necessary or real connection with the *object of man*, which is to

¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 56-57.

enjoy, and the harmony between the two can only be accounted for, as stated, by adaptation."¹

I have quoted these passages to show how careful I was to draw the distinction clearly between static and dynamic sociology and to disclaim all pretension to having attempted to treat the former subject. I would not have done so if there had not been numerous indications that certain persons, teachers of sociology in our great universities, look upon my works as practically covering the whole of that great science. I certainly deserve no such compliment, and positive harm might result, not only to the student but to the science, from perpetuating the mistake. All I have pretended to do has been, after looking over this vast field and discovering certain neglected patches, to proceed as best I could to cultivate these, leaving the larger areas to those better equipped for their culture. But I certainly did exert myself to draw the boundary lines as carefully as possible, and to show in the most fundamental way how the statical phenomena differ from the dynamical ones. Much more stress was, of course, laid upon the essential nature of dynamic agencies in society. Starting upon the basic distinction of feeling and function, I rang all the changes that could be produced upon this fundamental antinomy. Indeed, so forcibly did it strike me that I made an exception in its favor, and departed from my otherwise fixed policy of publishing no part of my philosophy in advance of the complete work, and three years before that work appeared I read a paper on "Feeling and Function as Factors in Human Development" before the section of Anthropology of the American Association for the Advancement of Science at its meeting in Boston in 1880, reports of which appeared in the daily press,² and an abstract prepared by myself was published in *Science*,³ in which not only was the general principle fully stated, but a classification of the social forces was given, substantially identical with that finally drawn up and published in *Dynamic Sociology* (Vol. I, p. 472).

¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 701-702.

² See the *Boston Advertiser* for September 1, 1880, p. 1.

³ *Science, Original Series*, Vol. I, New York, October 23, 1880, pp. 210-211.

In the preliminary paper referred to, while full weight was given to the fundamental antithesis itself, the direct or causal nature of actions produced by the one, and the indirect or consequential nature of those produced by the other, were not specially set forth. This was subsequently worked out, and the passages already quoted sufficiently express the latter of these laws, which is the basis of social statics. The former or dynamic law was formulated in the introduction to the classification of the social forces,¹ but perhaps the clearest expression of it occurs in the treatment of the reproductive forces, in connection with which the principle comes forward with the greatest clearness, and it is stated that "the first of these classes of effects may be denominated direct or causal, the second indirect or consequential."²

We see, then, that the primary characteristic of genetic social progress is that it results from the actions of men that directly flow from their efforts to satisfy their desires. It is this, too, which gives it its distinctively genetic character. Genesis is becoming, and whatever is genetically produced is the result of a *vis a tergo* molding it into shape by successive impacts. The impinging body is in direct and intimate contact with the one that is being molded. The change produced is gradual and the process is one of development or evolution. Social progress is in this respect analogous to organic progress, or even to cosmic progress. It is never sudden or rapid. It does not take place by leaps or strides. Increment after increment is slowly added to social as to animal structures, and in the course of ages habits, customs, laws, and institutions are changed, or abolished and replaced by others. As the object of all these activities is always the fuller satisfaction of desire, and as such satisfaction results in self-preservation and race continuance, the effect in the long run, under the ever-present law of selection, is to produce superior races. This effect, however, is biologic, or rather ethnologic. The sociologic effect is to adapt the environment, *i. e.*, to improve the conditions of existence. This is social

¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 469.

² *Ibid.*, p. 603.

progress, but, like organic progress, it may and does result in the extinction of deficient and the preservation of efficient races and institutions.

Reverting to the figurative expression employed in the fifth paper, we may now perceive that just as the origin of feeling, except as a condition to function, was a matter of entire indifference to Nature, so this social progress, like organic development, is equally immaterial from the standpoint of Nature's purposes, and only useful in so far as it incidentally compasses the furtherance of those purposes. In other words, just as Nature does not care whether desire is satisfied or not, so long as life is preserved and perpetuated, so she in like manner has no concern for this social progress in and for itself, but only in so far as it becomes a means to her ends. Still more broadly put, it is no part of the scheme of Nature to bring about change, but only to secure growth and multiplication. Everything else is extra-normal and unintended.

It certainly seems a startling proposition that social progress forms no part of the scheme of Nature, but it is true in this sense, and civilization itself belongs to the class of extra-normal products. This would of course be a futile speculation but for the important practical truth that flows from it as a corollary. This is that man is living under a new dispensation. He has cut loose from his natural moorings and is afloat upon a great sea. He has started on a voyage in search of an El Dorado. He left the mother country against the protestations of his countrymen, and now he must, like a real hero, discover the rich land of his dreams or else he must ignominiously perish. He is too far out now on this great voyage of discovery to turn back, and therefore he can only go forward. He is therefore pushing on, and already the dim outline of the distant land is looming upon the horizon.

To drop the figure, this blind genetic progress which has, without man's knowledge or solicitude, wrought out the civilization that we have, has nearly reached the point at which society itself will awake to collective consciousness and usher in an era

of telic progress, the end and nature of which cannot now be forecast. But its object cannot be other than that which the individual man has always pursued, viz., that of turning to higher and higher use the capacity to enjoy with which Nature unwittingly, and for her own totally different purposes, originally endowed him.

Genetic progress, the blind, unconscious working of the social forces making for human perfectionment in the collective state, is what is generally understood by social evolution. Every stage of ethnic culture, from savagery to enlightenment, is a product of this genetic, unconscious social evolution. For most writers on social science this is the only kind of social progress recognized. Long before sociology was named there were many such writers. With the habits of abstract reasoning which all that passed for philosophy had encouraged, it was the practice of such writers to make use of the few facts that their education, observation, and experience had given them to work out by logical deduction from these facts the most general laws that they were capable of formulating. Much of this reasoning was sound, nearly all of it was logical, *i. e.*, did not violate the canons of logic, and many of the conclusions reached were correct, but so narrow was the induction, and so many and important were the unknown or neglected premises that the general fabric of their philosophy was worthless. Such was the greater part of the so-called political economy which the present age has inherited from the age that went before it. Most of the pre-Comtean sociology comes under this head. A few publicists, like Montesquieu, wrote rather from the standpoint of jurisprudence. Hobbes was the panegyrist of political power, and Malthus, although really following the same lines as Adam Smith and Ricardo, put his work into the form of a sort of philosophy.

All this, as well as the French physiocracy that preceded it and largely inspired it, had the merit at least of regarding society as a domain of law, and its chief defect was in failing to recognize a sufficient number of factors and in omitting some of the most effective ones, as we shall see in the next paper. These

men saw in human society a theater of wide general activity which proceeds from the inherent nature of man. They perceived that if men were left quite to themselves they would, in seeking their personal ends, spontaneously initiate and carry on all the industries of society. Owing to the manifest abuses of power by the ruling classes in seeking to raise revenues for their own uses, conquer other nations for their own glory, and otherwise satisfy their own greed and ambition, whereby the free flow of these natural activities was checked, industry and commerce were stifled or misdirected, and the general prosperity was interfered with and diminished, they felt called upon to counteract these tendencies and advocate the liberation of the natural forces of society. In taking this course at such a time they accomplished a worthy purpose and inaugurated a wholesome reform.

No one denies that the unrestrained activities of the human race would work out some sort of social development. The analogy with organic evolution in the subhuman sphere is also a true one. Though qualified in its details by the differences between men and animals, even by the immense difference between the human mind and the animal mind, with a corresponding difference in the results, the principle according to which these results are accomplished is essentially the same. Those reformers who maintain that the monopolistic tendencies so prevalent in society under the apparent absence of external restraint or collective influence are peculiar to human affairs, and wanting in the lower domains of life and mind, simply betray their lack of acquaintance with those domains. In fact, the fundamental condition to biological development is monopoly. Natural selection operates on this principle exclusively. What is called the survival of the fittest is simply the monopoly of the strongest. It does not work here either in the mild manner characteristic of human society, viz., that of allowing the weaker to exist, only under conditions of reduced activity and stunted growth, but it is thoroughgoing and crushes out the unsuccessful competitors completely. It is only paralleled in human society in those rare cases where a superior race overflows the domain

of an inferior one and utterly eradicates it—does not enslave it and allow it to lead a life of subjugation, much less, as is the more frequent case, partially commingle with it and ultimately absorb it, but destroys it root and branch so that it utterly ceases to exist. This is the method of nature in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, and thus is organic evolution brought about. At least such is the tendency and frequent result, but of course the competitors are often so nearly balanced in this monopolistic power that they coexist for long periods or indefinitely.

The expressions natural selection and survival of the fittest give only the positive side of this general law. There is a negative side which brings out the nature of the law even more clearly. Selection implies rejection, and survival suggests extinction. It may be looked at as a process of *elimination*. The survival of the fit means the failure of the unfit. The selection of the strong is the destruction of the weak. The rejected vastly outnumber the selected. Throughout nature this is the law, and the result is, or has thus far chiefly been, progressive development or structural perfectionment. Up to a certain point this law must have operated on man as on the animal; the only men with whom we are now acquainted have gone beyond it, or at least greatly reduced its effects.

As already stated, sociology has nothing to do with structural changes in man, and social development consists in modifying the environment. But even here the law of natural evolution may and does apply. Monopolistic tendencies are apparent in all social operations. They assume a great variety of forms. The self-aggrandizement of rulers is one of those forms. One of the principal mistakes of the social philosophy under discussion, and one still largely prevalent, is that of assuming that the desire to rule differs in some generic way from other desires, that it is not *natural*, and does not belong to the class of natural laws. It certainly admits of no such distinction, and must be reckoned with along with other monopolistic tendencies. And it cannot be doubted that the efforts put forth to satisfy this desire have resulted in some of the most effective steps in social evolu-

tion. To this influence is largely due the founding of great nations, and there is probably no one factor in the progress of society more potent than the crystallizing and humanizing effect of bringing great areas and vast populations under a single set of regulative agencies.

But taking for the moment the standpoint of the physiocratic school of writers referred to, and separating the natural forces of society into the two classes, which may be called industrial and governmental, let us endeavor to form an idea of what the result would be if the former alone existed. In the face of the obvious fact that if the latter class were at any moment wholly in abeyance it would immediately resume operations and soon restore the existing duality of conditions, let us make a complete abstraction of all this and seek to represent to ourselves the normal result of the industrial forces working alone. Some such attitude has always been tacitly assumed by those who habitually condemn the governments of the world and conceive them to be hostile to society. These misarchists see the beneficent influences of natural law in the industrial world interfered with by what seems to them an extraneous power, which most candid persons will probably admit to be in itself, at least as commonly defined, non-progressive or only negatively progressive. But the class I refer to take a part and declare it repressive and obstructive of progress. The celebrated "parable of Saint Simon" gives perhaps the most extreme expression to this view that has thus far been uttered, but Mr. Herbert Spencer, although he would not abolish government, is unquestionably its severest modern critic, so much so that anarchistic organs openly claim him as their philosopher.

Now if we could imagine that no single member of society would for a moment think of such a thing as the formation of a governing body, and conceive of each of its members as simply pursuing his individual ends in a private way; taking possession, each as best he might, of some portion of the soil, cultivating it for his own use, exchanging his surplus products with others who, choosing as now other occupations, should produce other

useful things ; making contracts, not indeed legal, but moral, conditioned ultimately on each one's individual power to enforce them ; building cities and entering into mercantile and other kinds of business ; adopting a mutually accepted medium of exchange, or carrying on a banking system based on the much-praised principle of credit and trust ; establishing manufactures of all kinds and disposing of the products ; building railroads and operating them without any other restrictions than those imposed by the laws of business and the conditions favorable to the maximum profits ; conducting educational institutions wholly on "business principles ;" each one worshipping as now in the manner he prefers ; and in all other respects acting individually and without collective restraint—if we could conceive, I say, of such a state of things, we might gain a clear idea of society distinct from government. The two things are not essential to each other, at least in thought, and it would be a great gain to the sociologist to be able to separate them. Even if it be admitted that government is a necessary part of human association, it would be an advantage temporarily to abstract it just as we can abstract any other one element of association. Some, of course, will say that the things specified could not be done in such a state ; that government is a condition to conducting the normal operations of society, and that the hypothesis involves the assumption of higher moral attributes than humanity possesses. Such an assumption would render the hypothesis worthless. This, therefore, is precisely the question to be asked and answered. If it is held that without government society would defeat itself and succumb and the race disappear or lapse into a purely animal or non-social condition, then the inquiry is ended. But given the mental powers possessed by man, few will go so far. The real question therefore is: What would have been the condition of society had no government ever been framed? How many and which ones of the existing institutions and operations of society would exist, and what other ones would have been developed? These are difficult questions, but they are legitimate ones for the sociologist to raise and, as far

as possible, to settle. This is especially the case at a time like the present, when able philosophers are calling in question the very *raison d'être* of government. Unquestionably these are the ones upon whom it devolves to answer these questions, but aside from all controversy it is profitable to consider them.

Assuming that society would have survived a pure state of anarchy from the beginning, it is obvious that there must have been some kind of organization. This is implied in the idea of association. Gregarious animals have no rulers or laws, but they still have a social organization. There are social forces that hold them together. So it would be with men. It is claimed with much truth that government is never the result of a desire to be governed, but always of a desire to govern. Peoples never clamor for a ruler, but rulers rise up spontaneously and assume gubernatorial powers. If there were no ambition to rule, no desire to hold office, no love of glory, and no expectation of emolument beyond what private life affords, would the members of society ever take steps to have a government established? Perhaps not, and yet there is no doubt that many institutions would arise under such circumstances. In fact we may regard all the institutions of society except those that form a part of government as having arisen in this spontaneous way. The multitudinous forms of association that prevail belong to this class. These are all limited as to membership, which is more or less voluntary. They exist for a great variety of widely different purposes, and the same person may belong to any number of them at the same time. It is clear that these would exist even if no government existed, and the various objects of these associations would be accomplished. The primary social forces would be in full activity in a state of anarchy the same as under any form of government, and men would put forth the normal efforts to preserve, continue, and mitigate life. If, as has been assumed, human nature was what it is, the egoistic propensities would exist as now, and even if no one wanted to undertake their control society would certainly adopt some means of holding them in check. This is proved by the way in

which the citizens of frontier districts, in the absence of adequate governmental protection, deal with adventurers and desperadoes who disturb the peace. Vigilance committees may be regarded as incipient spontaneous governments, without any motive of ambition or emolument. So far as mere protection from anti-social tendencies is concerned, they seem to prove that government would always originate itself spontaneously. How far it would go if these motives were permanently absent seems, then, to be the real question.

It is therefore clear that society would not only exist without other government than that which would originate spontaneously from other causes than the desire to rule, but also that it would progress in some degree. This progress might be regarded as typically genetic, and the exclusive product of the normal action of the social forces directly modifying the environment in the interest of society.

I have stated this hypothetical case in order to draw the distinction as clearly as possible between genetic progress and telic progress. So large a part of even past social progress has been telic that it is extremely difficult to separate the two. Still, from a certain point of view, nearly all the progress thus far attained may be regarded as genetic. In the sense of being the result of the normal action of natural laws all of it must be so regarded.

There is a sense, then, in which society makes itself, is a genetic product, and its progress takes place under the general law of evolution that prevails in all departments of natural phenomena. In organic development new principles are constantly coming in, but none of these exempts the resultant phenomena from the action of the law of evolution. That law applied to plants after each of the successive steps, sexuality, exogeny, phanerogamy, gymnospermy, angiospermy, apetaly, polypetaly, gamopetaly, insect agency, etc., had been taken, the same as before. In the animal kingdom it was not affected by the successive appearance of the several higher types of structure from moners to mammals and to man. Even the psychic faculty, the

gradual growth of which resulted in an almost complete reversal, from birds upward, of the conditions that governed all creatures below and including the Reptilia, did not visibly check the onward march of organic progress, and the appearance of man with his rational faculty, while it has not wholly arrested physical development, had the effect of transferring the evolutionary forces to the social field to go on at an accelerated pace. No more has social telesis interfered with social genesis, and the telic progress which individual men have secured to society becomes an integral part of the natural evolution of the human race. We may even rise to a higher plane and take into the cosmic conception the past, present, and prospective conscious and intentional social modification, and thus bring the whole into one great scheme of social evolution.

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SOCIAL CONTROL. VI.

IDEALS.

IN a small and very simple group like the family, sept or tribe, that *sense of being related* which is the moral core of religion may do very well as a basis for harmonious living. But for a large and highly organized society acquired sympathy has just the shortcomings I pointed out in a spontaneous sympathy in the first paper of this series. It establishes general bonds and sees to it that no social class is exploited or left behind, but it is not fit to be charged with the immediate regulation of men. The reason for this lies in the nature of the social order.

Taking the society we are in, this social order presents itself as a system of active individuals, unlike in respect to dependence, desires, abilities and occupation, engaged in the strenuous pursuit of personal ends, but nevertheless so ordering their activities and conduct as to realize a certain equilibrium which can be indefinitely maintained. People are constantly dropping out of this system, new people are constantly maturing into it, and these after entering frequently change their places in it. But whatever be a person's place in the system, there are required of him in that place certain definite relations to other persons and to other parts of the system. The individual as daughter is to defer in certain ways, as wife must assume certain relations of mutuality, as mother is expected to become care-taker of her children, as nurse is called upon to meet unflinchingly certain responsibilities. As one passes from youth to manhood, from minority to citizenship, from study to work, from bachelor to father, from subordinate to chief, many definite changes at once take place in social requirement. At times these requirements are so unlike as to call up precisely opposite sentiments. Consider the contrast between the individual as diplomat and as man of science, as advocate and as judge, as business man and

as priest, as soldier and as nurse, as section boss and as kindergarten, as policeman and as tutor, as bill collector and as Sunday-school superintendent. The kindness that society desires of the pastor is no twin to the vigorous competition it expects of the business man. Running religion on business principles and running business on religious principles prove equally disastrous. Nor is the disciplinary severity of the warden akin to the tenderness of the "Salvation lassie," though each is suited to its function.

Unlimited altruism is, in fact, wholly unsuited to hold every one unswervingly to the special activities and forbearances belonging to his particular position in the social system. Such an adjustment of each to the demands of the social order as shall insure equilibrium flows not from a vague altruism but from a particular way of regarding these requirements. However contrasted the sentiments that go with the function of the jailer and that of the nurse, both functions can be looked upon and discharged as *duties*.

The spirit of love, whether born of fellowship or of faith, is everywhere at work abolishing flogging in the navy, abbreviating penal codes, rooting out slavery, averting or humanizing war, lifting the plane of business competition, relaxing the rigor of industrial discipline, softening the treatment of children in home or school, ameliorating the lot of dependents and defectives, injecting sweetness into manners and trimming the claws of theological dogma. It is the source of constant improvement in the social order. It continually revises the standard of requirement for the various positions in the system. But it is not the immediate parent of that orderliness that day by day harmonizes the activities of thousands of men. It is not the force that holds each individual in the orbit marked out for him in an organized group.

This view of social order is confirmed by Alexander. "This system of social relations . . . implies similarity and diversity of functions among its members. Many fight, and many work, and many govern; and there are some needs so general that

morality makes similar requirements of all—temperance, and justice, and the like—but has his own individual place, and holds it through preserving a right relation to those who are like and to those who are unlike himself. Morality makes the best of the endless repetition it finds in the natural beings called men, and marshals them to their place in a system of relations, the meaning of each of which is present to their consciousness.”¹

The enlistment of the feelings on behalf of impersonal functions and requirements is effected chiefly by the elaboration of social patterns or types, which tend to become the guiding ideals of the members of society. This method of causing righteousness to abound is the method of *morality*.

The corner stone of this form of social control is the fact that men have feelings of love or hatred, of admiration or of contempt, for traits of character. Just as we are attracted or repelled by odors, colors, forms, scenes, deeds or doctrines, so we are affected by the qualities of people. Some love impetuosity; others admire cool deliberation. Some are drawn toward the compliant; others toward the strong will. Some bow to cleverness; others to tenacity of purpose. Passionate natures have their admirers, but so do contemplative ones. The self-assertion that angers one intimidates another and charms a third. Why people have these preferences the sociologist is not called upon to explain, any more than in treating of marriage he is called upon to account for the vagaries of preference between the sexes.

Whether as the offspring of the instinctive will to live or as the result of living closer to our own choices and efforts than to those of others,² we have naturally a high self-esteem. But with the advent of reflection self-esteem comes to be bound up in a measure with a more or less critical and objective self-judgment. We get the power to stand off and look upon and pass judgment on ourselves. In such cases self-esteem lifts its head when we

¹ ALEXANDER, *Moral Order and Progress*, p. 127-8.

² JAMES, *Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 326-7.

see in ourselves that which we consider estimable, droops when we see in our own qualities or character, or abilities or achievements nothing we can hold dear. Shame and self-loathing appear when we must confess to that in ourselves which inspires scorn or disgust when seen in others.¹

A high estimate of one's self, the sense of rare worth or excellence, is a source of distinct pleasure and exhilaration. It is bound up with the feeling of power, a poignant consciousness of self, a vivid feeling of being alive and of triumphing, which elates and rejoices. Self-contempt, on the other hand, is attended by slow heart beats, reduced circulation, drooping of spirits and a sense of oppression and anguish.

From this it follows that men will aspire to that which they deem precious in order to possess it and make it their own. Whether something outward, such as dress, ornament, retinue, title or genealogy; or something personal, such as grace, beauty, strength or dexterity; or something inward, such as courage, temperance, *savoir faire*, manners, erudition, conversational ability, eloquence or fidelity—it remains true that the thing or quality one admires one strives to acquire. Admiration, therefore, has a real dynamic power. It is a transforming agent of the first order, seeing that the object of admiration becomes the goal of endeavor. In the field of character, what is admired becomes the ideal toward which one strives. To control ideals, therefore, is to control character.

The main original factors of one's admirations and abominations are instinct and idiosyncrasy on the one hand and social environment on the other. For most men it is the social *milieu* that gives us the key to their dominant emotional reactions. In one circle the bruiser is admired, in another the dandy, in another the priest. The soldier, the organizer or the thinker—each has his following. An outsider introduced into one of these circles finds it difficult not to adopt the tone and take the hue of his

¹"That we dislike in others things which we tolerate in ourselves is a law of our æsthetic nature about which there can be no doubt. But as soon as generalization and reflection step in, this judging of others leads to a new way of regarding ourselves."
—JAMES, *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 435.

immediate environment. The nature habituated to certain kinds of response may hold out against the social influence; but the young quickly succumb to the reiterated suggestions of their associates. Herein lies the assimilative power of societies. Besides the infection with speech, dress or manner, there is the more subtle infection of the newcomer with the master likes and dislikes of the group.

While most of the reaction habits acquired are caught up by imitation, there are admirations and abhorrences that are impressed for a purpose. In other words, society, besides unwittingly or carelessly influencing its members, deliberately sets to work to affect their feelings in certain ways with a view to control. This is done by steadily holding up before a man that which he is to admire and by studiously disparaging that which he is to scorn and abhor. By thus orienting his feelings society determines what ideals shall rule his endeavor and shape the development of his character. Here, then, we have a method of molding people to the social pattern. It is scarcely necessary to add that society will seek to excite admiration for that in deed and in character which is deemed socially fit, and repugnance for that which is too egoistic, foreign, reactionary, radical or eccentric to suit its purpose.

Recent ethics has glimpsed the sway of ideals over conduct and seen how these in turn depend on one's admirations and detestations. But the significance of it all is hidden by a lame analysis. The socializing ideals that are found actually reigning in the lives of many people are spoken of as "social ideals." Ethics thus implies that, being the ideals guiding the mass of men at a given time, they are communicated by social influence to each new member of the community. If this is the process, we cannot help wondering how the mass of men ever came to follow these ideals that so often lead them aside from the smooth paths of instinct and spontaneity over the rough road of self-denial. Scientific explanation of this ethics has nowhere given.

There is, of course, such a thing as a collective or social ideal. So might we speak of the aspirations of crusading Europe, of

Omer's Arabs, of Garibaldi's Italy, Kossuth's Hungary or New Japan. A Society of Jesus or a Civic League has a goal toward which it presses. But an ideal that guides the lives of many members of a society is not therewith a social ideal. As in an army there are held up standards of obedience, endurance, and bravery, which become ideals for its members, but which for the army as a whole are mere means to an end and not at all to be identified with its ideals of achievement, so society gives its members ideals which are in no wise ideals for society as a whole.

• Let us therefore not fail to distinguish "type" from "ideal." Society gets up certain patterns, which as they are framed in the interest of the group, may be termed "social types." In a differentiated society, there are many of them and they are unlike. These if persistently held up may become in the course of time ideals—each for the class for which it is intended. By making distinct these stages in the process we are enabled to see that the presence of self-control, fidelity, and devotion in the types held up for imitation in a community by no means evidences these qualities in the character of the group that frames these types. A social type may be lofty because the character of society is high, or simply because the mechanism of control is perfect. It is, indeed, perfectly possible for the pattern conduct of a community of grasping men to embrace fair play and respect for ownership. It is just because the types contrived and set up are higher than the actual feelings and standards of society that they can achieve a moral uplift.

It will here be objected that such a differentiation of social type from private standard will do no good. The trick is too thin, the legerdemain too transparent. By no such device can the stream be made to rise higher than its source. Either the social type agreed upon imposes on nobody and is hence ineffective, or it imposes on the framers of it and is therefore a social ideal.

We escape this paradox by recognizing three great social facts—the functional differentiation of society, the division into leaders and led, and the sway of the past over the present. To

see these in the concrete, consider how it is that the soldier comes to regard as despicable that prudent concern for one's safety which is instinctive and which is commended in other walks of life. There is first the fact that contempt of danger, little needed elsewhere, is absolutely necessary to the business of fighting. Those dependent on the success of the fighting force, *i. e.*, all the rest of society, will see to it that courage is emphasized in the soldier type. Secondly, the leaders of the soldiers, whether self-devoted or not, perceiving that professional success with all the glory and personal aggrandizement it brings depends on the inspiring of courage in their men, will impress this quality with a zeal certainly no less than that of an advocate for his client or a politician for his party. In the third place, courage bepraised and besung in one generation will shine before the eyes of the next generation with a prestige it could never have acquired in a day.

This last fact should be dwelt on. For it is chiefly by being handed down embedded in transmitted culture — literature, art, religion, codes, discipline, systems of morals — that types of character developed in the social interest win such authority and prestige that they are accepted as ideals, not merely by the led, but even by the leaders and guides of society. This lifting of social type higher than actual social character, which might at first appear to be mere shallow artifice, is therefore, in reality the outcome of a long social growth. It is from the summit of twenty centuries of myth and legend, song and story, faith and aspiration that certain types of today look down upon us. Social control is based not only on the ascendancy of the many over the one, of the wise over the simple, of the rulers over the ruled, but yet more on the domination of the living by the dead.

We have yet to show how the individual is induced to admire the social type. What is meant by "holding up" a pattern?

Let us consider how the social model of a soldier embodying such elements as courage, prowess, endurance, fidelity, frankness, loyalty, self-sacrifice, none of them easy for ordinary human

nature, is so impressed on great numbers of ordinary folk as to become for them an imperious ideal. Where as in militant societies, or in industrial societies during war time, military qualities are deemed all-important, we find that all manner of homage is paid to the soldier type. Literature glorifies it, eloquence crowns it, religion canonizes it, multitudes applaud and cheer it. Everywhere that type is honored, revered, sung, and praised. Healths and toasts are drunk to the soldier; women smile on him; men bow down to him. Art, literature, oratory, worship, monuments, statues, festivals, commemorations, and observances unite in perpetually reminding men of soldier qualities, exploits, and prizes.

Besides these streams of suggestion all playing on one point, ✓ admiration is further kindled by flashing before the dazzled eye those aspects of the soldier's life which are adventurous, dramatic, or picturesque, while carefully keeping in the background its cruelties, hardships, and agonies; by gracing it with attractive imagery; by expurgating history of the horrors of war and literature of all disparagement of the soldier; by referring to soldier worth on the most momentous and solemn occasions; by bringing it forward when habitual self-interested prudence is thrown off its guard in a sudden rush of emotion; by getting it associated with all that is beautiful or holy; by identifying it with the defense of the roof-tree from the torch, of ancestral graves from the vandal, of women from the ravisher, and of children from the destroyer.

By thus marshaling every influence and by using for leverage every inclination and passion of the human heart it is possible to achieve wonderful results. And yet I have recited but a tithe of the ways in which a transmitted type is gradually stamped upon the rising generation. To set them all forth would be to describe the making of man. Of Chinese education Professor Mary S. Barnes says: "The influence of conscious education is mighty. In this study we have seen this environment actually *making* men, and constantly making men—millions of them, after a desired pattern."¹

¹ *History of Education*, No. III.

The diversity of conduct and character required in the highly differentiated society is so great that if it were sought to use one concrete type for all this type would be so generalized as to be valueless. How few are the moral elements that the schoolboy, the scout, the mother, the bank clerk, the boss, the nurse, and the stock jobber have in common! How unlike the qualities that will make each one *good* of his or her kind! The variety of place and function is therefore met by a certain variety of type. In an advanced society there is quite an elaborate hierarchy of types answering to all the principal and many of the minor situations of life. Besides such patterns as the son, the lover or the father maintained on behalf of the family, we shall find types of the friend, the neighbor, the partner, the business man, the teacher, the servant, the policeman, the citizen. However fluid and indistinct in the literature and debate of the day where variants get most of the attention, these types will be found quite definite for each family or neighborhood. Vague though they may seem for the whole nation, they are precise enough for each little local group; and it is just in such little groups that everybody is born and raised. These types, then, are very real things in the lives of people. A girl is impressed at home with the daughter pattern, at school with the pupil pattern, with her teens she is confronted with the young lady type and later she encounters the reigning standard of wife and mother.

If, however, she varies her life to the extent of becoming saleswoman, milliner, or accountant, she finds no specialized model held up to her. This brings us to the truth that the molds provided by society are, after all, few, while nowadays the variety of situation and requirement is all but infinite. It would seem, then, that this species of control is useless for detail regulation. But this difficulty has been triumphantly met. Symmetrical types complete in every feature are provided only for the chief positions which one may occupy. For the rest society by dissecting and comparing normal conduct for all sorts of exigencies in the social system brings to light certain resemblances. Social conduct under all sorts of conditions is found to repeat

a few general qualities. Social character at a thousand points in society can be resolved into a few simple elements. Therefore after the ground plan of society has been laid down in its special types, it is possible to confine the rest of regulation to patterns of qualities and elements of character. For each of these few elements a type is framed and held up to admiration that the individual may consent to incorporate it into his ideal. These abstract types are the moral virtues. By this analysis we get such generalized forms as honesty, justice, truth, fullness, fidelity, kindness, self-denial, loyalty, sincerity, courage, perseverance, temperance, etc. Society no longer bids the taskmaster not to "strip the temples of their stores," "diminish the substance consecrated to the gods," "carry off the cakes and bandages of mummies," "over-value or diminish the supplies," or "cheat in the weights of the balance," as it did in Old Egypt. It simply bids him "be honest." The guidance of men by such abstractions presupposes in them the power to recognize the abstract in the concrete and is, therefore, not without its drawbacks and dangers.

The analysis of fit character in all manner of positions bringing to light uniformities which are erected into virtues and made the reigning ideals for individual life must be deemed one of the greatest inventions in the history of societies. Its economy is that of the alphabet. There by analyzing spoken words into their simplest sound elements we are enabled to reduce the number of written characters from thousands to a little over a score; these in turn must be variously combined in order to form the multitude of written words required. Here by analyzing social characters into their ultimate elements we can make a few virtues do the work of many concrete types; but these virtues must be combined in varying degrees and proportions in order give the variety of guidance needed in the social system. The social gain is vast. In all early societies that reached a settled social order we find elaborate codes specifying what is standard conduct for all the chief places and functions. The bringing up of each man to the highly specific

ethic of his status and calling tended to confirm caste, lessen mobility and discourage variation. Such societies had to throttle progress, for with change in the number, strength or relation of the orders of men in society the elaborate patterns ceased to fit and morality collapsed. It is the bringing up of people to love and imitate generalized social qualities and generalized social character that, more than any other improvement in this department of social evolution, has given control an elasticity favorable at once both to order and to progress.

Of the concrete types elaborated strictly for the social rather than for the family group there are three which on account of the social energy that has gone to perfect and to glorify them, stand preëminent. These are the *gentleman* (or *lady*), the *soldier* and the *priest*. Each of these, instead of being a mere synthesis of abstract virtues, has been worked out into the most amazing detail by past generations and becomes so embalmed in tradition and literature as to constitute a formative influence of the first rank. The "gentleman," originally the quintessence of sociality worked out within the highest caste, has won the admiration of many, and is today in America the ideal of the aspiring millions of democracy. Low indeed must we descend in the social scale to find common the man who does not wince at being told he is "no gentleman." Religion itself hardly does more in molding lives at the present moment in our democracy than this single fascinating figure. The union of this type to the primeval type of "man" (or "woman") that for centuries supplied the chief guiding ideal for the humble workaday millions—the serfs, villeins and peasants — is a long forward stride in moral progress.

Priest and soldier, on the other hand, are not universal types. They have been the concern of society partly because the due discharge of religious and military functions has seemed of highest moment to the common welfare, but still more because the demands of these professions go so much against the grain of the average individual. To develop the courage, obedience, endurance and loyalty of the warrior, or the gentleness, self-

denial, chastity and piety of the priest, human nature had to be overlaid with an artificial nature. As the task was difficult the means had to be powerful, and thus it is that these types have been worked out to a distinctness and backed up with an authority we find nowhere else. The most powerful known agencies — poetry, song, eloquence, applause — are summoned to uphold and commend them. So forcibly in consequence is the type stamped on the individual, so deeply is it graven, that he retains an enduring impress of it in his thought and feeling. A certain arrest of development treads on the heels of this specialization. The thought of the soldier or the priest cannot wander much beyond the range marked out by his type. Either can do scientific detail work but very rarely does either do first-class thinking on social, religious or philosophical subjects — those, namely, about which he has been trained to think and feel in a particular way.

Every religion, when it is an independent stream of influence sweeping in from without or springing up in the footsteps of some great teacher, must be recognized as making its own contribution to the general stock of ideals in society. Each apart from its supernatural sanctions or its teachings respecting the bonds between men offers its pattern lives, characters, qualities and virtues so set forth in narratives, examples, parables, legends, myths and sayings as to win and hold the love of generations of men. Indeed a religion like that of Confucius, almost devoid of supernaturalism or idealism, touches the feelings on behalf of society chiefly by the attractive power of its model characters and virtues. The Norse myths form the proper mold in which to shape the spirit of the warrior. Mazdeism was but a pedestal to lift purity into the upper heavens. "The spirit of Shinto," says Mr. Hearn, "is the spirit of filial piety, the zest of duty, the readiness to surrender life for a principle without a thought of wherefore. It is the docility of the child; it is the sweetness of the Japanese woman."¹ Stoicism was in essence a wrought-out character-type fortified by philosophical doctrines and made

¹ *Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan*, Vol. II, p. 388.

fascinating by the genius of Epictetus. Buddha gave an irresistible charm to unselfishness, self-control, serenity. Jesus conferred on meekness, love, forgiveness and purity a luster that has led captive the hearts of millions. As it is the concrete that moves the world the force of a religion lies less in its framed ideals than in its realized ideals, that is, the types presented incarnate in its founders, heroes or saints. Fleckless, flawless pattern-lives clothed with a more than human prestige are the priceless possessions of a religion.

Besides these chief types carefully constructed and strongly fortified society employs many subordinate types to effect the minor adjustments of the individual to the group. The framing of these is the work not of society but of the minor group most directly conversant with the function thus regulated — usually the trade or profession. The lawyers in their intercourse, their papers and discussions, their legal books and periodicals, their bar associations, and their law schools arrive at a professional ethics which sketches out the type that becomes the ideal of those lawyers imbued with the "professional" spirit. So teachers, clergymen, physicians, civil engineers, artists or actors, by agreeing among themselves as to what is praiseworthy and what disreputable, control the feelings and consequently the endeavor of the individual. Likewise drummers, conductors, typesetters, glassblowers or pilots communicate to each other standards of excellence which become trade types. Every "service" — military, naval, civil, hospital, medical, customs, quarantine, revenue, police, life saving, detective, telegraph, railroad, or missionary — acquires in time traditions, stories, anecdotes, precedents, maxims and sayings which conspire to delineate and glorify its type. It is this power to subdue the initiate to its standards that marks the bureaucracy. When a service is originated, say the Franciscan Order or the Salvation Army, the inspiration of its members comes from the magnetic charm and the ascendant personality of its founder. The raw recruit is transformed by the enthusiasm and aspirations of a St. Francis or a General Booth. But with age the vitality of an order comes to reside in its

models or ideals which each member has accepted for himself and seeks to communicate to the novice.

Every sect, party, church, brotherhood, order, crew, camping party, surveying corps, ball club, athletic team, labor union, fraternity, guild, lodge, or other minor grouping based not on mere likeness but on recurrent relations and interactions, will in course of time develop for its special purposes appropriate types of character, conduct or observance which exert on its members an invisible pressure subordinating them to the welfare or aims of the association. In other words, the minor groups of men resemble the great social group in needing to control their units and in the means they employ for this purpose. We have pointed out the need of a succession of generations for perfecting a social type and giving it prestige. So of minor groups it is only the stabler ones with a succession of memberships that are able to create a distinctive atmosphere.

Below the associations each with its "genius" or "*esprit*," and the trades and professions each with its standard are the innumerable callings in which those engaged have never been in such close touch as to arrive at a consensus of admiration for this or that practice. Here there are no special guiding types and each must do his work as he is led by the general moral types offered by society or driven by considerations of self-interest.

The special ethical standards that associations, professions and trades impart to their members may be said in the main to constitute social types and to be among the agents of social control. They are usually worked out under the oversight and criticism of the public. If they run counter to the general social interest they excite hostility. If the profession fails to amend, its type will be stripped of prestige by being confronted with those general types that are backed up by the full authority of society, past and present, *i. e.*, the ruling moral standards. This is not to affirm, however, that the professional ethic is always what it would be if it grew up in the full light of publicity, nor to deny that the reigning standards of a minor group may at times flout the general interest and aim covertly at the aggrand-

izement of one set of social functionaries at the expense of other groups.

So much for the objective side. Turning now to the subjective side let us study the type as ideal. The force that is relied on to hold the individual to his ideals is self-respect, self-reverence on the one hand, shame and loss of self-respect on the other; these together constituting a self-acting system of rewards and punishments. Compared with applied rewards and punishments they have the merit of dispensing with inquest and award by external authority, of being certain in operation, of regulating men when unobserved, of appraising motive as well as deed and of shaping character as well as conduct.

The lofty independence of this righteousness lifted far above calculations of gain or loss or desire for approval¹ has won the admiration of thinkers in all ages. It was the supreme aim of stoic morality. Said Marcus Aurelius: "When thou hast done a good act and another has received it, why dost thou still look for a third thing besides these, as fools do, either to have the reputation of having done a good act or to obtain a return." It is the goal of the great modern teachers.² "The hero fears not," says Emerson, "that if he withhold the avowal of a just and brave act it will go unwitnessed and unloved. One knows it—himself—and is pledged by it to sweetness of peace and to nobleness of aim." In high contrast to those lives regulated by the prospect of heaven and hell stand those lives governed by ideas. Dispensing with belief in a future state³ they demand simply belief in one's self.⁴ Neither reposing on dogma nor responding to self-interest⁵ they give a security for lasting goodness that seems absolute.

¹ "Suppose any man shall despise me. Let him look to that himself. But I will look to this, that I be not discovered doing or saying anything deserving of contempt."—Marcus Aurelius.

² "Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,

These three alone lead life to sovereign power."—Tennyson.

³ "Man's ignorance as to what will become of him after he dies never disturbs a noble, a truly religious soul."—Salter.

⁴ "The fearful unbelief is unbelief in thyself."—Carlyle.

⁵ "Can he really be honest, can he be called really virtuous who would gladly give himself up to his favorite vices if he feared no future punishment?"—Kant.

In contrast with supernaturalism control by ideals inspires pride rather than humility.¹ Strangely enough egoism is here the soil out of which the social virtues spring, the well from which they are watered. Realization of the ideal is regarded as one more step toward perfection, the winning of a new personal excellence which naturally excites self-admiration. That this may lead to self-vaunting is true. We must put up with stoic arrogance² for it is after all a little enough price to pay for right conduct. By various devices—chiefly by keeping the ideal always well ahead of performance, or by incorporating modesty into the ideal itself—it is possible to cure this defect.

Its dependence on pride explains why it is that control by ideals often flourishes in the higher classes while the inferior orders are curbed by custom and authority. Always in aristocracies, nobilities, higher social castes and military orders pride is of necessity exaggerated to such a degree that society can get no leverage at all for control unless it uses self as a fulcrum. At a time when supernatural sanctions were woven through and through the European social fabric, chivalry called into being a proud and jealous sense of honor which routed the monastic spirit from castle and court. As the fiery individualism that heralded the great democratic movement awakened the sense of dignity and worth in layer after layer of the people, pride in the sober garb of self-respect was given more and more the custody of virtue. During this transformation honor has assumed a new rôle. Honor was formerly a caste badge. It was that quality which guaranteed one his caste and loss of which meant

¹ "Pride, under such training (that of modern rationalistic philosophy), instead of running to waste, is turned to account. It gets a new name; it is called self-respect. . . . It is directed into the channel of industry, frugality, honesty and obedience, and becomes the very staple of the religion and morality held in honor in a day like our own. It becomes the safeguard of chastity, the guarantee of veracity, in high and low; it is the very household god of the protestant, inspiring neatness and decency in the servant girl, propriety of carriage and refined manners in her mistress, uprightness, manliness and generosity in the head of the family."—J. H. Newman, quoted in Lecky's *History of European Morals*, Vol. II, p. 188.

² "Do thou also then not be greatly proud of thy food and dress, or of any external things, but be proud of thine integrity and good deeds."—Epictetus.

loss of caste. But with the widening sway of social types honor comes to mean the salient or cardinal virtue of each concrete type. Failure to attain this excellence is failure to realize type. Thus for woman honor is identified with chastity, for the soldier it is courage, for the business man it is the meeting of all engagements. The officer who runs away, the gentleman who tells lies, the judge who takes bribes, the pugilist who hits "below the belt," the jockey who "pulls" his mount, the school-boy who "peaches" forfeits his honor. He is taught to feel that by that act he is degraded and *declassé*.

The use of ideals implies a view of human nature diametrically opposed to that of supernaturalism. While there we have doctrines of the fall, of sin and of total depravity, here we have a buoyant confidence in the fundamental goodness of man.¹ Regeneration not by grace but by endeavor² implies that human nature is not fallen or bad. People must be taught that the good or noble they admire they may attain by their own efforts. Vistas of infinite possibility must be opened. Free will must be exalted and fate depreciated. No one is to be so bound by heredity that he may not move upward. Hope and aspiration must be offered the meanest man. The belittling and maligning of human nature must yield to ethical optimism. Man, it is insisted, is "a moral being" and so but achieves his true selfhood by realizing his ideals. It is this set of correlated teachings that underlies the method of "morality."³

There has never been a time when a great deal of life was not regulated by ideals. But looking at the species of control to which the cardinal virtues of the age are intrusted, we can say that the Middle Ages exploited belief, that with the growth of protestantism greater reliance was placed on self-respect, and

¹ "Within is a fountain of good, and it will ever bubble up, if thou wilt ever dig." — Marcus Aurelius.

² "Wipe out thy vain fancies by often saying to thyself: 'Now it is in my power to let no badness be in this soul, nor desire, nor any perturbation at all!' Remember this power which thou hast from nature!" — Marcus Aurelius.

³ "Men talk of 'mere morality,' which is much as if one should say, 'Poor God, with nobody to help him!'" — Emerson.

that with the decay of supernaturalism this motive has become the chief guarantor of social order. As the rationalism of the skeptical eighteenth century undermined the beliefs on which order reposed, a new type of control was sought. This at first supplied ineffectually by sentimentalism, utilitarian morals, juiceless homilies on "the fitness of things" and the inculcation of abstract virtues, was finally wrought out by the new idealism portraying with eloquent words the splendid possibilities of human nature. Kant, Fichte, Carlyle, Mazzini, Ruskin, Cousin, Channing, Martineau, George Eliot, Emerson and Thoreau have so forcefully uttered the master ideas of the new appeal to the individual that the Time-Spirit is thoroughly imbued with them. Thanks to the spell of these great teachers the stupendous moral evolution involved in carrying the masses over from supernaturalism has already in great measure been accomplished in protestant countries, not only with few and relatively unimportant perturbations in the field of conduct, but along with increasing demands of society on the individual. In southern Europe, where the mediating influence of protestant ideas was wanting and where self-respect had not served so long an apprenticeship in the household of religion, the transition has been more disastrous.

The guidance of men by ideals is just the reverse of guidance by authority. When we bind from without, free inquiry, criticism, and unhampered choice are discouraged. We undermine the confidence of the individual in himself and surround the source of intimation with the prestige of antiquity, universality and numbers. But when we bind from within, he must be entertained with the illusion of self-direction even at the very moment he martyrizs himself for an ideal that society has sedulously impressed upon him. His very sacrifice must seem self-assertion, his abnegation as a rounding out of his personality. This type of control, therefore, builds on granite men and granite men are produced by it. It is small wonder Cromwell wanted not "broken down serving men," but "men of spirit" to pit against the cavaliers. He who is master of the secret of impart-

ing ideals can have the pick of the human race for his purposes.

In an age of skepticism and self-assertion it is not the most effective form of control society can lay hand to. At the same time it has the defects of its qualities. Contrasting the oriental social order resting on authority with that of the Occident so largely based on self-respect, Mary S. Barnes says: "The East, on her side, must confess that her systems of education tend to allow, if not to cherish, such faults as servility and double dealing, while they actually crush out the inventor and the variant, in a word, the hope of progress. The West, on her side, must note the fact that her systems develop arrogance, self-conceit, angularity, and eccentricity, and, still more serious arraignment, they actually discourage love, patience and courtesy, in a word, social harmony."¹

Just because it is the ascendant moral force of our time it is hard for many to see that this exquisite and perfected guidance is a form of social control at all. Least of all can "ethics," addressing, as it always does, the individual, and bent on providing him reasons for being good, surrender this, its trump card. The moralists assure us they are not "controlling" the individual, they are simply enlightening him. They are thinking not of the social order, but of what it is best for the individual to strive for. That the *moral values* they point him to should tally with *values for society* is a mere accident. That what it is best for the individual to make himself agrees so exactly with what his particular group would have him be, that the values of the various elements of moral excellence are revised with every change in the situation and need of society, gives them no hint of the truth. On whatever crutches of law, divine retribution, or hell-fire, humanity has hobbled up to its present moral level, it has at last, they tell us, thrown away all such aids and now advances upon its own legs.

But the sociologist must regard the polarizing of the feelings of the individual in regard to carefully-framed social types of character as simply one of the means by which bodies of men

¹ *Studies in Education*, III.

have been brought to get along together harmoniously. It is simpler and more elastic than many of its predecessors. It is peculiarly compatible with that higher evolution of personality society exists for. At present it has more of promise than any of its rivals. It may be the final type of social control. But it is certainly not the final form of sociology.

Self-regard, however transfigured into self-respect, self-reverence and sense of honor, has never been the mainstay of family altruism, nor did it underlie social disposition in the smaller and earlier groups. Two developments have combined to make morality, rather than enlightened altruism, the chief support of our social order. The size of modern societies makes it easier to love a few abstract relations to our fellows than to love our fellows themselves. The increasing division of labor, by removing the discharge of our special functions further and further from the welfare of particular persons, tends to depersonalize our services and so make them duties rather than ministrations. But the adjustment of these two circumstances should not blind us to the nature of that goodness which is above and on the other side of all social control. Social order will rest on artifice till there is joined to the natural altruism we find developing in many families, chiefly through prolonged and intimate contact a clearness of intellectual vision that sees in the upright discharge of the social requirements of every office and station the highest ministry to the welfare of our fellows.

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THE PRESENT STATUS OF SOCIOLOGY IN GERMANY.

I.

THE official guardians of science in Germany have not yet brought themselves to grant sociology equal rights with other sciences. It is well known that sociology is not native to German soil. It was imported in the first instance from France and then from England. It is, consequently, to the present day regarded as an alien. Official recognition is so far refused that in Professor Conrad's *Staatswörterbuch* the article "Sociology" is entirely lacking. German professors of philosophy and political science ignore sociology entirely, and whatever is done within this territory, either on the continent or on the other side of the channel, is hardly taken seriously here. On account of a fatal association of ideas the German professor joins sociology so closely with the names of Comte and Spencer that he is obliged to repudiate it utterly, by as much as he denies to the theories of these thinkers the rank of science.

While rejection of sociology may be partially accounted for by its alien birth, and jealousy about admitting it to equality with "autochthonous" sciences, nevertheless the admission cannot be avoided that the fault is to be charged in very large measure to sociology itself, because of the form which it has assumed. At the present day, when specialization is carried to the minutest detail, if a science is to maintain its existence, it must in the first place be able sharply to define its territory, and thus, in a certain measure, demonstrate its right to exist. In fact, sociology, as represented by Comte and Spencer, claims to be nothing less than universal science. In that case, what is not included in sociology? With the exception of a few special branches of natural science, sociology would include every department of human investigation which has anything to do with the psychical sciences. In this case sociology is merely

another name for metaphysics—and of that Germany has had already enough.

If, then, sociology is to make a place for itself as a science in the complete sense of the term, it must mark off its territory, it must define the complex of phenomena which it attempts to bring under general conceptions. Within the vast circle of the psychical sciences sociology must announce precisely the section which it proposes to cultivate—so far as it is possible in the psychical sciences to give a precise account of method or of material.

I assign to sociology as a science *the phenomena of the formation of social groups*. Sociology is, accordingly, not the theory of *society*, merely, but rather of *socialization*.

Sociology in this view has a dual task, a formal or descriptive, and a normative or ætiological. In the first place it is the task of sociology to investigate socialization with respect to its forms. The mere facts must be registered and brought under general rubrics. The more dignified task, on the other hand, and that which is properly scientific, is to investigate and declare the psychical motivation of association. We have before us, for example, the historical fact of a *crusade*. In pragmatic research and representation the historian has given us the pertinent details. He has pictured the separate factors—peoples, knights, clergy, and so forth. He has completed his task as historian by giving us a picture of the prevailing culture of the times, of the moving ideas and ideals. Now comes the sociologist, and to him a new problem presents itself. Before him is the fact that many peoples combined, “associated,” or “socialized” themselves for the conduct of a war. In what relation did the associated peoples stand to each other? Assuming that his researches yield him the result that the peoples concerned stood to each other in the relation of superiority and subordination, the sociologist in question has thereby solved one portion of his problem. That is, he has found the *form* in which socialization proceeded toward a given purpose. Now arises, however, the further question: What impelled these peoples, who, under other

circumstances, would have fought each other, to association? The common purpose to rescue the Holy Sepulchre. This common purpose had its source in a common will, which, in turn, in the case before us, is determined by common religious conceptions. Thus, in the last analysis, religious conceptions and feelings are the psychical motivation of this association. Herewith is a considerable portion of the task of sociology performed in outline. It is no concern of sociology what significance this occurrence had for the development of European civilization; that it resulted in establishing the hegemony of one state over another; that it made Europe acquainted with Arabian-Greek philosophy, and in consequence philosophical thought was led into unwonted paths; or that new vistas were opened to art by contact with the Orient. All this and much more belongs outside the frame of sociology. In like manner sociology will not extend its investigations to the economic circumstances and conditions which were grounds for this undertaking, or which followed upon it; what forms and dimensions the taxes assumed which were levied for this purpose; how this taxation affected the further tax system, and so forth. All this is to be investigated by the historian of national economics.

Another example may be cited. Suppose a stock company is formed. Economic science has taught us the conditions, circumstances, and foundations under and upon which stock companies may and should be established. They are of no further interest to sociology, any more than are the questions whether the company has much or little prospect of profit, whether it proposes to establish a textile factory or to work a gold mine. Sociology is content with the fact of the formation of a society, and inquires in the first instance merely after the relations of the members among themselves. If it is a voluntary association the members stand to each other in the relation of coördination. Their association is essentially impersonal. The capital alone is bound to it, and the relations of the members to each other grow out of their common property right in the active capital. There consequently results a whole complex of forms and diversified

relations, which it is the business of sociology to determine and to trace back as distinctly as possible to fundamental forms and types. Now appears the question with reference to the motivation of this association. The answer will be, for example, the certainty of competition, the desire to economize the labor power, and finally desire for wealth and the increase of wealth. Herewith sociology has entirely accomplished its task.

From the foregoing we derive, then, the following definition of sociology: *Sociology is the science of the forms and the psychical motivation of human association.* The material of sociology is derived from the results of all the psychical sciences, since the phenomena of association are considered by all these, and are of fundamental significance. Nevertheless sociology is by no means on this account compelled to give up its character as an independent science, and to be rated merely as an eclectic method.

The conception of sociology as a special science developed above corresponds in essentials with the view represented by G. Simmel.¹ Nevertheless there is still a considerable difference between the two views. Simmel lays the chief weight upon the former portion of the task, that is, upon the formal side, while I emphasize chiefly the second part, namely, the psychical motivation. Simmel fortifies his conception with the analogy of geometry: "Thus, geometry contemplates merely the spatial form of bodies, which has no existence by itself, but only with and as a part of a substance, the investigation of which belongs to other sciences." This comparison is misleading and is not strictly appropriate to sociology. The contents of geometrical figures, that is, the substances so shaped, are in fact entirely irrelevant for geometry, because abstraction from them is easily made. Whether the cylinder is of wood or glass or iron is never taken into consideration in reckoning its spatial relations and its dimensions. In the case of sociology, on the contrary, it is a matter of very great importance who brings associations into

¹ "Das Problem der Soziologie," in SCHMOLLER'S *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung*, u. s. w., 1894.

existence. The determination of societary forms depends essentially upon whether, for example, children come together for play, or the members of a primitive village community are the persons in question, or the case in hand is that of persons upon an advanced plane of culture, forming a political party held together by an elaborately thought-out social programme. In the sociological form the element of consciousness is manifest, and this relates sociology unequivocally to psychology.

Moreover it is not feasible to treat forms of association in complete abstraction from their content. As a matter of fact, Simmel himself, in his own sociological investigations, by no means conceives the problem in a purely formal way. On the contrary his strength is in profound and acute psychological interpretations. In the monograph already cited psychology comes at last to its rights. Psychology is involved in the definition. Simmel defines sociology as "the investigation of the *forces*, forms, and developments of socialization." That is, when we examine the definition closely it is precisely what I mean by *psychical motivation*. The "forces of socialization" are none other than psychical forces, and the investigation of them is psychological investigation; not properly individual psychology, to be sure, but rather social psychology.

On the other hand, Simmel represents this part of sociological procedure merely as a methodological point of view. He says "the methods according to which the problems of socialization are investigated are the same as in all comparative psychological sciences." We may grant that certain primary presumptions of individual psychology are to be understood in sociology primarily only as methodological conditions; social psychology, however, is not to be entirely separated in its substance from sociology; it is rather by far the most important constituent of sociology. Sociology can only regard its task as performed when it has discovered the psychical motivation of the phenomena of association.

Too broad and, therefore, too inexact is the definition of sociology given by Ferdinand Tönnies (*Jahresbericht über die*

Erscheinungen auf dem Gebiete der systematischen Philosophie). In his opinion sociology is identical with social philosophy. This appears in the following: "Every science is philosophy, on the one hand in its general projections, on the other hand in its practical importance; that is, in its ethical and political significance." The idea seems to be too loosely conceived. The results of sociology are, to be sure, the foundation for ethical and political science or activity. They are not, however, ethics and political science themselves. The "general projections" of sociology are, to be sure, basal elements for social philosophy, but they are not on that account social philosophy itself. The latter builds in the air if it does not use the results of sociology for its foundation. Sociology loses itself in intangible generalities if it poses as a completed system of social philosophy. The domain of sociology is narrow and more exact than that of social philosophy, which, like every philosophy, is an extract from sciences, not, however, science itself.

With this delimitation of the field of sociological research we have drawn the boundaries for the task of this paper. Our purpose accordingly is to treat here only the specifically sociological. We shall not refer to the technical economic sciences, nor to experimental social politics. In so far, however, as sociology on the one hand has its source in history, and on the other hand flows into social philosophy, will it be necessary to treat here certain fundamental problems of historical philosophy, and the most recent tendencies in social philosophy.

It is a most peculiar situation, such as should seldom occur in the history of the sciences, that the question, historical materialism or idealism, has become a party issue between the historians of the conservative (*bürgerlich*) element and those of social-democratic affiliations. At all events it is eagerly represented in this way on the social-democratic side. Thus Franz Mehring says, for example: ¹ "Historical idealism, in its various

¹"Ueber den historischen Materialismus" (Anhang zu *Die Lessing-Legende*, Stuttgart, 1893).

theological, rationalistic, and also naturalistic phases, is the historical conception of the burgher class, while historical materialism is the preconception of the working class" (p. 500). As matter of fact, the burgher historians tend to be very shy of historical materialism, while those who call themselves socialists feel themselves in duty bound to justify historical materialism, to investigate only from its point of view, even at the cost of turning the facts upside down. For a person of somewhat delicate sensibility it is inordinately disgusting to see a purely theoretical question treated from the standpoint of a political party. The circumstance that Karl Marx was the author of this theory cannot be a sufficient ground in the minds of the upright scientific investigator for rejecting it without further thought, nor, on the other hand, for establishing it as a dictum to which, according to the party programme, unlimited obedience must be paid. Philosophical theorems are more changeable and flexible than party programmes; they also give rise to less hatred and bitterness. Historical materialism derived an impulse, as is well known, from Marx, although he nowhere formulated it as a systematic theory. We find it scattered in his various writings, and we distinguish it as a sort of undertone in all his assertions. Only once is the fundamental proposition of this theory plainly spoken out. In the *Kritik der polit. Oekonomie*, Preface, he says: "The method of production of the material life determines the social, political, and spiritual life-process in general. It is not the consciousness of man that determines his being, but his social existence determines his consciousness."

According to this formula we have a key which explains the most complicated historical events. Suppose we have before us, for example, the "Renaissance." Nothing is easier than to understand it. We need only to know the economic relations of the time, which is not so very difficult. We need only to figure out how many loaves of bread and pounds of meat per year and per capita the men of the Renaissance had to divide among themselves—something that with a little trouble may easily be discovered, as M. Taine did it for the time preceding

the French Revolution—and we have it explained why in this period Aristotle was superseded by Plato, why Raphael and Michael Angelo put in their appearance just at this time, why—in a word—all the countless questions which present themselves to the historian in connection with this tremendous spiritual revolution resolve themselves into more or less difficult examples in arithmetic, all of which work out without a remainder.

And now comes the application which the moderns, Mehring, for example, have given to this play on words, "It is not consciousness that determines the mode of existence, but the mode of existence determines consciousness." In the monograph above cited this latest champion of historical materialism in Germany says: "Precisely the assumption that men are led to eat, drink, and lodge by thought, that by philosophy they are brought to economy, is demonstrably the most arbitrary of premises, and accordingly historical idealism leads to the most miraculous historical combinations" (p. 476). The implication is that the reverse is correct; namely, that through eating, drinking, and lodging men come to thought, through economy they come to philosophy.

The absurdity of this proposition is too evident to require proof. It rests, however, primarily upon the fact that Mehring and the other materialistic historians do not make perfectly clear the notion with which the proposition is concerned. Most assuredly, if it should be asserted that human beings first think and afterwards eat, the meaning being that systematic thought precedes eating, there would be little need of profound speculation to make this view ridiculous. But nobody has ever indulged in such an assertion; no more has anybody asserted that philosophy precedes economy; as a department of literature, philosophy is antecedent, to be sure, but not as a historic social fact.

The thing in point therefore, in the first place, is to determine what is here understood by eating, drinking, and lodging on the one hand, and by thinking on the other. We may

easily conceive of the eating of grass or of wild fruits, of the drinking of water and of lodging in caves without thought—that is, without processes of reasoning with abstract conceptions and ideas. For all this animal instinct, unconscious impulse of self-preservation, is abundantly sufficient. If, however, men eat bread, and drink wine, and live in houses, there must surely have preceded an amount of intensive thought, a process of observation and reflection through a long series of generations; all of which prepared and founded the conditions of complex and purposeful production. Here materialism is of no avail. Thought cannot be eliminated from this process of foundation, any more than it has permitted itself to be supplanted in psychology by philosophical materialism.

The analogy is not far fetched. It has also been attempted to reduce psychology to physiology. Psychical phenomena have been regarded as physiological manifestations, and it has been attempted to confirm this hypothesis by experiments. Nobody has observed, and nobody will observe "how matter thinks;" and from the ranks of the physiologists one of the most eminent has proclaimed, with less world-woe (*Weltschmerz*), it must be confessed, than with complacent defiance, *ignorabimus!*

The "psyche" has not permitted itself to be driven out of psychology, and no human eye has been able to penetrate to the "psyche," no matter how fine the glasses with which it was armed. The same fate awaits also historical materialism—the latest messenger of metaphysical materialism. It will go to pieces because it will never succeed in adducing proof of its declaration that material conditions causally determine spiritual conditions.

As though they anticipate this fortune, the historical materialists contend against acknowledging their derivation from the metaphysician. Thus Mehring declares that *philosophical* materialism regards man merely as an animal; "Historical materialism on the contrary starts with the fact of natural science that man is not an animal merely, but a *social* animal, that he arrives at consciousness only in the community of social combinations

(horde, gens, class) and can live as a conscious being only in them; that *in this way* the material bases of these combinations determine his ideal consciousness, and their progressive development exhibits the advancing principle of progress in humanity" (p. 446). Notice particularly this "in this way," and mark the fallacy. This is precisely the question involved; whether the material conditions have a temporal and logical priority or not. If the former is asserted, we have materialism, bare and raw and unproved, as it has occurred very often in the history of philosophy. It is precisely the same thought when one says, "Stimuli of such and such character upon the brain substance are or produce thought," as when it is said that the material bases and movements of society beget its ideas and ideals. If we have once reached the correct perception that in the former case there can be no assertion of a causal nexus, because it cannot be discovered and proved, we have thereby removed the ground for the subsequent assertion, and the old sciolism about the "social animal" can no longer be of the least assistance.

The only reconciliation to be reached, and the only logically admissible alternative, is a sort of parallelism. This is again the path over which psychology has gone. That certain stimuli of the brain substance produce movements contemporaneous with thought, that these movements and the thought perhaps stand in functional relationship with each other, may be asserted with perfect logical propriety; likewise that certain correlations of the material conditions of society appear contemporaneously with given psychical conditions. This relation is to be asserted, however, only hypothetically and as a proposed principle of interpretation. Such an application of the theory would be not only a serviceable methodological guide, but its content would have actual justification and positive foundation. That historical materialism is merely a serviceable methodological view point dawns upon its champions from time to time. But even in these moments of illumination they overdo the matter in another way. Thus Mehring says: "Historical materialism is no closed and final system of truth, it is only the

scientific method of investigating the process of human development" (p. 450). I am quite ready to let it pass as such. I deny, however, most emphatically that it is entitled to the exclusive character which it claims. It is not *the* scientific method *par excellence*, but *a* scientific method. From the standpoint of the parallelism just referred to, we must hold both materialism and idealism to be one-sided, and thus insufficient. If the history of the process of human development is to be composed into a stereoscopic picture, we must bring both sides into the field of vision and investigate both with equal precision, instead of promoting the one to the rank of cause and degrading the other to the rank of effect.

This, however, is by no means what is done. Thus K. Kautsky, in his *Entstehung des Christentums*,¹ attempts to prove "that the history of classic antiquity is nothing else than the history of the crowding out of communism by private property." Well said, "nothing else!" And in the same spirit Mehring declares, with a definiteness that leaves nothing to be wished: "The human mind is not over but in the historical development of human society; it has grown from, upon and with, material production." (*Er ist aus, an, und mit der materiellen Produktion erwachsen*, p. 451). This is more than a mere method of research; this is a definitive theorem, and more than that, a fundamentally false one. This "*grows from*" is here simply smuggled into the presumption, as though it were not precisely the thing which remains to be proved.

Whether the so-called ideological motives, to use the awkward current terminology, produce the material structure of society or *vice versa*, is just the question in dispute. As was remarked above, this question cannot be settled by an *ex parte* answer. But idealism falls into an error precisely identical with that of materialism. Thus Paul Barth,² when, in attempting to refute historical materialism, he cites the illustration of the rela-

¹ *Neue Zeit*, III, 11, 12, 1885.

² *Die Geschichtsphilosophie Hegels und der Hegelianer bis auf Marx und Hartmann*, Leipzig, 1890.

tion between the Osmanlis and the Magyars, says: "Christianity, attributing higher value to spiritual forces, spurred the Magyars to higher intellectual development, while Islam, having a smaller spiritual content, made the Osmanlis incapable of competition with Christian people" (p. 57). This assertion is historically incorrect and methodologically false. It is in the first place untrue that Christianity attributes higher value than Islam to spiritual forces. With quite as much authority we might assert the contrary. More than that, it is a decided mistake to attempt to explain the entire complexity of the history involved by the one factor of religion. We may easily name numerous Christian peoples who have been under the same religious influence and have still not succeeded in reaching any remarkable degree of culture, either in material or in spiritual respects. That the spiritual content of Christianity promotes and encourages material culture is by no means an impregnable fact as Barth seems to assume. Spanish Catholicism with its highly spiritual content, for example,—the Inquisition and the *auto da fé*,—may be mentioned in qualification. Barth here employs an hypothesis quite as unfounded and unscientific as that of Mehring and Kautsky, when they declare that the rise and progress of Christianity was determined only by the devastating and pauperizing *latifundia* in ancient Rome. This is leaning altogether too much to one side. Such hypotheses, in attempting to explain everything finally, as a rule explain nothing.

According to the foregoing explanation historical materialism reduces to a mere method of investigation, but even in this relation it is far from being all that is necessary; we can by no means allow that it is a comprehensive, well-grounded philosophy of history. A philosophy of history in a comprehensive sense is still in Germany, and elsewhere as well, a demand upon thinkers. A very important attempt to lay the basis of such a philosophy has been made by Georg Simmel.¹ The thing which has been most evidently lacking in the philosophy of history and in thought upon social problems in general is a turn-

¹ *Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie*, Berlin, 1892.

ing of the power of cognition to consideration of itself—a critique and a theory of knowledge. For natural philosophy Kant elaborated the categories which we read into experience, and with the help of which experience becomes possible and intelligible. Simmel makes the attempt to demonstrate in the case of historical experience, and for the knowledge of historical occurrences, the same *a priori* element, which must be given as presumption or major premise in order that understanding and explanation of the historical occurrences, as minor premise, may be possible.

Historical comprehension is nothing else than the reproduction in the mind of the investigator of the psychical conditions fundamental to the historical occurrences. If it were impossible for us to reproduce in ourselves the psychical processes of all historical actors, history would be for us not merely uninteresting but totally incomprehensible. "If there were such a thing," says Simmel, "as a psychology as the science of law, historical science would then be applied psychology, in the same sense in which astronomy is applied mathematics" (p. 2).

In overcoming these difficulties of historical interpretation crass historical materialism is of no assistance. So long as the search is for an explanation of historical occurrences it will be essential for the historian to transport himself, so to speak, into the psychical conditions of the persons or groups whom he depicts. We may add that historical materialism not only does not remove this difficulty in cognitive theory, but rather increases and complicates it. That is, if we assume only one kind of motivation for historical acts and occurrences, as the self-sufficient and universally applicable interpretation, we at last completely defeat comprehension of history. It is not to be denied that historical materialism, with its stereotyped monism and its soulless barrenness, is much less able to sustain criticism than its counterpart idealism, with its abundance of psychical motives and view points.

A further serious difficulty is exposed by a critique of the method of historical knowledge, in the perception that the his-

torical investigator is in danger of interpreting known psychical motives into the phenomena where, it may be, only undetermined motives are manifest; and also the reverse of this process is possible. This is the more important since even in daily observation the boundaries between known and unknown run into each other, and, moreover, what was at first consciously done falls gradually by long practice beneath the threshold of consciousness, whence it still operates by way of limitation and impulse. These two critical requirements are urged by Simmel upon historiography: subjective reproduction by the historian of the unfamiliar psychical conditions; and the obscure, perhaps inevitably obscure, relation between the known and the unknown psychical motives operating in the circumstances studied.

So much for the critique of knowledge. But how about the theory of knowledge? Simmel has not proposed one. He offers only suggestions in that direction, and shows the way that the theory must necessarily take. He even doubts whether it is possible to reach a solution of the problems of cognitive theory which he has proposed. Thus he says with reference to the first point here raised: "This feeling of something which I still do not really feel, this reconstruction of a subjectivity which is again a subjectivity, but at the same time stands objectively over against the former—that is the riddle of historical cognition, for the understanding of which our logical and psychological categories are still much too clumsy instruments" (p. 16).

Nevertheless he attempts to solve this riddle to some extent by a very bold hypothesis. He refers this power of understanding psychical conditions long since experienced to a sort of inheritance. He says in this connection, among other things: "In order to regard this vast domain of comprehension of psychical occurrences not experienced by ourselves as not wholly miraculous, we may consider such intelligence as a kind of consciousness of latent inheritances" (p. 25). This hypothesis would seem to suffice in explanation merely of normal psychical occurrences. Only that which is general and average is usually perpetuated by heredity and propagation. If we have

to do, however, with heroic, or, so to speak, idealized historical personalities, this inheritance hypothesis will only add to our difficulties. The fundamental motive, and the whole mental *habitus* of these supreme representatives—these heroes of crime and virtue—surely did not perpetuate itself by inheritance. When, nevertheless, we understand a Cæsar Borgia, or a Socrates, which we do by reconstruction of their psychic condition, since, as Simmel very rightly claims, there is no other possible way of comprehension, this riddle surely rises to the rank of a miracle. Simmel, however, does not seem to press this thought seriously; he throws it out simply as a conceit which makes no claim to scientific, still less to fundamental, significance.

No more has Simmel spoken a final word with reference to the relations between known and unknown motives in historical interpretation. He is content at this point with calling attention to the problem, and with showing the way which the investigation must take. "A philosophy of history," says he, "should undertake to determine in what cases the historical writer, led by instinct or by reflection, abstracted from the known utilities in the actions of men; it should discover when we must suppose that conscious volition and thought formed the basis of a given occurrence, and when we must abandon such an hypothesis" (p. 13). As method for this investigation Simmel announces empiricism: "The assumption that there was consciousness or unconsciousness behind given physical acts is to be established by enquiring of the historical conceptions, not as they should be, but as they actually were" (p. 14). Whether this path will really lead to the goal must remain undecided. There is room for a good deal of doubt, since in respect to this point the historians themselves, according to their view of the world in general, differ widely from each other. And consequently "historical conceptions as they actually were" are very difficult to determine. A Buckle would surely be inclined to see unknown powers and inevitable natural laws in operation, where a Mommsen would find conscious acts of will.

At all events we may confidently assume that a thinker of the rank of Simmel cannot have failed to perceive how difficult, how almost impossible, is the problem which he has formulated. Psychology is still far from ability to show with sufficient exactness the relation in any case between known and unknown psychical factors. Daily experience shows us that, even in the case of a given concrete occurrence, the actors in which stand before us, it is by no means always possible to prove either conscious or unconscious agency. Countless examples are furnished by the criminal courts, where accountability and consciousness are practically identical ideas. How much more difficult is this then in the case of historical persons and actions. It is the more to be regretted that, in addition to proposing the problems, Simmel did not attempt to indicate their solutions, or at least the points of view, not merely methodological, but also concrete, according to which solutions may be found.

Nevertheless the positive results of Simmel's investigations in this province are still very significant. So far as I know Simmel has here for the first time clearly spoken out the thought that the Kantian principle, according to which the thinker construes experience with his own forms of conception and reflection, is applicable to the psychical sciences, and particularly to history. Here, also, there is an *a priori*, and indeed a richer and more complete one than in the case of natural science, since the *a priori* with which we are now concerned is the whole *ego* of the investigator. "*Psychology is the a priori of historical science*" (p. 33).

This pregnant thought seems to me to render impossible for all time all sorts of naïve objectivism in historical investigation. The historians who emphasize the value of being *impersonal* will never write interesting and intelligible history. Only the chronicler can be "impersonal," and he only to a certain degree. Whoever seeks on the contrary a reasonable and intelligible unity, a correlation in history which may be scientifically comprehended, must in the first place live history over again in order to be able to narrate it. This does not cause historical

research to abandon its objective character any more than the Kantian principle eliminates objectivity from natural science. Reality is no less real from the fact that we grasp it and organize it into unity with our powers of comprehension. Both nature and history are *to us* actual, and they stand over against *us* as objective existences, because *we* recognize them as actual and objective.

Historical materialism will be least of all able to withstand the criticism of knowledge which Simmel proposes. Its fate will be like that of metaphysical materialism under the bludgeon blows of the Kantian criticism. That materialism which in history derives men from conditions, and conditions from conditions, is least of all competent to comprehend history, because it does not approach the investigation of history with the whole equipment of psychology. Let us cite for example the point of view of Marx. With him, as we remarked above, consciousness does not determine our being (*das Sein*), but our being determines consciousness. Very slight reflection will show that upon this assumption historical investigation must become a mere chimera. With our consciousness we must comprehend the consciousness of factors that have manifested themselves in history. That is the task of historical research. Now it is incomprehensible that we, with our consciousness produced by our own present "being," which is different from the "being" of the earlier time in question, can understand the consciousness of historical persons and groups.

The history of humanity must be humanly explained; that is psychologically. The only tool which we possess for this explanation is our "psyche," and it is an absolutely essential presumption that in this explanatory instrument we have the same categories, fundamental forces, and impulses, which existed in historical people. If we repudiate this presumption, however, our own soul is no longer the mirror in which the psychical conditions of historical people are reflected, and history consequently ceases to have for us interest and life.

In the second chapter of the above mentioned book, entitled

"On Historical Laws," Simmel occupies essentially, as in the first chapter, the Kantian standpoint. In this case, again, the question is not so much with reference to a positive theory as with reference to a critique of knowledge. He exposes in the first place the difficulties which the attempt to establish historical laws encounters. This chapter, full of suggestive and fruitful thought, may be briefly summarized as follows: In historiography we are usually accustomed to discriminate normative science from pure narrative. The former is, as a rule, considered the domain of historical philosophy, whose business it is to investigate the laws of historical events and to formulate them, while narrative history is concerned with the mere discovery and registration of the facts. But this discrimination is by no means founded in the nature of the subject. Upon closer examination it will appear that the so-called historical laws are really nothing else than the demonstration of facts, of such facts to be sure as have occurred so and so frequently. The frequent repetition cannot in itself be regarded as a criterion of regularity. Law involves the claim of applicability always and everywhere, and precisely this is not demonstrated in concrete historical occurrences.

Still further: natural law posits any given phenomenon behind which a force is hidden, as cause, from which some other phenomenon must necessarily follow; in history, on the contrary, we see only effects and infer from them producing causes. This kind of conclusion produces in itself no full and complete certainty and is highly unfit to establish "laws." To this must be added that in nature the relation between cause and effect is much simpler and more immediate than in history, where the phenomena are invariably results of various causes in conjunction, and on that account are by no means to be derived each from a single natural law (p. 45). Summing up all this the conclusion is that "historical laws" can by no means reach the rank of knowledge that is complete and secure against all criticisms. At the same time this is not to deny to them all value as knowledge. Their value consists rather in this, that the formulation of historical

laws in the present state of the historical sciences is a preparation for more exact research. Such is and has been the case with all sciences. "Metaphysics" first furnishes general theorems and principles, which do not touch the individual case but rather, as preliminary combinations of the typical phenomena, orient and promote research. The historiography of our time is in this stage of preparation, and "historical laws" are its metaphysic, from which science is called to proceed toward greater exactness. In this sense Simmel understands the generally current principle that the formulation of laws is the task of the philosophy of history.

I must admit that I neither feel the same objections to "historical laws" which Simmel raises, nor am I entirely satisfied with the result at which his investigations arrive. In the first place I cannot see that historical laws are in so much worse plight than natural laws. All uncertainty which attaches itself to historical laws is also the lot of natural laws, yes of all causality. The only escape from the confusion of Hume's theory of knowledge is after all Kant's idea that we import causality into things. *We* are entitled to the conclusion *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. Now every law reduces finally to a causal relation. This is so according to Simmel's definition, which regards a law as a "formula in accordance with which the appearance of certain facts necessarily—that is always and everywhere—has the appearance of certain other facts for a consequence" (p. 34). This is simply another way of expressing the demonstration that A and B stand to each other in a causal connection.

The parenthetic "always and everywhere" should by no means frighten us, because it always presupposes that the cause operates freely without any interference whatever. The physical law of the "free fall," for example, is merely an abstraction, because it applies only under the supposition of a vacuum, which we have really never observed. Every natural law reckons with obstructions and interferences and must consequently be formulated with many "ifs." Historical laws are similar abstractions

in the formulation of condition, and the greater or less complexity or variation of the individual case from the rule is no impeachment of their theoretical validity.

Nor can it be so serious a matter for historiography that historical laws are derived by inference from the effect to the cause. The same thing would be primarily the case with the student of natural science. Newton sees the apple fall to the ground—that is an effect, and he refers it to gravitation, that is to the cause.

Simmel does not directly emphasize the peculiar advantage of natural science, namely, experiment. Science can produce the cause and can directly observe the emergence of the effect from it. It goes without saying that this is an advantage which cannot be too highly estimated. It might, however, be said that there is some compensation for this advantage in the psychical sciences, inasmuch as the observer can reproduce in himself various psychic conditions which are regarded as causes. This is also a sort of experiment, though somewhat less reliable.

Nor can I with Simmel regard normative history, even as it is today written, merely as a preparatory and transitional stage like metaphysics. In my judgment the metaphysical stage in history is already passed. It lasted so long as men assumed divine Providence as the one principle from which to derive all historical occurrences. Since, however, in recent times we call in the various sciences such as ethnology, sociology, psychology, anthropology, and so forth, to explain separate facts as well as the totality of historical evolution, historiography may with right claim a high degree of exactitude, in spite of all theoretical difficulties which are in reality common to all departments of knowledge.

I admit, to be sure, that in this connection historical materialism is a return to metaphysics, in the sense that it erects a single invariable principle from which all history is made to proceed. That materialism has quite as much metaphysics in it as idealism has been long understood. So far as the theory of knowledge is concerned it is a matter of entire indifference whether divine

Providence or material conditions be anthropomorphized as the factors exclusively operating in history. A philosophy of history which is either materialistic or idealistic will be judged by a critique of knowledge in precisely the same way as the corresponding systems of natural philosophy. The very dilemma—materialism or idealism—savours of metaphysics; that is, the metaphysical character of present-day historiography is not the fault of the “historical laws,” but it comes from the principles from which they are derived, from the monism in which it is attempted to make them converge.

This judgment applies also to the latest attempt of Rudolf Staummler to found a philosophy of history upon the basis of idealism.¹

Staummler's book, the size of which is out of all proportion to its contents, starts from the standpoint of historical materialism. This philosophy, says Staummler, makes the rightful attempt to comprehend social life monistically. “Its principle takes this direction: that the whole of the social life of men is a unity to be scientifically understood according to mechanical laws” (p. 72). To which we reply that if the proposed aim is worth choosing the way selected by materialism does not lead to it.

The fundamental principle of historical materialism—that economics is the basis upon which law erects itself as superstructure—is false. Economics and law are inseparably connected with each other, like substance and form. “Social life is externally regulated association of human beings” (p. 90). This external regulation—law—is the *form* of social life, the *substance* of which is “human coöperation direction toward the satisfaction of desire” (p. 137). Karl Marx's picture of the foundation and the superstructure is consequently faulty. We can speak of economy in the social sense only when it is carried on under a certain legal order. Nowhere does the one stand above the other, nor is the one produced by the other. That a

¹ *Wirtschaft und Recht, nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung. Eine sozialphilosophische Untersuchung*, Leipzig, 1896.

technical modification in economics requires a modification in the legal order is regarded by Staummler as an erroneous conclusion. On the contrary, technical invention and improvements can get a definite character and be applied in economics only in accordance with the legal order which anticipates it. Consequently not "material" economics but "ideal" law is, so to speak, the *Ding an sich* of social life.

The social materialist finds a "social conflict" wherever law and economics come into opposition. In Staummler's view "a social conflict is in existence when the social phenomena that occur in a human community oppose the final purpose of the law under which the community lives" (p. 411). This final purpose is "the community of free-willing men," by which term is to be understood men "willing general purposes."

Staummler's style is so diffuse and obscure that it is extremely difficult to shell out the real kernel of his doctrine. This much, however, is clear, that Staummler wants to found a monistic system of historical philosophy along the lines of idealism. The ethical ideal is the fundamental force which produces the development of human history, and toward the highest possible realization of which history tends. Nothing but warmed-over metaphysics! In the criticism, however, which Staummler aims at historical materialism he has almost invariably been correct. He says very truly that the historical materialist "in strict logical consistency must deny the existence of social life in its essential peculiarity" (p. 453). If social life is entirely under mechanical laws it is both impossible and unnecessary for social scientists to create for themselves a peculiar domain.¹

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¹ Translated by ALBION W. SMALL.

(To be continued.)

PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC CHARITY AND OF PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY IN GERMANY.¹

I.

IN 1893 poor relief in the city of Hamburg was completely reorganized. In this reorganization, for whose conduct I was called thither, an attempt was made to take cognizance of all more modern methods and recent experience in charity work. It is therefore with pleasure that I comply with the request of the editor of the JOURNAL for a report on the system of poor relief and private philanthropy in use in Hamburg. A careful consideration convinced me, however, that the scope of the present paper would be too narrow if confined to a presentation of the recent changes in poor relief at Hamburg. The German who attempts to write on German poor relief for American readers finds himself involuntarily comparing his own with American methods with which we have become acquainted not only through the writings of theorists, but also through numerous reports and statistics. I do not hesitate to say that the science of charity work has been materially advanced by these more recent publications on American charities so far as they bring out and discuss the general principles underlying charity and philanthropy. Moreover, they serve to strengthen our conviction that all theoretical investigations based on a large practical experience must lead to the same conclusions, at least in all essential points, and it is a matter of indifference whether this experience is gained in England or in America, in Germany or in France. We are not dealing with an empty phrase when we speak of universal principles, founded, not upon territorial and local customs and conditions, but on human nature; though a considerable importance does, of course, attach to these customs and conditions.

¹ Translated for the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY by O. E. WIELAND.

It will depend largely upon the form of government of a community and upon the degree of self-government whether the public charities are to be administered by a system of honor officers or whether salaried officials will be required; and the quality of these same organs must determine whether the system of outdoor or indoor relief shall be preferred in public assistance. The mediæval view, which regarded philanthropy as a mode of penance done for the safety of one's own soul, leads to a relation between the benefactor and the recipient entirely different from charity work directed from the point of view of the police department or that carried on from purely philanthropic motives. The characteristics of a population, the kinds of industry carried on, the geographical position, inland or on the coast, the predominance of rural or urban work, etc., all have a decided influence upon the administration of charities. But it cannot be doubted that each system of poor relief, wherever practiced, will produce the same social and economic results. Whenever a workhouse under energetic management has superseded the system of outdoor relief in consequence of the abuse of outdoor relief, the result has invariably been a decided falling off in the number of paupers. This may be verified by statistics not only from England and America, but from Germany as well. Carelessness in the treatment of deserted children, as we find it in France in the early part of the present century, at the time of the so-called *tours*, resulted in an incredible increase in the number of desertions and strongly encouraged immorality and thoughtlessness in the matter of reproduction. The same fact was observed in Italy, in Spain, in England, and in Germany under similar institutions. Human nature has shown a decided tendency to accept services and favors rendered *gratis*, reluctantly at first, then more boldly and without any sense of shame. This holds true especially when the service is rendered by the state or the community so that no particular individual can be looked upon as the benefactor. The same fact has been observed in times of great public calamity, distress and need (arising from floods, epidemics, etc.), when a public fund or store has been

distributed, not carefully and in accordance with the needs of the individual, but lavishly and without regard to anything save the liberal collection of supplies.

The excellent observations of Warner¹ concerning the causes of poverty, the best means of its prevention, the treatment of tramps, concerning the best methods of uniting public and private charities, are in perfect agreement with the views which the great German organization, "Verein für Armenpflege und Wohlthätigkeit," has been attempting to diffuse for years. In all those publications of the latter part of the eighteenth century, which are of particular importance in our field, especially in the standard work of Gerando and in the publications of the London charity organization society, we find everywhere the same principles of benevolence, the same opinions in regard to the influence of philanthropy upon the benefactor and the recipient.

Modern methods of trade and commerce, the growth of the press, the large number of students constantly in attendance at foreign universities have wonderfully facilitated the interchange of ideas and experiences. Yet even in the reports from smaller communities and distant localities, where the leaders in poor relief and philanthropic work are certainly not men of thorough theoretical training, one is constantly struck by the fact that there are very exact general laws underlying every form of charity and that these laws have found more or less correct expression in the legislation and literature of all civilized countries.

To speak of the American and English "workhouse system" and of the German "Elberfeld system" as of different methods of poor relief seems, at first thought, in contradiction to our last statement. But the discrepancy is only a seeming one; in reality both systems are based upon the same fundamental conception; the principle of the workhouse, on the one hand, is sacrificed to a considerable degree in favor of outdoor relief, the latter in its turn yields the former a place in its system. Whether the one or the other system shall be given preference in a given community depends very much more on historical development

¹ WARNER, *American Charities*.

and the available administrative machinery, than upon any radical differences of opinion in regard to poor relief and philanthropy. The Elberfeld system will prove, on closer examination, to be not an arbitrary one, the sudden invention of a shrewd brain; in the main it is a renewal of principles which were actually practiced by the primitive church, which are clearly expressed in the poor regulations of the time of the Reformation, and which, toward the close of the eighteenth century, were again unearthed and given universal recognition. It is merely because Elberfeld revived these sound fundamental principles, after a period of mismanagement, and applied them with such remarkable success that we speak of the Elberfeld system as a new acquisition and as being, *per se*, the correct and proper system of present-day poor relief. The first of these fundamental principles is that poor relief must be individualized, *i. e.*, the aid given to each person must correspond in its character, its amount, etc., to the peculiar needs of the individual. This of itself implies the further principle, that, in order to be practical, poor relief must be a personal transaction from man to man. Any system which attempts to treat all exactly alike must be rejected. This again forbids receiving all applicants, without distinction, into almshouses, or taking children into nurseries without a careful examination of all circumstances connected with the case, or giving aid to unknown persons, or treating the able-bodied and those incapable of work exactly alike. The first and greatest result of the adoption of this principle of individualization was that those practicing charity in any form learned to adapt their gift to the circumstance of a particular case; to give work instead of money, or refuge and care in an institution in preference to work; or, where the circumstances of the case required it, even to mete out punishment instead of aid. This again made it necessary for the system to demand that before the nature and the amount of the aid were decided upon, the condition and circumstances of the applicant should be carefully examined by impartial and disinterested persons. If Elberfeld and other German communities were able to find among their citizens men to

whom the duty of such examination and the administration of charities could be entrusted, by a system of honor offices, this fact is to be attributed to certain peculiar characteristics of the life of the German community.

The principle of self-government has, it is true, been more fully worked out in England and, especially, in America. But there it is far more connected with politics and with private enterprise, so that in the matter of administration of the charities, requiring as it does an unusual amount of independence and impartiality, the advisability of a system of honor offices seemed very questionable. For this very reason, however, private philanthropy was developed to such an extent that (particularly in America) the state and the community are relieved of a great many burdens which in Germany they have to bear. And that is why England has been able to employ the workhouse system much more freely and unhesitatingly; for outdoor relief, especially the care of widows and orphans, is exercised quite generally by private individuals, while in Germany this rests to a greater extent on the community. But—and here we return to our starting point—this by no means alters the nature of the problems or the principles recognized as fundamental and essential for their solution. In the English Reform Act of 1834 there was recognized as fully as at Elberfeld the fact that above all things a thorough examination of each individual case was necessary; the only difference lies in the fact that they (the English), on account of the abuses of outdoor relief, felt justified in putting it down as a general principle that the best means of testing the individual case was the workhouse; for they argued that those who were really in need would gladly accept its help, while an impostor would shrink from the inconveniences and personal limitations enjoined by the life in such an institution. The truth of this claim has now been so fully demonstrated that, even in Germany, all those versed in the subject desire to give the workhouse principle a trial, so far as such a test of each case is at all necessary. The test is not needed where every suspicion of deception or of fear of work is precluded, as, for

instance, in the case of weak or sick persons, or widows with a number of children, or orphans, etc.; it becomes a necessity, however, when we are dealing with able-bodied men, whose willingness to work it is extremely difficult to ascertain outside of such an institution. The error of England and America in the application of this principle lies only in the fact that it has been made somewhat too general; all sorts and classes of people are received in the workhouse without distinction. But in both these countries this danger is met in a most happy manner, viz., by the founding of special institutions and homes for the sick, the imbecile, and for children, and (largely through private philanthropy) also for the aged, for widows and orphans. In this way the range of the inmates of the workhouse is limited. But there is yet another respect in which this relation of public and private charities is of importance to the development of poor relief in general. Naturally enough the state and the community will not undertake a branch of poor relief which is already fully provided for by private effort; this is very generally true of the work for children in Germany. And yet it makes no small difference whether a particular branch of poor relief is cared for by public organs or depends entirely upon the uncontrolled charity of private individuals.

The difference is to be found not so much in the results of a public and a private charity, as in the motives, and in the difference which exists between public and private institutions in general. In themselves the various arrangements are all alike; the dollar received through a public charity looks exactly like that given by a private individual; the bed in a public hospital does not differ from that in a private institution, except that the furnishings in a private institution, such as the "Girard College," are likely to be far more elegant than those of a public institution can ever be. In France and Italy, as well as in Alsace-Lorraine, the so-called voluntary system is in vogue, *i. e.*, poor relief is not enjoined upon the state by law; and yet the state and the community do very much; for the private charities of the *bureaux de bienfaisance* are by no means able to meet the

needs, and but for the assistance of the public authorities in poor relief actual loss of life, physical destruction of the inhabitants, must result, a condition which the state could never tolerate. In France the departments, together with the state on the one hand, and with the commune on the other, are legally responsible for the care of the infirm, the feeble-minded, and the children.

In America the expenditure of the states for public relief exceeds a hundred million dollars, a sum so vast that one would be led to suppose that public charities were predominant. In states like Germany, on the other hand, where the law requires public relief, the financial condition of a great many communities is such that they cannot begin to fulfill this legal requirement; they can meet it only in the most inadequate manner. In such cases the principle of the workhouse is naturally employed without any further consideration, and everyone who is dependent on the community for housing is packed, entirely regardless of age or sex, into a rural poorhouse which frequently falls very far short of even the most modest demands. Here the poorhouse is certainly a most severe test; for surely no human being would enter it unless forced by the direst distress. The great difference between the poor relief of rural districts and that of the city leads to the same results as in all other countries; the poor and the aged, as well as vagrants and beggars, tend to concentrate in large cities, where the resources at the command of charity are incomparably greater and much more freely distributed. Where public relief is wanting, as in the Latin countries, the deficiency is generally balanced by ecclesiastical orders and societies. It is extremely difficult to get a financial estimate of the work of such organizations, but no doubt it is very considerable. Wherever the civil commune has succeeded to the church in the matter of poor relief, as in Germany, the efforts of the church in this direction have fallen off very markedly, except where special endowments were available.

Our discussion thus far shows that we may justly speak of fixed laws and principles in poor relief and philanthropy, and

that the question is merely one of the proper adaptation and application of these laws to a local environment, due consideration being given to historical development and to actual conditions. The means of this adaptation are always to be sought in the right kind of organization. This is a matter of such great importance that, in judging of the real worth of a charity or a system of charities, the content of the poor laws and the means at disposal are only second or third-class criteria; a judgment of the worth of a charity must be based first and above all on the nature and character of the organization which dispenses that charity. A good organization, which establishes the proper relation between donor and recipient and judiciously combines public relief and private philanthropy, can produce far better results with only moderate means and in spite of entirely inadequate legislation than can ever be effected by a poor organization even with the most perfect laws and the most abundant resources; for neglect of and disregard for the laws and a squandering of resources must invariably result from poor organization.

In the light of these facts the following pages should be interpreted; in them it is our purpose to give a brief description of that form of organization which, in Germany, is regarded as the most effectual and most judicious at the present time.

II.

In order to understand German poor relief we must call to mind the fact that throughout Germany, with the exception of Alsace-Lorraine, the care for the poor is made a legal obligation. This obligation is enjoined upon communes, municipalities, and communal corporations in such a way that no person, whether he be a German or a foreigner, shall, in the hour of need, be without appropriate and suitable aid, wherever he may be. Every commune, therefore, has its organization for poor relief (*Armenverband*) which must furnish appropriate aid, without any regard to the political or civil connections of the recipient. In order that this duty may not become too heavy a burden upon those localities where the poor and needy are wont to concentrate, the

law requires that the community granting the aid shall be reimbursed by that commune in which the recipient (if he have wife and family with him) has last been in continuous residence for a period of two years. If he has not been in continuous residence anywhere for that length of time, or if more than two years have passed since he left a community, a larger district—state, province, or county (*Kreis*)—to which the recipient may belong politically is made responsible for the aid he receives. Assistance granted to foreigners invariably falls back upon the state. This system of reimbursement, it must be distinctly understood, is merely a financial measure for the purpose of equalizing the burdens of poor relief among the several communities; it does not give to the poor any legal right to claim the aid of a district. Whether, in any individual case, aid is really necessary, and of what kind, and in what amount,—all of these questions are decided by the authorities in whose district the applicant is living. Complaint because of the refusal of aid can be registered only with the officers of the association, not in a court of law.

In view of the great variety of organizations for poor relief, the poor laws are content to make one general requirement, viz., that aid is to be granted in case of need, within the range of necessity. Details as to plan of work, organization, etc., are left for the province or the community to decide. In what manner the work is to be carried on must, as we have pointed out above, be determined by local conditions such as the wealth of the church and ecclesiastical orders, the wealth of the community at large, the extent of the population, and the administrative system underlying the work. In smaller communities and less densely populated localities, where the entire field can be easily surveyed, a moderate fund is raised for charitable purposes, the dispensation being left entirely in the hands of a salaried official (mayor or alderman). Occasionally we find a community possessing such liberal endowments that public relief is hardly necessary. In the poorer rural districts people generally prefer to furnish their dependents provisions and necessities of life,

while they give them a home in the poorhouse. In medium-sized places (cities of 20,000–100,000), however, as well as in large cities (of over 100,000 inhabitants), a particular organization becomes necessary, which is generally quite separate from the strictly administrative machinery, and is met with under such names as *Armenverwaltung*, *Armendirection*, *Armenbehörde*, and the like. Among the latter we may distinguish three principal methods. First: the director of the *Armenverwaltung*, generally the mayor or some other member of the local administration, examines, usually through paid officials, every application for aid; these officials report on the case and thus reach a decision. This is now the least common method, all more important relief authorities having dropped it. Second: the administrative board has a number of unpaid assistants; to each of these is assigned one or two small districts, within which he is to examine carefully all cases of poverty and distress that may occur; his findings he reports to the board, usually with some suggestion or recommendation as to the kind of aid to be granted; the decision of this matter, however, rests with the board. Third: the board has the entire business management in its hands; the individual cases are divided among a number of honor offices; the holders of these offices not only examine and report on cases in their charge, but also determine what relief measures are to be employed, and, if the case does not require hospital care or removal to an institution, they even apply the remedy themselves and assume a sort of guardianship over the dependents during the time they receive aid. This is the method now most generally in use; it is based on the principle of the Elberfeld system, that the unpaid official must be held responsible for the resources which the community places at his disposal for the work. Following the example of Elberfeld, nearly all the cities of the Rhine have adopted this system, while many other large cities have reestablished or revived it, as Hamburg did. The old charity system of the city of Hamburg, superseded in 1893 by the present one, was organized by Büsch and Voigt at the end of the eighteenth century, and was received, at the time,

with a great deal of well-deserved admiration. It was based on entirely similar principles.

The fundamental principle of the Elberfeld system might also be expressed thus: thorough examination of each individual dependent, continued careful guardianship during the period of dependence, and constant effort to help him regain economic independence. But these requirements can be fulfilled only through the assistance and coöperation of a sufficient number of well-qualified persons. And the great results the Elberfeld system has attained must be attributed largely to its success in regulating and keeping alive this coöperation. The first experiments along this line were made at the beginning of this century in the form of an organization of municipal charities, including all religious denominations; its purpose was in the first place to check indiscriminate almsgiving, thus relieving the great evil of mendicity, and at the same time to take the place of ecclesiastical poor relief, which no longer sufficed. Here, already, the principle of thorough examination, careful guardianship, and continued assistance was established. But in practical administration the greatest difficulty was experienced because of the small number of helpers at command and their insufficient organization. Then the number of helpers was increased, they were divided among the local districts, and their duties defined as those we have indicated. But the successful working of this arrangement was again curtailed and hampered by the fact that the helpers remained mere investigators and reporters, the decision as to manner and amount of the aid to be granted still remaining in the hands of the supervising board. The evils which it was intended to combat were not remedied, the poor taxes increased, the number of beggars was on the increase, and the ideas of the poor regulations were not carried out. It remained for a citizen of Elberfeld to discover the proper method, establishing the personal responsibility of the helpers. Thus a great advance was made toward the solution of one of the most important problems of poor relief, viz., the proper relation between donor and recipient. In this spirit the reorganization was

effected, at Elberfeld, in 1852. We recognize in the reorganization three points of importance: (a) individualization, (b) the helpers have a voice in the determination of means, etc., (c) decentralization. The first is attained by a division of the entire city into quarters, such that each shall not contain more than four dependents (individuals or heads of families), and the placing of each quarter under the supervision of a helper. The helper (*Armenpfleger*) is the chief organ of poor relief; it is his duty to visit the poor of his quarter at regular intervals, to keep himself constantly informed as to their circumstances, and to exert an educational and refining influence over them and their families. He is to be their friend and adviser, and is to insist on discipline and order. Ill-disposed and lazy persons it is their duty to report to the authorities for legal prosecution. The arrangement which gives the helpers the decision as to manner and amount of the aid is this: the quarters are grouped into circuits or districts; the helpers of a circuit have regular meetings for the purpose of discussing the work, taking counsel, and deciding on the amount, the kind, and duration of the assistance to be given. At the head of each such circuit there is a superintendent or inspector (*Vorsteher*) who presides over and directs the proceedings of the circuit and negotiates between the helpers and the central board. The central administrative board (*Hauptverwaltung*) is composed of a representative of the city administration (*Stadtverwaltung*) and of members of the city council. It has in charge the general direction of poor relief, the control of the decisions and resolutions of the circuits, the making of general regulations affecting all quarters, the supervision of institutional and hospital relief, etc. Moreover, it is the duty of this central board to search out the causes of poverty, to acquaint itself with the conditions of the poorer classes, to prepare and direct measures of a general nature, to see that the means at disposal are wisely used—in short, to attend to everything not directly connected with passing upon the individual case. Their control over the proceedings of the circuit, therefore, does not imply a suspicious scrutinizing of

each individual case, but is merely to give them an opportunity to see, in a general way, that the principles laid down in the poor laws are being carried out. The validity of the decisions of the circuit is not dependent on the approval of the board.

With the single exception of the chairman of the general board, who usually belongs to the higher class of salaried municipal officials, all the offices, those of the board, the superintendents, and the helpers, are purely honor offices. The members of the general board are chosen by the municipal council, the remaining officials by the board; and all are obliged to perform the duties of their respective offices without any remuneration. This is in accord with the entire system of German self-government, which makes a large number of offices purely honorary; especially is this true of their system of poor relief. And the peculiarity of this latter system is that, contrary to the custom of other forms of self-government, the offices are not limited to persons who have already won the greatest respect of their community, or who are made prominent by reason of wealth or social position, or who may have leisure to attend to the duties of an honor office. Here we find, on the contrary, that all classes of citizens are drawn into the service, and that a special effort is made to enlist the citizens of modest means, the tradesman, the mechanic, and the better class of laborers as helpers. Experience has proved beyond a doubt, that circuits made up entirely of helpers from the upper classes distribute their funds far more lavishly than those composed of helpers of all classes, and that helpers drawn from the upper classes too easily lose their sympathy with their wards, from whom they are socially too far removed. Moreover, both at Elberfeld and in other cities, it has become a tacitly accepted custom that the office of a helper in the poor relief is the first round in the ladder of municipal honor offices; and no one can reach the upper, more highly esteemed positions, who does not begin on the bottom round.

The machinery we have thus described is complemented by a thoroughly organized, well-regulated business management.

This is composed of a number of salaried officials forming a division of the general board, whose work supplements, in a variety of ways, that of the honor offices. It is their duty to gather statistics concerning each individual receiving aid, to collect these statistics in books and papers, so that they will be easily accessible to anyone desiring information concerning a particular person. It is also its duty to examine the proceedings of the circuits, and to bring to the notice of the general board any faults that may be discovered, etc. The object of all this, however, is not to control or direct the work of the helpers, but to supplement it; but without this union and supervision and mediatory interposition there would be no decentralization, but the exact opposite; for the independence of the several circuits would lead to entire arbitrariness, to a dangerous inequality, and the system would be lost. Finally, it may be added that the work of all these offices, the general board, the superintendents, the helpers, and the business management, must be carefully regulated by wise poor laws and by instructions. These must furnish a good, reliable guide to a judicious performance of duty, without curtailing in the least the freedom of decision in a particular case. The value of good directions can never be overestimated. Lack of them and dependence upon the good sense and good will of the various officials may entirely frustrate the accomplishment of the desired results. To draw up proper regulations and directions, without going too much into minute details, and to carefully adapt them to a local environment will always be the most important part of the preparation for a reform of poor relief.

The fact brought out in the first division of this article, viz., that there are certain general fixed laws governing poor relief, which should be applied under all circumstances, is to be considered in the light of what we have just said at the close of the preceding division in regard to the adaptation of these laws. Nothing could be more senseless than to attempt to introduce the Elberfeld system, without making material changes in it, into all communes, even into all German com-

munes. To begin with, there is a vast difference between the sizes of the several communes. A measure that would be wise in a city of even 100,000 inhabitants might not be a success in Berlin, with nearly two millions of people in the city and suburbs. Hamburg, with its 600,000, occupies a position between the two; likewise Dresden, Leipsic, Munich and other cities. Besides this the class, the kind of population, makes a very material difference. While Elberfeld has, on the whole, a settled population, composed largely of skilled laborers, the surrounding districts, with their mining and manufacturing industries, are inhabited by a very fluctuating population which makes vastly different demands upon relief work. The agricultural East has quite other needs in this line than the industrial West. Wherever the growth of our modern cities creates special labor districts, where a single house often shelters a whole population of paupers, the Elberfeld quarter system cannot work; moreover it would be very difficult to find a sufficient number of helpers in such a district, and the fundamental idea of the Elberfeld system, that of maintaining friendly, neighborly relations between the helper and fellow-men, is almost entirely lost; for the constantly shifting population renders the establishing of such relations well-nigh impossible. On the other hand the system of administration is of importance. Where all or nearly all the officers are salaried and, as a consequence, the work tends to become formal and methodical, it should be quickened by the institution of honor offices. Where, as in Hamburg—and in this respect Hamburg probably comes nearer the American form of government than any other German city—the local government has for centuries controlled all public offices, and has never paid any of its poor relief officials except the lowest clerks,—here it was found necessary to add a number of more highly trained officials. Perhaps it is for this very reason that the Hamburg reforms excited a considerable interest in America, because it not only attempts an appropriate reform of the general system of poor relief, but also seeks to harmonize the work of the professional (salaried) officers

and that of the honor offices, and to supplement the one by the other.

The deficiency of the Hamburg poor relief arose mainly from the fact that the relief work had not kept pace with the growth of the city; the boundaries of the old quarters remained unchanged, while the number of helpers was not increased. The result was that a single helper, as a rule, had from 20 to 30 cases in charge; in some districts the number ran as high as 40-50, and in a few even to 70-80. It will be readily seen that one who undertakes the duties of a helper besides his regular business or trade cannot give 40 or even 20 persons or families sufficient attention to thoroughly understand and constantly oversee their circumstances, to say nothing of his being their friend and adviser and performing the most important social function, that of a helper. And as a matter of fact the work of the helper had, with a few praiseworthy exceptions, become limited to the receiving of applications for assistance and a more or less careful examination at the time of the granting of the first aid. But then the aid once granted was usually paid year after year, without a renewed investigation; and in the first year after the reorganization it was found upon investigation that in nearly 5000 of the 9-10,000 cases then receiving aid the assistance was no longer necessary at all. The principal type of this class were widows with several children. At the time of the death of their husbands they were, indeed, entirely helpless; but after a lapse of some ten years, during which their children had grown up, they were very well able to support themselves without any assistance whatever, and in some of these cases the joint earnings of several children living with their mother were found to exceed considerably the income of the better class of laborers. Another respect in which the old system of Hamburg was deficient was this: the record and such other material were not collected at one central office. The result was that as soon as an indigent pauper became reasonably well known in one part of the city and was no longer believed to be in need of support, all he had to do was to move to

another part of the city, there to receive aid again, instead of being legally prosecuted. In addition to this the superintendent of the circuit was overburdened with a lot of unnecessary clerical work, which would have been far better done by professionals. All this led to a falling apart of the several circuits, to dissimilarity and inequality in the application of the poor laws, carelessness and lack of control in the business management, and together with these all of the other evils which are wont to result from careless and planless charity: money was often squandered on people who were either unworthy or not in need; worthy poor, who were too backward to apply to the independent helpers for aid, were neglected; poor judgment was often shown in giving money instead of provisions, or alms instead of work, or in supporting the parents instead of placing their child in an orphanage or other institution, etc. Spite of all this it must be said that in Hamburg the system of honor offices rests upon such venerable traditions that the sense of responsibility, in many cases, was very strong, and the abuses were not nearly so great nor so numerous as might have been expected. Nevertheless the grievances were sufficient to convince all judicious minds of the absolute necessity of a thorough, energetic reform. This view was very materially advanced by the publications and assemblies of the German Society for Poor Relief and Philanthropy, which, like the National Conference of Charities and Correction, seeks to disseminate correct principles of poor relief and philanthropy.

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(To be continued.)

REVIEWS.

Une Vue d' Ensemble de la Question Sociale; le Problème, la Méthode. By LOUIS WUARIN. Paris: L. Larose. Pp. 266. Fr. 3.50.

THIS compact little volume is full of mature and available wisdom about everyday phases of social questions. Professor Wuarin writes not as a closet philosopher but from close touch with affairs, and his book has the flavor of personal experience and experiment. He summarizes the history of "the social question," and then shows that it is a problem of more than one unknown quantity. The third part of the book is a discussion of method—not of abstract theorizing about the social question, but of reaching conclusions about what to do in the portion of the problem in which one may be a possible factor. A fourth part discusses "obstacles in social economy," viz., politics, polemic processes, the social environment, prostitution, religion, sentimentality, irreligion, social Darwinism, professional whims, dilettantism, political economy. The whole treatment is judicial, and while no strikingly fresh views are presented, the book is a distinct contribution to the reference literature of social reform.

ALBION W. SMALL.

Conscience et Volonté Sociales. By J. NOVICOW. Bibliothèque sociologique internationale. No. VI. Paris: V. Giard et E. Brière. Pp. 381. Broché 6 fr.

THIS book will both amuse and instruct American readers. It pushes analysis in social psychology into details which even Schaeffle has left practically unnoticed, but it urges some special conclusions about social structure with a seriousness which democrats will hardly be able to share. M. Novicow frankly admires British aristocracy as an institution. He believes that a glorified British aristocracy is essential to the highest social attainment, and he finds conclusive reasons for his creed in the *organic concept of society!* Our faith in the

"organic concept" would hardly be equal to the strain if it actually did sanction such deductions. Happily the "organic concept" and British aristocracy have no more relation to each other than the world order has to any other accident of human institutions.

Apart from this fantasy, which does not affect the substance of the argument, the book is suggestive and helpful. It expounds facts of social consciousness in a way which very fairly covers the territory of social psychology. It is objective and concrete in treatment. It finds its phenomena not in prehistoric times but chiefly in the modern world. Tammany Hall, and President Cleveland's Venezuela message furnish illustrations, and the presence of such material makes the book seem to be dealing with reality much more than is usually the case with works upon like subjects. I should say that this is the most important of M. Novicow's works, and I place it confidently in the list of books with which every sociologist must become familiar.

ALBION W. SMALL.

Théories Modernes sur les Origines de la Famille, de la Société et de l'État. Par ADOLPHE POSADA. Translated from the Spanish by F. de Zeltner. Paris: V. Giard et E. Brière.

THIS work presents a very clear and concise survey of the modern researches, opinions, and speculations in respect to the prehistoric forms of the family and regulative institutions. The author starts from the principles assumed by all schools. Man is not the only social being, and the study of animal societies furnishes materials for a clearer conception of human associations. The psychology of primitive man must be studied in order to comprehend the remains of his institutions. The data for such study are gathered from relations of travelers, ancient laws and usages, myths, traditions, and archæological remains. All society begins with barbarous conditions. All races have something in common at the same stage of evolution. Degenerate races disappear; progressive races survive. There are fundamental analogies between primitive man and modern savages. Truth is reached from a rational interpretation of phenomena, not from mere historical description. Upon the basis of these principles the various theories of the origin of households and political organization are discussed.

The theory of the patriarchy, as held by Maine, is first analyzed.

Blood relationship, real or fictitious, is here regarded as the basis of community life. Political organization grows out of the settlement on a certain territory, and the bond of neighborhood interests takes the place of consanguinity.

Opposed to the theory of the patriarchy is the general tendency represented by Bachofen, McLennan, and Morgan. With various differences these agree that at a certain stage women were dominant in society. They differ in respect to the prevalence of monogamy, polygamy, and promiscuity, in the conditions anterior to the patriarchy. Bachofen depends for his proofs upon myths. Poetry reflects the laws of life. Religion is an early motive of conduct. Sexual impulses are the dominant factor in savage life. Social evolution is produced by the interests of consanguine groups.

McLennan relies upon symbols. For example, the contemporary playful imitation of capture in marriage ceremonies points backward to a universal custom of securing a wife by violence. Primitive men did not live in families, but in groups distinguished by a totem. Intercourse of the sexes was promiscuous and unregulated. Blood relation was the only social bond, and political society did not exist.

The socialists have used the data furnished by Morgan as the basis for a "materialistic" theory of history. According to this view the consanguineous bond was followed by the tie of economic interest. Morgan explains the origin of the gens and the tribe. His studies of Indian and Hawaiian people led him to construct a series of family forms based on nomenclature: Promiscuity; Punaluan family (where brothers are excluded from marriage with sisters); Syndiasmic family (community save in sexual relations); patriarchal; monogamic.

Giraud-Teulon rendered a valuable service by summing up the various theories, and by showing how they are reciprocally complementary. Posada offers his own summary of the tendency represented by Bachofen and his followers. Humanity proceeds from hordes which have no regular bond; these groups produce tribes, phratries, gentes, clans, and, finally, the family; the chief socializing agency is the sexual instinct, and the mother is the chief factor; political units are unknown.

Lubbock admits feminine filiation, but denies the matriarchy; holds to the theory of promiscuity and the purely physical impulse in marriage. The child belonged to the tribe, and the tribe owned the woman.

Starcke's views are given in the chapter on the origin of society. According to this writer there is no evidence of a definite primitive group; the intermediate stages between animals and man have left no trace. That is the region of conjecture.

At this point Espinas is introduced with his study of animal societies, and the lack of historic data is met by inferences from sub-human associations. From this ground one should infer many forms of society, each determined by the conditions of life. Certain fair inferences may be drawn. The male is predominant among animals; is it probable that the first men were subject to women? The male animal is jealous; is it probable that the primitive savage would permit promiscuity? The theory of the patriarchal family as primitive may not be accepted, but, on the other hand, the view that mere physical attractions were the sole social bond in early times is without proof. Even in animal societies there is a need of coöperation to secure food, to defend the group against attack, to enjoy sympathetic union.

Spencer's theory is stated and criticised. Primitive life was indefinite, unstable, homogeneous. Out of this condition came by different routes polygamy, polyandry, levirate, marriage by capture, patriarchate, and governments.

Coulanges and Ihering are cited as having made clear the religious and jural factors in the development of the family and the state. The gens is the institution which unites family and state. Society passes from the domestic to the political organization when the social bond is no longer one of blood, but of territory and common interests.

The problem of Posada is to trace the origin of the state. His view is that the family and society are contemporaneous. At first they were confused and indeterminate, and their functions were gradually differentiated. But from the beginning the bond of society was more than sexual impulse and need of economic production. Interests of sympathy, sociability, and religion combined from early ages to cement the relationships of social life.

C. R. HENDERSON.

Christianity and Social Problems. By LYMAN ABBOTT. Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1896. Pp. 370.

AMONG the men who have led in the work of stirring the social conscience of the churches Dr. Abbott stands among the first. Yet

his view of the function of the pulpit seems to be in conflict with this statement, for he would exclude all technical discussions of method from the sermon. The lecture gives occasion for more practical and direct application of principles. In this collection of articles the author traces the influence of Christianity on political, domestic, and industrial life, and gives an exposition of his own convictions in regard to the duty of the churches and of Christian citizens in these spheres of activity.

The assertions about the unequal distribution of wealth (pp. 58-59) have been questioned by statisticians. The figures showing a startling increase in crime (p. 299) have been declared by Dr. F. H. Wines to be absolutely misleading, yet the protest is not mentioned. The census report is here used in a very uncritical way.

The value of the book lies in its wide range of suggestions, its earnest spirit of humanity, and the stimulus it will give to a wiser direction of the studies of preachers.

C. R. HENDERSON.

Endokannibalismus. By DR. RUDOLF S. STEINMETZ. Reprinted from *Mittheilungen der anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien*. Band xxvi.

A COMPARATIVE description of cannibalism as it occurs within the tribe is accompanied with a tabular exhibit of the tribes practicing endocannibalism, the motives assigned for the practice, and the reliability of the information in each case. Lack of food, longing for meat, special relish for human flesh, and animistic belief, are the particular motives to cannibalism; and women, children, invalids, the aged, and criminals are, in the main, its objects. To cannibalism the following negative conditions are necessary: (a) lack of meat, (b) absence of æsthetic horror of the corpse, (c) absence of fear of resentment of the disturbed spirit of the corpse, (d) absence of fanciful sympathy with the corpse, (e) absence of feeling that the act will defile the person eaten or his memory. All these conditions are present among the lower races. Primitive man must have been omnivorous; especially in the first steps of his development he was obliged to refuse no suitable food. All motives which deter civilized men from eating human flesh were wanting, and only our prejudices prevent our recognition of the fact that some form of cannibalism has characterized lower stadia of human development as universally as have animism, ancestor-worship,

blood-vengeance, etc. The custom was probably universal to eat enemies, and also friends who died by violence or were not too much wasted by disease. The necessity of self-preservation would prevent extensive murder for cannibalism within the tribe, except in case of the aged, invalid, criminals, and the deformed. It is impossible that superstition should have led man to cannibalism, if periodic hunger had not led him to it long before.

This paper is valuable even more from the methodological standpoint than as a contribution to folk-psychology. The data of ethnology are singularly difficult of management, because of the unreliability of sources and the vastness of the material; and many writers who, like Herbert Spencer, have attempted to handle these materials comparatively, have, like him, exhibited, in the main, only the facts corroborative of their own opinions,—in this respect falling into a worse error than those editors of the last generation who, when they found a manuscript, changed it to the best of their knowledge and ability before giving it to the public. It may be that Dr. Steinmetz' conclusions are not all valid, but he has presented practically all the facts involved, and the article is unsurpassed as a model for ethnological research.

W. I. THOMAS.

The History of Mankind. By FRIEDRICH RATZEL. Translated by A. J. Butler. Introduction by E. B. Tylor. London: Macmillan & Company (Ltd.), 1896. Vol. I, 8vo., pp. 486. Cuts, map, and nine colored plates.

FOR ten years past Professor Ratzel's great *Völkerkunde* has been a veritable mine of information for the student. It was really the only comprehensive manual of universal ethnography. Valuable as the text was its value was greatly enhanced by the numerous illustrations. Notwithstanding faults, and even some errors, it was a useful work. The second German edition has lately been published and is now appearing in an English translation. The three volumes of the first edition have been condensed into two, and the order of treatment has been somewhat modified. The first volume of this translation is before us. It is a handsome book, well printed on good paper with many fine cuts, mostly made from objects in ethnographic museums, or from portraits of the peoples whose life is described. Nine of the beautiful colored plates of the first edition are reproduced; they

represent groups of natives, dwellings, and brilliant trophies of artistic objects. This volume contains Book I, *Principles of Ethnography*, and part of Book II, *American-Pacific Group of Races*. Book I is an excellent presentation of the task of ethnography and an illustration of its methods and materials. The treatment is comparative. After defining the field of the science, stating the situation and numbers of the human race, discussing what "natural races" are, and investigating the nature and development of civilization, the author passes to more special topics for consideration. Language, religion, science and art, invention and discovery, agriculture and cattle-breeding, clothing and ornament, habitations, family and social customs, the state, are the topics of as many interesting chapters. The publication of this part of the work as a separate book for use as a text in school and college classes would be an excellent thing. Book II but partly appears in this volume. It describes in detail certain groups of races. The physical characters, the languages, the social organization, the life and customs, the government, the religion, of each are presented. Special attention is given to the industrial arts and art products, and most of the illustrations are of museum specimens. The author makes great use of similarities in ethnographic objects as evidence of relationship or intercourse between peoples. His book will be in this country a wholesome corrective to the overstrained theories of "independent development" now so rife among us. The translator has done his work faithfully, but somewhat heavily; the author's style, terse and extremely condensed, presented exceptional difficulty.

FREDERICK STARR.

GUSTAVE LE BON: *The Crowd: a Study of the Popular Mind*.
New York: Macmillan & Co., 1896. \$1.50.

IN this work Le Bon makes a careful study of the character and scope of the activities of crowds and mobs. He bases all his propositions about these phenomena on his general theory of the nature of social interpretation as set forth in his prior work, *Lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples*. This theory involves a very sharp distinction between the social institutions and the social soul, the institutions being simply manifestations of the soul, and the latter alone a living or creative element. *L'âme du peuple* must then be studied first and

foremost by the sociologist and all social phenomena must be explained by reference to this soul as cause.

In the present work this theory appears throughout ; for it is the *mind* of the crowd that is primarily studied. The sub-title for the English edition of the work is "A Study of the Popular Mind." This raises in the thought of the reader at once all the difficulties which were involved in the other work referred to.

One form of this difficulty may be illustrated by reference to what Le Bon calls the "law of the mental unity of crowds." This law, propounded at the outset of the work, sets up for each crowd its own soul, permanent or transitory as the case may be. While Le Bon has here undoubtedly a firm basis of fact, his general theory leads him to give it very inadequate expression. It is on this account, I think, that the proposition estranges so many readers at the start. If the same phenomena were stated in terms of a unity of activity (these activities understood as intelligent) the proposition would be much fuller and truer and would carry much more force than when stated as a mere soul-unity in the sense, to me very abstract, which Le Bon gives to the term "soul."

Another result of Le Bon's general theory is seen in his continual use of the "unconscious" as a factor in society. Here again there are at the basis of Le Bon's remarks facts which much need to be recognized ; but with a more adequate statement of them that mystic, awe-inspiring unconscious would quickly disappear.

Although the question brought up in the points just referred to is probably the most fundamental one which the book raises, involving, as it does, the whole subject of social interpretation and of the adequate statement of social phenomena, it is not the most important matter in the author's own intention, and should not be further insisted on in a brief note.

Let us look, then, at the more concrete issues of the book.

Le Bon holds that this is an age of crowds, and that their activities are increasing in range and in power day by day. The organized crowd is a group of men acting together under stimuli which are in most cases novel and transitory. The activities of crowds are usually described as unconscious, and the best of them exhibit only very slight rational elements. Pictures, symbols, sparkling superficiality can best move them. Yet race characteristics of the men who compose them act largely as determining elements. Their deeds are marked by an

intensity and immediateness which can best be characterized as "religious" in quality.

In Book I, "The Mind of Crowds," it is the processes of crowd action which Le Bon mainly treats. In Book II, "The Opinions and Beliefs of Crowds," the emphasis is on the content of their souls—that is, the scope and concrete conditions of their activities. Book III discusses several forms of heterogeneous crowds. Probably these chapters on the criminal crowd, the jury, the electoral crowd, and the parliamentary crowd are the ones which will excite the greatest practical interest. Assuredly anyone who has been watching from a non-partisan standpoint those processes called discussion and argument in the present political campaign will find much here to interest him.

The homogeneous crowds, sect, caste, and class are not discussed in this volume, but a treatment of them is promised in a later work.

The translation is as a whole very satisfactory, though occasionally an amusing error creeps in; rarely, however, to the serious detriment of the sense. Despite the general good appearance of the volume, the student cannot but regret the tripling in both bulk and price which it has undergone in the process of reproduction.

ARTHUR F. BENTLEY.

Alterations of Personality. By ALFRED BINET, translated by Helen Green Baldwin, with notes and preface by J. Mark Baldwin. New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1896. Pp. x+396.

It is a most gratifying and unusual experience to meet with a book treating in a thoroughly sane manner the facts of abnormal and morbid mental life such as are found in hypnotism, somnambulism and the various types of hysteria. Indeed it has long been recognized by conservative psychologists that hypnotism and the cognate fields of investigation were intellectually and professionally "extra hazardous," so seldom has a psychologist dabbled in them and come off unscathed by fantastic and uncouth theories.

Professor Binet has in the main succeeded in fulfilling his avowed purpose to suppress all merely theoretic and discursive matter and to present simply a coherent statement of such phenomena as are agreed upon by all observers of the disturbances of personality. Of course he has his own theory of the nature of personality and he marshals his facts in support of the same. But the facts are really allowed to

tell their own story in largest measure and however much one may feel that other interpretations are preferable to the one Professor Binet advocates, there is never any obtrusive suggestion that the facts are being distorted for the sake of theory. The work, which has already in its French form won for itself a dignified place in the opinion of psychologists beside Binet's other writings, belongs therefore to that very useful class of books, which from time to time attempts the synthesis of large bodies of new and rapidly gathered facts, such as at present characterize in so bewildering a fashion almost every branch of psychology.

The subject is treated under the three heads of (1) successive personalities, (2) coexistent personalities and (3) alterations of personality. Spontaneous and induced somnambulism furnish the data for the first division. Azam's famous case of Félida with her successive personalities, which have now been under observation upwards of thirty-five years, forms a fair example of the phenomena reported here. Under the second head are passed in review the more striking and familiar symptoms of hysteria, *e. g.*, amnesias, anæsthesias, hyperæsthesias and unconscious coördinated activities, such as writing; while under the third head are cited the facts of altered personality as induced by suggestion in hypnosis, together with the facts of systematized anæsthesias.

This meager statement of the contents of the book must suffice and I pass on to a brief consideration of the positive doctrine of personality maintained by the author.

Stated concisely the theory is this—personality is altogether a relative matter of the synthesis of conscious conditions, cognitive, emotional and volitional. This synthesis may be broad and thoroughgoing, as in the case of the normal individual, overspreading and obscuring the presence of certain lesser synthesized experiences, or it may be relatively narrow and on a plane of essential equality with other like syntheses of mental conditions, each of which may then with equal propriety be regarded as a personality, each having in greater or lesser degree its own memory processes, emotions and character. The cases of double personality furnish the point of departure for this conception and on the whole its most convincing support.

Normal individuals on the basis of this doctrine really possess [*potentially at least*] an indefinite number of these selves, only it happens that one is distinctly predominant and the others, if recognized at all,

come to be regarded as subconscious. The automatic planchette writing of normal persons when attending to something else and quite unaware that any writing is going on, illustrates this condition. The writing is that of a secondary personality.

The cases of distinctly successive personalities, like Férida's, which displace one another at irregular periods, do not afford any insuperable difficulties of interpretation. On the side of the nervous system there must occur altered functioning of a cataclysmic but temporary character, an alteration of a very deep-seated but thoroughly intelligible nature. One can appreciate how such changed nervous conditions might lead to sequent syntheses of conscious experiences, each group of which would show its constituent members standing in relations of close organic coördination with each other, thus rendering possible a memory—although a memory quite cut off from a participation in the recalling of experiences belonging to the other and opposed neural conditions. On the side of the mental processes involved we have conditions which seem to justify entirely the designation of the sequent states as personalities. In temperament as well as in memory the conditions seem perfectly distinct and they evince just the same sort of isolation and insulation from other conscious states (with a few insignificant exceptions) as do the personalities of normal individuals.

But in the case of coexistent personalities the simplicity of formulation is much more questionable.¹ It does not appear to the reviewer at all events that physiological processes are inadequate to account for the facts of asserted subconscious personality. In the case of planchette writing, for example, the coördinations are all latent in the cerebral centers and there is certainly no obvious reason why they should not discharge in essentially coherent ways.² Space is lacking to do full justice either to Professor Binet's position or to that of his opponents, but it has seemed to me desirable to point out that this portion of his doctrine must for the present anyhow be subjected to further investigation before it can be safely adopted. The natural antithesis to his theory is the old and battle-scarred doctrine of unconscious cerebration against which he vigorously inveighs. But surely the fallacies of that

¹ An excellent discussion of this and other kindred topics will be found in a paper by ARTHUR H. PIERCE in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research for 1895. A reply by Meyers occurs in the same publication.

² This position seems to be supported by some recent experiments reported by SOLOMONS and STEIN in the *Psychological Review* for September 1896.

doctrine are scarcely more lamentable than the confusion arising from a theory which finds it necessary, or possible, to say, as does Professor Binet in his final paragraph: "Outside of our consciousness may occur conscious thoughts in us that we are not aware of." I confess this has no meaning to me and repetition and reflection do but further confound. In order that I may have a thought of which I am not conscious, I shall find it necessary to reconstruct my whole psychological vocabulary and ascribe to thought and consciousness meanings quite foreign to those they now possess. Be all this as it may, such studies as are here reported go far to make clear how infinitely complex a thing the self is and in how large a measure its unity is the functional one of binding together the utterly diverse. The wonder is not that rifts and cleavages should sometimes appear in it, but rather that it should ever present itself as a unit.

The book is distinctly welcome in its English form and the translation is thoroughly creditable, being smooth and accurate and in the main happy in its technical terminology. The typography is also good. Professor Baldwin's avowed part in the project is chiefly of the god-fatherly and protective character, although his preface and notes will give valuable supplementary suggestions to many readers. A table of contents is an improvement on the French edition.

JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL.

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NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

CONDUCTED BY J. D. FORREST, A. T. FREEMAN, AND H. A. MILLIS.

Social Christianity : Its Method.—Christianity ought to realize itself in the form of social institutions. Private initiative is preferable to state intervention as a means to this realization. All reforms implying a remodeling of legal codes are in the domain of the state. But the state cannot reconstruct society on a new basis and put it in harmony with the gospel. *Social* reforms are not only powerless to elevate the soul of a people, but may even be dangerous. Institutions and laws are merely inert instruments, capable of serving a bad as well as a good purpose. They need not be perfect, but they should be adapted to use. State socialism presupposes faultless officials. But even well applied it can attain only its economic ends. It cannot banish vice because the constraint of law is its only means, and liberty is an essential condition of true morality. The right of charity in educating the ignorant, in encouraging useful work for the material and moral good of the nation, cannot be denied to the government. But alms degrade, especially state alms. The personal element must be added in charity. A change of laws modifies men, and a change in men must be followed by a change in morals. Neither absolute individualism nor state socialism, as methods, take account of all the facts. The true method of moral action is social individualism, recognizing the reciprocal relation of men and morals.—L. RANDON, in *Revue du Christianisme Social*, November 1896. Fr.

The Principle of Social Christianity.—Hitherto the church has seemed to be ignorant that man is not entirely free, that he is a creature of habits formed by society and his surroundings. Christianity has tried to found the kingdom of God on earth by converting individuals. It gains thus units, for which the world ever disputes, and which death finally snatches away. With each generation the work must be begun over, a labor of Sisyphus. To bring humanity to that moral height which Christ called the kingdom of heaven it is necessary to suppress the mass of evil influences which press us on all sides and which almost inevitably drag us upon the downward path of sin. Christianity must declare war on prejudices and corrupt practices, must destroy the numberless iniquities at the base of our political and economic institutions, must, in short, prepare social surroundings favorable to the gospel. The church has too long held a false and mediæval conception of life as an evil to be endured. It is of no use to sulk over the life God has prepared for us on earth. Instead of avoiding contact with material things, Christians should grasp them and bring them into subjection. It is not enough to preach to men justice and charity. Justice and charity must be brought to men to win them. The church, for its own sake and for the world's salvation, should hasten to organize social Christianity. French protestantism looks with suspicion upon this movement. Some fear innovations on doctrine, whereas the movement calls only for new methods of practice. Others fancy that the care of souls will be neglected for the care of bodies. But Jesus showed profound solicitude for the poor and sick, and it is not new for Christians to found asylums, hospitals, etc. Besides, social Christianity regards the care of bodies as a means to an end—but the only efficacious means. A stronger reason for the distrust and aversion felt in France is due to the epithet "social" and a confusion of social Christianity with socialism. The two resemble each other in some external features, but not in spirit. Social Christianity does not hope to establish the kingdom of God by force, by violent attacks on the rich, by a war of classes, by contempt for the family and for religion. It appeals not to hate, but to love.—*Revue du Christianisme Social*, September 1896. Fr.

Liberty.—Happiness is not positive, but negative, consisting, not in an ever increasing number of pleasures, but in avoiding pain in the development of the faculties. In giving to his forces the direction of least resistance man allows his efforts to attain the maximum of productivity. This natural tendency explains the energy with which the love of liberty is manifested. The free development of the individual is the essential condition of his normal constitution and the expansion of his activity in respect to individual and race conservation, for it permits the individual to make use of his faculties and to adapt himself to external conditions. The necessities of social life demand that individual activity be submitted to certain rules, that the liberty of one may not infringe on that of others. Even authority established for this purpose is from the absolute point of view an evil, for it renders possible by the abuse of force the subduing of individual to individual, and even the absorbing of individuality in slavery. But it is an evil indispensable because of its services to society. The conclusion must be that regulation by authority of the conduct of individuals should exist only in cases of absolute necessity, recognized as such by science and the *élite* spirits of the time. Science teaches that the infringements of authority on the liberty of individuals ought in reason to be inverse to the degree of civilization of the time—the empire of men over themselves and nature. Thus this domain of authority has diminished in the course of history from primitive societies to modern American democracy. The principal difficulty encountered in trying to determine practically the functions of the state at a given moment consists in understanding the condition of culture of the people, and in fixing the degree of public guardianship indispensable for the time. This depends entirely on the average culture, intellectual and moral, of individuals. Two conclusions reached: first, that the government should be confided to those who, by their scientific and moral culture give the greatest guarantee of wisdom; second, that in what concerns complicated social phenomena the more rare and limited the intervention of authority, the smaller will be the chance of error, for its limitation gives free play to the laws of nature.—LADISLAS DOMANSKI, *Journal des Économistes*, November 1896. Fr.

Those "Without God" and the Social Question.—The economic and social problems are more or less direct consequences of the religious problem. The great and deplorable social uneasiness has for its fundamental cause life without God. Those "without God" are numerous. I. Contemporary. Atheism presents the following general characteristics: (1) Actual atheism is essentially variable and multi-form, being founded on a negative principle. (2) Contemporary atheism presents itself as scientific. Its popularity rests on the exclusive confidence accorded to the experimental method and to the results of the positive sciences. It thus tends to materialism. (3) Atheism becomes always more social in its manifestations. It is not merely an individual and theoretical doctrine, but above all a life. It is the social dissolvent, logically ending in anarchy. (4) Atheism is a religion. II. The blame for the increasing invasion of atheism rests upon: (1) Ecclesiasticism. The resistance of the Roman church to the progress of liberty, science, and democracy has caused the series of revolutions from protestantism to contemporary social atheism. With the fall of infallible authority has been connected the fall of religion itself. (2) The directing classes who have failed in their great task, the moral education of the people. (3) The Christian life of our epoch, our actual Christianity. Individually Christians, we are socially atheists. III. The true demonstration of the gospel is in men, in example. To those "without God" it is necessary to oppose men of God, the Man-God, the spirit of God. All that is spiritual is social. Social Christianity must be opposed to social atheism.—ELIE GOUNELLE, *Revue du Christianisme Social*, November 1896. Fr.

The Relations of Biology, Psychology, and Sociology.—The Science of Society has for its chief datum the Science of Mind. "Along with mental evolution in men, there goes higher social evolution." In order to follow out evolution under the higher forms which society presents, the special psychology of man, the social unit, must be understood, as "it is manifest that the ability of men to coöperate in

any degree as members of a society, presupposes certain intellectual faculties and certain emotions." To study social evolution the psychic faculties brought into play by social life and the influence of social life upon these faculties must be studied. The science of mind is dependent upon the science of life. For the laws of mind can only be known in connection with living bodies. Hence the relation of sociology to biology through psychology. The analogy between society and the animal consists merely in the fact that "in proportion to the multiplication of unlike parts, severally taking unlike functions, there is an increasing mutual dependence and a consequent individuation (integration) of the whole organism, animal or social," the mutual dependence of parts being that which constitutes the aggregate an organism. The analogy between animal and social structures is not to be used as the basis for sociological interpretation. Biology and sociology are reciprocal, yielding mutual elucidations. The latter can no more be founded on the former than the former on the latter. When contemplating the social aggregate simply as a mass of living units, and concerned only with increases or decreases of the units in number, and organic modifications of their natures—for interpretation of social phenomena in this group—we depend directly upon biology. When, on the other hand, we are concerned only with the development of this social aggregate into an organization of mutually dependent parts performing different duties, we depend directly upon psychology for interpretation.—HERBERT SPENCER, *Appleton's Popular Science Monthly*, December 1896. FR.

Report on the Testimony of Past Residents in College Settlements.—

[This report is based upon forty-two answers to a long list of questions sent to settlement residents of three months' or more experience. Only a few of "the questions" and "the answers" can be given here, and then in such a way that the wide diversity of opinion cannot be shown.]

1. "What order of settlement work do you consider most valuable: personal, social and unorganized work, club work, educational work, or civil work?"

"Twenty-two place the personal work first, eight believe in all forms as equally valuable, four plead for emphasis on clubs, three on civil work, five on educational."

2. "In your opinion, is the amount of work done commensurate with the energy expended?"

"Here twenty-three enthusiastic and emphatic 'ayes' are offset by nine reluctant 'noes,' three or four well-balanced uncertainties, and one vigorous and aggrieved negative."

3. "Do you feel encouraged or the reverse with regard to the possibility of doing away with class distinctions?"

"Most of the answers are despondent; twenty grow less sanguine as time goes on, while ten are doubtfully hopeful. Settlement life is a great destroyer of theories, and the belief in the speedy disappearance of caste is usually possessed by the theorist alone."

4. "Do you think it possible for working people to attain hygienic living under present tenement-house conditions?"

"Unanimously 'no,' though one or two say 'they might do better than they do.'"

5. "Do you consider that the more general practice of thrift would materially affect the welfare of the working classes?"

"Varying and lively answers. The ayes have it by twenty-two to eighteen."

6. "What does your observation lead you to consider as the usual cause of distress among the poor? Intemperance, shiftlessness, incompetence, or conditions over which they have no control?"

"Seventeen trace poverty back to the original causes over which the poor have no control, twelve accent present incompetence however caused, four shiftlessness, seven incompetence. One only gives intemperance as primary cause."

7. "Are you on the whole satisfied with the conditions of the wage-earning population which is not suffering acute distress?"

"Very quietly, very positively, very unanimously, no. There is only one affirmative."

8. "What reforms or changes have you come to feel are (a) most urgent, (b) most practicable; (c) where would you begin?"

"First and universal comes improved housing of the poor; in quick succession follow the organization of labor, the eight-hour movement, play grounds and parks, improved schools and school laws, municipal reforms, persuasion of the poor to have smaller families, trade schools, public baths, the introduction of poetry into the lives of the poor, income tax, coffee houses, cooking and sewing obligatory in public schools, regeneration of the upper classes, consumers' league, the inculcation of thrift, free silver, municipalization of railways, lighting, etc.; temperance reform, very low in the list; sweat-shop regulations, and, finally,—mentioned by one writer only—direct religious work."—*Publications of the Church Social Union*, September 15, 1896. M.

The Concentration of Wealth.—In this article the author shows the distribution of wealth in Great Britain by the following statistics. They are based upon the returns given under the inheritance tax law for five years, beginning with 1890.

Class	Average wealth	Number	Population percentage	Aggregate wealth	Wealth percentage
1. No property.....	459,694	56.723
2. Under \$500.	\$279.50	93,369	11.521	\$26,090,000	617
3. Under \$1,500.	964.00	91,175	11.250	87,900,000	2.077
4. \$1,500 to \$5,000 ...	2,461.00	87,936	10.852	216,400,000	5.113
5. \$5,000 to \$50,000 ..	16,251.50	64,307	7.935	1,045,070,000	24.693
6. \$50,000, \$1,250,000.	167,433.50	13,706	1.691	2,294,845,000	54.223
7. Over \$1,250,000....	2,475,727.00	227	.028	561,990,000	13.277
Totals and averages	\$5,222.50	810,414	100.000	\$4,232,295,000	100.000

To quote: "Over 56 per cent. own nothing; and if we add the first three classes together we have nearly 80 per cent. owning less than 3 per cent., and then a little over 20 per cent. owning over 97 per cent.; if we add the first four classes together, we have over 90 per cent. of the people owning less than 8 per cent. of the wealth of the country, and under 10 per cent. owning 92 per cent.; and if we take the last two classes, we find that less than one-fiftieth of the people own over two-thirds of the wealth; and then look at that last class of millionaires, numbering less than three one-hundredths of 1 per cent., and yet owning over 13 per cent. of the wealth!"

The statistics for Massachusetts (taken from the Twenty-fifth Annual Report of the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics) show that from 1879 to 1881, .08 of 1 per cent. of those who died during that period owned 24.17 per cent. of the wealth involved in the estates; .50 of 1 per cent., 26.48; 1.74 per cent., 21.33; 6.80 per cent., 18.73; 12.76 per cent., 8.21; 9.12 per cent., 1.08; and that the remaining 69 per cent. owned nothing at all. Comparing these figures with those of 1829 to 1831 and 1859 to 1861, we find that the very poor are increasing in number, while their small possessions are growing smaller; that the very rich are increasing in number, and that their wealth is increasing still faster; and that the middle class is decreasing in number and decreasing still faster in its aggregate wealth.—ELTWEED POMEROY, in *Arena*, December 1896. M.

Postal Savings Banks.—Faith in the absolute solvency of the general government has created a demand for a postal savings department. Since there is about \$700,000,000 hoarded, its deposit and circulation would be of general advantage. Within two years at least \$1,000,000,000 would be deposited, enabling the government to bring the national debt within the control of citizens. Government would be made more stable by the number of citizens who would make deposits in its own banks. Postal savings banks have been introduced in all the leading countries except the United States, Germany, and Switzerland, and in Germany there are many municipal savings banks.

The proposition to establish postal savings banks in *Great Britain* was first introduced into Parliament in 1807, but the measure was not passed until 1861, when Gladstone carried it through Parliament. At the end of the first year, 2535 persons had deposited nearly £2,000,000. There are now 11,000 offices. One out of every seven persons in England is a depositor. The total amount due depositors Dec. 31, 1893, was £80,597,641. The interest for that year was £1,860,104. Before 1894 deposits were limited to £30 per year; since then £50 may be deposited. Investments may be made in government stock equal to the amount deposited. No interest is allowed on deposits exceeding £200, and the accumulations, after that amount is reached, are invested in government stock. Annuities of not less than £1 nor more than £100 may be purchased on the life of any person over five years of age. Postal banks were introduced into *Canada* in 1868. The system is similar to the English. June 30, 1896, there were 755 postal banks, 126,442 accounts remaining open, \$29,932,929 standing to credit of open accounts, \$944,524 allowed in interest for the year. *Austria* introduced the system in 1868. Interest is paid at 3 per cent. on one guilder and upwards. Bonds are bought for depositors at market price. A clearing and check system has been established. In 1895, 1,917,784 deposits were made, aggregating 37,160,508 gulden. *France* introduced the system in 1881. There are 7000 offices in France and Algiers. Three per cent. interest is paid. Sept. 1, 1894, there were 2,224,813 depositors, of whom more than two-thirds held less than 200 francs each. The amount due depositors Dec. 31, 1893, was 610,793,920 francs. *Belgium* established postal banks in 1865. In 1886 the maximum sum upon which interest was paid was reduced from 12,000 to 5000 francs, and further reduced to 3000 francs in 1891, with interest at 3 per cent. *Sweden* established banks in 1883. Coupon receipts are there given for deposits. There are 369,000 depositors, and the bank controls an invested capital of 28,000,000 crowns. *Russia* adopted the system in 1889, *Holland* in 1886, and *Italy* in 1875. The *English Colonies* have systems modeled after that of the mother country. In New Zealand the deposits number 202,276 and amount to £2,386,089. *Hawaii* introduced the system in 1886. Seventeen different bills have been introduced in the United States Congress. The Postmaster-general first recommended the establishment of the banks in 1871.—EDWARD T. HEYN, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November 1896. F.

The Brewing of the Storm.—The rise of Altgeld denotes the introduction into American politics of the European spirit of revolution, of which socialism is the extreme and anarchism the delirious manifestation. American institutions were framed for a community of freehold farmers and small merchants of English blood. They are now being applied to a community embracing a body of great capitalists and employers on one side and masses of wage-earners on the other, and containing a large element imbued with the social acrimony of its class in Europe. The difficulty of amendment is such as to amount to immobility. Populism, which has its source in agricultural distress, is not the greatest menace, for the farmer has property and would not march far with the socialist or anarchist of Chicago. That everyone should be free to get as much as he could for himself, was the principle of American communities. But it does not work, now that there is a proletariat. The labor of the factory is mechanical and monotonous; whereas the hand-loom weaver might have a joy in his completed work, the factory hand has no interest except his wages. The system of education begets a general desire to rise in life. When there is no hope for these aspirations, education breeds discontent. Monstrous fortunes have stimulated envy. Religion no longer reconciles men to the order of society as a divine decree. The laborer will not be put off with compensation in another world. The revolutionary spirit has spread to the family, on which the state has hitherto been founded. At a critical moment, unfortunately, came the judgment of the supreme court against the income tax. The court probably only declared the law, but the decision in favor of the Legal Tender Act condemned it as a partisan body. Experience has shown that the pretense of fostering infant industries by protection is a snare. The degradation of the senate was the natural outcome of a fiscal policy which taught the trader to look to his influence with congress rather than to the marketable value of his goods. That

the state can create prosperity by legislation, is the fallacy against which, when it appears in the guise of socialism or populism, protectionist capital fights, but upon which its own theory is in fact built. Stock-jobbing and railroad wrecking naturally arouse a spirit of revolt, and many trusts afford color for the outcry against monopoly. Wealth must justify its existence on rational grounds. Had Bryan's movement been confined to an attack of abuses, instead of assailing national credit, the insurrection might have been purifying.—GOLDWIN SMITH, *Forum*, December 1896. F.

Some Practical Lessons of the Recent Campaign.—The need of leadership and the way to secure it is one of the chief lessons. There is need of statesmanship instead of declamation in the legislature, which will devise remedies for real evils and explode imaginary ones. Workingmen are in a better position in this country than any other, but what they want is justice, even more than prosperity. The recent victory was given by states in which education is best developed and most widely diffused. Our leading colleges should be strengthened as fortresses against future outbursts of demagogism. An unenlightened democracy is a mere mob. The enlightenment of citizens is the most important of public duties.—ANDREW D. WHITE, *Forum*, December 1896. F.

The Labor Movement and Socialism in the United States.—The workman's struggle in the United States is chiefly with "the boss," not against bosses or capitalists as a class. The movement is little known except for its trades-unions and its strikes. According to the Department of Labor, in the thirteen and a half years from January, 1881, to July, 1894, strikes have affected 75,234 establishments and 4,081,096 workmen. Losses of wages have amounted to \$190,493,382, and employers' losses to \$94,825,837. Two-thirds of the cost of the industrial war have then been borne by the workmen. Thirty-two per cent. of the strikes succeeded fully, 12½ per cent. partly, 55½ per cent. failed totally. The proportion of successful strikes lessens from year to year. The fault is not with the tenacity of the workman, for the statistics show that the average duration of the strikes was increased. The proportion of failures in large establishments is much greater than in small ones. The trades-unions are nearly powerless because capital has organized, and because of the large number of unemployed. The vast system of railways is in the hands of a half-dozen men. English nobles and syndicates possess immense tracts of land. Two great trusts have lately been formed, one in coal which includes the mines and railways of six rich districts, the other in the wood trade of the Pacific coast. The Socialist party which held its ninth congress at New York in August has eight official organs in as many languages. There are also seven unofficial dailies, besides several weeklies and one monthly review. There are four other great organizations. They are the Knights of Labor, the Fabian Society, founded by Gronlund, the American Railroad Union, of which Eugene Debs is head, and the People's party, which is largely made up of farmers and farm laborers. There are, therefore, besides the unions, and the Fabian societies for study and benevolence, two great reform parties opposed to the old Democrats and Republicans, the one, the People's party, is a party of pure agitation unhappily without clear views; the other, the Socialist Labor party, is conscious of its latent force and confident of its future. The two should unite.—ADRIEN VEBER in *Revue Socialiste*, for October, 1896. Fr.

Human Welfare and the Social Question (Fourth Article).—VIII. Development of Ownership.—Property was at first in common. In every civilized country private ownership has grown up. This indicates that in it lies the impulse to culture. Culture is a perpetual struggle and compromise between private and general interests. Development of production is tranquil only when directing powers are stable. Private ownership brought equilibrium and the organization and concentration of power. These gave a community advantage over its neighbors. Another cause was ambition and desire for independence. The possessor of the means of production is more independent than others; complete independence is impossible in society.

IX. Idea of Ownership.—Rooted in community of property, ownership may be defined as that primitive right to the enjoyment of a thing which forms the basis of

all other rights to its enjoyment. This is limited by the community's right of disposal, often latent unless public interests require it. In communal ownership the property of one person is limited by the number of persons; in private ownership it is limited not by persons but by things. The tendency is toward the latter, till many persons seem shut out of the right of enjoyment of things. Reaction may result. This is the ever present, never-to-be-settled social question.

X. *Division of Property*.—There must be a compromise between general and individual good. Society exists, not of nor for itself, but for individuals. Yet it cannot consider the interests of individuals as such, but only general or at most class interests. The state has an interest in the division of property, because that state is strongest in which the lower classes are rising, and hence happy. This condition could not exist where the majority are hopelessly poor, nor where there was no difference between rich and poor. Fear of sinking and hope of rising give courage and energy to labor. These motives are most active in a society where there are infinite gradations of wealth. A gulf between classes produces hatred and hopelessness on one side, contempt and languid effort on the other. Competition makes work intense and stimulates inventiveness, foresight and economy. But its tendency toward absorption of small enterprises by large ones is dangerous to society. If this absorption should become complete, the large enterprises might not do as well as now, while they have the stimulus of competition with small enterprises, the workman's pleasure in his work would be lessened, and men become machines.

The general welfare then demands a compromise which shall preserve men's independence without great injury to production. Statistics and experience must guide the state to find this compromise. The state must decide what small industries it is judicious to protect. Probably law should depress enterprises which crowd out smaller ones, not because of cheap production but because of larger capital. The state, by taking transportation upon itself, would prevent much unnecessary competition and set many free for production. Mining and banking might be undertaken by the state. Farming should be left to the independence it has shown itself able to maintain. Art should be given back to individualism. As food, shelter, and clothing are necessary to all and affect the worker's productive power, they should be *controlled* by the state. Productiveness must be increased and be made to benefit the lower classes especially, for the safety of the state as well as for unselfish reasons.—DR. VON SCHUBERT-SOLDERN, "*Das menschliche Glück und die soziale Frage*," *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, Viertes Heft, 1896.

Fr.

New Interpretation of Sociological Phenomena.—Social life among all animals has a tendency to arrest the production of new biological and psychological types, *i. e.*, of individuals more diverse and complex. One of a herd gains in sentiments of sympathy and certain material advantages, but loses independence and the stimulus to development of intelligence that isolation in attack and defense gives. The division of labor makes the case worse for man. It has a tendency to create new types, not biological, but professional. These types being specialized are simplified, hence lower than the primitive biological type. Division of labor injures mind and body, makes a man an attachment to a machine, and causes a long list of diseases and deformities. The sentiment produced by society is unnatural and sickly. The few men who stand above the mass are content to accumulate knowledge; hence decadence and lassitude. There is evolution, but no progress. Of social groups, the one in which cohesion and division of labor are carried farthest tends to survive, hence individuals are more and more simplified, less and less original. If an inventor appears, he will be a specialist, not a universal genius. Possibly the nervousness, even insanity, often accompanying marked talent is the consequence of this unnatural one-sidedness. Social evolution does not follow a regular formula. The evolutionary formula and the dialectic formula do not necessarily contradict each other. Neither is sufficient. If society were a perfect organism or brain, the individual would be only a cell which must passively submit to evolution. But the individual can try to adapt society to his needs. In fact society has tendencies, but only tendencies, to organic development. Social evolution has made thought more logical, less intuitive. But the greatest conquests of the human mind, *i. e.*, language-making, mythologies,

fire, the lever, pottery, weaving, were the work of the primitive mind. The poet preserves somewhat the primitive mind. What increases with civilization is the passive assimilating power of thought; what lessens is the spontaneous, original and intuitive power. Hence society is unfavorable to genius. This explains why genius has shown itself oftenest when social evolution was disturbed, in crises or periods of decadence. Social evolution tends to suppress genius, to perpetuate the anthropological refuse of humanity. Statistics show that men's craniums grow smaller with every age. Their aptitudes are ever narrowing. The only remedy is artificial selection and to make social forms so elastic as not to repress individuality.—*Léon Winiarski, in Revue Socialiste*, September and October, 1896. Fr.

Free Employment Agencies in France.—Municipal bureaus: Employment asked by 2944 persons; places secured for 1660. Labor bureaus: Employment asked by 2097 persons; places secured for 854. For months of August and September.—*Bulletin de L'Office du Travail*, October 1896. F.

Strikes in France.—For the first three quarters of the years, there have been in 1893, 558 strikes involving 157,973 persons; in 1894, 318 strikes involving 39,498; in 1895, 330 strikes involving 39,381; in 1896, 400 strikes involving about 44,000.—*Bulletin de L'Office du Travail*, October 1896. F.

State of Employment in Great Britain.—On the whole the labor market has an upward tendency. Of 111 trade unions, with an aggregate membership of 437,371, making returns, 14,582 (or 3.3 per cent.) are reported as out of employment at the end of October, compared with 3.6 per cent. in September, and with 4.9 per cent. in the 88 unions, with a membership of 395,991, from which returns were received for October 1895.—*The Labour Gazette*, November 1896. F.

Mutual Benefit Societies in Belgium.—1891, societies reporting, 398; members, 55,499; receipts, 763,899 fr.; benefits and expenses, 740,699 fr. 1892, societies reporting, 459; members, 60,995; receipts, 825,002 fr.; benefits and expenses 831,418 fr. 1893, societies reporting, 528; members, 76,095; receipts, 909,426 fr.; disbursements, 896,761 fr. 1894, societies reporting, 553; members, 77,840; receipts 962,143 fr.; disbursements, 914,069 fr. 1895, societies reporting, 699; members 90,045; receipts, 1,172,911 fr.; disbursements, 1,098,191 fr.—*Revue du Travail*, October 1896. F.

Strikes and Lockouts in Great Britain in 1895.—There was a diminution of labor disputes compared with previous years. In all there were 876 disputes resulting in stoppage of work, involving 263,758 laborers, against 1061 disputes and 324,245 laborers in 1894. The aggregate number of days estimated to have been lost during 1895 was 5,542,652, compared with 9,322,096 during 1894, and 31,205,062 during 1893. 4.2 per cent. of the disputes embraced 60.9 per cent. of the persons involved, and the six principal disputes furnished 53.4 per cent. of the aggregate number of days lost. The largest number of disputes, 197, was furnished by the building trades; but they embraced only one twenty-sixth of the persons involved. The boot and shoe dispute involved about 46,000 persons. 24 per cent. of all persons affected were successful, compared with 22 per cent. in the preceding year. 47 per cent. were partially successful. Only 28 per cent. were entirely unsuccessful, compared with 42 per cent. in the year before. 66 per cent. of the persons involved struck in support of their demands for advanced wages, as compared with 49 per cent. in 1894.—*The Labour Gazette*, November 1896. F.

Female Municipal and Provincial Suffrage.—In 1892, the resolution in the English House of Commons to give women the right to vote at legislative elections was defeated by a vote of only 175 to 152. A similar measure carried in New Zealand and in two of the United States. The movement is general. The general government of a state is occupied with general interests and is invested with public power. The provincial government is occupied with particular and private interests—chiefly the administration of funds for local purposes. With this distinction recog-

nized, it would be easy to hold that women should be excluded from participation in the general government, but permitted to participate in local elections. The right to elect members of parliament is a civil right; the right to elect members of a municipal council is a "*droit de contribuable*." A great part of local taxation is levied upon persons who have no voice in its expenditure. Woman would be a conservative element, especially if excluded from political ambitions. England, Ireland, Scotland, Russia, Prussia and Lower Austria grant women the right to participate in local government.—GABRIEL ALIX, "L'Electorat municipal et provincial des Femmes," *La Reforme Sociale*, November 1, 1896. F.

The Ethics of Socialism.—Socialism is an economic reform, but as everything else, it has its ethical basis and teaching. What is this ethical basis and what are its ethical teachings?

It is based upon collectivist ethics. It holds that the individual is the product of society and can only realize himself in society, and, therefore, that he owes everything to society. This is a good doctrine. It is also a conception of wonderful working force. We see its influence in the greater use of government for the good of all. One of the best examples of this is our factory acts.

As taught upon the street, in its popular form, its ethics is to be criticised. First, it insists "upon the enjoyments of life as an end to be sought after," and this "leads to a sort of deification of material comforts and satisfactions." The movement is too materialistic. Then "the biological conception of environment has so captured the average socialist that every moral fault in man is laid at the door of society, and the responsibility of the individual is in effect denied." Thirdly, the socialists criticise, to some extent justly, the Christian religion for teaching us to look for happiness in the next world instead of making the most of this. And, lastly, "no conception of sin enters into the ethics of socialism. Man, we are assured, would be quite right if only society would let him." These are only mischievous half truths.

In its practical platform socialism stands for the weak and the oppressed as against the strong and class interests. But in many points, especially in the case of the family, its influence is of a doubtful character.—REV. CANON E. L. HICKS, in *Economic Review*, October 1896.

Social Classes in the Republic.—The reason we have social classes, meaning by this groups who are not on an equality, and who do not meet as equals, is, that with machinery entering into production and the growth of intelligence, the working-man has become discontented and believes "that in the distribution of the earth's products and the products of industry, the laborer has been cheated of his share by the employer or capitalist." Is this condition of discontent and "class hatred" remediable? There is no conceivable system of distribution which will suit all and thus do away with discontent. Something may be done, however, by ceasing to preach the mischievous doctrine that capitalists, and the higher classes are made by special favor, and preaching that "our success in this world depends on character, as we all see every day of our lives," by preaching the fact that "the man who succeeds, succeeds for the most part through character." But "discontent we cannot cure. It is part of the lot of men. Combined with great human virtues, it has done wonders for the race; but linked with social hatred, with love of dreams and delusions, it can work, and has worked, great mischief."—E. L. GODKIN, in *Atlantic Monthly*, December 1896.

The Social Philosophy of Charity Organization.—Organized charity seeks to put the charitable spirit into the form by bringing the giver and recipient into personal contact. In doing this, in stamping out pernicious forms of almsgiving, in directing and economizing "relief," it is performing a great and valuable service. But it also has a social philosophy based upon half truths and full of inconsistencies, which has a bad influence. It condemns "doles" because they come to the recipient unearned, and so weaken his feeling of "individual responsibility." It is inconsistent in not seeing that gifts and bequests, "economic rents," and other "unearned increments" coming to the rich, have the same influence. It calls unearned riches good when put to a good use, and never looks far enough to see that in their accumulation

they have entailed poverty—poverty which they cannot remedy now. This social philosophy legitimatizes such things. It further assumes that the individual is responsible for himself and his family without noticing whether or not he is capable. Or rather it assumes that every man can rise to any point. That the whole thing is a question of moral character. It does not recognize the fact that not all can be first, neither does it see that moral character is dependent upon economic and social conditions. It does not see this and consequently reverses the progressive movement. Character is first with charity workers, while *environment* must be first in point of time. In preaching this doctrine they have hindered all economic and social reform.—J. A. HOBSON in *Contemporary Review*, November 1896.

Feeble-mindedness as an Inheritance.—A study of feeble-mindedness was made in 248 families containing 887 members. In 101 of these families containing 447 persons, feeble-mindedness was found in more than the one generation. In the remaining 147 families containing 440 persons, it was found in the one, the present, generation only. Of the 447 persons, 359 or 80 per cent. were feeble-minded. Of the 440 persons, 203 or 46.1 per cent. were found so. So far as we are justified in drawing any conclusions from this, we must draw the conclusion that feeble-mindedness is inherited and that much of it is due to inheritance. Abnormalities, such as blindness, deaf-mutism, etc., were found to be several times as frequent in these 248 families as in the general population. Of the 887 persons, 186 were found to have been of illegitimate birth. So by permitting the feeble-minded to reproduce, we are not only increasing their number, but we are also increasing the number of abnormals and illegitimates. There are now 95,000 feeble-minded in the United States, of which only 6000 are in institutions for their special care. Something can and must be done to stop the reproduction of this class. And when this is done, we believe those remaining will be relatively few.—ERNEST BICKNELL in the *National Bulletin of Charities and Correction*, November 1896.

Recent Economic and Social Legislation in the United States.—In recent years a wave of conservatism has passed over state legislatures. The only exception is in regard to economic and social legislation, particularly that in the interest of the laboring class. So far as the national legislature has departed from the *laissez faire* policy, it has done so in the interest of morality, of order, or of the laboring class. Throughout the South and West there is a tendency on the part of the courts to apply constitutional checks to extreme legislation. In New England alone, where there has been no disorder or extreme legislation, have the courts been slow in applying constitutional checks. Now nearly all labor legislation is in danger of falling under constitutional prohibitions. Nearly half of such legislation in the last ten years has been questioned by the courts. Except in the recent campaign, no court has been attacked for such decisions. The principle which such legislation contravenes is that of freedom of contract. This principle has no constitutional warrant, and is not recognized in England except as a general policy to influence legislators. The past year contains few examples of concrete social legislation, partly because the popular mind is in a spirit of reaction owing to the economic depression and the riots of 1893-4, and partly because most of the legislatures did not meet. Only fourteen legislatures had regular sessions. Their social legislation has mainly been limited to laws concerning fortnightly payment of wages, hours of labor in certain occupations, priority of legal claims given to laborers as against their debtors, etc. In 1889-90, of 1192 important statutes, 17 reasserted individualistic principles, 342 embodied socialistic principles, 832 dealt with general law matters; the percentage of socialistic legislation being greatest in the states around Kansas and Nebraska.—F. J. STIMSON, *Yale Review*, November 1896.

F.

Recent Legislation in England.—The conciliation act was passed providing that any board of conciliation may apply to the Board of Trade for registration. The Board of Trade is authorized to take steps to bring parties together where they do not seem to be coming to an agreement, or even where a difficulty is threatened. Conciliation boards may be established for given districts or trades. The Board of Trade is

empowered to defray the cost of its proceedings and make reports to Parliament. Thus any strike or dispute may come before Parliament, whereas that body has heretofore taken cognizance only of those on railways and steamships holding mail contracts or receiving subsidies from the admiralty. A new Truck Act was passed defining explicitly the contracts under which fines could be exacted of workmen by employers. Retail stores are grouped with factories. Fines must be fair and reasonable, or they may be recovered by legal proceedings. It was found in the investigation that the relative amount of fines was infinitesimal, but that they were of essential value in maintaining discipline as an alternative to dismissal. The new Mines Regulation Act is intended solely to set up new rules for the personal protection of laborers. The Agricultural Rates Act is to be in operation for five years. Under it, farm hands are to pay only one-half what they have hitherto paid to local taxation. The Light Railways Act provides for the encouragement of railway communication with great tracts of country still remote from existing lines. Regular railways can be built only by special charter and must meet certain requirements as to road and equipment. Light railways may be authorized by a commission, where they are proved to be necessary, and may be more cheaply built. The treasury may also make an advance of one-quarter the amount needed for construction.—EDWARD PORRITT, *Yale Review*, November 1896. F.

Ethics from the Point of View of Sociology (continued).—B. Ethics before Kant. (a) Character of Greek ethics. The fundamental trait of Greek life was individualism. It found itself the sufficient principle and final end of active life and speculation. The people in their theory reflected the equilibrium which they realized between social and individual life, but were not able to fix the principle they found. (b) Christian ethics. The value of man as man, which was lacking in ancient Greece, is the basis of the new ideas which bring about a social revolution. But a break with nature, the source of corruption, was introduced. The first effort to eliminate this dualism was marked by an apparent return to the past, by the resurrection of ancient naturalism of the epoch of the Renaissance. (c) Immediate antecedents of the Kantian ethics; social changes were closely connected with the transformation of ethical ideas. The most characteristic idea of this transformation was that of separation of theory and practice, found in Locke and the English moralists of the eighteenth century, in a measure in Leibnitz, in Diderot and Rousseau, but not explicitly until Kant. This dualism was not unconscious, as in Socrates, where it resulted from traditionalism in morals; nor as in early Christianity, where it was caused by the identification of morals and religion. It was the first effort to humanize the moral problem. C. The French Revolution and Kantian ethics. (a) Individualistic interpretation of the revolutionary movement and the ethics of Kant. (1) The Revolution proclaimed the rights of man—the inviolable will of the individual. (2) Kant's ethics founds its law upon a reciprocity of the action of free wills. The will is an end in itself, a principle of universal legislation. Morality is reduced to intention. (b) The struggle against individualism in the Revolution and in Kant's ethics. (1) On one side the Revolution was purely negative. It was a struggle to dissolve the bonds of traditional solidarity. But its point of departure was a reciprocity of rights, *i. e.*, it affirmed a solidarity based upon nature and common human aspirations. (2) The work of Kant was also destructive. He attacked speculative dogmatism. But no ethics could be founded upon such a negative work. (b) The deficiency in the revolutionary idea and the thought of Kant. Both were absorbed in the strife against institutions and doctrines of the time. Conclusion. Primitive ethics was constant in relation to social life, but was unconscious. Greek ethics was insufficient, because it isolated the individual, and by its opposition to traditional morality prevented a readjustment to the new social conditions. The triumph of subjectivism takes place in Kant. This leads to the disappearance of exclusive individualism and the reconciliation of society and the individual. Immediately after the Revolution and Kant, the idea of solidarity arose. In this sense, the ethics of Kant is antecedent to sociology. We are now in an epoch of transition. A remedy for its evils should be found in the search for the advent of a new organic period.—MARCEL BERNÈS, "Programme d'un cours de sociologie générale: la morale au point de vu sociologique (*fin*)," *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, November 1896. F.



STOCK TANK

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A DAY AT HULL HOUSE.

"On montrait sa maison à quiconque avait besoin de quelque chose."

THE old house is almost submerged. With its hooded top story of fanciful brick, and its large flanking of additions to right and left, there remain but the long windows and wide doorway to hint of the aspect that was its own in the long-gone privacy of the estate of which it was an important and hospitable part in the quiet days before the invasion of crowd and hurry and competition. The house justly retains the name of its original owner.

These additions are more intrinsic than external—growing out of growing needs—and therefore present in themselves a kind of rough estimate or history of them. Thus, the most extensive area and the highest wall belong to the Children's Building, on the right flank, the corresponding smaller wing being used for lecture and class rooms, with dormitory space above. Following again the analogy of need, with the growth of the work came an extension of the commissary and economic bases, so that the coffeehouse, the model bakery and kitchen occupy a generous surface behind the central house, having appropriately above them the constant but not uncheerful noises of the gymnasium and club rooms for the men.

This can be but a suggestion of locality, for under the various roofs are harbored many variations of effort, placing

themselves according to a natural convenience, and adding to themselves in slow accretions, much as the function adds its tool, the organ.

A few fortunate open spaces, bare or bricked as they are, defend the mass of buildings from the dread likeness to an institution. The playground porches of the Children's Building, where there are flowers up to the last moment, and the easy-going aspect of the outside benches and their frequenters, help out the welcome.

The house has suffered a variety of nomenclature. To the children it is usually and comprehensively "the Kindergarten;" the Italian neighbors with their invincible poetry call it "la casa di Dio," while in spite of its own simply chosen name of a social settlement, to most of its immediate friends and to many at a remote distance it is the place "where Miss Addams lives;" for this name has come to have a generic meaning, and stands for a real presence to many who have no personal or visual knowledge of her.

To those who must have a definition of a thing whose being is essentially plastic, there is no better reply to be given than that of a young Englishman at a conference of good people. Upon being pestered for an exact statement he burst out with: "Why, hang it, madam, we settle." It is the personality of the "settlers" which determines the character of each group, and forms differ with their environment. The one necessary element is permanency. Individuals come and go; the attitude, the movement, the activity remain. Hull House itself is not unlike a rock of permanence, about which the tide of population flows and shifts and changes, bringing to it and taking away, altering it and wearing it into certain forms, but feeling it always firmly based, or as one of its neighbors expressed it "well grounded in the mud." This was at once a statement and a compliment.

About the house are its tributaries, some in material form and some visible only in spirit. Around the southern corner is a brick building, the home of the Jane Club, an active club of working women who in a life of five years have solved some of

the most vexing questions of coöperative living to their own social and economic satisfaction.

Across the street to the north is the pleasant two-story frame building of the Phalanx Club, where the same plan of living,



except for the cares of the kitchen, is carried on by the young men. Just north of this is the model lodging house for women, where any dependent woman may have the wise encouragement of a bed and a breakfast. Some thousand feet toward the river is the public playground, safely guarded by its iron fence and closed until after school hours. This piece of land, cursed by a bunch of miserable and criminal tenements and an absentee landlord, came finally by strange and picturesque ways into the hands of the settlement, and now clean and clear and wholesome, it has seen many a good time. May poles and singing children and flowers and music have surprised its sandy surface and in winter it gets a coating of ice for the skaters. And

always it is the place where the crowded children may breathe and run and shout in safety. Away down toward the southeast and off to the northwest are large study clubs of young men and women whose literary life began under the roof of the house and who have outgrown her first care.

The public-library reading room on Blue Island avenue, the public baths a few blocks away, the popular lectures now being given in one of the public schools were initiated by the settlement. The decoration of public schoolrooms, which is so novel and lovely a thing, is now carried on by the Society of Art in Schools, of which Miss Starr was the founder and of which she is president.

And somewhere about, as one might say within calling distance, in little rooms at least warm and clean and rent free, are a dozen elderly women, for whom through one of its residents the house has laid forever the specter of the county poorhouse. Some, it is true, came to curse but remained to pray, and all preserve the freedom of the beneficiary relation by generous criticism or approval.

The day begins early with the paper carrier, who hides his impartial list of daily papers under the mat for safety. He meets the earliest working mother—or possibly father—who is bringing the baby to the crèche, where an average of twenty-five little ones are cared for every day. This means spending the day under wise supervision, with pictures and toys; it means bread and milk eaten at a tiny table in company; it means the neatness of a bath and the sweetness of a nap in a little white bed all to oneself; it means the big porch playground with bright red geraniums on its border, and an exciting squirrel and a placable parrot at the ends. So may these good hours of the waking day make all the others but a sleep and a forgetting.

Below the crèche is a larger room where the elder babies may play at serious kindergarten, alleviated by a sand-pile and a monstrous doll's house, and still above is the larger room for the older class.



RECEPTION ROOM.

By half-past seven o'clock the coffeehouse and bakery are well astir. In the latter, rosy "Annie" is turning out her quota of brown and white loaves, with a minor detail of pies and shining rolls. When the coffeehouse was opened, with its stained rafters, its fine photographs, and its rows of blue china mugs, it had a reflective visit from one of its neighbors. He looked it over thoroughly and without prejudice, and said decisively: "Yez kin hev de shovel gang or yez kin hev de office gang, but yez can't hev 'em both in the same room at the same toime." Time has shown the exactness of the statement. Its clientele, increasing with its increasing efficiency, have selected themselves, and it is not the man in overalls who is the constant visitor, but the teacher, the clerk, and the smaller employer of the region. The laboring man sends his children for bread and soup and prepared food, but seldom comes himself, however well within his means the fare may be.

Here the residents of the house are served with a movable feast according to their uprisings. The quiet young inspector, whose work in the narrow alleys has changed them as by a daily miracle, is likely to be the first. Then come those who bear a divided burden; the factory inspector and her deputy, the librarian, the students, and the two schoolboys of the household. These are gone before those appear whose clubs and classes have kept them late the night before at the task of guide, philosopher, and friend.

From the coffeehouse are also served the luncheon and dinner for the house dining room, so that the family of twenty-four are placed in direct social and economic relations with the common kitchen, and the "belated industry" of private service is dispensed with. The domestic economy is all under one skilled management.

Leaving the coffeehouse by a covered way to the main building, one finds the large room on the right of the entrance already filled with applicants to the labor bureau for employment, or to the relief department for aid. The latter acts as a clearing house for organized aids except in the case of the

friends with whom the house has summered and wintered. These receive help as freely as they would give in their turn.

Now the house is like some creature slowly awakening from sleep. It begins to put out its hands, touching, it is believed, with



humility as well as hopefulness and trust the lives of those about it. By nine o'clock the visiting nurse may be seen packing her bag from her supply chest with the little mercies of lint and salve and baby food. The workers whose province lies outside, who see sick children, study racial needs through manners, foods, and customs, visit the police stations in search of the astray girl or boy, or minister to some special necessity, are beginning their rounds. In the octagon, which is a kind of open sanctuary, the heads of the house are attacking, with a patience born of long usage, the unmitigable mail of the morning.

By two in the afternoon the kindergarten training class is filling the largest room of the children's building, the lively and

wide-awake session of the Woman's Club is at its climax, the gymnasium is mildly noisy with its afternoon classes of girls, and from far up in the upper story come sounds of the children's chorus.

The applicants for employment make way—with intervals for ventilation—to the children's sewing class which comes tumultuously from school. Here and there, in corners slightly secluded, are single pupils—a bright boy out of working hours getting up his Greek for college, an elderly Russian plodding slowly along some bit of English text, or an eager young Jew making the crooked ways of his letters straight—all this with assistance of someone in the house.

The six o'clock dinner hour brings the household and its guests together in the beautiful dining room. This is the meeting ground of the day. Here the generalizations of the over young are discouraged with kindness and qualifying facts; here are the all-experienced induced to reconsider and admit another fact of the great truth; here is the free play of the individual with enough of friction to stimulate and enough of the juice of humor to sweeten. Thus the social consciousness of the living house grows. There may be a very radical end or a very conservative middle at the long oval but there is always a fair field and fair play.

In this general life the private affairs of the residents become shadowy, yet mothers have been seen there plainly visiting their children; men have been known to come with motives not severely altruistic; there have actually been engagements, and to an interested friend from the far West who asked breathlessly, "Do they marry?" one might answer with truth, "Often, alas! often."

The leisurely last moments of the dinner hour are apt to be invaded by the classes, and from now on there is a riot of young people. The studious—and there are many—attend the Extension classes, which cover almost the entire ground of the teaching branches, ranging from clay modeling to psychology, from grammar to Dante, from embroidery to trigonometry. The younger and gayer crowd, the dancing and



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dramatic clubs, the gymnasium with its games and basketball, claim a share of all.

Each club, no matter how lightly social, has its own sober meeting once a month, when it listens to some lecture or informal talk. The club names range from the purely ornamental through the descriptive to the utilitarian. There is "The Violet," "The Study," and "The Fourth of July Mandolin." A favorite custom is to enshrine the name of some hero or heroine, local or general, whereby Henry Clay and Clara Barton appear in friendly competition.

The Penny Provident Bank, which opens at night from seven to eight, is an importation from New York. Supplies of bank-books and stamps come from the parent institution, and there the deposits are finally redeemed. The system is one of great simplicity. The child exchanges his coin for a stout manilla book ruled in squares suitable for the stamp. This he signs with his name and address, receiving a stamp of the value of his coin. The money may be withdrawn at any time after it reaches the sum of fifty cents. Any impulse to reckless spending of a lesser sum is discouraged by the mulcting of five cents from the amount drawn. Visitors to the house find the bank, with its eager tangible depositors, full of vital interest; even more so, however, are the weekly meetings of the Social Science Club. These have gone on steadily for seven years and represent in an astonishing manner the "American spirit"

"That bids him flout the Law he makes,
That bids him make the Law he flouts."

Speakers of every opinion and circumstance have come before this body, have said their say—not always undisputed, not always courteously received—until now the test of all real love of knowing can be put to it—for it seeks to make welcome not opinion but knowledge.

The lights linger in the gymnasium, which is also the theater and assembly room, but at midnight the kindly "special officer" sees them going out until all is dark. If some restless resident sits up with a problem, or wakens at every clanging car bell, he

also waits to serve, for calls for the doctor or telegraph boys temper the night to the general average of the ward.

To speak of the external activities of the house; its holiday entertainments, its Sunday lectures and concerts, its summer



vacation home and school, its lendings of pictures and books, its art exhibits, its maps and records, would be but an extension of its inner life. To describe its attitude toward the school, the saloon, and the church, to interpret its action in regard to strikes, arbitration, and municipal politics, would be to attempt its psychology. What has been here presented is the method alone.

Hull House stands not so much for a solution of problems as a place of exchange. The demands which are brought to it are varied enough. One man wants to be "shown the sense of poetry," another wants his wife "converted to the evangelical religion" for the sake of a peaceful fireside, and a third wants—just the patrol wagon. One mother leaves her baby "while she goes to the matinee," and another hopes to find her boy, arrested she knows not where, for what, or by whom. Often the effort put forth in return is unwise or inadequate, but the exchange is the vital thing. This is the heart of the movement. This is the reason of the settlement; the rest is pure façade. This only can destroy the artificial, and justify its life. It must help that direct human touch of richer with poorer, wise with simple, learned with untaught, dynamic with static which has for its aim the realization by all the children of their kinship with the great family.

DOROTHEA MOORE.

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A SKETCH OF SOCIALISTIC THOUGHT IN ENGLAND.

FOR STUDENTS OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.¹

"It is sheer intellectual laziness," Sidney Webb says, "not to know what socialism is" in these days of almost superabundant literature on the subject. Professor Flint says that socialism cannot be defined. One difference between these authorities is, that while the former is engaged in introducing "increments" of socialism, the latter has departed from his proper field of philosophy to write a large book on a subject he has not taken the trouble to investigate. We shall avoid the necessity of deciding this difference of opinion by defining the socialism of this article (in the dynamic sense) as the movement toward the collective ownership and administration of land and capital. Our study will be confined to the development of the collectivist ideal in England. Every reform which would aid collectivism will be considered socialistic.

Socialism in this sense was made possible, perhaps inevitable, by the factory system. With the introduction of the joint-stock principle in capital, it was merely a question of the solidarity of political organization when the community should undertake such enterprises as it could better conduct than private companies. Before the advantages of the joint-stock company were fully appreciated, the proposals for industrial reform were almost entirely communistic. The continuance of the communist ideal is doubtless due largely to the maladministration of private corporations, and partly to the survival of domestic methods of production, and a distrust in the superiority of the factory over

¹ This may be called a syllabus. The bibliographies are not intended to be exhaustive. Unusual events and only the most important contributors to the progress of thought toward collectivism have been selected. It is impossible to make a thorough study of the subject without continual reference to material only to be had in London.

the domestic system. It will, however, be admitted that the collectivist ideal has largely supplanted the communist. This is not only due to the enormous development of capitalistic enterprise, but to the education of large and influential elements of the people in such collective institutions as trade unions, coöperative societies, friendly societies, and the civil service.

It is manifest that the ideal of the collective control of capital could not have preceded the industrial revolution and the factory system. The marvel would be that the ideal could even subsequently become effective if we consider only the unparalleled expansion of industry and commerce as a result of capitalistic enterprise. The effectiveness of the ideal is undoubtedly still limited by the success of capitalism, but it is strengthened by the inadequacy of capitalism to meet social needs, and the growth of a new machinery of government capable apparently of ministering in some measure to those needs. The first man to successfully criticise the capitalist system was Robert Owen. The strengthening of the governmental machine dates from the political philosophy of Jeremy Bentham. If we begin our studies then with these men, we shall find it convenient to divide the history of the century into periods which will show, first, the men and ideals which were chiefly influential; second, the intervening events which strengthened the growing ideals or gave rise to new ones. We shall find periods of sixteen years, beginning with 1832, to give us convenient and usually homogeneous divisions.

Previous to 1832 the chief constructive ideals were the reforms of law and government proposed by Bentham, and the reforms of the factory system suggested and in some cases experimentally introduced by Owen.¹

Ia. In 1832, the year of Bentham's death, the first great act for the reform of parliament was passed, and one of the early

¹ References.—BENTHAM, *A Fragment on Government*. Edited by Montague, Oxford, 1891. *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Oxford, 1876. *Works*, 11 vols., Edinburgh, 1843. LLOYD JONES, *Life of Robert Owen*, Soc. Sci. Ser. OWEN, *Addresses*, London, 1835; *Observations on the Effect of the Manufacturing System*, London, 1875.

measures brought in by the Reform Parliament was the Municipal Reform Act (1835) the first great step in local government.

Ib. 1832-1848.—This period includes the continued activities of Owen, who was now largely dissipating his energies in community schemes, though he also happily demonstrated in the *Labor Exchange* the futility of the doctrine that labor is the sole source of value, taught by Francis Place,¹ William Thomson, Owen, and later by Marx. The chief new actors are Coleridge, Shaftesbury, and Cobden.

Samuel Taylor Coleridge was the prime inspiration of the early Christian socialist movement. He provided Maurice with some of his chief social doctrines. He accepted the organic conception of society. He criticised the aggressions of capital. He denounced the accepted political economy, especially Malthusianism. He placed citizenship before Christianity. Two quotations will suggest the advisability of consulting his writings in a study of the crude socialism of the broad churchmen. In a conversation with Harriet Martineau "he avowed that there were points on which we differed (I was full of wonder that there were any on which we agreed). For instance, said he, you appear to consider that society is an aggregate of individuals. I replied that I certainly did, whereupon he went off on one of the several metaphysical interpretations which may be put upon the many-sided fact of an organized human society, subject to natural laws in virtue of its aggregate character and organization together."² In his Second Lay Sermon, p. 414, he gives as the positive ends of the state: (1) "To make the means of subsistence more easy to each individual. (2) To secure to each of its members the hope of bettering his own condition or that of his children. (3) The development of those faculties which are essential to his humanity, that is, to his rational and moral being." The state which Coleridge has in mind is an aristocratic one, and his social philosophy is consequently paternalistic, but

¹ WALLAS, G. *Francis Place*, Longmans' (in press).

² HARRIET MARTINEAU, *Autobiography*, I, 397-8. Compare COLERIDGE, *The Friend*, 161.

we find it to be the basis of what Maurice and Kingsley called Christian socialism.¹

Lord Ashley, afterwards the Earl of Shaftesbury, from his first entrance into parliament devoted himself to the suffering people. He succeeded in stopping many of the abuses in lunatic asylums, which were formerly exclusively private institutions. He gave himself to the chimney sweeps, to ragged schools, to the victims from the opium trade in China, but his life work was the improvement of the factory operatives' life. He came into prominence in connection with the Ten Hours' Bill, which was being advocated as a result of the report of the commissioners of 1833. From that time to 1850, when the Ten Hours' Bill became law, Lord Ashley gave up every opportunity for preferment and personal enjoyment in his untiring devotion to the extension of the protective functions of the state. One need not ignore the services of Owen, Oastler, Hobhouse, Sadler and others in crediting the lion's share in the early development of factory legislation to the Earl of Shaftesbury. The importance of this act of 1850 was the establishment of the right and wisdom of the government in interfering with the manufacturers in the interest of their operatives. Although the act, as worded, provided only for a ten hours' day for women and young persons, it was clearly understood throughout the debate, as is indicated by the speeches of the opposition, that this restriction would also necessitate the limitation of the hours of adult males, and the battle was fought on that ground. Ten years later an almost unanimous expression of parliament endorsed the action. By this act one of the most favorable steps to socialism was taken. Henceforth the question of state interference is one of expediency, not of principle.²

¹ References.—COLERIDGE, *Complete Works*, 7 vols., New York, 1884; *The Table Talk*, Bohn's Library, 1884; *The Friend*, Bohn's Library, 1866; *Letters, Conversations, etc.*, London, 1864. CAINE, HALL, *Life of Coleridge* (excellent bibliography), 1887. TRAILL, H. D., *Life of Coleridge*, 1884.

² References.—PLENER, *English Factory Legislation*, London, 1873. SEELEY, *Memoirs of M. T. Sadler*, London, 1842. HODDER, *Life of Lord Shaftesbury*, London, 1892. JEVONS, *The State in Relation to Labor*, London, 1889.

Among the many instructive features of this period might be mentioned the Chartist agitation and the radical social philosophy of the Chartists (yet their teachings bore greatest fruit when they were dead).

Communistic coöperation collapsed in 1834. Democratic coöperation was born in Rochdale in 1844, Charles Haworth's device of dividend on purchase being the most socialistic principle yet introduced into private enterprise. But this movement has greatest interest for us in its relation to capitalistic organization during a subsequent period.

The anti-corn-law agitation of Cobden, Bright, and others, culminated in the repeal of the corn laws. Richard Cobden was as far from being tainted with the germs of socialism as Jeremy Bentham, and his name has been mentioned chiefly because he was the principal representative of the individualist school at this period. Yet the repeal of the corn laws and the agitation for free trade paved the way not only for an enormous development of industry, but for other demands for freedom in industry not anticipated by the individualists, and which they could not stifle.¹

IIa. In 1846 the corn laws were repealed; 1848, the Chartist agitation collapses; 1850, the Ten Hours' Bill was passed.

IIb. 1848-1864.—The philosophy of Coleridge lives over into this period in the teachings of Maurice. The other chief personalities are Carlyle, Comte, and J. S. Mill.

Frederick Denison Maurice and his followers, Kingsley, Hughes, Ludlow, and all the noble band of Christian socialists, derived their philosophy from Coleridge, Carlyle, the French communists, and the revelations of Chartism. Their sociology, was crude, their ideal of little coöperative workshops was crude, but their sympathies and devotion were great and formed the needful complement to the denunciations of Carlyle. Two brief

¹ *References.*—MORLEY, *Life of Cobden*, 2 vols., 1896. TRUMBULL, *The Free Trade Movement in England*, Open Court Co. HOLYOAKE, *The Rochdale Pioneers*, London, 1893. MARTINEAU, *History of the Peace*, Bohn's Library, 4 vols. HELD, *Zwei Bücher zur sozialen Geschichte Englands*, Leipzig, 1881. SCHULZE-GAEVERNITZ, *Zum sozialen Frieden*, Vol. I, 309-343, Leipzig, 1890.

quotations from Maurice will serve to illustrate the teachings of this group of men. "Monarchy with me is the starting point. I look upon socialism as historically developed out of it, not absorbing it into itself. A king given and an aristocracy given and I can see my way clearly to call upon them to do the work which God has laid upon them; to repent of their sins, to labor that the whole manhood of the country may have a voice, that every member of Christ's body may be indeed a free man."

"Competition is put forth as the law of the universe. That is a lie. The time is come for us to declare that it is a lie, by word and deed. I see no way but associating for work instead of for strikes." Christian socialism has never died. Today the influence of Maurice is only one among many others sustaining it, and that influence is largely an emotional one, yet so long as inspiration is needed for social regeneration, whether in the state or the individual, it is hard to overestimate teachings like his.¹

The place of honor in this period undoubtedly belongs to Thomas Carlyle. While his teachings have had to be made positive, expanded, almost transformed by his followers, before they could contribute to the collectivist ideal, they undoubtedly aided indirectly every progressive social movement by weakening the faith in the existing order. If Carlyle was not a socialist he was the most powerful anti-individualist of the century. He shares with Coleridge and Comte the credit of having introduced a crude conception of the organic nature of society, being influenced as was the former by German philosophy, but he stands alone in the vigor of his destructive criticisms. Carlyle's writings must be read not merely as literature, but as prophecy. One example will suffice. Its counterparts are legion:

¹ References.—*Life and Letters of F. D. Maurice*, by J. F. MAURICE, 2 vols., London, 1884. *Life and Letters of Kingsley*, by his wife. MAURICE, *On the Reformation of Society*, Southampton, 1851; *Social Morality*, London, 1869; *The Workman and the Franchise*, New York, 1866; *Christian Socialism*, Church Social Union, Boston, 1896; *Tracts on Christian Socialism*, London, 1850; *The Christian Socialist*, 2 vols., London, 1851. SCHULZE-GAEVERNITZ, *Zum sozialen Frieden*, I, 295-306. KAUFMANN, M., *Christian Socialism*, London, 1888.

I admire a nation which fancies it will die if we do not undersell all other nations to the end of the world. Brother, we will cease to undersell them; we will be content to equalsell them; to be happy selling equally with them! I do not see the use of underselling them. Cotton cloth is already twopence a yard or lower, and yet bared backs were never more numerous among us. Let inventive men cease to spend their existence incessantly contriving how cotton can be made cheaper; and try to invent a little how cotton at its present cheapness could be somewhat justlier divided among us. Let inventive men consider whether the secret of this universe, and of man's life here, does after all, as we rashly fancy it, consist in making money! There is one God, just, supreme, almighty; but is mammon the name of him? With a hell which means "Failing to make money," I do not think there is any heaven possible that would suit one well; nor so much as an earth that can be habitable long. In brief, all this mammon gospel of supply and demand, competition, *laissez faire*, and devil take the hindmost, begins to be one of the shabbiest gospels ever preached, or altogether the shabbiest.¹

Auguste Comte's influence promised at one time to become the dominant one in English social philosophy. Harriet Martineau made such an excellent two-volume abridgment of his ponderous work that he had it retranslated into French. Lewes and George Eliot preached positivism incessantly to their large coterie of influential friends, including the young Frederick Harrison destined to be the greatest champion of positivism in England. Herbert Spencer, whatever be his own opinion in the matter, is generally conceded to have helped to spread the positive philosophy. The most successful workers in the field of social reform in the seventies were the positivists. Today the two little rival religious bodies which continue to hold their

¹ *References.*—The best estimates of Carlyle's teachings and influence are to be found in SCHULZE-GAEVERNITZ, *Zum sozialen Frieden*, I, 77–290, Leipzig, 1890, printed separately as "Thomas Carlyle;" and CLARKE, "Carlyle and Ruskin and their Influence on English Thought," *New England Magazine*, December 1893. CARLYLE, *Sartor Resartus*, *Past and Present*, *Chartism*, *Latter Day Pamphlets*, *Correspondence between Goethe and Carlyle*, 1887, *Correspondence of Carlyle and Emerson*, Boston, 1886; *Early Letters*, London, 1886; *Letters*, London, 1888. FROUDE, J. A., *Thomas Carlyle's First Forty Years*, 2 vols., London, 1890; *Thomas Carlyle in London*, 2 vols., 1890. JENKS, *Thomas Carlyle and J. S. Mill*, London, 1888. NICHOL, *Thomas Carlyle (English Men of Letters)*. TAINE, *English Literature*, Vol. II. FLÜGEL, *Carlyle's religiöse und sittliche Entwicklung*, Leipzig, 1887. WHITMAN, W., *Prose Works*, 168–78, Philadelphia, 1892.

peculiar Sunday services seem to be almost all that remain. It would be a great mistake to estimate the influence of Comte in contemporary England by these little circles of religiosity. His elevation of the idea of humanity, his philosophy of order and progress, his inspiration of some of the noblest workers and sociological thinkers of the last half century have been incalculable boons to social progress. Socialism has been helped by positivists partly by their tolerance, partly by their conceding it to be one of the preliminary stages in the progress toward positivism, partly by the exaggerated emphasis of the social organism.

Comte must be allowed to speak just a few words for himself. "The ideas of order and progress are, in social physics, as rigorously inseparable as the ideas of organization and life in biology, The misfortune of our actual state is that the two ideas are set up in radical opposition to each other—the retrograde spirit having directed all efforts in favor of order, and an anarchical doctrine having arrogated to itself the charge of social progress." The truth of this doctrine is illustrated by the fact that the positivists have lost ground ever since the collectivist movement came forward with the assurance of a reconciliation of order and progress.¹

John Stuart Mill contributed to the progressive movement, despite his individualism, by developing the doctrine of utilitarianism, by writing a transitional political economy (between Manchesterism on one side and the historical school on the other), by laying down principles of liberty which his own philosophy could not realize, by championing the cause of woman, by his political position as an advanced radical belonging to the group which has evolved into semi-collectivists today. His

¹ References.—COMTE, *General View of Positivism*, 2d ed., London, 1880. MARTINEAU, H., *The Positive Philosophy of A. Comte*, 3 vols., London, 1896. MILL, J. S., *Auguste Comte*, London, 1877. COMTE, *Lettres à des positivistes anglais*, London, 1889. CAIRD, *Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte*, 1885. WATSON, *Comte, Mill and Spencer*, 1895. SOMMER, H., *Die positive Philosophie A. Comtes*, Berlin, 1866: FOUILLÉE, A., *Le mouvement positiviste et la conception sociologique du monde*, Paris, 1896. SCHULZE-GAEVERNITZ, *Zum sozialen Frieden*, II, 3-77, Leipzig, 1890.

influence was also valuable because in contrast with Herbert Spencer his individualism weakened with maturity.¹

IIIa. The beginning of the sixties was marked by the revelations of Darwin, Wallace, and Spencer in the field of biology, later to enormously influence sociological thought.

In 1864 the great coöperative movement began to attract attention and illustrate the progress of democracy by the organization of the Wholesale Society, coördinating and consolidating the distributive societies all over England. In 1867 another great step in parliamentary reform strengthened the power of the growing spirit of democracy.

IIIb. 1864-1880.—The giants in this period are T. H. Green, Ruskin, and Spencer. The greatest philosophic mind of the century was doubtless that of Thomas Hill Green. He deepened ethical and political philosophy while he at the same time made their application practicable by bringing them into conformity with the laws of evolution. A mere hint at a few of the subjects he has treated with the unrivaled skill not merely of the greatest English philosopher of the nineteenth century, but of an experienced politician, will suffice to show the necessity of examining his influence on contemporary political philosophy; thus: the relation of the individual to the state, the liberty of the individual, natural rights, the spontaneity of social interests, freedom of contract, rationale of property, land monopoly.

Green's advance on Mill's doctrine of liberty may illustrate the position of progressive thought in this period as compared with the former one.

The freedom to do as they like on the part of one set of men may involve the ultimate disqualification of many others, or of a succeeding generation, for the exercise of rights. This applies most obviously to such kinds of contract or traffic as affect the health and housing of the people, the growth of population relatively to the means of subsistence, and the accumulation or distribution of landed property. In the hurry of removing those restraints on

¹ References.—MILL, *Dissertations and Discussions*, 4 vols., London, 1859-75; *Political Economy*, successive editions. *Autobiography*, London, 1873. *Socialism* New York, 1891. COURTNEY, W. L., *Life of J. S. Mill*, 1886. WATSON, *Comte, Mill and Spencer*.

free dealing between man and man which have arisen partly, perhaps, from some confused idea of maintaining morality, but much more from the power of class interests, we have been apt to take too narrow a view of the range of persons — not one generation merely, but succeeding generations — whose freedom ought to be taken into account (freedom here meaning their qualifications for the exercise of rights). Hence the massing of population without regard to conditions of health; unrestrained traffic in deleterious commodities; unlimited upgrowth of the class of hired laborers in particular industries, which circumstances have suddenly stimulated, without any provision against the danger of an impoverished proletariat in following generations.¹

John Ruskin is so well known that he is but little studied. Otherwise more people would know that he has been one of the greatest ethical and economic teachers of this century. Of deep significance are his contributions to social welfare in the realm of art, still scantily appreciated even by his admirers, and his sturdy and beautiful ethics. For a true appreciation of Ruskin one must carefully follow the processes of thought which led the art critic to turn economist. Disregarding his disputed economic contributions he has, by promulgating the first scientific conception of wealth, given promise of revolutionizing economic thought. No single influence has been so great on the young British economist of today, and even the popular mind has been aided by it in ways that it will take a generation fully to appreciate.

Ruskin was also the first to lay stress on the importance of consumption.

The greatest problem of political economy is the consumption of goods. The great question for a people is not how much labor can be employed, but how much life is made possible. It is uneconomic to produce anything which does not lead to life. There is no wealth but life — life, including all its powers of love, of joy, of admiration. That country is richest which nourishes the greatest number of noble and happy human beings, and that man is richest who, having perfected the functions of his own life to the utmost, has also the widest helpful influence, both personally and by means of his possessions, over the lives of others.

¹ *References.*—GREEN, *Works*, 3 vols., with Memoir, London, 1885. *Lectures on Political Obligation*, London, 1895. FAIRBROTHER, *The Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green*, London, 1896.

The impartial student will be chiefly impressed by the effect of these doctrines in transferring, unconsciously to Ruskin himself, the chief defenses of collectivist and other progressive social movements from the sphere of economics to that of sociology. His doctrine of wealth is as yet often neglected because its place is not found in the conflict over the limits of economics and sociology.

A remarkable feature of Ruskin's influence is its extent. The numerous Ruskin clubs comprise manufacturers, shopkeepers, professional men and women, university professors, teachers, artisans, clergymen, laborers, and other equally diverse classes.¹

Herbert Spencer has enjoyed the distinction and suffered the misfortune of completing recently a system of philosophy. It has been carried out with remarkable faithfulness to the original plan. Since the prospectus of the Synthetic Philosophy was issued, the whole tenor of philosophic thought has changed, some of the most important practical applications of the growing body of knowledge have been made, but the Synthetic Philosophy has proceeded, serenely indifferent to the progress of the world. One cannot but admire the man whose physical disabilities for thirty-six years permitted at the most not more than three hours' work a day. In the face of that fact the completion of this great system is a marvel, but one can hardly be expected to accept the later results of this plucky invalid, who for years has been out of touch with the actual affairs of life. The man who could boast in his latest volume that in the middle of this century (especially in England) a degree of individual freedom had been reached "greater than ever before existed since nations began to form" is alluding to a period, the memory of which brings the blush to the cheek of every lover of his kind.

His influence has been great, both negatively in bolstering up a party of reaction, and positively in actual contributions to

¹ References.—RUSKIN, *Unto This Last*; *Crown of Wild Olive*; *Ethics of the Dust*; *Munera Pulveris*; *Sesame and Lilies*; *Fors Clavigera*; *Præterita*. COLLINGWOOD, *Life and Works of John Ruskin*, 2 vols., London, 1893; *The Art Teaching of John Ruskin*, London, 1891; *The Ruskin Reader*, 1895. GEDDES, *John Ruskin*, *Economist*, Round Table Series, 1884. AXON, *John Ruskin*, a bibliographical

sociological thought. The inelasticity of the system is what has destroyed its once promising influence. The strong negative element characterized by the damaging phrase, "administrative nihilism," has also undoubtedly tended to weaken the positive element. It is difficult for the Americans, who are still reading Spencer, to realize what a negligible quantity he has become in England. Perhaps it will suffice to illustrate this estimate of Spencer by saying that the most intellectual woman among the collectivists was a personal student of Spencer for years.¹

IVa. Sydney Webb, in a lecture on "The Progress of Collectivism," delivered in February, 1894, said: "The turning point in the history of socialism in England may be taken to be 1880. Prior to that unsystematic individualism reigned supreme. The political ideal was free competition and the minimum of government, whilst the millennium for the workers was to turn artisans into little capitalists, and agricultural laborers into owners of 'three acres and a cow.' In 1879 there were more unemployed than there have ever been since; but no responsible authority thought of anything but charity or poor-law relief for them. In 1882 John Morley, in commending the systematic and constructive thought of John Stuart Mill and his school, declared that no such political thinking then existed. This introduction of constructive thought into English politics is the great work of the socialist movement Twenty years ago the typical young politician was an individualist quoting Herbert Spencer. Today he is an empirical collectivist of a practical kind."

The deductive political economy of Ricardo, Mill, and Cairnes was giving way before special economic investigations and the influence of German thinkers, which led to the growth of

biography, 1879; *RUSKIN, Abstract of the Objects and Constitution of St. George's Guild*, 1877; *The Guild of St. George*, Master's Report, 1885. CLARKE, "Carlyle and Ruskin and their Influence on English Thought," *New England Magazine*, December 1893. COOKE, *Studies in Ruskin*, London, 1896.

¹ References.—SPENCER, *Principles of Sociology*, 3 vols.; *Justice; Social Statics; Man vs. the State*. WATSON, *Comte, Mill, and Spencer*. BÖSCH, *Die entwicklungstheoretische Idee sozialer Gerechtigkeit, eine Kritik und Ergänzung der Socialtheorie Herbert Spencers*, Zürich, 1896. SCHULZE-GAEVERNITZ, *Zum sozialen Frieden*, II, 176-86.

the historical school. Bagehot said of the classical political economy in his *Economic Studies*, 1880, "It is a convenient series of deductions from assumed axioms which are never quite true, which in many times and countries would be utterly untrue, but which are sufficiently near to the principal conditions of the modern English world to make it useful to consider them by themselves." Stanley Jevons (*On the Future of Political Economy*, 1876) and Cliffe Leslie (*Essays, Moral and Political*, 1879) followed Bagehot in the development of the historical school. The gigantic work of Thorold Rogers on *Agriculture and Prices* had been appearing from 1866 to 1882, to be followed by *Work and Wages* in 1884. Cunningham's *Growth of English Industry and Commerce* was first issued in 1882. In 1881-2 Arnold Toynbee delivered at Oxford his lectures on the "Industrial Revolution." Since that time the inductive method has been in the ascendancy in England. Whatever be the faults of Henry George's *Progress and Poverty*, which appeared about this time, its theories were founded on a startling array of facts. Even Marx's *Capital*, the English translation of which appeared in 1883, although its deductions influenced certain socialist bodies, contributed, by its exhaustive treatment of capitalistic production, valuable material for the inductive students. This material is still used, while his theories are rejected by the thoughtful English socialist. The following declaration of Professor Ingram in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (Article, Political Economy) would probably be accepted by all the leading English economists of the last decade: "It cannot be permanently our business to go on amending and limiting the Ricardian doctrines and asking by what special interpretations of phrases or additional qualifications they may still be admitted as having a certain value. The time for a new construction has arrived." That new construction has been taking place in the hands of the younger economists ever since.

By the legislation of 1875 trade unions were assured an uninterrupted development which has been wonderfully realized. In 1884 the last great reform act was passed, extending the franchise to more voters than had received it by the two previous acts.

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IV. 1880-1896.—The great name which falls in this period is that of William Morris. A disciple of Ruskin, he developed the philosophy of his master into genuine socialism. As manufacturer of the most beautiful fabrics, designer of unsurpassed patterns, printer of the handsomest books, original and edifying lecturer, vigorous and fearless agitator, even as uncrowned poet laureate, he contributed to socialism. He is doubtless (not forgetting Marx) the greatest man who has advocated the cause of socialism. It may further be said that his has been the most elevating influence, his teachings, while idealistic, often the most profoundly practical, his life the greatest benediction enjoyed in the socialist movement. It would be hard to find a more pithy and pregnant statement of socialistic idealism than this: "First, a healthy body; second, an active mind in sympathy with the past, the present, and the future; thirdly, occupation fit for a healthy body and an active mind; and, fourthly, a beautiful world to live in."¹

Mention has already been made of the influence of the foreigners, Karl Marx and Henry George, to whom must be added Frederick Engels in this period. As their contributions to English socialism have only become effective after adaptation by Englishmen to English conditions, nothing more need be said.²

The Fabian Society, the most unique and progressive of socialist organizations, enjoys the position almost of an individual of strong personality. The members have in fact had all the

¹ References.—MORRIS, *Signs of Change*, London, 1888; *Hopes and Fears for Art*, London; *Art and Socialism*; Hammersmith's Socialist Society's Tract: *News from Nowhere*, New York; *The Dream of John Ball*, New York. VALLANCE, *The Art of William Morris* (only an edition de luxe, London, 1897). TRIGGS, O. L., articles in *Folk-Lore*. ZUEBLIN, R. F., "William Morris, a Poet's Workshop," *The Outlook*, October 31, 1896. ASHBEE, *Workshop Reconstruction and Citizenship*, Boston, 1895. HORNE, H. P., "William Morris," *Saturday Review*, Christmas, 1896.

² References.—MARX, *Capital*, translation by Engels and Aveling, 1883. ENGELS, *The Condition of the Working Classes in 1844*, Soc. Sci. Ser. *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*, Soc. Sci. Ser. GEORGE, *Progress and Poverty*. WALLACE, A. R., *Land Nationalization*, Soc. Sci. Ser. HYNDMAN, *The Historical Basis of Socialism*. AVELING, *The Student's Marx*, Soc. Sci. Ser.

advantages and disadvantages of a "school." Their compact organization, controlled by a handful of strong leaders, has developed socialist theory as few individuals have been able to do, while at the same time the division of labor among the members and the limits of their specialties have deprived the society of some of the most important influences. The progress of thought within the society has been quite remarkable, and is well treated in G. Bernard Shaw's lecture on "The Fabian Society," delivered in 1892 (tract number 44). So marked, indeed, has been their progress that they are hardly more in harmony with the average Marxist group than with the Liberty and Property Defense League. The latest developments in Fabian thought are expressed in the manifesto presented to the International Socialist Congress in London, 1896. This is in large part reprinted in Bernard Shaw's article (*Cosmopolis*, September 1896), next to Morris' *Art and Socialism*, the most brilliant defense of socialism in English. As laid down in the manifesto —

The object of the Fabian Society is to persuade the English people to make their political constitution thoroughly democratic, and so to socialize their industries as to make the livelihood of the people entirely independent of private capitalism The Fabian Society does not suggest that the state should monopolize industry as against private enterprise or individual initiative The distinction made between state socialism and social democracy in Germany has no meaning in England. It [the Fabian society] has no distinctive opinions on the marriage question, religion, art, abstract economics, historic evolution, currency It recognizes that social democracy is not the whole of the working-class programme Each installment of social democracy will only be a measure among other measures The Fabian Society, far from holding aloof from other bodies, urges its members to lose no opportunity of joining them, and permeating them with Fabian ideas as far as possible Compromise is a necessary condition of political progress The Fabian Society has no romantic illusions as to the freedom of the proletariat from narrow (middle class) ideals The Fabian Society discredits such phrases as "the abolition of the wage system," which can only mislead the public as to the aims of socialism resolutely opposes all pretensions to hamper the socialization of industry with equal wages, equal hours of labor, equal official status, or equal authority for everyone The Fabian

Society does not put socialism forward as a panacea for the ills of human society, but only for those produced by defective organization of industry and by a radically bad distribution of wealth.

In addition to the official contributions of the Fabian Society in literature and practical politics, the Fabian spirit has been abundantly manifested in independent publications of its members, some of them among the most important contributions to practical politics, economics, and sociology, and many ephemeral but important contributions to newspapers.¹

David G. Ritchie is proving the ablest of the many pupils of T. H. Green. No one has done more efficient service in the application of evolutionary principles to politics, with the result among others of extending Green's influence in the defense of state intervention as an instrument in securing personal liberty.²

Among those who have developed more scientifically than Morris, Ruskin's ideas of wealth and consumption, and applied them to economics and sociology, are Ingram, Toynbee, Geddes, Mackenzie, Hobson, and Smart. The most active and influential of these writers are John A. Hobson and William Smart. The latter has undone some of Marx's influence by popularizing the theory of value of the Austrian school. An unusual interest attaches to their economic writings because the subject they chiefly treat, consumption, lies on the threshold of sociology.

The problem to which they are contributing is to determine the influence on both producer and consumer of a transition from quantitative to qualitative consumption, that is, to enable indi-

¹ References.—*Fabian Essays*, London and Boston; *Fabian Tracts* (last No., 74), London. BEATRICE POTTER (WEBB), *The Coöperative Movement*; Soc. Sci. Ser. *Trade Unions and Coöperation*, Manchester, 1892. WEBB, S., *Socialism in England*, Soc. Sci. Ser.; *Three Years' Work on the London County Council*, London, 1895; *A London Programme*, Soc. Sci. Ser.; "Municipal Progress," *Coöp. Soc. Annual*, 1896. WEBB, S. and B., *The History of Trade Unionism*, 1895; numerous articles in the *Economic Review*, the *Economic Journal*, the *Political Science Quarterly*, etc.; WEBB, S. and COX, H., *The Eight Hours' Day*. BALL, S., "The Moral Aspects of Socialism," *Int. Jour. Ethics*, April 1896.

² References.—RITCHIE, *State Interference*, Soc. Sci. Ser.; *Darwinism and Politics*, Soc. Sci. Ser., 2d ed., 1891; *Natural Rights*, London, 1895; "Social Evolution," *Int. Jour. of Ethics*, January 1896.

viduals to satisfy a preference for durable goods instead of perishable, goods whose use is social rather than those whose consumption is selfish, and goods expressing individuality instead of fashion's products. The higher wants of life can only be satisfied by individual production. Art and music are not machine made. Machine products are exactly alike, but consumers are not. There can be little progressive consumption so long as consumers sink their individuality. As qualitative consumption increases the individuality both of consumer and producer is encouraged, a higher class of labor is employed. As such tastes increase there is a probability, almost a necessity, that the lower wants shall be satisfied by routine effort. Machinery is naturally adapted to the satisfaction of routine wants, provided it be under social control. The character of machine production is essentially collective. The maladies of machine industry are due to the fact that this collective character is inadequately recognized. But it is impossible to obtain this recognition until there is a greatly increased demand for the products of individualized labor. Qualitative consumption will stimulate the demand for a variety of products, but it must be accompanied by the desire to consume now. This is a necessity not only to avoid overproduction, but because the effort to consume now in the satisfaction of existing wants will stimulate new ones. The truest conception of consumption is to combine work and life. It is a great evil for a laborer to work too hard to enjoy consumption today, and be too idle tomorrow to consume qualitatively. The problem of the overworked capitalist and the unemployed laborer is in a sense one. The manifest implications of such theories of consumption, though not necessarily claimed by the writers, are the collective organization of routine efforts and universality of labor and leisure.¹

¹ References.—INGRAM, History of Political Economy, article in *Encyclopædia Britannica*. GEDDES, John Ruskin, *Economist*, Round Table Series, 1884; *The Claims of Labor*, 1886. MACKENZIE, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, Glasgow, 1890. SMART, *The Theory of Value*, London, 1891; *Studies in Economics*, London, 1895. HOBSON, *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism*, New York, 1889; *The Unemployed*, London, 1896.

It must be recognized that while these contributions have been enabling the collectivist movement to gather strength, as important or even weightier influences have been at work in the world of facts. To mention but two forces; the Parish Council's Act gives power to local governing bodies to become land owners, and in some cases the power has been already exercised; the municipalization of monopolies has proceeded with great rapidity of recent years.¹

If it is asked why so little attention has been given to the critics of collectivism, the answer is not far to seek.² The work of the earlier and influential critics like Herbert Spencer has been undone, as is evidenced by the strong collectivist tendency of the last few decades. Whatever be the strength of individualism elsewhere it has no hold on the social philosophy of contemporary England, though it is still as strong as ever in some commercial and financial circles, such as manufacturers' associations and the Liberty and Property Defense League.

Many great writers are neither individualist nor collectivist, such, for example, as Marshall, Cunningham, Sidgwick, Leslie Stephen, and Charles Booth. Even John Morley's latest political addresses are "tainted" with vague demands for "Labor." The defense of individualism rests, with one exception, in the hands of writers who are their own refutation. The strongest

¹ References.—SHAW, A., *Municipal Government in Great Britain*, New York. BELL and PATON, *Glasgow: Its Municipal Administration*, Glasgow, 1896. PARKER, G. F., "Birmingham," *Century*, November 1896; WEBB, S., *Socialism in England*, Soc. Sci. Ser.; "Municipal Progress," *Coöp. Soc. Ann.*; Three Years' Work of the London County Council. *London (Weekly Organ of the London Reform Union)*, invaluable for students of municipal movements.

² References.—MARSHALL, *Economics*, 2d ed. CUNNINGHAM, *History of English Industry and Commerce*, Vol. II., Cambridge, 1892. SIDGWICK, *Methods of Ethics*, 5th ed., London, 1893; *Elements of Politics*, London, 1891; *Principles of Political Economy*, London, 1883; STEPHEN, L., *Science of Ethics*, London, 1882; *Social Rights and Duties*, 2 vols., London, 1896. BOSANQUET, B., *Aspects of the Social Problem*, "The Moral Aspects of Socialism," *Int. Jour. of Ethics*, July 1896. MALLOCK, W. H., *Labor and the Popular Welfare*, London, 1894; *Classes and Masses*, London, 1896. DONISTHORPE, W., *Individualism, a System of Politics*, London, 1889; *Law in a Free State*, London, 1895. HAKE and WESSLAU, *The Coming Individualism*, London, 1896. MCKECHNIE, *The State and the Individual*, Glasgow, 1896.

opponent of collectivistic devices is probably Bernard Bosanquet. Others are of the rank of the prodigal novelist, W. H. Mallock, who, wandering in the strange paths of economics, has lately taken to writing axiomatic defenses of individualism, or Geoffrey Drage, who sublimates much valuable material, gathered by scholarly effort, with a strong tincture of Toryism. The influences of privilege, reaction, and conservatism are for the moment ascendant in England, but the social philosophy is strongly collectivist.

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INSTRUCTION IN THE OBSERVATION OF SOCIAL FACTS ACCORDING TO THE LE PLAY METHOD OF MONOGRAPHS ON FAMILIES.*

I.

1. *Principles and advantages of the method of F. Le Play.*—

The Le Play method consists: first, in basing the study of populations upon that of certain families judiciously chosen and belonging to the working class; second, in describing these families according to a determined and uniform outline. Seeing in the family the true social unit, it proceeds as the zoölogist who, in order to describe a living species, applies to certain individuals of this species the processes of anatomical and physiological investigation. It searches for the laws of social science in the most simple cases, reserving the determination of the influences which modify them in more complex cases.

It is to facilitate observation and to render it more fruitful that it is preferred to choose among laboring families the types for monographs. These families in fact form the great mass of the population. They are more subordinated, in their material life and in their physical activity, to the climate and to the productions of the country which they inhabit, and for this reason they also form the characteristic element of the population. Moreover, certain classes of laborers are less exposed than the superior classes to social fluctuations. They conserve with an energy wholly peculiar the order which has been progressively established by anterior civilizations, and which must be the basis for accomplishing new improvements. Finally the relations which bind the laborers to the superior classes are everywhere the foundation of the existence of these latter, and the principal trait of nationality.

*Translated for the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY by CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.

In opposition to the fault, so general in our time, which consists in treating social questions from an exclusive point of view, the Le Play method of monographs embraces, in its entirety, the existence of a family considered under all its aspects. It directs the observer, moreover, by rules determined with rigorous precision, by a question-book completely applicable to all families, in whatever latitude and in whatever civilization they belong; and this uniform framework facilitates comparisons upon which true social laws must be founded.

The necessity of making these social studies precise and complete gives to the monographs some complication. Nevertheless they are not on that account tasks accessible only to very cultivated minds; the method has been often applied with success by men little educated, but guided by good sense. Every judicious observer will succeed in this sort of work if he will consult well the work entitled *La Méthode d'Observation*, in which are briefly set forth the origin, the description, and the history of the method. (It forms the first volume of the second edition of *Ouvriers européens* in six volumes 8vo.)

2. *The dominant idea in monographs of families.*—In the main family monographs are derived from a higher idea called forth by the observation of facts.

Crises of misfortune are common in the history of societies of complex constitution; the precarious situation of France for more than two centuries might at first view be regarded as one of those periods of decay which habitually follow epochs of prosperity. But the actual state of our country, and of the countries of the West led by our example, offers a character exceptional, new, and of grave importance. It is the specialization which has extended itself even to the primary social unity, the family. It is this infinite parceling out of sentiments and interests which no longer permits people to confer together on the subject of local means of reform. Happily, unity of spirit subsists in numerous regions of the Orient and of the North, and even in the Occident, in certain oases of social peace. One can, without going out of Europe, observe nations

both happy and unhappy. The comparative study of their social constitutions causes therefore the symptoms of health or of disease to be recognized, and, by consequence, the means of effecting a cure.

On the other hand, nations are composed not of individuals, but of families. The work of observation, which would be vague, undefined, and unable to lead to any conclusion if it had to be extended in one locality to individuals of different sex and age, becomes precise, limited, and conclusive as soon as it has for its object families. This is an evident fact; it belongs to the very nature of that social unity of which the physical and moral organization of man furnishes the principle, and it is in this fact that the practical efficacy of the Le Play method of family monographs resides.

II.

1. *Elasticity of the Le Play method.*—The application of the method of monographs does not require that the observer confine himself to one locality, to one class, or to one determined family. The principal advantage which it offers is that of permitting one to ascertain in a short time the customs of any country whatever. Not only is it not necessary to be located in that country, but one can even study it with success at a distance if he has under his eyes a family that was born in it and lived in it for a long time.

Likewise one may observe indifferently any one of the agricultural or industrial classes of a locality. However, in a region which has not yet been described it is preferable to fix one's attention upon the peasants; that is, upon the little agricultural proprietors who, with their families, employ upon their estate the whole of their time, without being obliged to work outside in the quality of hired persons. This class is always the fundamental element of a civilization. Thanks to the nature of its labors and habits, which result from the ownership of land, it preserves better than the others the imprint of the local genius.

2. *Choice of the family to observe.*—In a determined class

one ought always to choose a family which is originally of the locality, and which gathers together nearly average (mean) conditions; that is, which is neither superior nor inferior to others in respect to its material situation or its morality. Again, one must attach himself most often for description to a complete household, for the study of such is, in general, more fruitful than that of a household without children. Finally, it is necessary to take a family which lends itself willingly to observation, yielding itself to the wish expressed by the observer or by persons influential in the locality.

Admittance to the family will be especially open to the observer, in all the countries where social peace reigns, through the employer in whom the confidence of the workingman reposes. In the countries that antagonism desolates, and with a workingman whom a secret or declared hostility alienates from influences which are ordinarily efficacious, the difficulties will be greater, but by taking for an absolute rule, in this case, that one shall never let be seen or felt the least disapprobation on the subject of what has been said to him; by remembering always that it is proposed to observe and not to enlighten or to redress the wrongs of him who is observed, the investigator will succeed beyond doubt in calming the laborer's mistrusts, and in getting him to speak with an open heart. In any case one must recollect that the time of a workingman is his capital, and compensate him from whom he has taken long hours in order to obtain from him the information of which he has need.

3. *Conditions in which it is necessary to place oneself in order to observe well.*—The type of the monograph being thus chosen, two conditions will permit of obtaining from this study the results that one has a right to expect. The first is a sincere love of the science which aims to seek out the truth and to register the facts with a scrupulous exactness. It is not, however, necessary that the observer be impartial or imbued previously with true social principles; he can often set himself to the work with the purpose of demonstrating by the facts an erroneous principle, which has his sympathies, but the application of the method will

suffice always to cause him to distinguish the true from the false. The passion which induces in our time so many good men to defend error, will be thus for social science, as it has been for the physical sciences, the principal force which will conduct men to the truth. It is not to be feared, besides, that this bias will lead to concealing or to knowingly altering the nature of the facts; this class of dishonesty is sufficiently rare, and, thanks to the means of counter-checking which it contains, the method offers in this matter every guaranty.

A second condition in order to ascertain the facts contained in the framework of a monograph is to gain *the confidence of the family* which one studies. One must not believe that the bait of a merited remuneration is sufficient for this family to consent to initiate an observer who is often a stranger, during eight or ten days, into the secrets of its inner life. On the other hand, it will yield itself to a minute inquiry, it will bear with docility a prolonged questioning, if it perceives that the observer is seeking to know the condition of the working classes only in order to establish through facts the principles which will make possible the bettering of that condition.

4. *Means of ascertaining the facts.*—In order to collect the elements of a monograph, one may employ concurrently three means which are far from having an equal importance. The first consists in observing the facts, the second in interrogating the laboring man upon the things which escape direct observation, the third in obtaining information from persons of the locality who have known for a long time the family or who have an influence upon its existence through relations of patronage.

5. *Direct observation.*—Direct observation ought to reveal the least details, which may appear at first useless, but the necessity of which soon becomes manifest. In general, it is necessary to collect the facts without drawing conclusions from them immediately. It is only after having finished the study of the family, after having classified the observations in the framework adopted for the monographs, that one may try drawing from them general inductions.

This first means of investigation is especially suitable to the study of the physical constitution of the workingman and his family; of their daily habits, their religious and moral opinions, as well as of their characters; of the general state of the country, of the house and its surroundings. Besides being attentive, without letting it appear, to all that he sees and hears, the observer ought perpetually to register by himself all the answers made to his questions, all the assertions which he receives while in the family. In a word, every time that direct observation is possible, it is necessary to have recourse to it.

6. *The questioning of the workingman and his companion.*—The questioning ought to be conducted in the order indicated by the method; it is not necessary, however, to be bound to it too rigorously. The workingman will be naturally led to enlarge upon certain subjects; he will love to recall the memories of his youth and to tell the history of his family. One must be careful not to interrupt him, lest he let escape some information which it is useful to collect. Besides, questions too multiplied will fatigue him, if they do not excite in him disgust or mistrust, while recalling to his mind at every instant the inquest to which he is submitting. It is better to listen than to question, especially in the sufficiently frequent cases where a difference in the dialect or in the habitual language renders difficult on both sides the interpretation of questions and answers.

It is only by long, minute questioning, precise, and detailed, that one gathers the diverse elements of the computations whence result the budget of receipts, the budget of expenses, and the accounts which are annexed thereto. It is in the same way that one secures information concerning the organization and the constitution of the family; concerning its morals, its beliefs, its ideas, its hopes, its disappointments, its troubles, its joys, its affections, and its hates; concerning its labors and its wages; concerning its resources of every kind, its furniture, its clothes; concerning its recreations; concerning the principal elements of its life; concerning the reasons which it believes it has for regarding the future with serenity, or for seeing in it nothing

but what is precarious and unstable. On the whole, the great majority of social facts which will be recorded in the monograph of the family are ascertained by way of questioning. So the art of questioning, of listening to responses, of inducing sincere and complete outpourings of the heart plays a great rôle in the success which the observer can look for.

7. *Information gained from persons of a superior rank in the locality.*—One ought to get information only with an extreme reserve from the directing classes of the locality, who know often less than one supposes of the social organization of which they are a part. Their assertions, besides, should always be checked either with the aid of facts observed directly, or with the aid of facts revealed by the declarations of the family.

The family monograph, being, above all, the methodic description of that which one has personally observed, could not borrow anything from a book. An exception can be made only for certain facts authentically ascertained—in particular, statistical information offering a character of absolute certainty. In every case, the origin of documents of this class ought always to be indicated *in extenso*.

8. *The double budget and its commentaries.*—Every monograph has for its essential part a double *Budget of Annual Receipts and Expenses*, which is preceded by *Preliminary Observations* and followed by *Notes* which have been grouped under the general title: *Divers Elements of the Social Constitution*.

The *preliminary observations* will give an opportunity for the observer to gain precisely that confidence of which we have spoken above. They will prepare the workingman little by little to reply to the numerous questions of the budget, and even to understand the necessity of them. They will give to the observer a mass of preliminary notions upon the customs and the life of the family, upon the place which they inhabit, and upon the region of which they are a part.

It is not necessary to seek to complete immediately the preliminary observations, and to this end wearisomely to lead back the workingman whom one is questioning to a detail omitted in

a paragraph already treated. The budgets alone will give precision to the information obtained; they will permit of verifying its correctness; they will bring up questions about which one would not have dreamed of making inquiries.

9. *It is necessary to adopt uniform valuations in order that they may be comparable.*—For the questioning of the workingman and even for a first redaction of the budgets, all the estimates of quantities and values must be made with the measures and money of the country. For the definitive redaction, however, the author will convert the local units into metric units, and he will establish their correspondence in a special note.

The information relating to quantities and to values of objects bought or sold, produced or consumed, will relate always to a single year, supposed to be moderately prosperous in what concerns the general situation of agriculture, of industry, and of commerce, and the special situation of the domestic hearth which one is considering.

It will often be impossible for the workingman to give the figures of the two budgets and of the accounts annexed for an entire year, whilst he will indicate them easily for a week or for a day. In general the observer ought to seek after every means of avoiding for the members of the family observed any intellectual labor to which they are not habituated, and which might trouble the accuracy of their declarations.

10. *Origin of notes called elements of the social constitution.*—The notes entitled "Divers Elements of the Social Constitution" comprise the important facts of social organization, the remarkable peculiarities, finally, the general judgments and conclusions which the author draws from the whole of his studies. The elements of these notes will be furnished by the family and the locality which are the object of the monograph. They will be equally furnished by persons settled for a long time in this locality and knowing well the manners and customs of the population. But one should never forget to check the declarations obtained by the facts observed.

11. *The supreme virtue of the observer.*—All the elements of

success which the method of monographs contains remain sterile, or become even harmful, if they are not fertilized by the supreme virtue for the observer: respect for the truth.

The method of observation for the student who carries not in him this sacred respect is like logic for the sophist; it may, in hands little conscientious, become an instrument of error and of corruption.

However, in the subject-matter of social science, observation, applied to permanent facts, offers guaranties of correctness which do not exist in pure reasoning applied to the variable facts of private or political life. A population badly observed preserves in itself all the elements of a decisive counter inquiry. The error propagated through ignorance or bad faith can always be refuted through means of a monograph due to the inquiries of a true student.

III.

1. *Methods of obtaining information.*—There are three methods which share the favor of monograph writers; they are: the question blank (*le questionnaire*), the account book (*le livre de compte*), and oral questioning (*l'enquête orale*).

(1) The *question blank* method puts questions to correspondents who undertake to answer them. In use for a long time, this method was improved and codified by the international congress of statistics held in Brussels in 1853. It is a very convenient method since it reduces the work of the observer to the redaction of questions and the abstracting of replies; but its scientific value is unfortunately quite inferior to its practical convenience, and, in spite of the numerous precedents which this method can invoke, we are forced to express the most formal reservations as to the quality of the results to be expected from it.

(2) The method of *account books* seems free from the objections which that of question blanks incurs. The instrument of observation is this time the account book kept by a good housewife. It is this method which was used by one of the great masters of statistics, the learned Dr. Engel, for his great inquiry into the budget of European laborers. He presented

to the international congress of Berne in 1895 the first part of it, which contains the statement of his method and the application which he made of it to the laboring classes of Belgium.

The account book and the "quet"¹ are the two characteristic features of the method followed by Dr. Engel in his learned researches. We do not doubt that in his hands it may produce good results; but, in spite of the authority which it claims for itself, we could not recommend the general use of it without reservations. In the first place, the account-book method excludes all persons who do not keep accounts and who are governed by their life, instead of governing it. They eat as they earn, "sometimes more, sometimes less," and do not trouble themselves to keep accounts. But the account-book method is not even free from other criticisms. It may be vitiated by voluntary dissimulations, by unconscious errors, or by omissions which mislead the observer. The notebook of expenses is a mirror whose sincerity is oftentimes indiscreet. Again, families do not often classify scientifically their expenditures, but group together in a lump, as a single sum, the expenses corresponding to a unique fact, like a journey. They will omit also—and this is a grave fault—expenses and receipts in kind, which in most ordinary budgets play a considerable part. In fine, account books constitute, if well kept, precious documents, but they will not take the place of direct observation; they ought almost always to be verified and if necessary completed and corrected by the *oral method*, which is besides the only applicable method in the innumerable cases in which account books are a failure or do not merit credence.

(3) The *oral method* (the method described above in Part II) consists in installing oneself in the midst of, or at least near, the family whose monograph it is wished to prepare, in gaining its friendship and confidence; then in interrogating it with tact, getting it to relate its history, and obtaining from it the elements of its budget of receipts and expenditures.

¹ The "quet" is the unit of consumption adopted by Engel. It is an abbreviation of the name of the great Belgian statistician, Quetelet. It corresponds to the amount consumed by a child during the first year after birth.

This method is that of Le Play, who had the rare distinction of discovering it and of making masterly applications of it. It is wholly an art to know thus how to penetrate into the intimacy of a family, to overcome its instinctive distrust, to elicit its confidences and direct them wisely, so as to fill out one by one the different compartments of a methodic plan, without omitting anything which is necessary, and without getting lost in useless details. For this there is necessary, along with much tact, a real sympathy for those whom one interrogates; they feel this quickly and then surrender themselves without reserve, whilst they will escape a haughty inquiry conducted by a grave pedant or a uniformed official through evasive replies, often systematically inexact. It is the friendly chats which get at the secret of a family; interrogations must not in any degree take the character of questions before a court of justice or of an official proceeding.

2. *The framework of the monograph.*—One of the essential traits which characterize the monograph in its several applications, whatever be its object, is the invariability of its framework or outline. This condition is not less profitable to those who draw up the monograph than to those who consult it. To the first it serves as a guide and reminder, in order that they may omit nothing while upon the field of observation; it puts them face to face with a very clear plan to which they have to conform and which directs them in their observations. As for those who have recourse to the monographs, they know immediately where to find the information they are looking for, since it is always placed under the same heading and in the same order. Thus all the portraits, in spite of the unlikeness of the originals, are rendered comparable.

IV.

The uniform outline for a family monograph according to the Le Play method is as follows:

1. *The title of the monograph.*—Its significance and importance can best be seen by an example: "Carpenter of Paris (Seine, France), of the society of The Companions of Duty (day-

laborer under a system of temporary contracts); according to information collected in the locality, April and May 1856, by F. Le Play and A. Focsillon."

2. *The preliminary observations.*—They are always composed of thirteen paragraphs, divided under four principal headings, as follows:

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS defining the condition of the several members of the family. I. *Description of the locality, of the industrial organization, and of the family.* (1) State of the soil, of industry, and of the population. (2) Civil status of the family. (3) Religion and moral habits. (4) Hygiene and care of the health. (5) Social rank of the family. II. *Means of existence of the family.* (6) Properties (furniture and clothing not included). (7) Subventions. (8) Labors and industries. III. *Manner of existence of the family.* (9) Foods and meals. (10) Dwelling, furniture, and clothing. (11) Recreations. IV. *History of the family.* (12) Principal phases of its existence. (13) Morals and institutions assuring the physical and moral well-being of the family.

3. *The budget of receipts for the year.*—This is arranged in parallel columns to show clearly not only the receipts but the sources of the receipts, as follows:

SOURCES OF RECEIPTS.	RECEIPTS.
I.	I.
PROPERTIES POSSESSED BY THE FAMILY.	REVENUES FROM THE PROPERTIES.
1. Real estate.	1. Revenues from real estate.
2. Personal property.	2. Revenues from personal property.
3. Rights to allowances from mutual-insurance societies.	3. Allowances from mutual-insurance societies.
II.	II.
SUBVENTIONS RECEIVED BY THE FAMILY.	PRODUCTS OF SUBVENTIONS.
1. Properties received in usufruct.	1. Products of properties received in usufruct.
2. Rights of usage over the property of others.	2. Products of rights of usage.
3. Allowances of objects and of services.	3. Objects and services allowed.

SOURCES OF RECEIPTS—*Cont.*

III.

LABORS PERFORMED BY THE FAMILY.

IV.

INDUSTRIES UNDERTAKEN BY THE
FAMILY.RECEIPTS—*Cont.*

III.

WAGES.

IV.

PROFITS OF THE INDUSTRIES.

4. *The budget of expenses for the year.*

DESIGNATION OF THE EXPENSES.

I.

EXPENSES RELATING TO NOURISHMENT.

1. Foods consumed in the household :

Cereals.

Fats.

Milk-foods and eggs.

Meats and fish.

Vegetables and fruits.

Condiments and stimulants.

Fermented drinks.

2. Foods prepared and consumed outside of the household.

II.

EXPENSES RELATING TO THE DWELLING.

1. Lodging.

2. Furniture.

3. Heating.

4. Lighting.

III.

EXPENSES RELATING TO CLOTHING.

IV.

EXPENSES RELATING TO MORAL NEEDS, RECREATIONS, AND THE CARE OF
HEALTH.

(Worship—Instruction of children—Helping others—Alms, etc.)

V.

EXPENSES RELATING TO INDUSTRIES, DEBTS, TAXES, AND INSURANCE.

5. *Accounts annexed to the budgets.*1. Accounts of profits resulting from industries undertaken by the family
on its own account.

2. Accounts relating to subventions.

3. Divers accounts.

6. *The notes annexed to the monograph.*—Following the budgets
and the accounts come several paragraphs of notes connected
with the description of the family, but not making any intrinsic

part of it. They are placed under the following title and subtitles: *Divers elements of the social constitution*. (1) Important facts of social organization. (2) Remarkable particulars. (3) General estimations. (4) Conclusions.

The thoroughgoing and systematic study of family life which the Le Play method proposes will, it is hoped, throw light on the solution of many vexed social questions. Among the principal questions which its authors believe the method of family monographs will help in solving are the following:

1. The influence of religion upon individual well-being and upon social relations.
2. The conciliation of family bonds and paternal authority with individual freedom.
3. The influence of the fecundity and of the systematic sterility of marriages.
4. The influence of laws of inheritance.
5. The influence of a communistic régime and of individual action upon work and upon production.
6. The organization of the home and of the family from the point of view of stability.
7. Customs relative to marriage.

Upon all of these questions and many more it is believed that every carefully compiled family monograph will throw some light.

EXPLANATORY NOTES.

1. *Title*.—The title should always indicate: (1) the occupation of the laborer; (2) the population of which he forms a part; (3) the nature of the contract (*engagement*) under which he obtained employment; (4) the position which he holds in the social organization characterized by this sort of contract. Thus one would say: "Peasant soapmaker of la Basse-Provence (France). Proprietor and day-laborer in a system of voluntary permanent contracts." "Cutler in an urban factory, Sheffield (England), piece-worker in a system of temporary contract." Contracts (*engagements*) are of three principal kinds: forced contracts, where the laborer is bound to the soil; voluntary permanent

contracts; and temporary contracts or work without contract. Laborers (other than domestic servants) are classified as day-laborers, piece-laborers, laborers who are tenants, chiefs of trade or foremen, laborers who possess property, laborers whose work is chiefly upon their own property (proprietors).

2. *Preliminary observations.*—The preliminary observations describe in a way the whole family and the social *milieu* in which it lives. The principal facts which these thirteen paragraphs should contain are as follows: (1) Precise designation of the locality inhabited by the family.—Constitution and relief of the soil; mountains, forests, rivers situated in the vicinity, channels of communication.—Climate.—Hygienic conditions due to the nature of the locality.—Agricultural products.—Industries.—Commerce.—Status of the land; division of rural properties.—Status of the population; number of heads of households classed according to their professions.—Nature of contracts which bind laborers to masters, communities, or societies.—Political and administrative conditions. (2) Constitution of the family in an isolated household or in a communistic group.—Give here also the names, the place of birth, the age, the parental and domestic relations of the different members of the family still living together; also the names of other members who are dead or established elsewhere. (3) Religious beliefs and worship of the members of the family and of the population in general.—Influence of the clergy.—Details of religious practice; domestic worship, public worship, prayers, images, ceremonies at marriage, at birth, and at decease; temples, holidays.—Note also domestic virtues: attachment between husband and wife; position accorded the wife in the home; care and deference shown to aged parents; affection and enlightened care given to the children, and measures taken for their intellectual and moral development.—Also social virtues; charity and self-sacrifice; spirit of conciliation; politeness; deference and attachment of the family for their employer; tolerance in religious belief.—Also moral habits relative to mode of existence: disposition to propriety in the house and in clothing; tendency to simplicity,

temperance; disposition to save; tendency towards a settled life or towards temporary or permanent emigration.—Note, finally, principal traits characterizing intellectual development; special facts relative to the education of the children; attachment to tradition or tendency to innovations in the methods of work, in the relations of laborers to their employers, in civil and political institutions. (4) Physical constitution of members of the family; their state of habitual health.—Hygiene in matters of baths, foods, drinks, clothing, dwelling, etc.—Medical service.—Occult practices, charms, etc. (5) Social consideration which the head of the family enjoys by reason of his personal qualities, his property, his trade, or his civil or military services.—Relations of the family with other families of the locality.

(6) Enumeration and value of properties possessed by the family: real estate, money, domestic animals, special materials of labor and industry. (7) Persons and institutions giving patronage or aid in the locality.—Benevolent and relief societies; communal aid; state aid.—Enumeration of subventions and aids received from each of the preceding persons and institutions. (8) Labor performed by the workingman and his family for the profit of an employer or for mutual profit.—Industries undertaken for the exclusive profit of the family: cultivation of fields, gardens, etc.; making of butter, cheese, etc.; washing of clothes; making of new clothes, ornaments, etc.; gathering of fuel.

(9) Distinctive features of the family diet; mention of penury or of abundance.—Nature of the foods which are the principal sustenance of the family.—Manner of preparing and cooking these foods.—Number of meals per day; ordinary hour and duration of each meal and manner of taking the meals. (10) Description of habitation and its dependencies: materials of the house; stories in the house; interior arrangement; number of rooms occupied and used by the family and their size; bathroom and water-closet; light, ventilation, and air; yard and its size; general cleanliness.—Furniture: give detailed inventory of the furniture with some indication of the actual value of each piece.—Give nature and value of the utensils employed in cooking, wash-

ing, and general housekeeping.—Clothing: distinctive features of the clothing of each member of the family.—Give detailed inventory and actual value of each piece of clothing for each member of the family; also jewels, ornaments, etc. (11) The nature of the recreations sought after by each member of the family.—Bodily exercise: walks, dances, games of strength and skill.—Consumption of spirituous liquors, whisky, wine, beer, cider, etc.—Use of narcotics, tobacco, opium, etc.—Festivals, family reunions, anniversaries, etc.—Theaters, shows; games of chance, lotteries, etc.—Intellectual pleasures: books, music, lectures, etc.

(12) Any remarkable particulars concerning the life of the workingman or of his wife, children, or parents.—Marked peculiarities of any member of the family.—Amount of education and intelligence of the several members of the family.—Inheritances received and according to what customs. (13) Conditions of security and welfare which the family has in its intellectual and moral qualities.—Means of security sought by the family by membership in societies of mutual aid, insurance societies, trade unions, etc.

3. *Budget of receipts*.—The budget of receipts comprises two columns divided each into four sections as shown above.—The column on the right headed *Receipts* is an enumeration of all the revenues which result to the family from properties, subventions, wages, and profits of industries. These revenues are received by the workingman in two different forms: *in money or in kind*. Consequently two separate columns are always devoted to these two sorts of receipts, and the comparison of these totals gives interesting information relative to the economic organization of the locality.—The column on the left, headed *Sources of Receipts*, is an enumeration of the several sources of receipts which furnish the family its means of existence. It is the simple reproduction of the figures set down in paragraphs (6), (7), and (8) of the Preliminary Observations. These figures may be verified by information taken in the locality.

4. *Budget of expenses*.—This budget estimates in five sections the expenses relating to (1) sustenance; (2) habitation;

(3) clothing; (4) moral needs, recreations, and the care of health; (5) industries, debts, taxes, and insurance. Here also expenses in money and in kind must be distinguished. It furnishes thus a means of checking the budget of receipts. The mechanism of this budget is simple, and the headings under each section may be increased if found necessary. Under the heading *Cereals, e. g.*, should be placed bread, rice, oatmeal, macaroni, pastries, etc.; under *Fats*, butter, lard, suet, fat pork, oils, etc.; under *Milk foods and eggs*, milk, cream, cheese, eggs, etc.; under *Meats and fish*, beef, mutton, bacon, veal, fish, etc.; under *Vegetables and fruits*, potatoes, farinaceous vegetables, green vegetables, roots, spicy vegetables, fruits of all sorts; under *Condiments and stimulants* come salt, pepper, vinegar, sugar, tea, coffee, chocolate, etc.; under *Fermented drinks* all alcoholic beverages. The amount of the above commodities consumed should also be indicated when possible.—There ought to be an exact balance between the general total of the budget of expenses and the general total of the budget of receipts, unless there is an annual saving. Where such annual saving is indicated, it ought to be carefully verified.

5. *Accounts annexed to the budgets.*—These simply contain the complicated calculations which could not figure in the budgets without introducing into them more or less confusion. The calculations come in chiefly in connection with industries undertaken by the family and subventions. The *divers accounts* include all other accounts connected with the household.

6. *Notes annexed to the monograph.*—These last paragraphs should complete the picture of the life of the family, introducing facts relating to social organization, race, and environment thus far omitted. They should also contain the conclusions reached by the writer of the monograph through his personal study.

It will be seen from the above explanations that the Le Play family monograph is, in brief, nothing more than the careful and scientific historical and descriptive study of some single family, made by an observer who has entered into relations of closest intimacy with that family.

PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC CHARITY AND PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY IN GERMANY.¹ II.

III.

THE reform was begun in the fall of 1892 by the employment of an expert.² This, however, had absolutely no connection with the breaking out of the cholera the same fall, frequent public statements to the contrary notwithstanding. The reform and the calling of an expert had been decided upon long before the cholera broke out, although the two events were contemporaneous. And yet the cholera did have a considerable influence upon the development of poor-relief in the succeeding years of the reform. In the first place, the epidemic showed that public relief was by no means able to meet the demands of such an emergency, thus deepening the conviction of the necessity of a reform and giving the work the benefit of favorable public sentiment. In the second place, however, the distress created a need for speedy and more extended relief work than even a well-organized public relief could have furnished. As a result subcommittees were promptly organized in each of the smaller districts of the city, for such work as providing boiled water, provisions, clothing, and gifts of money, finding temporary homes for children, and supervising the distribution of the abundant stores which flowed in from all directions, even from foreign lands. The whole of this work was under the superintendence of a central committee composed, besides a few leading spirits, of the chairman of the subcommittees. In spite of the mistakes made by these committees, principally at the start, they performed most extraordinary services in supplying rapid and suitable relief. A very large number of men and women

¹ Concluding article. Translated for the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY by O. E. WIELAND.

² The writer of this paper.

devoted themselves to the work in the most unselfish manner, and during this brief period learned more about poor-relief and philanthropy than long years of experience in connection with public relief or private philanthropic societies could teach. For the reform, the importance of this work lay in the fact that it convinced all classes of the necessity of relief work, and brought out and even distinguished a large number of persons hitherto entirely unknown in this work, to whom the directors of relief work could successfully appeal, when, a little later, the reformed system was in need of a force of auxiliaries. This circumstance, therefore, was very favorable to the success of the reform. True, the cholera did, on the other hand, create conditions which were far from normal, and which, at the outset, severely obstructed the work. The great increase in the number of dependents was brought about not by actual needs alone, and the loss to many of their supporters, but also by the fact that many, while all kinds of assistance were so freely given, learned to like such subsidies, and supposed they were now to continue indefinitely. The first step in the introduction of the reform was the working out of a plan which should at the same time take advantage of the most recent scientific and practical experience, and be adapted to local conditions. The first of these requirements made the resulting system a modification, agreeing with the Elberfeld system principally in the entire independence of the helpers, while in compliance with the second the independence of the districts was extended in many ways; for instance, they were given the right of nomination for the offices of superintendent of a district and of new helpers and visitors; the appointment to both these offices being usually the prerogative of the general management. The choice of a temporary superintendent or chairman was left entirely to the districts; moreover, they were given a considerable power to vote aid.

The quarter system, on the other hand, which is characteristic of the Elberfeld system, was dropped on principle; it was also found necessary to drop their system of granting aid for a very brief period only. The principal advantage of the

quarter system lies in the fact that each dependent is from the start in definite relations to a particular helper, in whose "quarter" he lives, the quarter being very closely defined within certain streets and house numbers; the helper is therefore able to keep very fully informed on the conditions in his quarter; he can, within the range of the few houses allotted to him, find out every case that may demand his attention, and come in contact with the poor of his quarter frequently and in many different ways. The disadvantages are these: a given case must of necessity remain always under the same helper; under circumstances a sort of protectorate is developed; and (especially) an approximately even distribution of the population among these quarters has ceased. Frequently certain houses are occupied almost solely by the poorer class, while others do not contain a single dependent. It is therefore possible under this system, and it actually did occur in Hamburg, that some helpers had in charge houses containing fifty to sixty paupers, while others never saw anyone in need. Hamburg, therefore, as well as Berlin, Leipsic, and Dresden, has adopted the district system (*Bezirkssystem*). Here the district includes quite a number of streets and places. The district assembly or council is made up of the district superintendent or chairman (*Bezirksvorsteher*) and a number of helpers, varying with the needs of the district—usually not under twelve, under no circumstances more than twenty. But none of these helpers has, at the outset, any relation to a particular house or its occupants. On the contrary, every applicant for aid must first present himself to the district chairman (*Vorsteher*), who refers him, by means of an application blank, to one of his helpers; this helper, then, is obliged to examine into the case, supply any urgent and immediate need, and report at the next district assembly. Usually the case will be left in his charge for further treatment as long as the dependent continues to reside in his district; the case may, however, be given to another helper for further treatment. The advantage of this dividing of dependents among the several helpers by the superintendent lies in the fact that the latter can employ

all his helpers, not only in the same degree, but also each one according to his ability, without giving to all an equal number of cases. He will be able to give one living very near at hand more cases than he gives to one living at some distance, more to a man of considerable leisure than to a very busy man; to entrust to some very energetic person the investigation of a case demanding a great deal of energy, and to refer cases of aged people or children, where a tender heart is not so likely to be taken undue advantage of, to some tender-hearted person. Thus a superintendent is able to meet every need of a case, and at the same time to prevent the overburdening of certain helpers; he can also change helpers in a case, placing a dependent, either successively or simultaneously, under the charge of several helpers, etc. This system, which is very elastic, has proved extraordinarily successful in Hamburg.

The second point of difference, the lengthening of the period of time for which aid is granted, was, as has been said, a matter of necessity. In the nature of the case it is very desirable that aid be voted only for a very brief period, two or four weeks (in Elberfeld the time is a fortnight). But had this policy been adhered to in Hamburg, it would have necessitated such frequent sessions of the districts as to preclude from the very beginning the willingness of the helpers to assume the responsibilities of their office, or at any rate to give rise to a mere formalism soon after the introduction of the reform. Instead, however, the dependents are divided into several classes. Those whose genuine distress there is no reason to doubt, the aged, sick, and frail—in general, all sexagenarians—may be granted an allowance for six months; younger persons, as widows with several children, not longer than three months; all others, as able-bodied men and persons not sufficiently well known, are granted aid only from one session to the next, generally one month, in order that such cases may be under constant surveillance. For like reasons it was thought best to hold regular meetings of the districts only once a month in Hamburg, since fortnightly meetings would have been too

poorly attended, while on the present plan the attendance has hitherto been very good. These meetings are of very great importance; in them all cases are thoroughly discussed by all the helpers, and after due deliberation the proper measure of relief is decided upon by a vote of the entire body. In this way the assembly is bound more closely together, its members are kept informed as to conditions throughout the entire district, and they gradually arrive at uniform principles. It has been noticed, also, that friendly relations between the superintendent and the helpers are encouraged by this system.

A further point of difference between this and the Elberfeld system is the insertion of an intermediary between the district and the general administrative board; this is the circuit (*Kreis*), including a number of districts. In its geographical boundaries it follows roughly those of the ward (*Stadtbezirk*). The members of the circuit are the superintendents or chairmen of the districts, while the chairman of the circuit in turn is a member of the central board. The circuits discuss matters of common interest to all the districts, and hear complaints against the decision of the districts; they also consider and rule upon motions to grant hospital or institutional care (*Anstaltspflege*) for an extended period of time, or allowances exceeding a certain specified limit.

The central board, having for its chairman and vice chairman two members of the senate, is composed, as to the rest of its membership, of sixteen persons, chosen directly by the representative body of the city government (*Bürgervertretung*) on nomination by the board. It exercises a general supervision over the circuits and the districts, it is the court of last appeal for complaints, fixes general rules and principles, investigates the condition of the people at large, and decides upon more general remedial measures and agencies. The business management, finally, serves as the organ of the central board, preparing and carrying into effect the resolutions of the latter; it collects and keeps in a general registry information concerning all dependents. All applications for aid must pass through this central

office. If, in urgent cases, this was not possible before the voting of the aid, the whole matter is afterwards brought to the notice of the business management through the minutes of the district and circuit assemblies and such other papers from which it is copied, and filed with the rest of the papers referring to the particular pauper in question. This plan makes it very easy to detect duplication of relief. Moreover, whenever it appears from the papers that any circumstance of importance has escaped the notice of the helper who has the case in charge, he is notified of their full contents. When the decision and resolutions of one body are at variance with the laws or the business regulations, they are submitted to the next higher authority, the circuit or the central board. One of the most important principles of work is the demand for absolute reliability and the promptness and dispatch of the business world. The work of the business management includes a great many separate branches, such as the treasury department, the collecting of subscriptions from well-to-do relatives of dependents, the making good of claims a dependent may have upon other poor funds. All this is carefully regulated in detail by instructions and rules.

The entire corps active in poor-relief includes about twenty members of the central board, somewhat more than 100 district chairmen, nearly 1600 helpers and nearly 100 clerks. The distinction between the function of the honor offices and those held by professional or salaried officials may briefly be stated thus: the former foster the spirit of the work; the latter have the care of the forms; each is supplemented and modified by the other, so that neither arbitrariness, disorder, and looseness, on the one hand, nor, on the other, stiff formality and excessive writing may hamper the work. This aim has thus far been realized in a very satisfactory manner.

IV.

It was said above that the general principles of poor-relief are so fixed as to be applicable everywhere, if properly adapted to local environments. This will be borne out by a comparison of

German and American conditions. When the American reader has informed himself concerning the Elberfeld system, its working and application, and compares with it the methods and institutions in vogue in the larger cities of America, he will immediately and entirely concur in the statement that only a system of careful investigation of the individual case is in accord with correct principles of poor-relief. Moreover, he will fully understand why, in Germany, the development of this principle has led to outdoor relief as the principal form of public relief, while in America indoor relief, the almshouse, is predominant. This contrast results from that between a system of honor offices and one of salaried offices. If, in Germany, each commune has hundreds, if necessary even thousands, of citizens who are willing to assume the task of helping the poor, it is evident that they can rightly perform this duty only by entering into some sort of neighborly relations to the poor. And if, in America, it is not possible to disburse public funds and public means otherwise than through salaried public officials, it is no more than right to demand such control and supervision as is possible in the almshouse. Add to this the fact that the frequent changes of administration, both state and municipal, place public offices within the grant of each new ruler, that appointment to office has become, in no small degree, a reward for services rendered elsewhere, and the need of some means of control is very much augmented. Especially does this hold true for poor-relief, where there is danger lest the aid granted be made a reward for political services rendered by the recipient.

It is not mere chance that Warner, whose book is a summary of rich experience and a fine theoretical understanding and insight, arrives at the very same conclusion and expressly says: "It is through the development of a system of honor offices that outdoor relief in Germany has been robbed of its dangers, and it will be in part by the extension of the honor-office system in this country that the spirit of willingness to serve the state may be developed."

So long as one holds to the principle of individualization he

will concede that outdoor relief, with well-qualified helpers and visitors, gives the greater assurance of careful investigation and continued surveillance of the environment of dependents, and of their rapid return to normal economic conditions. The advantages are these: It is possible to find out exactly what the condition of the dependent has been previously, to get a knowledge of his character and of the life he is leading; to look into his home surroundings and to ascertain the state of health, education, etc., of himself and of his family. Furthermore, it is much easier to decide whether aid shall be given in the form of money or of provisions, by the securing of work, or by intervening with some private charity. True, the frail and the sick must still be cared for by indoor relief, but not in the workhouse. This principle of individualization makes it possible, also, to separate the family and legally to prosecute the indigent or drinking husband, while at the same time the innocent family is supported. Under circumstances recourse may then be had to the almshouse. I am of opinion, however, that this should be done only in exceptional cases; but then this method should be applied with the utmost rigor and severity, every other form of aid being denied. But in order that this be successful, it is absolutely necessary that the almshouse be, in reality, a workhouse, *i. e.*, maintained solely for persons who will not work, but who can work, and will finally be forced to choose this way of escaping the pangs of hunger. Should they seek to satisfy their wants by culpable means, as begging, stealing, or teaching their children to do these things, they are to be placed in a workhouse by force, or turned over to the civil authorities. The baneful custom of making the almshouse "the charitable catch-all for the community" must be abolished entirely. Especially is it necessary that children, the sick, and the frail be cared for in separate institutions. When aged people are kept in the same institution with indolent persons, there is great danger lest the indulgence and forbearance necessary toward the former slacken the discipline and thus alter the entire character of the place. The reverse may also come true; the strictness and severity neces-

sary in the reformatory treatment of the lazy and indigent may make the discipline that of a house of correction, and work injustice and injury to the aged and feeble.

All the more important and well-conducted poor-relief organizations in Germany base their efforts on these principles. The visitor is required to inform himself by personal visits, inquiry among neighbors, at bureaus of information, etc.,—if necessary even calling in the advice and assistance of the public physician for the poor (*Armenarzt*),—concerning the health of the dependent and of his family, the sanitary condition of their dwelling, etc.; he is also to find out whether or not the dependent be possessed of any property or means, whether he have any claim on relief funds of any sort, or upon relatives; besides all this the visitor is to ascertain the exact amount of the earnings both of the dependent himself and of his relatives, then determining the manner and amount of aid to be granted, after due consideration of all these facts. In the collecting of the information the business management assists if necessary. All these matters are then to be constantly kept watch over, the visitor recording all information in the books he is required to keep concerning each family under his charge. Due attention and consideration must, of course, be given to important changes, as the remarrying of a widow, death of children in a dependent family, inheritance of property, etc. The books mentioned above are to be kept in such a manner as to enable one at any time to get a full and clear idea of the circumstances in the case. Whenever the aid in a particular case is temporarily discontinued, the book is returned to the business management, where it is kept, to be reopened should the same family renew their application for support. When a dependent moves from one district to another, the book passes into the hands of the visitor in the district into which he moves.

The visitor first refers the applicant to those who may be indebted to him or otherwise under obligation, relatives, employers, insurance or benefit funds (*Versicherungskassen*), etc.; in this direction the visitors oftentimes accomplish a great deal

in recalling faithless persons, especially relatives, to their duty and their rightful obligations. Often the visitor has connections with some private charity to which he can appeal in the interest of especially worthy people. Frequently he will even supply an immediate want from his own purse, seeing that the case is only a temporary exigency and that the applicant has never before been dependent upon public relief. In many cases, too, the visitor is able, through his own personal influence, to find employment for his charge, thus making it possible to relieve the latter's distress by a temporary allowance only. The training of the citizen [in the duties of a visitor and helper is productive of excellent results, arousing in him a most manifold interest for his ward, and teaching him to search out all possible ways in which the needed relief may be supplied most promptly and most thoroughly. It is unnecessary to state that this principle, which is, of course, emphatically expressed in the regulations, is not obeyed by all, that many slight their duties as visitor and helper and regard the whole work in an altogether too perfunctory manner; on the whole, however, this work is not only very successful, but of very great variety both in manner and direction of their efforts.

Whenever the conditions in any case are found to be such as to warrant relief at public expense, the total receipts of the family are to be ascertained and the allowance fixed accordingly. The length of time for which and the amount in which assistance is to be given must depend upon the nature of the distress and its probable duration. This aid consists principally in money, provisions being used only in a supplementary manner, chiefly clothing for children of school age (*schulpflichtige Kinder*), together with such articles as bedding, underwear, and the like. In general, however, the principle is held, that the dependent himself will know better than any other person which of his needs should be satisfied first of all; it is furthermore believed that the expending of money is the best possible means by which to acquire frugal, economic habits. The visitor oversees the expenditure of the money in a general way, to see that it is rightly

and carefully spent. Should the dependent prove injudicious and careless in his use of the money, the allowance is of course withdrawn, or its revocation at least threatened. Least anxiety and suspicion is necessary in the case of widows, aged people, and children, whose physical condition, or whose inability to earn a living (*Erwerbsverhältnisse*) leave no question as to the necessity of help. Care must nevertheless be taken, in these cases, to search out relatives, and especially adult children who may be able to provide for their aged parents. Such search, conducted in the main by the business management (*Geschäftsverwaltung*), besides making a large number of allowances superfluous, has the general social effect of reminding the people that the first duty of a child is to care for its parents, a duty of which the people of Hamburg, for instance, previous to the reorganization, had become most shamefully oblivious. The rules pertaining to able-bodied persons are very strict; likewise those pertaining to women and children whose husbands and fathers are living, but are reported as having deserted their families. Even in these cases help cannot be denied when actual distress has been proven; but the allowance is always for a very brief period only, and its necessity thoroughly investigated upon each renewal of the application. Under no circumstances must the faithless father be permitted to feel that now he has deserted the family they are better off than if he himself still cared for them. And yet just such cases are the bane of nearly all relief organizations; for, while women and children, who are sometimes guiltless in the matter, cannot be left in the depth of misery and distress, it often turns out that husband and wife play into one another's hand, the wife pretending to be forsaken, only to draw an allowance.

The amount of the allowance depends upon the circumstances of the family: the number of children, the age of the father, etc. The fixing of the amount in a particular case is left to the judgment of the district, except where a definite amount per head is fixed by the regulations. Very serious objections might, however, be urged against this latter plan, which is in use in Elberfeld,

Cologne, Frankfort, and other cities: when, *e. g.*, the limit set for the head of a family is 3 M., for the wife 2.50 M., and for each child from 1 to 2 M., according to age, a large family will sometimes draw an allowance greater in amount than an ordinary laborer could earn. Besides, it is very difficult, with a fixed scale, to take cognizance of a change in economic conditions, or a change in the scale of wages; when, on the other hand, the fixing of the amount is left to the wisdom of the visitor of the district, the whole situation, all the facts, can be duly weighed and considered, the various other sources of income, opportunities for temporary employment, etc. True, this system is also not entirely free from objections: it leaves room for arbitrariness in fixing the amount of an allowance; and where it is in vogue it is found that in districts where a large number of wealthy persons act as visitors the allowances are too high, in the inverse case too low. In this respect we feel very keenly the lack of any trustworthy statistical reports concerning the domestic economy of the class next above the pauper class, *i. e.*, of the lowest self-supporting class, whose income must of necessity be a little higher than that of those who receive public aid.

Besides giving aid in the form of money and provisions, the public relief furnishes free medical attendance in all cases; for the calling of a physician, midwife, or nurse, easier forms have been introduced, so that no one, even in the most urgent case, need suffer for want of prompt and immediate help in the hour of need. But the importance of this department of the public relief has fallen off considerably of late years on account of the development of insurance, the majority of workmen now having access to some sick insurance fund. The most valuable means of promoting health, *viz.*, healthful dwellings and good ventilation, often, alas! cannot be had, because of the wretched housing common in all large cities. It is an undeniable fact, however, that the various attempts at improvement in this matter have been due, in no small degree, to the participation of so large a number of citizens in the administration of public relief. For the visitors again and again discover what

hotbeds of disease and immorality poor dwellings are; and even the most selfish taxpayer cannot fail to see the force of the argument that the mere possession of a better dwelling will save a large number of persons from ever falling in need of public aid or public relief, and thus reduce very materially the expenses of public charities.

As in America, so also in Germany, relief organizations have given special attention to caring for children. Whenever it becomes necessary to interfere, or to take charge of a child, they aim to secure to it good, healthy surroundings, good bringing up, and thorough instruction; such children enjoy the protection and care of the respective charities even after entering the business world, while they are already earning their own livelihood. But here again we meet with the very same mischief already mentioned above in connection with the support of forsaken women. In an extraordinarily large number of cases the care of children by the public relief is welcomed by faithless parents as a very convenient way in which to receive aid themselves. This is especially true in the cases of the illegitimate offspring of workwomen and servant girls, who are hindered by their child, in returning to work. One favorite trick is to place a child in another and strange family on promise of payment for its keeping; the promise is not kept, and the strange foster parents are forced to appeal to charity. It is, of course, impossible completely to abolish the nuisance; it may be checked to some degree by dealing severely with the parents and, under circumstances, by legally prosecuting them. Here (in Germany), as well as in other highly civilized countries, the principle of anonymity has been entirely abrogated; foundlings, *i. e.*, children who are found entirely helpless, and whose parentage is really unknown, are comparatively very rare. Whenever a child is received into a charitable institution its personal relations are fully established. It is attempted, wherever possible, to leave the child in its natural surroundings—to return it to its parents, or to its mother. Only when domestic relations and domestic environment prove such as would expose the child to

too great danger, the child is cared for by public charity, which, in the matter of care for helpless children, is now usually exercised by placing them in good healthy homes (*Familienpflege*). As a rule a child is first placed in an institution which serves the purpose of a temporary home. Here the children are carefully observed, and every effort made, particularly in case of the older ones, to determine whether they are better adapted for care in an orphanage or in a private family (*Anstalts- oder Familienpflege*). The orphan board (*Waisenverwaltung*) has connections with a large number of respectable families, mostly in the country; to these the children are entrusted, certain fixed rates being paid for their keeping. When so placed a child is under the guardianship of an inspector, usually a local clergyman or teacher, who may, in case of necessity, return it to the orphanage. Here, as elsewhere, experience has taught that cases of total depravity are rare. Most of these children improve immediately when placed in new and healthy surroundings. Thus nearly all of the orphanage work has taken the form of family care (*Familienpflege*), which has given by far the most satisfactory results in the matter of development of character. The sick, the frail, and the feeble-minded, are placed in separate institutions, which afford such care and instruction as the nature of the malady may permit or demand. Institutions for the care and keeping of children while the mother is away at work are not maintained by the public relief. This department is left entirely to private charities, which are sometimes assisted by public appropriations.

V.

The relation of public relief to private charities has, so far as I can see, been even less carefully defined in Germany than in America. On this point also I am in perfect accord with Warner, who has correctly apprehended their respective provinces. Here again the difference lies not in the general principles recognized in the two countries, but in historic development and actual, existing conditions. The very thing which, in Germany,

renders the participation of the citizen in the public relief so valuable is, on the other hand, a hindrance to the development of private charities; while the very circumstances which have impeded the growth of public relief in America have quickened private charities in a most unusual degree. The activity of the German citizen in relief work is a voluntary contribution toward the burdens of the commune; the American makes his contribution in the form of direct private charity. While the German demands that the portion of the public funds to be devoted to poor relief be turned over to him, and expended by him as he shall judge best, the well-to-do American provides himself with a somewhat larger income, and also expends it according to his own judgment. The only difference is, that in Germany the burdens of the public relief are borne by all taxpayers equally, while in America the beneficent and philanthropic man bears a greater share than the egotist, and the latter is relieved at the expense of the former. And yet I do not hesitate to say that the American custom in this matter is worthy of imitation. The very fact that the public funds are at the disposal of the visitor and helper, without restrictions, goes far toward discouraging private charity. and makes a limitation rather than an extension of public relief seem desirable in Germany. In this connection it should be borne in mind that, as already pointed out above, the work of the public relief does not differ in the least from that of private charities, so far as the nature of the work is concerned; the dollar of the one looks exactly like the dollar of the other. The difference lies not in the gift, but in the motive of the giver and in the attendant circumstances. For the commune, poor relief is a legal duty, the exercise of which readily leads the pauper to think he has a right to claim assistance, although the law expressly denies any such right. The recipient of a charity feels no debt of gratitude for the help he receives (except as he may be grateful for the manner in which the aid is given) and that because the gift comes from the public fund. Moreover, the visitor is likely to be more lavish in the expenditure of public moneys than he would be with his own, or with those

entrusted to him by a limited number of friends. For this reason assistance is more easily obtained, as a rule, from a public than from a private charity; very often self-help is not urged as strongly as it should be, and if the officers of public relief are not possessed of a very strong sense of responsibility, or if the district management is not very cautious and conservative, too great liberality may be the direct means of producing and multiplying poverty. The experience of every country and every age might be quoted to verify these statements. We can now understand why it is that even in Germany, where the system of public poor-relief has proved very successful, there is a growing sentiment in favor of restricting public relief, in the main, to such institutions as the workhouse, all else being left to private charity. At present this is, in my opinion, entirely impracticable. So long as we do not insure widows and orphans against the loss of husband and father, upon whom they depend for support, we cannot think of abandoning them to the chance of private charity. Then, too, the public care for the sick and infirm should not only be maintained, but extended by every possible means. These things offer very little opportunity for fraud or abuse, for their external characteristics are far more easily recognized than a mere want of the means of subsistence. Moreover the misuse of accommodations and arrangements for the sick is not so likely to work harm as is fraud in the disposition of public moneys.

One thing must still be demanded on both sides of the Atlantic: the respective provinces of public poor relief and of private charities must be defined as clearly and as carefully as possible; furthermore there must be established between the two a definite and well-ordered relation. This is recognized, in Germany, as the aim and the goal of relief work. To begin at the two extremes one might say: Essentials, necessities of life, are to be supplied by public charity, while the furnishing of useful or unnecessary things, or even luxuries, shall remain the province of private charities. How much shall be included in the "essentials" must, of course, depend upon circumstances; in

regard to the necessity of animal food or of wearing shoes, for instance, a small rural community will entertain opinions differing widely from those held by the inhabitants of a large city, where barefoot children are not allowed in school and consequently the wearing of shoes becomes a necessity. The establishing and maintaining of institutions for the feeble-minded, the infirm, the deaf and dumb, the blind, and orphans will also fall unquestionably within the province of public charity, although even in Germany the care for the blind and the deaf and dumb has been left largely to private philanthropy, while private institutions very often relieve the state of the burden of caring for orphans. At this point we find the connecting link (between public and private charities) the public subsidies, which have been developed to a considerable extent in Germany also, though not so much as in America. Private institutions for the deaf and dumb and the blind usually receive from the bureau of public charities certain appropriations which go far towards supporting the institutions. Asylums for the aged, the feeble-minded, and children also receive subsidies in the form of free use of public lands, etc. The demands of Warner—careful supervision of all subsidized institutions, regulations in regard to admission and dismissal of such people as are kept in any institution at public expense, and finally specific payment for specific work—are very judicious and proper.

To decide further than this what particular work shall be done by public relief and what left to private charities, will always remain a very difficult matter. In most cases it will be a question of actual conditions: the one branch will have taken charge, to a greater or less degree, of this or that department, from which the other branch will then keep more or less aloof. In any case the commune should be thoroughly familiar with such institutions as already exist, and should carry on the extension of its own efforts accordingly. It is also very desirable that the two branches arrive at some mutual understanding and agreement as to who shall be entitled to aid, under what conditions, etc. The constant annoyance occasioned by shameless

imposters, who now manage to secure duplicate or excessive allowances, could be avoided by keeping a careful registration of all those who receive aid and throwing the register open for the free use of all interested. In Hamburg such a bureau of information was established over a year ago, where at least the names of all those who receive public aid or are supported in charitable institutions are recorded. Attempts to secure the coöperation of the various charitable organizations as well as of individual philanthropists in this matter have met with little encouragement. Similar experiments have been tried in other cities; but their success is very doubtful, for private charity organizations are very loath to reveal the names of their beneficiaries, and besides unsystematic and planless almsgiving is as yet too prevalent. It is clear that in the work of establishing proper relations between public and private charity, the education of the benevolent public will be one of the most important factors. What Warner says in regard to public poor-relief in America—"It is time for us to stop bragging and humbly to take up the study of the science and art of administration"—may be applied equally as well to the majority of the institutions of private charity in Germany. It is really time that the study of the science of poor-relief be taken up by philanthropists in this country (Germany). It is a plain fact that a sort of strange sentimentality is exceedingly predominant; a certain softness of heart which impels those whom it possesses to do something for their unfortunate and suffering fellow-men, without, however, trying to ascertain what is really needful to be done. Above all else it is essential that we break completely with the notion that poor-relief and philanthropy are in themselves meritorious. We must teach, and thoroughly convince everyone of the fact, that the first thing necessary is to find out the causes of poverty—that those measures which aim to set the poor and needy dependent on his feet again and to make him independent are of far greater value than all the beneficence in the world, however good its intentions. House owners who make regular contributions to charitable societies must understand clearly that they

will be doing a great deal more for suffering humanity if they cease to rent poor and unhealthy dwellings; employers must learn the necessity of protecting their employes against dangerous and injurious occupations by suitable hours of work and such other measures of precaution; and all others must be made to comprehend the seemingly very simple truth that the possession of a healthy body is worth more than the nursing of a sick one in the most magnificent hospital. In other words: poor-relief must become *the social science*; its proper exercise can be understood only by a comparative study of economic and social life. We know that no social effort can or will succeed in making poor-relief and philanthropy superfluous, within such a time as lies open to our present vision. But relief work would no doubt be performed far more thoroughly and more intelligently if those engaged in it know and realize that their work is to be for others, not for themselves. The essence of poor-relief is not the gratification of one's self-esteem by giving alms, but the complete resignation, sacrifice of self in the service of others.

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INDIVIDUAL TELESIS.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. XI.

THE kind of social progress described in the last paper as Social Genesis constitutes the greater part of what has heretofore been recognized as having taken place. Man has been looked upon as a product of nature and as having developed like other such products. Society has been contemplated as an evolution, which term is restricted in its scope to the products of natural forces acting under the various laws which have been discovered to be in operation throughout the universe. Mr. Herbert Spencer has formulated those laws more fully than any other writer for both cosmic and organic evolution.

This point of view may be regarded as a purely objective one in the sense that the products of evolution are conceived as the passive recipients of the impulses that have combined to form them, and as not themselves taking any part in the process. This view is not meant to exclude internal reactions to external stimuli, which are essential to any correct idea of evolution. It does not even exclude the efforts which creatures put forth in seeking satisfaction, which is believed by Lamarckians to constitute the largest factor. All this belongs to genetic progress or evolution proper. I am, I believe, the only one who has attempted to show from a biologic, or rather a psychologic standpoint, that in restricting social progress to these passive influences an important factor has been left out of view. This factor, I maintain, is a subjective one not found at any lower stage of development, and exclusively characterizing human or social progress. It was chiefly to emphasize this factor that *Dynamic Sociology* was written, and the second volume of that work is devoted to this task. But although the first volume was limited to setting forth the nature of the already recognized objective, passive, or negative kind of social progress as defined

in passages quoted in the preceding paper, still I did not in that volume neglect to point out the distinction and emphasize the contrast between the two kinds of social progress. Immediately following the definition of passive or negative progress that of active or positive progress is given as follows:

Active, or positive, progress takes place through the application to the natural forces acting in and upon society of a force external to and distinct from them. To the regular course of the social phenomena as determined by the laws of evolution, we must conceive added a new force limiting and directing these into special channels and for special ends. Its chief quality as distinguished from other forces is *purpose*. In short, it is the teleological force, the abstract conception of which is familiar to all, having formed the basis of theological philosophy . . . This force is regarded as *active* by reason of its direct action upon the remaining forces controlling society, while progress thus produced may be fitly called *positive*, from the purely arbitrary character of its processes and the recognition of man himself as the disposer of social events.¹

In the initial chapter of the second volume (chap. viii), after further contrasting genetic and teleological phenomena in general, I attempted a classification of human motives or efforts. Employing an old but excellent word revived by Sir William Hamilton, viz., *conation*, to signify human motive, I divided the methods employed in seeking the satisfaction of desire into the two classes *direct* and *indirect*. The "direct method of conation" is of course that employed by irrational beings and by rational ones, too, when they do not use their reason. The "indirect method" is the method of reason, and is teleological. The nature and use of this method were set forth somewhat fully. Notwithstanding all this and the stress laid throughout the work on this important antithesis, I still had reason to feel that I had fallen far short of impressing students of society with a full sense that there was a great neglected factor in the current social philosophy, and in 1884 I prepared a paper on "Mind as a Social Factor," which, after reading it before the Anthropological Society of Washington and the Metaphysical Club of Johns Hopkins University, I contributed to the British psychological

¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 57, 58.

journal, *Mind*.¹ In this paper I attacked the problem in a somewhat popular way, directing it more or less against the school of *laissez faire* philosophers, but bringing out certain aspects in a different light from that in which they had previously been viewed.

I continued to reflect upon the subject, and its importance grew as its varied applications and implications became apparent. At last I decided to devote an entire volume to its full elucidation, and my *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, which appeared in 1893, was the result. In this work I have passed in review the entire philosophy of mind and joined this to that of society. It is in chap. xxxiii of that work that I have brought forward the principal considerations that should occupy this paper. These I shall now endeavor to epitomize as comports with the limits which the paper imposes.

Telic progress, as the name implies, depends altogether upon that faculty of mind which enables man to pursue ends which it foresees and judges to be advantageous. A clear idea must therefore be formed of the precise nature of that faculty before it is possible fully to understand how it operates. After all I had said in *Psychic Factors* in the direction of explaining the origin and nature of that faculty, which, so far as I am aware, was the first attempt that had been made to explain these on wholly natural principles, I still felt that there was more to be said, *i. e.*, that there was another way of approaching the subject and leading up to the same result, which for certain types of mind might render the explanation still clearer. I reflected a year on this new mode of treatment and then undertook to formulate it.²

My purpose in this new *pugillus* was to arrive at the exact nature of final causes, as the result of a long series of cosmic steps in the direction of rendering the forces of nature and the properties of matter more efficient in accomplishing results or doing work. These several evolutionary steps were shown to

¹ Vol. IX, London, October 1884, pp. 563-573.

² "The Natural Storage of Energy," the *Monist*, Vol. V, Chicago, January 1895, pp. 247-263.

have been taken by the production of as many successively more and more energetic products, whose respective forms of energy are represented by their properties, and which by the different activities manifested, produce different classes of phenomena and constitute different kinds of causes producing effects in different degrees. The following table was drawn up to exhibit all these aspects of the subject :

PRODUCTS	DIFFERENTIAL ATTRIBUTES			
	PROPERTIES	ACTIVITIES	PHENOMENA	CAUSES
Man	Intellect	Molar	Psychic	Final
Animals	Feeling			Conative
Plants	Life		Vital	Physical
Protoplasm.....				
Organic Compounds ...	Elective Affinities	Molecular		
Inorganic Compounds..				
Chemical Elements....				
Universal Ether.....	Wave Motion			

This table results from an attempt "to arrange these several products of evolution in their ascending order of development, assigning to each the particular property by which it is distinguished from all below it," and to exhibit in the remaining three columns the kind of activities belonging to each product, the class of phenomena it manifests, and the nature of the cause through which it produces effects. "The universal ether is placed at the bottom of the scale as representing the most diffuse form of matter with the least power, when not concentrated, of producing effects. Next come the chemical elements, which form a class, although they might themselves be arranged in an ascending series. The inorganic compounds naturally follow the elements, and the same remark applies to them. The organic compounds differ from the inorganic still less than the latter differ from the elements, but they belong above them,

and like them, only to a still greater degree, exhibit gradations in efficiency. Protoplasm is their highest expression and spans the chasm between the chemical and the biotic planes of existence. It makes the plant possible and prepares the way for the animal. At the head of the animal series and of the entire system stands man."

Leaving out of view the physical, chemical, and purely biological aspects of the question as leading up to the psychic products and properties, I will confine myself to these latter, in presenting which I cannot do better than to quote from that article:

As already remarked, chemical organization ceased and biotic organization began with protoplasm. It is the only vital and psychic substance, the true life- and mind-stuff, and all further progress in focalizing and utilizing the universal energy has resulted from the organization of protoplasm so as to multiply its power. This has consisted in a series of mechanical adjustments. In the organic world protoplasm is the power while *structure* is the gearing which concentrates that power. Although protoplasm exists in every cell, the main lines through which it works are the nerves, which, in the higher organisms, consist of large trunks with numerous local reservoirs and innumerable branches permeating all sensitive tissues.

In order that sensibility accomplish its purpose, the preservation of the organism, sensations must be either agreeable or disagreeable; hence pleasure and pain. The instability of protoplasm renders every part ephemeral. The entire organism is in a state of constant and rapid change of substance (metabolism), and fresh supplies must be momentarily introduced to prevent destruction by waste. The biological principle of advantage is adequate to secure this end. The supply of tissue is attended with pleasure and the actions necessary thereto follow naturally. The same is true of reproduction, which a study of the lowest organisms shows to be theoretically only a form of nutrition. The origin of pain is even simpler. The destruction of tissues results in pain and the actions necessary to prevent it also follow naturally.

Pleasures and pains once experienced are remembered, *i. e.*, they are represented when not present, and there arises a disposition to repeat the former and to avoid a repetition of the latter. This is *desire*, and it becomes the prime motive to action. The organism necessarily acts in obedience to desire, or if there be several desires that interfere with one another it acts in the direction of their resultant. Hence the conative faculty or *will* so called.

Up to and including this stage the *cause* of all activity is generically the same. It is the efficient cause, the *vis a tergo*. *Motive* must be distin-

guished from *purpose*. Desire and will are simply motive. It is a natural force and does not differ except in degree of complication from any purely mechanical or physical force. But evolution has gone on to another stage. In much the same way as, by adopting a new method, it passed from chemical to biotic organization, it has, by making another new departure, passed from genetic to telic causation.

The direction of progress was seen at the outset to be toward the greater concentration of cosmic energy, toward making the universal force, whose quantity cannot change, perform more work. This law continues in operation to the last. Telic causation is only another way of accomplishing this end. Just as biotic organization was called in where chemical organization could go no farther, so teleology is resorted to at the point where genesis ceases to be effective. In the last stages before this point is reached the chief agent in nature is will, but, as already stated, its action is direct, the same as mere force in any other form. The new agent differs primarily from all others in being *indirect*. The essential characteristic of the final cause is indirection.

It is a common figure to represent any force as blind. The conative force is still more frequently so characterized. Desire sees no obstacles. Love is blind and blind impulse rules the lower world. But while results are accomplished by this direct method according to the intensity of the impulse and the strength of the organism, it is evident that there is a limit to the achievements of will. Desire must go unsatisfied if its object cannot be attained within this limit of physical strength. With the advance of biotic organization desire increases more rapidly than does the power to overcome obstacles, and the number and magnitude of the obstacles to the attainment of desired ends thus rapidly increase. Any new advance must look to overcoming these difficulties and to clearing the way for the accomplishment of higher results. Still again the biological law of advantage comes forward. The new device is the *final cause*. It consists of a mechanism for the utilization of force that is running to waste, and in this respect the economic principle of all evolutionary progress is employed, but the application of this principle is wholly unlike any hitherto made.

The conative power was seen to reside in an organized nervous system with an increasing integration of its parts in subordination to a general directive center, the brain. The physical progress continued to all outward appearances unchanged except in degree in passing from the conative state which is genetic into the noetic state which is telic, but by insensible degrees a new psychic faculty was evolved. This new psychic faculty in its developed state is called the *intellect*, but it had its nascent and inchoate stages, which, though the same in essence, scarcely deserve that name. The name, however, is unimportant. It is only needful to understand its nature.

Its physical nature may be safely said to be unknown. A theory is that there takes place within the substance of the brain a miniature repro-

duction of the entire panorama displayed by the external world to the organs of special sense, which register all impressions and preserve them for future comparison and use. The mind itself thus actually *feels*, or, as it were, *sees*, not only all that is presented to the senses but all that has been so presented in the past, or so much of it as it has the power to retain. The simultaneous felt presence of so many impressions renders it possible to make comparisons and recognize differences and samenesses. It thus declares agreements and disagreements, which constitute the basis of all *thought*. Agreement of wholes is identity, agreement of parts is similarity. These are the fundamental relations, but there are many kinds of relations, and the intellectual process *per se* is the *perception of relations*.

How, then, does this simple faculty of perceiving relations become a new power in the world for the storage and use of the universal energy? What is the precise form of indirection that so greatly multiplies the effect produced? Is there anything essentially new in the nature of the force constituting a final cause? To the last of these questions a negative answer must be given. There is only one *genus* of cause in the sense of a force, and that is the direct impact. The difference between efficient and final causes must be sought in the mode of their application. While the final cause, as its name implies, is inspired by an end in view, it is in reality not directed toward that end. In mere motive, or will, unaided by the intuitive faculty, the force of the organism is so directed, but for want of this faculty it may fail to attain it. The telic power differs essentially from the conative power in being directed not to the end but to some *means* to the end. Intelligence works exclusively through means, and only in so far as it does this does it employ the final cause. Instead of seeking the thing desired it seeks some other thing, unimportant in itself, whose attainment it *perceives* will secure the thing desired. This is the essence of intellectual action and all that constitutes a final cause. It is the process of converting means into ends. It thus becomes necessary that the means be *desired*, otherwise there is no *force* for the accomplishment of results. So far as the pursuit of the means is concerned the action is purely conative and does not differ from that which pursues the end directly. The whole difference consists in the *knowledge* that the end will follow upon the means. A final cause, therefore, stripped of its manifold concomitants which so obscure its true nature, consists in the pure intellectual perception that a certain end is attainable through a certain means. But this is simply saying that in and of itself it is not a cause at all. Knowledge is merely a *guide* to action. Intellect is a directive agent and can no more be called the cause of the result accomplished than the rudder can be called the cause of the progress of a boat.

There are all degrees in the amount of indirection involved in teleological action, from a mere *détour* necessary to avoid an obstacle to the highest feats of engineering, in which each separate part, say, of a Ferris wheel, must be

wrought and put together to make the perfect structure which exists in the mind before the first step is taken. In this latter illustration every effort put forth from the beginning to the end is a direct conative act applied to a means. But the work as a whole is telic, the end being constantly in view. And such is the nature of the entire course of material progress achieved by man. It is by this that he is primarily distinguished from the rest of nature. The human intellect is the great source of telic activity. The works of man are the only ones with which we are acquainted that proceed in any considerable degree from final causes. But if there be any other source of final causes, the process must always be the same—efficient causes applied to means.

It was observed at the outset that in the case of genetic phenomena, *i. e.*, of efficient causes, the effect, if the impinging bodies are inert, is always exactly equal to the cause. This is also true of final causes, so far as their action upon the means is concerned, but the *final* effect, if it can be so called, is usually much greater than the cause or effort expended. Wherein consists this difference? How has the force exerted acquired this increased efficiency? The answer is easy. The final cause is the mind's knowledge of the relations that subsist between the means and the end. But the chief of these relations, and the only practical one, is the action of other natural forces outside of the agent's will-power or muscular strength. What the mind sees is that such forces exist and are operating in certain directions. What the intelligent agent does is to place the thing he desires but lacks the power to move into the current of such a force which moves it for him. This is the type of teleological action. It is illustrated in its simplest form by the lumberman who puts his logs into the river and lets the current float them to their destination. But the most complicated cases may, by proper analysis, be reduced to this simple principle. Teleology is essentially the utilization of natural forces, causing them to do what the agent perceives to be useful and wills to be done. The applications of wind, water, steam, and electricity are this and nothing else. All machinery falls into the same class. Civilization in all its material aspects is but the expression of this truth.

I have dwelt thus at length upon the mind side of the general principle of telic progress because I consider it to be the most important principle in the whole domain of social science, almost entirely neglected hitherto, and because it is essentially a psychological principle which cannot be understood in its sociological aspects until its psychological aspects are firmly grasped.

It is here that the principles laid down in the eighth paper of this series on the Mechanics of Society¹ find their application.

¹AM. JOUR. OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. II, No. 2, September 1896, pp. 249-251.

It is not proposed to restate these principles, but as they lie at the very foundation of all social progress, they require some further illustration than was there given. Indirection was classified under two heads, moral and physical, both of which, but especially the second, require fuller treatment.

Following out the line of the first of these classes of actions, viz., those expended upon sentient beings, we find that the intellect, as the repository of the telic force, first subjugates the animal kingdom and brings it under the power of man so that he can make any use of it that he pleases; then it exerts itself upon men, and one man or class of men seeks to render other men subservient to self. Both of these operations involve deception. The general term for the form of deception practiced on animals is *cunning*. The cruder efforts to make one man serve another go by the same name, but the higher and more refined methods of the intellect are called tact, shrewdness, strategy, and diplomacy. In every case it is a form of deception.

It must be remembered that the intellect or telic power was developed as an aid to the will for the better satisfaction of desire. But for its value as such it could not have come into existence under the biologic law of advantage. It is as much a product of that law as any useful organ in an animal or a plant. Its supreme utility accounts for its rapid development, and for the fact that the race in which it first appeared in a marked degree soon gained an ascendancy over all other races. The lower kingdom became an easy prey, but when mind became pitted against mind and the great battle of the giants began, higher and higher generalship was developed until there was produced what we commonly call the competitive system on which modern society rests.

I have been in the habit of characterizing the telic or intellectual process or principle, as I have endeavored to define it, as the *law of mind*, in contradistinction to the process or principle according to which evolution in general takes place, which I call the *law of nature*. I do not mean by this to say that the

law of mind is not also a natural law, but it certainly is utterly unlike the other law, and as it came forward at a late stage in the history of cosmic evolution, it seems to have inaugurated a wholly new order of things. Schopenhauer declares that the intellect, as contrasted with the eternal and universal will, is an "accident," and there is a certain amount of truth in this statement. Although, like all the rest of the extra-normal products of nature, some of which have been enumerated in previous papers, it had a natural origin and was brought forth as a means of advancing nature's ends, still, like them, when once created it soon cut loose from its original attachments and entered upon a career of its own, independent of, and to a considerable extent antagonistic to, its primary purposes. Not only did this faculty early become the champion of feeling as against function, until today it threatens the depopulation of the globe, but from the outset it took it upon itself to counteract the law of nature and to oppose to the competitive system, that completely dominates the lower world and still so largely prevails in human society, a wholly different system based on rational coöperation. In dealing with the animal world the law of nature is replaced by that of reason in destroying the feral tendencies and substituting complete submission to man's will—in a word by domestication. In this state the equilibrium previously existing between the organism and the environment is destroyed, and even the colors of the fur and feather are changed. But these are not the most important changes. By a process of artificial selection, which supplants that of natural selection, those qualities which are most useful to man are rendered more and more prominent until most domestic animals undergo profound physical modifications in the direction of utility. These modifications are not always also in the direction of greater structural perfection so as to be in the line of natural evolution, but, so far as the particular qualities selected are concerned they usually are so, and in many cases careful breeding improves the whole animal, so that man becomes a powerful ally of evolution itself. This is not disproved by the fact, upon which so

much stress has been laid by certain biologists, that such improved races usually revert more or less to their original condition when human influence is withdrawn. On the contrary, this fact establishes another law of biology, viz., that natural selection does not secure the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence. It merely fixes the exact position which each species is capable of holding in the general competition. This is always far below what it might attain if competition were removed. Exactly what man does is to remove this competition, and the immense progress that every species makes is shown in the improvement of the stock under man's intelligent care.

Considering next the effect of the telic power directed to the vegetable kingdom we perceive that substantially the same results have attended it. These are even more important here, for they involve nothing less than the whole range of agriculture and horticulture. These prime sources of social existence are altogether due to the working of the intellect upon the laws of vegetable life. One of the first manifestations and essential characteristics of the telic faculty is foresight, or the power to "look before" as well as after. Upon this, more than any other, agriculture depends, since the seed could only be sown in anticipation of the harvest, which is a future event.

In the vegetable kingdom, even more clearly than in the animal, is the truth apparent, to which attention was drawn, that the effect of human *telesis* is to improve the quality of the plants selected for cultivation. In the case of the cereals, for example, it is clear that this improvement is in the direction of a general structural advance. In fact it was through the study of plants that the principles I have here stated were first brought home to me. I made an attempt to formulate them over twenty years ago, and in the following words:

There is no necessary correspondence between organism and habitat, no necessary harmony between species and environment. This need only exist so far as is necessary to render the life of the species possible. Beyond this the greatest inharmony and inadaptation may

be conceived to reign in nature. Each plant may be regarded as a reservoir of vital force, as containing within it a potential energy far beyond and wholly out of consonance with the contracted conditions imposed upon it by its environment, and by which it is compelled to possess the comparatively imperfect organization with which we find it endowed. Each individual is where it is, and what it is, by reason of the combined forces which hedge it in and determine its very form.¹

Recurring to the subject in 1886 I quoted this paragraph from the older paper and added:

Since these words were written this principle has been widely recognized by botanists. It is now known that the plants of every region possess the potency of a far higher life than they enjoy, and that they are prevented from attaining that higher state by the adverse influences that surround them in their normal habitat. The singling out of certain species by man, and their development through his care into far higher and more perfect forms to supply his needs, both physical and æsthetic, further demonstrate this law. Man gives these plants a new and artificial environment favorable to their higher development, and they develop accordingly. In a word, he gives them opportunity to progress, and they progress by inherent powers with which all plants are endowed. Once, when herborizing in a rather wild, neglected spot, I collected a little depauperate grass that for a time greatly puzzled me, but which upon analysis proved to be none other than genuine wheat. It had been accidentally sown in this abandoned nook, where it had been obliged to struggle for existence along with the remaining vegetation. There it had grown up, and sought to rise into that majesty and beauty that is seen in a field of waving grain. But at every step it had felt the resistance of an environment no longer regulated by intelligence. It missed the fostering care of man, who destroys competition, removes enemies, and creates conditions favorable to the highest development. This is called cultivation, and the difference between my little starveling grass and the wheat of the well-tilled field is a difference of cultivation only, and not at all of capacity. I could adduce any number of similar examples from the vegetable kingdom.²

I now reaffirm this principle, which has not been challenged, and assign it to its proper place in a system of sociology as one of the leading contributions of biology to that science.

It remains to consider the effect of the exercise of the telic faculty upon the physical world. Much has already been said

¹ *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. IX, New York, October 1876, p. 682.

² *The Forum*, Vol. II, New York, December 1886, p. 348.

on this point. In the domain of plant life we were already beyond the range of feeling and out of the moral world. In the domain of non-living matter we are no longer fettered by the complicated and subtle laws of life. The work of molding such products is therefore much simpler, but, as already remarked, the principle is the same. It is remarkable, when we reflect upon it, how easily nature is managed by intelligence. We have perfect passivity combined with absolutely uniform laws. It is only necessary to know the nature of matter and the laws according to which physical phenomena take place. As Comte insists, we need not know the causes of things, but only their laws. We need not ask the question *why*, but only the question *how*. This question was early asked and, for the simpler laws of matter, was correctly answered.

Probably the first inventions were tools. Man is a tool-employing animal. Few have ever reflected that no animal ever uses tools, much less makes them. It is not proved that the most sagacious creatures ever increase their power to do anything by the aid of inanimate bodies within their reach, such as sticks or stones. They work *upon* such objects but they do not work *with* them. This is because a higher telic power is required in doing this than they possess. They are unable to see that the use of a club wielded, as by an ape, with the hand would greatly increase the force of a blow they might wish to inflict upon an enemy. Alleged cases of such action may be found in the books, but, so far as I am aware, none of them are authentic. Still, if such cases have been observed, this simply denotes that there are creatures below man that possess the rudiments of a telic faculty—an incipient intellect—and this I am not disposed to dispute. Tools were among man's first necessities, perhaps primarily as weapons of defense, but also as means of obtaining subsistence. Clothing and shelter even of the simplest kind could scarcely be obtained without them, agriculture was well-nigh impossible in their absence, and every form of art presupposes the means of modifying and transforming material

substances. But not only in the manufacture of the tool but in its use, either in manufacturing other useful things or in carrying on any of the arts of life, the telic faculty is brought into requisition.

The sociological significance of all this lies in the corollary that only a rational being can practice economy. There is no true economy in the operation of the law of nature. It is a sort of trial-and-error process and involves enormous waste. I have endeavored to formulate what may be called the law of biologic economics, with the result that while "every creation of organic nature has within it the possibility of success," that success is only secured through the "multiplication of chances."¹

True economy, on the contrary, is necessarily telic. Instead of going in all directions for the sake of being sure of ultimately finding the one only advantageous direction, it first looks over the ground, discovers the desired path, and pursues that and no other. This saves the expense of trying to go in all the impossible directions with the resultant failure. Yet this last is nature's method. Not only must we conceive the effort as proceeding from the center of a circle, but we must usually conceive it as proceeding from the center of a sphere. This is the principle that underlies the paradox upon which I have so often insisted that the artificial is superior to the natural.² At a later date the principle was more fully expanded in the following form:

A closer analysis shows that the fundamental distinction between the animal and the human method is that *the environment transforms the animal while man transforms the environment*. This proposition holds literally almost without exception from whatever standpoint it be contemplated. It is, indeed, the full expression of the fact above stated that the tools of animals are organic while those of man are mechanical. But if we contrast these two methods from our present standpoint, which is that of economics, we see at once the immense superiority of the human over the animal method. First consider the economy of time. It has taken much longer to develop any one of the organic appliances of animals, whether for war or industry, than is represented by the entire period during which man has possessed any arts, even the simplest. Look next at the matter of efficiency. Not one of

¹ *Psychic Factors*, p. 250.

² *American Anthropologist*, Vol. II, Washington, April 1889, p. 121.

the organic appliances has sufficed to enable the species possessing it to migrate far from the region to which it was originally adapted. Man, on the other hand, without acquiring any new organic adaptations, but by the invention of tools, by providing himself clothing and shelter, by artificial devices for capturing prey, and by other ways of transforming his environment, has placed himself in position to occupy the whole earth from the equator to the arctic circle, and to become the only animal that is not restricted in its habitat.

Every implement of human design is calculated to take advantage of some mechanical principle through which the muscular force necessary to be exerted is less for any given result accomplished than it would be without such implement. In most cases it is many times less, but in the great majority of cases no result could be produced at all without the implement. Machines are simply more effective tools, and it is through tools and machinery that the arts have been established. The utter helplessness of man without the arts is well illustrated by De Foe in Robinson Crusoe, and yet in order to enable him to survive at all, even in a tropical climate where nature's productions were exuberant, he must provide himself from the stores of the wrecked vessel with a considerable supply of tools and other artificial appliances. What was true of Robinson Crusoe thus circumstanced is much more true of the great majority of mankind who inhabit what we call temperate climates, *i. e.*, climates in which the temperature sometimes falls ten or twenty degrees below the freezing point. One winter without art would suffice to sweep the whole population north or south of the thirtieth parallel of latitude out of existence.

We are so much accustomed to the terms *labor* and *production* that we rarely stop to think what they really mean. Neither of these terms has any place in natural economics. All labor consists in an artificial transformation of man's environment. Nature produces nothing in the politico-economic sense of the word. Production consists in artificially altering the form of natural objects. The clothes we wear are chiefly derived from the sheep, the ox, the silkworm and a few other animals, the cotton plant, flax, hemp, and a few other plants; but between the latest stage at which nature leaves these and the final form in which they are ready for use, the steps are many and the labor great. The dwellings man inhabits once consisted chiefly of trees, clay, and beds of solid rock. These have been transformed by labor performed with tools and machinery into houses. The same is true of temples and of all the other buildings that now cover the surface of the earth wherever man is found. And so the entire cycle of human achievement might be gone through. All these transformations are accomplished through the arts.

The sum total of human arts constitutes man's material civilization, and it is this that chiefly distinguishes him from the rest of nature. But the arts are the exclusive product of mind. They are the means through which intelli-

gence utilizes the materials and forces of nature. And as all economics rests primarily on production, it seems to follow that a science of economics must have a psychological basis. In fact the economics of mind and the economics of life are not merely different but the direct opposites of each other. The psychologic law strives to reverse the biologic law. The biologic law is that of the survival of structures best adapted to the environment. Those structures that yield most readily to changes in the environment persist. It has therefore been aptly called the "survival of the plastic." The environment never changes to conform to the structures but always the reverse, and the only organic progress possible is that which accrues through improvements in structure tending to enable organic beings to cope with sterner and ever harder conditions. In any and every case it is the environment that works the changes and the organism that undergoes them.

But the most important factor in the environment of any species is its organic environment. The hardest pressure that is brought to bear upon it comes from other living things in the midst of which it lives. Any slight advantage which one species may gain from a favorable change of structure causes it to multiply and expand, and unless strenuously resisted, ultimately to acquire a complete monopoly of all things that are needed for its support. Any other species that consumes the same elements must, unless equally vigorous, soon be crowded out. This is the true meaning of the survival of the fittest. It is essentially a process of *competition*. The economics of nature consists therefore essentially in the operation of the law of competition in its purest form. The prevailing idea, however, that it is the fittest possible that survive in this struggle is wholly false. The effect of competition is to prevent any form from attaining its maximum development, and to maintain a certain comparatively low level for all forms that succeed in surviving. This is made clear by the fact that wherever competition is wholly removed, as through the agency of man, in the interest of any one form, that form immediately begins to make great strides and soon outstrips all those that depend upon competition. Such has been the case with all the cereals and fruit trees; it is the case with domestic cattle and sheep, with horses, dogs, and all the forms of life that man has excepted from the biologic law and subjected to the law of mind, and both the agricultural and the pastoral stages of society rest upon the successful resistance which rational man has offered to the law of nature in these departments. So that we have now to add to the waste of competition its influence in preventing the really fittest from surviving.

Hard as it seems to be for modern philosophers to understand this, it was one of the first truths that dawned upon the incipient mind of man. Consciously or unconsciously, it was felt from the very outset that the mission of mind was to grapple with the law of competition and, as far as possible, to overcome and destroy it. This iron law of nature, as it may be called, was

everywhere found to lie athwart the path of human progress, and the whole upward struggle of rational man, whether physically, socially, or morally, has been with this tyrant of nature, the law of competition. And in so far as he has progressed at all he has done so by gaining, little by little, the mastery in this struggle. In the physical world he has accomplished this through invention from which have resulted the arts. Every utensil of labor, every mechanical device, every object of design, and every artificial form that serves a human purpose, is a triumph of mind over the physical forces of nature in ceaseless and aimless competition. In the social world it is human institutions—religion, government, law, marriage, customs—that have been thought out and adopted to restrain the unbridled individualism that has always menaced society. And finally, the ethical code and the moral law are simply the means employed by reason, intelligence, and refined sensibility to suppress and crush out the animal nature of man.¹

Such has been the influence that the telic faculty of man has exerted in all the great domains of nature, and the general result is what I understand by telic progress. The reason is therefore clear why it is necessary to insist that sociology shall from the outset recognize man as a rational being endowed with this faculty which he has exercised from the first and continues to exercise more and more. Thus far, however, it is only the employment of this faculty by the individual that has been considered. This has sufficed to subject the law of nature to the law of mind only for the individual. It has not done this for society at large. Society remains a prey to the law of nature, *i. e.*, to the competitive régime that prevails throughout the animal kingdom. The struggle has simply been raised to a higher plane to go on as fiercely as before. This, as we saw, does not secure the survival of the fittest except in the narrow sense of best adaptation to an adverse environment, which often, as in parasitism, involves degeneracy. The power to expand always exists but is checked by competition. Individual telesis acting upon inferior organisms removes the competition, and these expansive powers immediately assert themselves, produ-

¹ "The Psychologic Basis of Social Economics." Address of the Vice President for the Section of Economic Science and Statistics of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, at the Rochester meeting, August 1892. *Proc. A. A. A. S.*, Vol. XLI, Salem, 1892, pp. 308-312.

cing superior types of vegetable and animal life, and making agriculture and stock raising the chief sources of human subsistence. Applied to men individual telesis has the effect of creating artificial inequalities. Obeying the law of nature, it follows the uniform course of that law in producing monopoly, and, as among animals and plants, the weaker are crowded out by the stronger and the few dominate the many. The accident of position is a more potent influence here than on the lower plane and comes to constitute the leading element of strength and fitness to survive.

But it is in its application to inanimate objects and natural forces that individual telesis has displayed its chief power. The exercise of this innocent physical indirection has been the main-spring of human progress. It is not cunning, shrewdness, strategy, and diplomacy, but *ingenuity* that has inspired civilization. The exercise of ingenuity is *invention*, and invention is the basis of the practical arts. The systematic search for and discovery of the natural properties of bodies and the constant laws according to which the forces of nature act is *science*, and this usually has art for its end. The combined effect of science and art constitutes so nearly the whole of the material civilization of the world that for all ordinary purposes the other factors may be omitted, and we may define civilization as *the utilization of the materials and forces of nature*. The highest expression of science and art is found in machinery, and the possible improvement of machinery renders the productive power of society practically unlimited. Yet we know that there is a limit to the amount of production that society can assimilate. That limit is not one of human ingenuity, neither is it one of capacity to consume. It is a limit to the ability to obtain. The so-called over-production takes place while men are starving, and while thousands desire, want, and even need the very products whose production must be abandoned. This has been the enigma of economists. The explanation lies in the fundamental principle of this paper. It is the natural result of individual telesis acting under the law of nature so far as society at large is concerned.

It checks production by choking circulation. It makes no provision for equitable, not to speak of equal, distribution. The monopolistic tendency of natural law, working here as everywhere, closes the smaller avenues of trade, heaps up the products in certain centers, and clogs the free flow of the social chyme before it can fairly get into the circulatory system of society.

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THE PRESENT STATUS OF SOCIOLOGY IN GERMANY

II.

It is perhaps indirectly due, in no small degree, to theoretical socialism that the historical view point has been so generally adopted in more recent national economy in Germany. When socialism announced its dictum that the realization of its plans and theories is an inevitable necessity in the course of natural historical development, its more or less positive opponents encountered the task of investigating the historical development of the industrial system, which served socialism as the premise from which to derive its bold conclusion. If it should be possible to meet socialism upon its chosen ground, to gain historical perspective unfavorable to socialism, the theory would thus be shaken from its foundation. Marx, and still more Engels, found in history a constantly increasing tendency to collectivism. If historical research should reach a contrary result, then an exceptional place will no longer be claimable for socialism. It will, in itself, have no more plausibility and scientific viability than other social impulses which have sprung from definite arbitrariness and not from historical necessity.

In the broad circuit of questions arising in this connection the phenomenon of the formation of social classes, so important for sociology, constitutes the central problem. How is it with the fact of social classes? History shows them from the beginning. Is the tendency with them toward stronger socialization and unification or toward divergence and differentiation? Inseparable from this consideration is the related phenomenon of the division of labor. It is a long way from primitive domestic economy to the modern industrial system with its industrial specialization and organization. Moreover, the division of labor in our day is constantly becoming more minute. Does it lead finally to socialization or to individualization? Socialism sees

in the separation of society into classes the strongest factor to produce ultimately complete collectivism. Class antagonisms must and will find their termination when there are no more antagonisms, that is, when society is no longer split into classes. Private property alone is it that separates society into reciprocally hostile classes. With the abolition of private property this antagonism will disappear. So it is also with the division of labor. The more occupations are specialized, the more fragmentary each one's work becomes, the more dependent is each individual upon another. This dependence tends obviously towards ultimate socialization—in the first place, of production. So at least reasons socialism.

Gustav Schmoller reached an opposite result in his monographs upon this subject.¹ By division of labor Schmoller understands "the permanent, individual, lifelong adjustment to a specialized vocation" (*Jahrb.* XIV, p. 47). He traces division of labor back to differences in men. It can consequently not be regarded as an historical category. Variation of social rank and possession, of honor and emolument, is really only a secondary phenomenon, a consequence of social differentiation, and it is developed according to natural laws. He recognizes in all only two grounds for division of labor: "the difference in personal qualities and the community of interest of the men in a given combination" (p. 53). Even a contrast as radical as that in our time between wage-earners and entrepreneurs has its roots, according to Schmoller, not in property but in hereditary typical qualities, the modification of which is of much greater importance for social reform than changes in the distribution of property" (p. 89). According to this view division of labor depends originally upon adaptation and then upon transmission of the qualities concerned. In the social order of today it is "neither absolutely harmonious nor absolutely anarchic, but rather a

¹The following are notable in this connection: (1) "Das Wesen der Arbeitsteilung und der socialen Klassenbildung" (*Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, u. s. w.*, xiv. Jahrgang); (2) "Die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Unternehmung" (*ibid.*); (3) "Ueber die Entwicklung des Grossbetriebes und die sociale Klassenbildung" (*Preussische Jahrbücher*, April 1892).

social system which has its basis in the unity of language, thought, and moral ideas; its support in the unity of customs, law, and the commercial organization" (p. 58).

In connection with division of labor the formation of social classes is both a consequence and a concomitant. This phenomenon is not to be traced primarily to differences in possessions, since this is an effect of a primary cause—the difference in power of adaptation. On the contrary, "the first accumulation of property and the incipient inequality of its distribution is to be ascribed only to division of labor, to the formation of classes, and to the superior productive capacity of certain persons and occupations (p. 86).

The formation of classes does not progress incessantly. Social classes are formed rather in certain epochs, of which Schmoller asserts that in them "differentiation predominates over integration" (p. 74). Further, according to Schmoller, these classes constituting groups on the basis of natural differences are in normal conditions not in conflict with each other. On the contrary, "the culture of society rests in morally and legally ordered conditions of peace, which have their roots in a psychical community. Social conflicts are disturbances of this community. They arise in case of sudden and powerful increase of differentiation, when the bonds of community are too weak, when legal and moral ordering of the newly originated division of labor and of possessions is either not yet established or has ceased to be effective" (p. 99). The struggle of oppressed classes against their oppressors does not break out, however, when the pressure is severest, "but precisely in periods of improvement in their condition it is the *aristocracy* among the oppressed who give the signal for war" (p. 101). We might express the gist of these conclusions of Schmoller in a proposition which occurs elsewhere: "The higher civilizations will necessarily produce a shifting variation of forms of employment, not a uniformity in the sense of mere state action or mere individual action" (*Preuss. Jahrbücher*, 1892, p. 471).

For all these conclusions Schmoller has practically omitted

proofs. It is, to be sure, doubtless true that the first impulse to human differentiation is given by the physical and psychical differences of men. That these differences, however, are so exactly and certainly transmitted from generation to generation that they produce the groupings according to class is by no means to be asserted without further evidence. The constant passages from class to class, ascents to a higher class, and falls into a lower one are too plain and frequent to be ignored. Gustav Freytag was nearer right than Schmoller in saying that "a piece of Darwinism finds expression when the sexton's son becomes a parson." No more is Schmoller's assertion to be accepted that the division of labor is to be traced *solely* to physical and psychical differences in individuals instead of being an eminently social category. So far as our social order of today is concerned it is surely false to assert that each individual fills the place which best corresponds with his abilities. The division of labor appears in Schmoller's representation, on the one hand, as a natural necessity, on the other as the voluntary act of the individual. In fact it is usually a *necessity socially imposed on the individual*.

Quite as unauthorized is the assertion of Schmoller that the promotion of classes is a consequence of division of labor alone. It is not superior industrial capacity of given persons and occupations that determines their inclusion in a higher class, but their superior social power. Doubtless Schmoller would not claim that social power (*Macht*) and industrial capacity (*Leistungsfähigkeit*) are identical concepts.

In spite of the insufficient basis and evidence for Schmoller's specific assertions, his fundamental thought that the industrial order tends not towards uniformity, but towards diversity, seems to me a very fruitful one for sociology and materially quite justified. We are reminded by it of the thought of Herbert Spencer, that specialization and differentiation are in direct ratio to each other. These two tendencies, particularly in modern society, assert themselves with equal energy, and no one is entitled to say which of them will be the victor. At all events

today's political policies show that the industrial order is breaking a path which is a compromise way between private economy and collective economy.

Symptomatic of this harmonization of the antitheses is nationalism in its modern type. If we regard individualism and socialism as the two component forces in the state, their resultant is nationalism. Nationalism satisfies both in so far as it presents on the one hand a unity of individual type, on the other hand a great social group. A like harmonization of the antitheses may be contained in the state socialism connoted in the above cited doctrine of Schmoller, and favored in Germany in a special manner also by Adolf Wagner.

With this criticism of Schmoller's propositions I have anticipated in many respects the position of Karl Bücher.¹ The latter takes a deeper and more comprehensive view of the problem. He is not satisfied with the ordinary conception of the division of labor. He distinguishes rather five types of division: (1) division of production (*Produktionsteilung*); (2) apportioning of labor (*Arbeitszerlegung*); (3) specialization; (4) separation into callings (*Berufsteilung*); and, finally, (5) displacement of labor (*Arbeitsverschiebung*). This fivefold division has this immediate advantage of avoiding the confusion that has arisen from Adam Smith's well-known illustration of needle manufacture. In that illustration we have primarily only the phenomena of apportioning labor ((2) above). These phenomena are, however, both for national economy and for sociology, much less essential than the division of production (1) with which it is usually confounded. Smith further traced division of labor to a basal psychic impulse in man—the impulse to exchange. Bücher on the contrary denies that such an impulse exists in primitive man. In low stages of culture indeed we encounter an unconquerable mistrust of all exchange. We might rather affirm that the impulse to exchange gets its origin under the influence of an

¹ *Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft*. Sechs Vorträge. Tübingen, 1893. We have here to do with lectures I and III only. The former bears the title of the series; the latter is entitled *Arbeitsteilung und sociale Klassenbildung*.

industrial order which includes division of labor. "The division of labor which national economy considers is a historical category, not an elementary economic phenomenon" (p. 139).

Bücher directs his polemics against Schmoller also. The latter claims division of labor as the ground for variation in possessions, etc. Bücher declares: "So far as these occurrences (*i. e.*, the phenomena of division of labor) do not elude research in prehistoric obscurity, as in the case of the rise of the priest-hoods and of the most ancient orders of nobility, I am disposed to believe that we might invert Schmoller's remarkable dictum and declare that differences of possessions and of income are not the consequence of division of labor but its chief cause" (p. 152).

The assertion of Schmoller that the structure of classes rests entirely upon inheritance is characterized by Bücher as "a thesis without supporting evidence, and a crooked Darwinian analogy." At the same time Bücher admits that it may be as difficult to adduce evidence against the assertion as for it. Bücher distinguishes between vocational class (*Berufsklasse*) and vocational status (*Berufsstand*). Only of the former is it true that possessions and occupation define its limits. Bücher also admits that the inheritance hypothesis is admissible in case of the former but not in case of the latter.

Of special weight in Bücher's treatment is the further circumstance that he does not overlook the differences between industrial epochs. The relation of division of labor to possessions is quite different today from what it was in the Middle Ages, for instance. Schmoller—the head of the historical school!—planted himself on grounds of natural history, and let history drop out of sight! In opposition to this summary method of treatment, Bücher rightly emphasizes the difference between different periods. "During the Middle Ages," he says, "lack of capital compelled division of occupations (*Berufsteilung*); at present abundance of capital tends to minute subdivision of labor (*Arbeitszerlegung*) and to displacement of labor (*Arbeitsverschiebung*)" (p. 155). In this analysis Bücher's new terminology does very good service.

Finally, whether we decline or consent to accept the particular allegations and conclusions of these two thinkers, we certainly cannot fail to notice one serious omission in both forms of treatment. There is no profound perception of the individual or social psychical, that is, of the peculiarly sociological basis and setting of this significant social phenomenon. This remained for another thinker, a specialist in sociology, of whom I shall speak presently in connection with the systematic sociologists.

Meanwhile the first of Bücher's lectures, which gave the title to the collection, has no little interest in its bearing upon the historical mode of sociological investigation. It treats of the origin of national industry (*Volkswirtschaft*), and attempts to outline a universal scheme of its development. As criterion for characterization and designation of the different epochs in industrial history Bücher selects the objective circumstance, which is surely of vast importance for national economy, viz., the length of the course over which goods pass between the producer and the consumer. Accordingly, three epochs are distinguished; those, namely, of: (1) domestic industry (*Hauswirtschaft*), (2) municipal industry (*Stadtwirtschaft*), (3) national industry (*Volkswirtschaft*). The first extended until about a thousand years after Christ; the second survives even to our own day; the third is really a development of present times. "The elaboration of national industry is essentially a result of that political centralization which begins at the turning point of the Middle Ages with the rise of territorial state structures, and reaches its culmination today in the creation of states, realizing "national unity" (*des nationalen Einheitsstaates*) (p. 67).

The whole tendency of economic politics since the sixteenth century has been for satisfaction of the impulse toward integration of nationality. "In the latest phase of this development the principle of nationality has become an underlying motive of mighty consolidating force" (p. 75). Bücher experiences, therefore, neither the customary satisfaction, nor does he feel any alarm over the alleged present tendency to widen national

industry into world industry. According to him the development of industry runs the course from the home via the city to the state. Here, so far as we can see, it halts. In the first stadium blood relationship forms the basis; in the second, neighborhood; in the third, nationality. "The path which humanity has passed over is from community to society (*Gemeinschaft zur Gesellschaft*) and so far as we can see it ends with constantly closer socialization" (p. 77).

This is the undertone of the book—socialization is constantly becoming closer. At the highest grade of culture which the development of humanity has thus far reached social bonds are not loosened, but on the contrary they are drawn closer. And again, it is a sort of blood relationship which serves as basis and as impelling force for this socialization. We shall further see that another thinker, who first put this terminology "community" and "society" to the special uses just noticed, reached conclusions of quite dissimilar sort, something indeed like pessimism. At all events Ferdinand Tönnies pays too little, and perhaps no respect to "the mighty consolidating force of the principle of nationality."

III.

While it is true of every science that the search after and the leaning toward analogies has resulted in little good, in sociology they have even—for who knows how long—barred the way to normal and regular development. With all due recognition and admiration for the monumental works of Herbert Spencer, he must yet be charged with obstructing the development of sociology by his insistence upon the analogy between society and an organism. In his own mind this analogy may have had merely the force of a means of interpretation, which served him, according to a perfectly valid methodology, as a leading string to guide from member to member until all could be comprehended as existing together in a comprehensive phenomenon, "society;" others, however, have been unable to observe proper bounds, and on the basis of analogies which they

took for definitions have arrived at wild conclusions and still wilder systems. One of our younger scholars, Paul Barth, has even gone so far as to cite this analogy as a scientific authority to refute Marx. His reply to Marx's claim that industry is the "foundation" upon which law rises as a superstructure is that this cannot be "because it is *incongruous with the only correct conception of society as an organism*" (p. 137). He declares that Spencer is authorized in regarding his principle—"society is an organism"—as a parallelism existing not in thought merely, but also in reality, and that he is entitled to draw from it conclusions about reality. However that may be, the organic analogy has been made the basis of a science, and thereby its evolution has been nipped in the bud. From the fruitless efforts of Comte to Paul von Lilienfeld enough discussion of this subject has been contained in sociological literature. I may here select only one of the most eminent German representatives of this theory in order to show from his works the unfruitfulness of this lame analogy. In his colossal work in four volumes Fr. Albert Schaeffle has attempted, from the view point that society is comparable with an organism, to understand society and to describe its life and development.¹ I shall not inquire how far he has been led by Comte and Spencer. Schaeffle himself admits only a very slight measure of influence from them.

Schaeffle takes his departure from the conviction that the social "body" differs in degree, not in kind, from every other individual organism. He announces this frequently. Thus: "The psychical life of the social body is a higher potency of the psychical life of the individual. It would not be hard to show what there is added to this, in a given grade of social development, as peculiar social reinforcement,—language, symbols, institutions for communication of ideas, division and combination of psychical labor,—though it must be admitted that

¹ *Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers*. Encyklopädischer Versuch einer realen Anatomie, Physiologie und Psychologie der menschlicher Gesellschaft mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Volkswirtschaft als socialer Stoffwechsel. 4 Bände. Tübingen, 1875-78. (For a notice of the second edition, in two volumes, and a different estimate of SCHAEFFLE, *vide* AM. JOUR. OF SOCIOLOGY, September 1896, p. 310.)

comparatively little has been done towards making such exhibits" (p. 10). "In other respects also, which do not belong immediately to evolution and dissolution, the social body proves itself in its structure and life not essentially but only in degree different from the material systems and processes of organic and inorganic nature" (p. 19). "The psychophysical and the physical phenomena of the social life are to be sure incomparably more complex and evolved than those of individual life; they manifest nothing (*sic*), however, the germ of which does not appear in the life of individual men, or which is not in part suggested at least in lower animal life" (p. 703). And thus he proceeds with all sorts of variations.

Now, in my opinion, the truth is precisely the opposite of all this. If we contemplate society as a totality, or with Schaeffle as an organism, we have at least in view an organism of a wholly peculiar sort. We need not first make profound studies and penetrating observations in order to discover that a coherent mass of men, a society, is something different from a mere sum, or the product of its individuals. If society were only a higher potency of the individual organisms, or if, as Schaeffle expresses himself, "the differentiating and characterizing marks of the social body" were "merely the universality and high spiritualization of its components and of their movements" it would be a necessary consequence that the psychical energy of the mass must increase in proportion as the number of individuals increases. The first and strongest effect of mass association is, as a matter of fact, unquestionably a reduction of the level of psychical force, a grinding down to the measure of the average. This observation had been made even by Schiller, who in sociology accomplished if possible still less than Schaeffle. "Each individual," he says, "seems to me fairly wise and intelligent. Let them incorporate and the result is a block-head." The explanation is not far to seek. The universal, the generic, is in each. On the other hand, the special, the higher, the more spiritual belongs only to individuals. In the coexistence of the mass, this general, possessed by all, alone comes to

successful expression. "What is common to all can be only the possession of him who has the least," says Simmel.

Yet the important thing after all is rather that society whether we think of it in the broadest sense as humanity, or in a more restricted sense somewhat as a club, is something entirely different from the individual *per se*, and furthermore something *generically* different. Still more: for science the primary thing is not properly the individual that sometime enters into society, but rather society itself. The individual is only an abstraction. It is therefore an entire inversion to take as the point of departure of sociological investigation the *individual*, who, so far as we know him in history and life, is merely a member of a group—to use Simmel's phrase, "a point of intersection of social threads" (*Schnittpunkt sozialer Fäden*). Rather were it to be recommended that individual psychology take its departure from social psychology. And further; supposing the view were admissible that the social body is analogous in structure and life with the organism of the individual man; what addition would that bring to *positive* knowledge and understanding of this peculiar organism? None whatever, except mere, and at that almost always misleading, or at any rate irrelevant, designations of the particular members of society—designations taken bodily, without criticism, and only for sake of the sounding name, from anatomy, biology, etc. Thus Schaeffle busies himself with rebaptizing groups or members of the social body with names of members of the animal body. There are, he says, five "social tissues" corresponding to the organic tissues—(a) osseous, (b) tegumentary, (c) vascular, (d) muscular, (e) nervous. The social tissues are (1) locative, *i. e.*, settlements, roads and buildings (attaching the social body to the soil); (2) protective; (3) commercial (*i. e.*, devoted to exchange of materials, including "production" trade, etc.); (4) for administrative technique (civil and military); (5) for psychic guidance (planning, book-keeping, control, etc.).

Apart now from all errors of fact, I raise the one practical question: Of what good is all this? We certainly cannot carry

over to "psychic guidance," and "military and civil institutions" the same law which the physiologist may have discovered for the nervous tissue and muscular tissue. We have then nothing but an empty designation. We surely cannot lay serious claim to any scientific insight from having been taught that there are "devices for protection." Moreover, these hollow designations are, as remarked, actually misleading. To uncover only a single harmful aspect, they encourage the thought that the "social body" is born with all these "tissues," and that it can as little do without them or provide substitutes for them as a man can in the case of his muscles or his skin. This ready-made theory surely has no room for a thought of development.

Hand in hand with a favoring biology and physiology Schaeffle seeks further component parts of the social body, and, as might be expected, he is fortunate enough to find them. "We recognize," he says, "the social connecting tissue in the ideally mediated, legally unformed coherences." Such are blood relationship, stock, nationality, race, compatriotism, party, estate, confession, etc." (p. 288 *sq.*). We might have thought that all these represented separate and independent organisms. Schaeffle teaches us, however, that they are mere "connecting tissue." In another passage he says, however, "The family is for the social body what the cell is for the organic body" (p. 213). But the family rests on relationship. Hence it follows that the family is *a cell constructed from connecting tissue!*

But this is far from being the most absurd conclusion to which Schaeffle's premises and definitions lead. In the second volume of his work he inquires after the "law of development." He starts with the thought that mechanical causality does not suffice for explanation and comprehension of the progress of civilization; that *causæ finales* are rather to be assumed. The "goal-setting interworking of a divine world substance" must not be left out of account. In accordance with this presumption Schaeffle posits "adaptation" (*Anpassung*) as the moving force in social development, which, however "is assured and mediated by the struggle for existence." He formulates the law of social

development in these terms: "Progressive social formation is the highest result of the perfecting selections of the human struggle for existence" (p. 55 *sq.*). Schaeffle is here quite on Darwinian ground. He insists that society is advancing toward constantly improved adaptations, that the higher human types are constantly transmitted and extended, while the lower species are in course of extinction. In short, Schaeffle holds fast to belief in the intellectual and moral progress of the human race. He has not demonstrated it, as no belief can be demonstratively established.

Another incomparably profounder sociologist, Ferdinand Tönnies, disbelieves in this progress.¹ As a basis for his theory Tönnies constructs a new psychological terminology. He distinguishes between "essential will" (*Wesenswille*) and "arbitrariness" (*Wilkur*). "Essential will is the psychological equivalent of the human body, or the principle of unity of life, in so far as the same is contemplated under that form of reality to which the thinker himself belongs (*quatenus sub attributo cogitationis concipitur*)" (p. 99). "Arbitrariness" is a fabric of thought itself, to which, therefore, proper reality can be attributed only in relation to its originator, the agent of the thought, in case the arbitrariness becomes known to others and is recognized as such by them" (p. 100). In other words "essential will" is, on the one side, generic will, on the other side, instinctive will; arbitrariness is *individual*, and, so to speak, *willed will*. With the former men enter natural, with the latter artificial relationships. Natural relations and circumstances of men are called by Tönnies "community" (*Gemeinschaft*); artificial relationships he calls "society" (*Gesellschaft*). The former is divisible into three kinds: (1) blood relationship (*Verwandschaft*); (2) neighborhood² (*Nachbarschaft*); (3) friendship.³ In the case of each the following laws prevail: (1) Relatives and mates love

¹ *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*. Abhandlung des Kommunismus und des Socialismus als empirischer Kulturformen. Leipzig, 1887.

² This form of the word is needed in sociology. Tr.

³ Preference for Latin forms might dictate the alternative translation: 1. *Consanguinity*. 2. *Proximity*. 3. *Amity*. Tr.

each other or accustom themselves easily to each other; speak and think often and gladly to, with, and of each other. The same is true in different proportions of neighbors and other friends. (2) Between persons loving each other in these varying degrees there is common understanding. (3) Persons thus loving and understanding each other continue together and order their common life (p. 25). The first and most intimate type of community is the family, the last and most extreme the religious society.

While thus the community manifests a complete subjective coherence, a natural affinity (*Zusammengehörigkeit*), such element is entirely wanting in society. Here the bond is lax and external, and the individual "wills"—or more precisely "arbitrarinesses"—which are bound to and in it "remain independent of each other and without subjective influence upon each other." At the same time it is to be borne in mind that society is not to be regarded as an artificial product, as a combination formed for defined purposes, according to the *social contract* theory. Society is rather, like every other human work, a combination of natural and artificial elements, with the immanent tendency toward the preponderance and ultimate entire prevalence of the artificial. Today's society is derived from primitive society; that is, what was originally subjective has become "externalized," what was originally close and intimate has become loosened and alienated. Externally this transition appears to be the passage from universal domestic economy to universal commercial economy, and in the closest connection therewith from predominant agriculture to predominant "industry" (p. 63).

While now society shows "industry" as its external stamp, it appears at the same time that the "capitalist class" is the peculiar social agent, for in the tripartite process of industry—Tönnies here strictly follows the scheme of Marx—the proletarians, the laborers, are for the most part "unfree" and only "formally arbitrary" (*formal willkürlich*), while the capitalistic class acts in all respects as "free" and "materially arbitrary."

The state also, in so far as it exists for the protection of the property and the freedom of its subjects, is identical with society, and is accordingly a "capitalistic institution."

Our society, moreover, is approaching its dissolution along two paths; first, in economic relations, inasmuch as laborers will finally gain the upper hand and will do away with production of goods after the social (capitalistic) fashion. Again, in social relations, through the emancipation of woman. When woman, who belongs exclusively in the home and the family, acquires also social independence, and marriage is reduced to a contract, the ground will be entirely removed from beneath human "community" life, for, says Tönnies, "the radical quality of the race and of the family is vegetative life in the sociological sense as the substantial basis of human coexistence in general" (p. 247). With the fall of society "civilization also collapses. The strife of classes is destroying society and the state which it intends to reform. Since the aggregate of culture is worked into social and civic civilization culture itself comes to an end in this its changed form" (p. 288).

What will come then? Who can tell? Tönnies can hear only the crashing of society. He construes the course of history, up to date at least, as a movement "from the primitive, simple, domestic communism and the involved and consequent *individualism* of the hamlet or village to the *independent individualism*, metropolitan or cosmopolitan in spirit, and the consequently posited state or international *socialism*. And here is the end of all!"

So much for the hopeless theory which Tönnies has set down in a book that at all events must be reckoned among the most profound and suggestive of all times. The undertone of this book is profound despair over the inevitable social fall. The whole reads like the last will and testament of society—and of the author! No issue can of course be made with the author's personal view point. Another more optimistic thinker is equally entitled to a contrasted point of view. One may see in the agitations of our time the signs of a new renaissance more splendid

than anything before, and one may claim that this prospect is assured by the fact that acquired science and broadened æsthetic perspective afford an unprecedented basis for an improved social condition. This view in turn could maintain itself against all criticism.

But when we come to objective scientific truth, criticism must challenge many fundamental principles of Tönnies' theory. In the first place there is no such sharp discrepancy between "society" and "community" as Tönnies alleges. When the circumference of the community widens, there still remains within it room for closer and smaller circles. In fact in our society the most intimate bonds of blood relationship, of neighborhood, and of friendship, have by no means ceased to be. Consequently the "essential will" remains and works parallel with "arbitrariness." Again Tönnies regards trade (*Tauschverkehr*) as the central activity of society, and indeed as its "root." But trade is, in idea and essence, only a function, not even an essential trait, least of all the "root" of society.

What Tönnies entirely overlooks, and Bücher rightly emphasizes, is the principle of nationality. There is a temptation to adapt Tönnies' terminology to the service of this principle. A national state is a "community." It cannot be denied that nationality in today's form, and in its historical efficiency, in spite of all crossings and comminglings of races, includes almost all the qualities which Tönnies predicates of a "community." Moreover in society, even of the loosest sort as it appeared to Tönnies, there is an undeniable interworking of the members upon each other. The mere fact that individuals are together has, as a consequence, a reciprocity of influence among them. It cannot, therefore, be seriously contended that in society individuals are independent of each other. Simmel indeed has contended¹ that reciprocal influence (*Wechselwirkung*) is the sole discoverable mark of the concept society. "There is no such thing," says Simmel, "as a societary entity, from the unitary character of

¹ *Ueber soziale Differenzierung*. Sociologische und psychologische Untersuchungen. Leipzig, 1890.

which new qualities, and conditions, and arrangements of the parts may be derived. There are rather relations and activities of the elements on the ground of which alone unity may be predicated." In this sense it may be said that society is only a name for a function. The function is reciprocal influence, which, to be sure, may be more or less close, so that, according to Simmel, there is "more and less" of society.

In opposition to Staummler also, has Simmel rightly emphasized the importance of this reciprocity. Staummler defines society as "an externally regulated coexistence of human beings" (*loc. cit.*, p. 90). Simmel on the contrary contends that external regulation is only a secondary *sine qua non* derived from reciprocity, without which the regulation could not come into being.

It may be replied to Tönnies further that reciprocal influence must exist in order that an exchange may take place. Exchange is, as even Tönnies psychologically interprets it, "a resultant of two divergent components." In order that a resultant may arise, it is a mechanical necessity that the components shall have an effect not alone on a common point of contact but upon each other. In our case, volitions, psychical forces, are the components. Accordingly in every case of exchange there is concerned in fact a more or less intensive psychical reciprocity between the parties. The "root" of society, therefore, is not the derived exchange, but the reciprocity which is the foundation and source of all intercourse.

From the standpoint of reciprocity Simmel undertakes to elucidate the relation of the individual to the group and of groups to each other. The question is essentially as to the relation between differentiation and socialization. The well-known dictum of Spencer that differentiation and integration are in direct proportion to each other, finds here complete justification and splendid illumination. So profound and comprehensive, and yet so compact is the treatment, that it is impossible to render a brief account of the argument. One or two points of view, which seem to me fundamental, may be indicated.

The first symptom of the undifferentiated condition of groups is *collective responsibility*. This lack of differentiation is both subjective on the part of the one observing and judging, and objective on the part of the group judged. Conversely collective responsibility is a powerful hindrance to differentiation, since inasmuch as the group is identified with each of its members it is compelled to show a compact front against a third party in order to maintain its defense. This necessity of compactness is the first and strongest occasion for integration.

When through a long process of differentiation the group has arrived at a certain height of development, there appears the astonishing tendency to revert toward collective responsibility. Thus men are today trying to throw the blame for individual faults upon society. But the sociological conception of the individual as "the point of intersection of countless social threads," while in part relieving the individual of responsibility, on the whole places more responsibilities upon him than would be possible with the atomistic conception.

Simmel credits the "extension of the group" with a high degree of individualizing force. Differentiation within a group proceeds in two ways: by the differentiation of the individual members within the group, and by attachment of the whole group to a larger social circle. From such attachment there results not only a severance of many bonds of union with the narrower group, but innumerable possibilities are opened for new relationships—*i. e.*, for differentiation.

In the chapter on The Social Level Simmel declares, in opposition to all previous explanations, that the psychological ground of all struggles for equality, the socialistic included, is endeavor after higher status, not for actual equality. It is in point of fact very characteristic that in such social struggles for equality the weapons are mostly used only against the class that is immediately above, not against the highest. It appears that this eminently socializing motive contains a vigorous individualizing element.

Particular mention should be made of the point of view that

differentiation is an effect of effort for conservation of energy. This thought, which is used in psychology as "the law of minimum effort," and in various ways in the natural sciences, should be made useful in sociology. Thus Simmel shows great skill in tracing the development of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and of military ranks from the principle of the conservation of energy.

In a word Simmel's method of sociological investigation is distinguished by profound psychological analysis and by historical illumination of problems, though relatively less by the latter than by the former. This is methodologically justified, since historical phenonema can have no value for sociology until they have been brought into the clear light of social and individual psychology.¹

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¹ Translated by ALBION W. SMALL.

(To be continued.)

REVIEWS.

Juvenile Offenders. By W. DOUGLAS MORRISON. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1897. Pp. 317. \$1.50.

THE problem of this work is the problem of habitual crime. The proportion of habitual criminals in the criminal population is constantly increasing. This implies the partial failure of the methods of penal law and administration, since the object of these institutions is to prevent the repetition of acts injurious to the community. There are two general classes of offenders, the occasional and the habitual. Young criminals pass from one class to the other during the period of immaturity, and their career is determined by causes over which penal machinery has little control.

Part I deals with the individual and social conditions favorable to juvenile and habitual crime. By a critical statistical analysis it is shown that serious crime is increasing in continental Europe. England has been generally regarded as an exception, but this impression is based on error. There has, indeed, been a decrease of the number of youth in prisons. But this does not prove an absolute decrease in crime. A milder treatment of young offenders has become common since 1867; the average length of sentence has been shortened; fines have been substituted for incarceration; and private institutions have taken up many offenders who would formerly have gone to prisons. In England and in the United States juvenile crime has increased.

The chapter on the distribution of juvenile crime gives the variations in the various countries of the modern world. The effects of density of population, of city life, and of centralized industry are considered. Pauperism and crime are in inverse ratio, and the causes of this interesting fact are discussed. The influence of sex on juvenile crime is inferred from statistics; 85 per cent. are males and 15 per cent. are females. This fact is due both to the difference in personal traits and to the social environment. Age has an important bearing on the form of crime.

The physical condition of juvenile offenders is carefully studied.

From comparison of death rate, number of orphans, measurements of stature and weight, and observed abnormalities, it is shown that juvenile crime is largely due to degeneration. The vagrant boy comes into collision with a competitive world with which he is not able to cope. The study of mental condition is more difficult and more important. The conclusion is reached that the physical inferiority of the class is necessarily accompanied by mental defect.

On the basis of wide induction the author concludes that the domestic environment is decisive in giving direction to abnormal conduct. Parents of criminal youth are, eighty of them in every hundred, addicted to vicious, if not criminal, habits. The economic condition of juvenile offenders might be inferred from their physical, mental, and domestic conditions. As a rule they are not trained for any occupation and belong to the class of unskilled laborers. Society never attempts to instruct them in the art of making an honest living until it arrests them and places them in reformatory schools; then it is too late.

Having studied the personal and social causes of juvenile crime, the author directs Part II to the subject of its repression. First of all he considers the method of admonition and conditional release. The Massachusetts system of placing hopeful cases under the care of a probation officer is highly commended. Mr. Randall's article in the *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY*, May 1896, is used as the basis for a description and commendation of the Michigan system of child-saving work. When the parents are fit persons to train their children the method of admonition gives them additional control. In cases of children whose homes are immoral this method has little value.

Fining is undoubtedly one of the best and most effective forms of punishment. It is almost the only form of punishment which is not irremediable. When corporal punishment is resorted to, or where a sentence of imprisonment is imposed, it is almost impossible to repair the injury to the individual if it is afterward discovered that he has been unjustly convicted. But the fine should be largely in the nature of reparation to the injured party. In case of poor parents who must pay the fine for their offending children the sum should be accepted in installments. In some situations the fine can be worked out without imprisonment, and this should be done whenever possible, since prisoners are a costly burden to the state, and prison life depraves those subjected to it.

Whipping is still legal in England, but magistrates shrink from

applying this punishment, and the "international conscience" is opposed to it.

The chapter on imprisonment as a corrective measure is chiefly occupied with its history and with the reasons for using it as seldom as possible. Police-court missions, probation officers, truant schools, fines, and other substitutes, should be employed.

Very interesting is the account of English industrial and reformatory schools given under the head of corrective institutions. The schools of similar kind in the United States are briefly mentioned. It is shown that the children treated in these institutions have generally been improved.

But the author shows that all these methods at their best do not touch the primary causes of habitual crime, which are in the economic, domestic, physical and educational conditions which surround and form the life. The author might have made more of the influence of heredity on the production of crime. If juvenile offenders are so defective as his statistics show, and if personal treatment of these in prisons, reformatories, and schools have little influence in checking crime at its source, it ought to start inquiry as to the degenerate families which breed such persons. Education, industrial reforms, better housing and sanitation, may do much to mitigate the evil and yet crime may increase in spite of all these agencies if the degenerates are not segregated and prevented from producing multitudes of the same kind. His argument carries us beyond his conclusions and compels thought of abysses below those directly opened to view.

The author writes, naturally, from the English point of view, yet in the most catholic spirit and with a mastery of the sources of knowledge for all modern nations. As chaplain of Wandsworth prison and a patient student of criminology and penology, his recommendations bear the stamp of a high degree of authority. The treatment is thorough and exact, but so free from all technical difficulty that the literary form is popular. The book will be indispensable for every serious student of the child-saving problem.

C. R. HENDERSON.

Economics. An account of the relations between private property and public welfare. By ARTHUR T. HADLEY. G. P. Putnam's Sons. Pp. xi + 496. \$2.50.

THIS book attempts to explain modern industries objectively

rather than in terms of obsolete conventionality. The industrial world of the living Rothschilds and Morgans and Carnegies and Vanderbilts, the world of railroad systems and clearing houses and legislative lobbies and trusts and trade unions is a world in which Adam Smith would not readily find himself. Professor Hadley has not attempted to fit descriptions of ancient combinations to present conditions, he has tried to explain the relations of modern industrial factors to each other. He has done his work splendidly. He is clear, precise, and thorough. Mastery of this account of modern industries would transform some of our prominent social rhapsodists into philosophers with at least this potentiality of science—perception of some things as they are, in the world where their alchemy hopes to find a vocation. No one is justified in accepting, still less in creating a theory or programme of social change until he understands the things which this book explains. No other book has given an equally compact and intelligible interpretation.

Nevertheless, Professor Hadley has made one serious mistake. His alternative title is an entire misnomer. It is not in harmony with the first sentence of his preface, "This book is an attempt to apply the methods of modern science to the problems of modern business." The author succeeds in this attempt, but in so doing he entirely neglects "the relations between private property and public welfare," except as the industrial system is a factor of public welfare. The relations chiefly expounded are those between private wealth and public or general wealth; or perhaps rather between private wealth and the effective operation of the present industrial system. A thinker so modern in spirit as Professor Hadley need not be told that while private wealth or public wealth is a condition of welfare, neither is the synonym of welfare. The perception is in the thought of the author (*e. g.*, § 26), but it is not sufficiently in the book to justify the description on the title page. Confusion of wealth and welfare is a mistake only slightly less anachronistic than the notion that money alone is wealth. No single discrimination so distinctly marks the difference between the economic and the sociological view point. Since economics deals primarily with wealth, and sociology aims primarily to learn the conditions of welfare, failure to distinguish the concepts obstructs and confuses both, and retards adjustment of thought between economists and sociologists.

ALBION W. SMALL.

The Principles of Sociology. Vol. III. By HERBERT SPENCER.
D. Appleton & Co. Pp. x+645. \$2.

MR. HERBERT SPENCER has been a much mixed blessing. He is the most miscellaneous paradox in the history of thought. The species "speculative positivist" doubtless culminates in him. The most contradictory metaphysics of this century will be found in his impeachments of metaphysics. His science is philosophy, and his philosophy is mostly overdrafts on unauthorized assumption. He has probably done more than any man of recent times to set a fashion of semi-learned thought, but he has lived to hear himself pronounced an anachronism by men who were once his disciples. It is impossible to understand the terms of today's philosophical and ethical problems without knowing Spencer. At the same time, the suspicion is afoot among the very men whom Spencer taught that the Synthetic Philosophy is a rope of sand.

Without presuming to pass specifically upon the Spencerian biology and psychology, I may speak with some confidence of the ethics and the sociology—figs from the same thistle. Mr. Spencer has pathetically confessed that the sap did not run in the root as he expected (*Ethics*, Vol. II, preface). His effort to establish a positive basis for morals was gallant. Its incidental results entitle Mr. Spencer to lasting remembrance and gratitude. The impulse that he gave to further endeavor in the same direction will not soon lose its force. Nevertheless Mr. Spencer's material contribution to a positive basis of ethics is a minus quantity. His "data of ethics" are no data at all. They are important considerations upon the methodology of ethical inquiry. They are notable reflections upon what to do with data after they are found. His own method, however, is neither proper induction nor legitimate deduction, but presumption fortified by illustration—a method more seductive than the cocaine habit after its fascinations have once been tried. Mr. Spencer fondly imagines that his "law of equal freedom" is a premise from which the various human "rights" may be deduced—the right of property, of exchange, of free belief, of free speech, etc. In point of fact, if the "rights" and prevalent belief in them did not exist, the "law of equal freedom" would no more reveal them than the law of gravitation reveals things that are subject to it in unknown planets. The "law of equal freedom" amounts simply to the formal principle that, whenever a human right is discovered, one man has the same natural title to its benefits as another. Spencer is one of the goodly fellowship of the apostles of humanity who have her-

alded the same truth. He has not enlarged the truth. The means of discovering what are human rights, what are human duties, and so what is the material of morality, are not increased by anything that Spencer has written.

Of the sociology scattered through several volumes besides those bearing the title, the judgment of sociologists would doubtless be more appreciative if Mr. Spencer's work had ended with the generation to which his thought belongs. It would be unfilial to repudiate the obligation which the younger sociologists owe to Herbert Spencer. It cannot be precisely characterized in a few words. Enough that it is distinct and large. Yet Mr. Spencer's sociology is of the past, not of the present. It has a permanent place in the development of sociological thought. Present sociology, however, is neither Spencerianism nor is it dependent upon anything Spencerian.

The *Principles of Sociology* may be described as an attempt to arrange facts about society in such order that they may be made to divulge social and sociological principles. Disciples and opponents of Spencer may agree that his labors to this end are valuable beyond estimate. Possibly they will soon agree, if they cannot now, that the element of highest value in them is their inevitable demonstration that after all they only advertise the need of labors a thousandfold more abundant to accumulate sufficient material for induction of sociological principles. It cannot be said, as of the "data of ethics," that the "principles of sociology" are no "principles" at all; for Spencer has put generalizations in the form of principles. We must rather say that Spencer's "principles" of sociology are supposed principles of biology prematurely extended to cover social relations. But the decisive factors in social relations are understood by present sociologists to be psychical, not biological. Whether Spencer's biology will stand is a question by itself. Whether Spencer's biology is also a correct prevision of social psychology is a much more involved problem. The present presumption is altogether against it. I am not aware that there is a sociologist in the world who accepts Spencer's sociology at its author's appraisal. The volumes entitled *Principles of Sociology* contain an array of provokingly interesting details, classified under obvious and familiar categories, and interpreted by hypotheses that do not explain. In other words, Spencer has collected a vast amount of descriptive material which is not reduced to science, but is rather cumulative evidence that social science is yet to be developed.

ALBION W. SMALL.

Problems of Modern Democracy. Political and Economic Essays.
By EDWIN LAWRENCE GODKIN. Charles Scribner's Sons.
Pp. 332. \$2.

THE editor of the *Nation* is not sweet to the average American taste, but certain of us may take him with advantage in moderate doses—preferably after meals. His view of the mission of the educated man in a democracy is that he should be a sort of political *memento mori* to the multitude. He discharges the function with a Spartan determination which frequently reacts against its purpose. Yet if Mr. Godkin is educated out of feeling with and for the multitude, he is of a type that may well be attended to by the few, and through them may profitably affect the many.

Essays published in several magazines from January 1865 to October 1896 make up the present volume. The titles are: Aristocratic Opinions of Democracy; Popular Government; Some Political and Social Aspects of the Tariff; Criminal Politics; The Economic Man; Idleness and Immorality; The Duty of Educated Men in a Democracy; Who will Pay the Bills of Socialism? The Political Situation in 1896; The Real Problems of Democracy; The Expenditures of Rich Men.

The essays from first to last are serious, strong, and judicial. They are of more than transient importance. They rise to the rank of social phenomena. They are like the atmospheric currents at a given point of observation; not at first glance revealers of general and permanent laws, but of inestimable value toward making out laws. The deliberate thoughts of a man like Mr. Godkin afford an incomparable means of acquaintance with some of the factors in our civilization. No person who is capable of considering Americans, American institutions, and American ideas as still in their apprentice years, no one who can rule out the presumption of perfection from his estimates of American conditions, can afford to ignore these criticisms of facts and forces in our national life.

Precisely because the arguments and points of view are so significant, it is important to point out that they are not final nor always tenable. For instance, Mr. Godkin becomes the spokesman of an obsolescent conception in the following (p. 172): "There is unhappily no absolute test of success in economic legislation. All that the wisest legislator can look for as a sign of his success in dealing with economic problems is a reduction in the amount of discontent among the poor. To abolish discontent among the poor completely, in any

country, is as hopeless a task as to abolish poverty, and no statesman attempts it. . . . It is here that the complexity of all sociological problems comes in to baffle the politician, and compels him, in the vast majority of cases, to legislate simply for the Economic Man, with whose needs and tendencies he is, as a rule, far more familiar than he is with the needs of the ethical man."

An unintended confession, and an excellent illustration of demand for a definite and adequate social criterion! The epithet "obsolescent" applies not particularly to the foregoing but to the whole thought of which it forms a part. Thus (p. 162): "Ethics and religion in fact constitute the disturbing forces which make possible the organization and prosperous existence of civilized states." It should be conceded in passing that "disturbing forces" is truly a happy *fin de siècle* conceit! The "constant tendency" which these forces disturb is economic self-interest. Mr. Godkin continues: "If the Economic Man were blotted out of existence, nearly all the discussions of the economists would be as empty logomachy as the attempts to reconcile fixed fate and free will."

Again (pp. 165-6): "Science means the law which regulates the succession of phenomena. . . . In all economic investigation the first inquiry is, and, so far as it is economical, must forever remain: what will the Economic Man do when brought in contact with certain selected phenomena of the physical or social world? And the more complicated the facts of the industrial and social world are, the more necessary to the economist the Economic Man is, in order to enable him to steer his way through this maze."

The naïve assumption of the old economic conception which Mr. Godkin represents is that this abstraction, the Economic Man,—that everybody now concedes to be an element of the actual man,—is the whole of actual man; and, further, that having selected certain "circumstances" or "phenomena," it is possible to discover what the actual man will do in contact with them by discovering simply what the Economic Man would do. The Economic Man is a perfectly legitimate abstraction, but reasoners of Mr. Godkin's kind implicitly claim the privilege first of abstracting him, and then of recreating him as a substitute for the whole from which he was abstracted. Mr. Godkin further remarks (p. 167): "The test of science is that it enables one to predict consequences. Until our researches have enabled us to foresee exactly what will happen if something else happens, although we may

have discovered valuable and interesting facts, we have not discovered a law." Mr. Godkin's tacit assumption is that if we find out what the Economic Man would do "if something else happens" we thereby know what the actual man would do under circumstances the economic elements of which have been calculated in the hypothesis. In fact, this desiccated specimen, the Economic Man, is merely a cadaver which lives only when it moves and has a being in combination with several other men. The Sensuous Man, the Social Man, the Intellectual Man, the Æsthetic Man, the Conscientious Man are abstractions of the actual man quite as legitimate and necessary as the Economic Man. The tendency of which one of these abstractions is the exponent is quite as constant as another, after once emerging in the order of culture, though the relative strength of the tendencies is variable. Each of these men within the actual man exerts a distinct reaction "if something else happens." To know what will take place, then, in the case of the actual man we must find out how to solve the equation of these reactions within him. We may then be in a position to calculate the relation of the resultant to the facts outside of him. For instance, the Social Man occasionally asserts himself in the actual man and reduces the Economic Man to partial abatement. He has been known to do more and harder work than the Economic Man would do, and for less wages or no wages. In this he is like the other abstractable men in the actual man. The Social Man wants prestige as constantly as the Economic Man wants price. Desire for prestige sometimes nullifies the laws of price. So does appetite, or taste, or principle, or scientific curiosity. It is belated provincialism to assume that having the formula of the Economic Man we have the equation of the actual man. The economists were unable to reach this larger outlook, even when they yearned for it with John Stuart Mill's wistfulness, until the sociologists took up the task of showing that the Economic Man can be known only in company with the actual other men in the real man.

ALBION W. SMALL.

The Story of Human Progress. By F. W. BLACKMAR, Professor of History and Sociology in the Kansas State University. Published by the author. Pp. x+375.

PROFESSOR BLACKMAR has written "an elementary treatise on the history of civilization, especially designed for those who desire a brief

survey of the whole field." The author says : " There is no great claim to originality in the book except in the presentation in logical and orderly arrangement of the different phases of progress covering the entire field of human activity."

The book is divided into five parts, entitled : The Nature of Civilization ; The First Steps of Progress ; The Dawn of Civilization ; Western Civilization ; Modern Progress. Under these heads a succinct account is given of the important changes in human conditions and relations which are the substance behind the shadow frequently projected as " history."

It requires no little courage in our day of specialization for a university professor to do a piece of work of this sort, for beginners rather than for scholars. The results in this case justify the attempt. The book might well be made the basis of historical teaching in secondary schools or colleges. Like any other book it would be a comparative failure unless used by a teacher who knows, or knows the necessity of knowing, more than the book contains. An instructor familiar with elementary sociological conceptions, and intelligent about historical method, might make Professor Blackmar's book do for pupils better than was done for college students a generation ago, when Guizot's more pretentious *History of Civilization* set the standard for some of our best college instruction. This modest " story " directs the reader's attention to the things of real moment in the experience of the race. From this point of view it is possible to present the incidents and accidents of history in a truer perspective than that in which they are ordinarily placed even by the most studious historians.

It may be taking some risk, in the present state of the public mind, to assert that any good thing can come out of Kansas. I shall nevertheless venture to say that Professor Blackmar has made a book worthy of general use. It should be secured by an enterprising publishing house and brought to the attention of teachers throughout the country.

ALBION W. SMALL.

The Present Distribution of Wealth in the United States. By CHARLES B. SPAHR, PH.D. New York : T. Y. Crowell & Co. Pp. 184. Price \$1.50.

It has long been one of the great merits of statistical science, so far as many of its devotees are concerned, that its method could be

used in destroying the power of a general impression and even to refute such a general impression by proving its opposite. While the manipulation of figures for political or rather partisan purposes has been a great abuse, yet statistics really performed the corrective service as one of its chief functions. Mr. Spahr comes preaching a new doctrine, and announces in his preface, that "he has come to believe that social statistics are only trustworthy when they show to the world at large what common observation shows to those personally familiar with the conditions described." If it is true that "upon matters coming within its field, the common observation of the common people is more trustworthy than statistical investigations of the most unprejudiced experts" (p. v.), it is at least pertinent to inquire what is the justification of this elaborate statistical presentation which the author makes. If it adds nothing to popular impressions, not even scientific accuracy, is it not reprehensible to give it the appearance of doing so?

It is even possible that the author has indulged in some of the performances of the statistical prestidigitator, to whose activities statistics owe much of their disrepute. At least such an impression is possible when such statements as the following form a justification for generalizations covering the entire country. On page 65 the author says: (1) "The small holdings of real estate should be increased about one-half, because of the failure to record real estate in the rural counties. It is chiefly the small holdings of realty that fail to be recorded. (2) The small holdings of realty should be reduced about one-half, because the returns cover the gross possessions of the decedents." Why 50 per cent. should be added and subtracted instead of 20 per cent. or 100 per cent. is not suggested. Now while this particular readjustment does not affect the relative proportion in this particular table, it reveals the unscientific character of statistics drawn to accord with popular impressions. Nor does this criticism fail to recognize the fact that the author has made some special investigations into this field, though covering a limited area; but that fact alone does not justify such sweeping assertions of such importance without elaborating the basis for the assumptions. In other words, there are too many occasions in the argument where the connecting link is an assumption (*e. g.*, pp. 65, 68, 69, 97, 99, 100), often no doubt well founded; but assumptions however well founded are not statistics.

Some of the difficulties into which the author is led by such a method are revealed in the following instance. In his estimate of the

national income the author credits 2790 million dollars to manufactures and mechanical trades, 1674 millions of this being wages; the total earned by 5,091,000 persons, of whom 4,650,000 were wage earners. But the eleventh census (*Extra Census Bulletin, No. 67*) estimates the total wages in manufacturing industries at \$2,282,823,265, almost as much as Mr. Spahr allows to wages and profits combined. Of this sum \$1,890,908,747 was earned by the 4,250,783 employés, exclusive of officers, firm members and clerks. In other words, a smaller number of wage-earners, according to the census, earns almost the sum that Mr. Spahr credits to both profits and wages of the whole number engaged in these pursuits. Whence this great discrepancy? The census estimates are based upon direct returns from manufacturers. Without accepting the infallibility of the eleventh census, it is pertinent to ask whether Mr. Spahr's estimates are trustworthy. Mr. Spahr derives his figures as follows: The Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor for 1890 found the average yearly earnings for all employés to be \$360, based upon returns from 20,000 establishments; and the average annual profits to be approximately two-thirds of the wages of the employés. The great objection to this estimate as representative of the entire country is that in an older settled country wages are lower than where industries are further developed, and also that Massachusetts has an exceptionally large number of women and children employed in industries.

Throughout the entire country women form only 17.2 per cent. of all engaged, while in Massachusetts they form 26.5 per cent. Since most of these are in manufactures in Massachusetts and more widely distributed throughout other occupations in other states, the discrepancy is magnified. The proportion is only surpassed by Rhode Island with 26.7 per cent. and the District of Columbia with 31.6 per cent., this latter having nothing to do with manufactures. A somewhat similar objection might be made to taking the ratio of profits to wages in Massachusetts as indicative of the ratio in the country at large. To what extent this error vitiates the estimates concerning the distribution of incomes by classes (chap. vi) cannot be computed, but that such a vitiation occurs cannot be doubted.

The same procedure is resorted to in order to determine the incomes of the 2,863,000 persons classed as "others in trade and transportation." Respecting the 3,357,000 persons classed as servants and laborers, "everyone's common observation may be trusted" (p. 100),

guided to some extent in the case of the common laborers by fragmentary official statistics. It might be about as easy to determine accurately the rate of wages of these classes as to determine "every one's common observation," if that means anything more than the personal impressions of the writer.

However, it is not to be presumed that the book is without merit, for it has great merits. The author is also original, or at least independent, in regard to some of his conclusions as well as to his method and conception of statistics. His defense and advocacy of a personal-property tax (chap. viii) certainly shows that he reaches economic conclusions in a somewhat different way from that in which statistical ones are sometimes reached. Nor does his predilection for "silver" (chap. v) depend upon a similar coincidence with the popular impression. Such positions do show, however, that the author is an independent thinker in fields where scientific opinion is almost universally upon the side criticised.

The historical reviews of the distribution of wealth, the growth of incomes, etc., are concise and suggestive; the brief analyses of the results of the Civil War and of the protective tariff are keen and to the point; and the brief statement of the railroad problem and the problems of taxation are helpful and worthy of close attention if not conclusive. In fact it is because there is much that is commendable both in motives and the general conclusions that it is to be regretted that the method is so vulnerable. The author is familiar with the subject and with such statistical investigations as have been made. But the overpowering desire for definite and conclusive results, a feeling that every investigator can appreciate, has led to a treatment of the subject which at times is unscientific. Nor is science a fetich here, for being unscientific means that the results are neither conclusive, nor strictly accurate.

And those who sympathize with the author's attitude should be the first to perceive the dangers involved. If social truths are to be gained by revelation—even if the oracle consulted is common opinion—there is no means for proving Mr. Mallock's revelation less reliable than Mr. Spahr's. A serious objection to all oracular pronouncements is that they are capable of contradictory interpretations. Nor will the *vox populi, vox statistici* theory prove to be any more reliable. A serious factor in the present social condition is the lack of intellectual sympathy. And if the proposed theory be allowed there is little hope

of mitigating the present evil of class interpretation of social problems. While the *Nation* and the *Outlook* might agree as to the desirability of such a process, yet their interpretations would never be harmonious.

Mr. Spahr's general conclusions may be summarized as follows. As to the distribution of property: Less than half of the families in America are propertyless; yet seven-eighths of the families hold but one-eighth of the national wealth, while 1 per cent. of the families hold more than the remaining 99 per cent. As to the distribution of incomes: One-eighth of the families in America receive more than half of the aggregate income, and the richest 1 per cent. receives a larger income than the poorest 50 per cent., this latter class receiving from property alone as large an income as half of the people receive from property and labor. As to national taxation: The wealthy class pay less than one-tenth of the indirect taxes, the well-to-do class less than one-quarter, and the relatively poorer classes more than two-thirds. As to local taxation: Our system is the most just in the world to the poorer classes; for from incomes less than \$1200 less than 3 per cent. is taken, and from incomes above \$5000 7 per cent. is taken. Yet these relatively humane burdens rest twice as heavily upon the property of the poorer classes as upon the property of the rich. When these local taxes are joined with the national the aggregate tax is one-twelfth of the income of every class. There is no exception of wages. The wealthiest class is taxed less than 1 per cent. on its property, while the mass of the people are taxed more than 4 per cent. on theirs. In this way the separation of classes is accelerated by the hand of the state.

It is neither to the motives nor the general conclusions of the work that objections are taken, but to the method. The end does not justify the means, for the means but become obstacles to the realization of the end,—the removal of the alleged conditions. It is a favorite amusement with a certain class of individuals to construct straw men only to be destroyed by their own brave selves. Such a practice has no serious consequences and misleads few. But it is quite a different thing when sincere friends of the common man erect dummies of this kind to be destroyed by the other fellow. The fallacies in Mr. Spahr's method will but render more complacent the self-satisfied adherent of *laissez faire* and the existing status.

PAUL MONROE.

Report on Public Baths and Public Comfort Stations. By the Mayor's Committee, WM. H. TOLMAN, PH.D., Secretary. New York City, 1897.

THIS is an admirable account of provision made for health, convenience, and comfort in the principal cities of the world, and an argument for the introduction and extension of bath-houses, lavatories, and public-comfort stations in American cities. There are many illustrations, a full index, and a complete bibliography. The report is indispensable for those who are working for public health and morality in towns.

C. R. HENDERSON.

Christian Life in Germany as seen in the State and Church. By EDWARD F. WILLIAMS, D.D. Fleming H. Revell Company, 1896. Pp. 313. \$1.50.

THIS volume is a noteworthy contribution to the study of the social work of the protestant (Evangelical) church in the German Empire. Those who desire to study the Inner Mission movement will find here a very good abstract of Schäfer and of Lic. Weber, two excellent authorities. The author has himself studied the life and institutions of Germany in his visits among the people. The book is written from the standpoint of an "orthodox" man who is in manifest sympathy with the evangelistic work of Pastor Stoecker; but the treatment is broad and fair to all parties.

C. R. HENDERSON.

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COMPILED BY C. H. HASTINGS.

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[A selection of the more important works dealing with various lines of social work which have appeared since the publication of the last bibliography in the JOURNAL of September 1896.]

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE INDEX.

Months: Ja. F. Mr. Ap. My. Je. Jl. Ag. S. O. N. D.

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|-------|--|---------|--|
| A. | Arena. | JHS. | Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science. |
| AA. | American Anthropologist. | JMS. | Journal of Mental Science. |
| AAC. | Archives d'Anthropologie Criminelle. | JNS. | Jahrbücher für National-Oekonomie und Statistik. |
| AAE. | Archivo per l'Antropologia e la Etnologia. | JPE. | Journal of Political Economy. |
| AAP. | Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. | LG. | Labor Gazette. |
| AC. | L'Association Catholique. | LH. | Lend a Hand. |
| ACQ. | American Catholic Quarterly Review. | LoQR. | London Quarterly Review. |
| AE. | Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen. | LQR. | Law Quarterly Review. |
| AGP. | Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. | M. | Monist. |
| AH. | Archive für Hygiene. | MHM. | Mansfield House Magazine. |
| AHR. | American Historical Review. | Mi. | Mind. |
| AIS. | Annals de l'Institut de Science Sociale. | MIM. | Monatsschrift für innere Mission. |
| AJM. | American Journal of Medical Sciences. | NA. | Nuova Antologia. |
| AJP. | American Journal of Psychology. | NAR. | North American Review. |
| AJS. | American Journal of Sociology. | NC. | Nineteenth Century. |
| AK. | Arbeiter-Kolonie. | NS. | Natural Science. |
| ALR. | American Law Review. | Nt. | Nature. |
| ALRR. | American Law Register and Review. | NW. | New World. |
| AMC. | American Magazine of Civics. | NZ. | Neue Zeit. |
| AMP. | Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, Séances. | PhR. | Philosophical Review. |
| AN. | American Naturalist. | PSM. | Popular Science Monthly. |
| Ant. | L'Anthropologie. | PSQ. | Political Science Quarterly. |
| AOR. | Archiv für öffentliches Recht. | PsR. | Psychological Review. |
| Ar. | Arbeiterfreund. | QJE. | Quarterly Journal of Economics. |
| ASA. | American Statistical Association, Publications. | QR. | Quarterly Review. |
| ASAR. | Allgemeine Statistisches Archiv. | RCS. | Revue Christianisme sociale. |
| ASG. | Archiv für Sociale Gesetzgebung und Statistik. | RDI. | Revue de Droit internationale. |
| ASP. | Archiv für Systematische Philosophie. | RDM. | Revue des deux Mondes. |
| BDL. | Bulletin of the Department of Labor. | REA. | Revue mensuelle l'Ecole d'Anthropologie de Paris. |
| BG. | Blätter für Gefängniskunde. | Ref. S. | Réforme sociale. |
| BML. | Banker's Magazine, London. | ReS. | Revue Socialiste. |
| BMN. | Banker's Magazine, New York. | RH. | Revue historique. |
| BOT. | Bulletin de l'Office du Travail. | RHD. | Revue d'Histoire diplomatique. |
| BR. | Bond Record. | RIF. | Rivista italiana di Filosofia. |
| BS. | Bibliotheca Sacra. | RiS. | Rivista di Sociologia. |
| BSt. | Bulletin de Statistique et de Legislation Comparée. | RIS. | Revue internationale de Sociologie. |
| BUI. | Bulletin de l'Union Internationale de Droit Penale. | RISS. | Rivista internazionale di Scienze Sociali. |
| ChOR. | Charity Organisation Review. | RMM. | Revue Metaphysique et de Morale. |
| ChR. | Charities Review. | RP. | Revue de Paris. |
| CoR. | Contemporary Review. | RPe. | Revue pénitentiaire. |
| DR. | Deutsche Revue. | RPh. | Revue philosophique. |
| DRu. | Deutsche Rundschau. | RPP. | Revue politique et parlementaire. |
| DZG. | Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft. | RRL. | Review of Reviews, London. |
| EcJ. | Economic Journal. | RRN. | Review of Reviews, New York. |
| EcR. | Economic Review. | RSI. | Revisita Storica italiana. |
| Ed. | Education. | RSP. | Revue sociale et politique. |
| EdR. | Educational Review. | RT. | Revue du Travail. |
| EHR. | English Historical Review. | S. | Sanitarian. |
| EM. | Engineering Magazine. | Sc. | Science. |
| EMo. | La España Moderna. | SP. | Science Progress. |
| F. | Forum. | SR. | School Review. |
| FR. | Fortnightly Review. | SS. | Science Sociale. |
| GEc. | Giornale degli Economisti. | VSV. | Vierteljahrsschrift für Staats- und Volkswirtschaft. |
| GM. | Gunter's Magazine. | VWP. | Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie. |
| HLR. | Harvard Law Review. | YR. | Yale Review. |
| HR. | Hygienische Rundschau. | ZE. | Zeitschrift für Ethnologie. |
| HZ. | Historische Zeitschrift. | ZGS. | Zeitschrift für die gesammte Staatswissenschaften. |
| IAE. | Internationales Archiv für Ethnographie. | ZPK. | Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik. |
| IJE. | International Journal of Ethics. | ZPO. | Zeitschrift für das private und öffentliche Recht. |
| IR. | Investor's Review. | ZPP. | Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane. |
| JAI. | Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland. | ZVR. | Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft. |
| JEc. | Journal des Economistes. | ZVS. | Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Socialpolitik und Verwaltung. |
| JFl. | Journal of the Franklin Institute. | | |
| JGV. | Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft. | | |

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INSURANCE AGAINST NON-EMPLOYMENT.

No SOCIAL evil has assumed such acute form or such large proportions in so short a time as that of non-employment. The problem is not altogether recent. It seems to be a concomitant of the rapid changes incident to the present industrial system. The more rapid development of mechanical processes, the more extensive use of machine-made machinery, the tendency towards the elimination of the relatively inefficient workmen from industry, and the absorption of unoccupied lands, together with the recent commercial depression, have resulted in a really ominous condition. If it could be believed that the evil is due solely to the cause last mentioned, it need attract no particular attention, save to provide temporary palliatives. But this comforting explanation is hardly credible. It accounts for the present acuteness of the evil, but that which previous to the current depression was only sporadic promises to become chronic even when the epidemic has passed.

Much attention has been given to palliation of this evil, but little to its permanent removal. In previous forms of social organization such evils have been met by some application of the principle of mutual aid, as in the mediæval guilds, in their modern counterpart, the trade unions, and in benevolent societies. These alike fail to reach the difficulty. The functions performed by the mutual-aid principle in earlier forms of society are largely

undertaken in our present industrial system by insurance enterprises—commercialized applications of the social principle. The extensive application of the insurance principle by European governments, to provide for sickness, accident, old age, and other forms of invalidity, suggests the extension of the principle to meet the new evil. Certain experiments, five in all, have been inaugurated in Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, but time alone will give the experience upon which to found such a general system. Most of these attempts have either been instituted by the state or assisted by it. Two of the plans are compulsory, the remainder voluntary. In America any like application of the insurance principle must be upon the commercial basis.

It is argued by those who are opposed to the present tendency toward collective action that individual initiative will undertake all enterprises essential to social welfare and progress, and carry them on more advantageously both for the individual and the group. But there are certain burdens that can be borne and certain activities that can be maintained only by the group collectively. It has seemed that these could not be left to individual enterprise. Yet while such burdens must be borne collectively, the individualist has argued that the collective action should be initiated and voluntarily carried on by individuals. The most prominent of such forms of voluntary coöperation upon a purely individualistic basis are the various forms of insurance companies. It has seemed that non-employment was a form of disability that could not be relieved by an extension of this principle carried out by individual initiative, and that individual enterprise could never undertake to guarantee against it. This latter at least is not the case, for with the current year a private enterprise for insuring against non-employment was launched in Chicago. It is backed both by capital and by managerial ability. We offer no judgment upon the sufficiency of either factor. In many ways the advantages offered by this plan are more promising than those given by the collective undertakings of European localities, though they are inferior in other respects.

The following six attempts, then, are all that have become known outside the limited efforts of trade societies to provide for their own unfortunate. These are attempts to provide for the evil as an inherent one rather than as a temporary inconvenience. The city of Berne, Switzerland, took the initiative in January 1893. This system, which, with some modifications, is still continued, is upon a voluntary basis. The city of St. Gall, Switzerland, established the second in June 1895, in conformity with a law passed by the canton St. Gall the previous year. This was a compulsory state system and was in operation for almost two years. By a plebiscite on November 15, 1896, the system was abolished on and after January 1, 1897. This perhaps is the most instructive instance. In the early part of 1896 a system similar to that of Berne was established in Cologne, Germany, to operate during the winter of 1896-7. This was initiated by private philanthropic agencies, but worked in connection with municipal agencies, and received a large municipal subvention. In May 1896, under the auspices of the Bologna Savings Bank, a similar plan was adopted in Bologna, Italy, to become effective during the winter of 1896-7. In 1895 the grand council of the canton Bâle, Switzerland, appointed a committee to investigate the subject and submit a plan. The committee reported the following year and elaborated a plan in greater detail than any previous one. Though the plan was approved it has not yet been made compulsory as a governmental institution. Zurich and Lucerne have also taken steps towards formulation of similar systems. The Chicago enterprise above referred to, which began business with the current year, is the last of these, and is upon a radically different plan. It is a purely commercial venture similar to the many mutual-insurance companies of the United States.¹

It will be seen from the above sketch that no comparison of results can be instituted. But a comparison of the features of

¹ This article is in no sense a commendation of the company whose scheme will be outlined below. We state such facts as appear, without presuming to pass judgment upon the responsibility of the organization operating the plan.

the plans may be profitable. A feature of initial importance is that of the forms of invalidity against which insurance is given. In this respect the American enterprise is much more comprehensive than any of the European. All the latter exclude non-employment caused by sickness or accident. These are covered in most cases by other associations to which the laborer belongs, at least if employed. This elimination removes a great burden from the association guaranteeing the indemnity. But the American workman is not so protected; and under normal conditions a large portion of non-employment is due to these causes. In 1892 more than one-third of the 7.7 million German workmen insured under their compulsory-insurance law received benefits for such invalidity. All of the systems except voluntary non-employment as a matter of course; also when due to negligence, incompetency, inebriety, and similar causes within the control of the individual insured. Strikes are similar exemptions, in the case of the Chicago company including all who are thrown out of employment on account of a strike, whether they voluntarily participate or not. The latter company makes one further possible exemption which is deemed "extra-hazardous." That is in case more than twenty-five persons, members of the association, employed by any one person or firm become unemployed at any one time by reason of a "shut down" or any other cause. Then the total number of beneficiaries is entitled to receive only so much indemnity as twenty beneficiaries would be entitled to receive, based on a salary of \$40 per month, this being paid *pro rata*.

All other forms of involuntary non-employment entitle one to receipt of benefits, though a refusal to accept work when offered is an indication of voluntary non-employment. In the European systems departure from the locality invalidates all claims. A somewhat similar provision in the American system is that a change of occupation or location, without notification and approval, to an occupation or location more hazardous or uncertain as to permanency renders the contract voidable at the option of the association. Delinquencies in all cases forfeit the

right to benefits. In the Swiss cases the insured must have paid premiums for six months, in Cologne for eight months. In the latter case there are requirements for inspection and cancellation of stamps used in the payment of dues. In the American plan the applicant for insurance must have had regular employment for the previous six months. Insurance in anticipation of impending discharge is a similar bar to receipt of benefits.

The terms upon which the insurance is granted are of course much easier in European cases, where the government, private charity, or the employers contribute; in some cases all three, in all cases at least two of these. The American system must be self-supporting and in the long run prove profitable to the promoters. In this association there is an initiation fee of \$3, evidently to cover soliciting and incidental expenses. In Europe there is no initiation fee; but in Cologne payment of premiums for eight months and in Switzerland for six months is a prerequisite to participation. In all the European systems benefits begin to accrue only after from five to seven days' idleness. In the American case they begin immediately, one day's sickness entitling the insured to a proportionate benefit.

The size of the premium depends upon the amount of benefits given and upon the proportion of the support furnished by sources other than the premiums paid by the insured. From both reasons the premiums of the commercial enterprise are higher than those of the others. The commercial enterprise calls for a monthly payment of \$1 by each insured on the basis of a monthly salary of \$30 or less, and from those insured on a basis of a salary in excess of that sum an additional amount each month equal to 1 per cent. on the excess. The indemnity is proportioned to the premiums. While out of employment the beneficiary receives one-half of the amount taken as the basis of the monthly salary upon which the policy was issued, for a period of not more than four months out of each twelve, beginning with the date of his certificate of enrollment. Mention of the other benefits is postponed. In the Cologne Association, insured workmen pay a weekly premium of twenty-five pfennigs (about

six cents). This is done by purchasing stamps and affixing them in a cash book. There are further requirements as to presentation and cancellation of these and relating to reporting (twice a day) at the central office while out of work. These members are given first consideration by the General Labor Registry of the city, with which the association is connected. In case work cannot be secured members are entitled to draw a daily allowance from the insurance fund for a maximum period of eight weeks during the time elapsing between December 15th and March 15th. The daily allowance is as follows: For the first twenty days on which no work can be obtained a workman with a family receives two marks (about forty-eight cents); an unmarried workman receives one mark twenty pfennigs (about twenty-eight cents). For the remainder of the eight weeks the allowance is one-half this sum.

In the system as first adopted at Berne the dues were forty centimes (eight cents) per month. The benefits amounted to one franc fifty centimes (about thirty cents) per day for workmen with families, and one franc for those unmarried. This was given only in the winter months and never for more than two months out of the three. As modified in 1895 the dues were raised to fifty centimes per month and the benefits raised fifty centimes for each class.

The St. Gall plan called for a contribution varying from fifteen to thirty centimes per week according to the wages earned, and the benefits varied accordingly. The following table gives the plan adopted, though the cantonal law permitted considerable variation.

	Earnings per day	Premiums per week	Benefits per day
First class,	3 fr. or less	15 centimes	1 fr. 80 cent.
Second class,	from 3 to 4 fr.	20 centimes	2 fr. 10 cent.
Third class,	from 4 to 5 fr.	30 centimes	2 fr. 40 cent.

Benefits could be drawn for a maximum period of sixty days per year.

The plan elaborated at Bâle was as follows: All workmen receiving an annual wage of less than 2000 francs (\$400) were

to be divided into three groups and each group into three classes. Their weekly contributions were as follows :

	1st class: earning less than 15 fr. per week	2d class: earning from 15 to 24 fr. per week	3d class: earning more than 24 fr. per week
First group: those engaged in mfg. industries,	10 centimes	15 centimes	20 centimes
Second group: those engaged in building trades not subject to irregularities,	20 centimes	30 centimes	50 centimes
Third group: those engaged in building trades exposed to climatic conditions,	30 centimes	45 centimes	60 centimes

The benefits vary from a minimum of eighty centimes (sixteen cents) per day for the unmarried man of the first class to a maximum of two francs (forty cents) per day for the married man of the third class having more than one child younger than fourteen years of age. The details are quite complex. Relief is given for no more than ninety-one days.

The case at Bologna is quite simple and relatively unimportant. The annual dues are one dollar for those over twenty-one years of age, and sixty-six cents for those younger. This must be paid between June 1st and October 18th. After this date the insured is entitled to relief, for not more than forty days beginning with the sixth day out of work, amounting to twenty cents per day if over twenty-one years of age and twelve cents per day if younger.

So far as the insured are concerned these constitute all the financial obligations save in one instance. The Chicago association provides that beneficiaries shall be further bound to pay upon demand a special assessment of such an amount as may be needed to pay the indemnities, benefits, or expenses of conducting the business, provided that such total additional assessment shall not aggregate, during the period of one year, more than one-fourth of the total amount agreed by the beneficiary to be paid during such year. It is specified that such assessment shall be made, if at all, only in the event of special and unforeseen necessity, such as epidemics, disastrous fires, or unusual dis-

turbances affecting earners of salaries. The explanation of this is that with all the other risks there are sufficient data in the experience of other insurance companies to furnish a basis of calculation, but there being none for the causes affecting the stability of employment, such an elastic clause must be included. This, however, is a matter of no little importance to the insured, and must be given full consideration in estimating the advantages and disadvantages of the plan.

The table on page 779 gives a comparative view of the advantages and disadvantages of all the systems from the standpoint of the insured workman, taking the maximum premium and benefit as a basis.

It appears that the Swiss systems, which are much more scientifically elaborated, afford the greatest advantages to the insured, so far as the ratio of premiums to benefits is concerned. While with the highest paid laborers the ratio rises above 10 per cent., yet as a rule it falls below that figure. With the Bologna system the ratio is above that figure, while with the Cologne system it is far above it. In fact it is considerably higher than with the American commercial system. With the former the variation is from 19.1 per cent. to 31.6 per cent.; while with the latter, even including the possible assessment, the variation is from 11 per cent. to 25 per cent., or without the assessment from 8.8 per cent. to 20 per cent. In respect to the American laborer it is evident that a well organized and conducted system of mutual aid would accomplish the same result with less sacrifice, but experience has demonstrated the futility or at least the insufficiency of these for the present at least. Systems such as those adopted in Europe are even more inadequate. It is true that the practical point to be considered in each case is not so much the advantages relative to foreign systems as the advantage compared with that which actually or potentially exists in the same society. Yet this consideration is one aside from our present purpose.

One point of difference is to be noted, and it is characteristic of the different principles upon which the institutions are founded. The American plan, based upon commercial principles,

	Dues	Benefits	Maximum duration of benefits	Annual premiums	Annual premiums plus possible assessments	Maximum annual benefits	Ratio of dues to benefits	
							Premiums (per cent.)	Total premiums and assessments (per cent.)
Chicago	\$1.00 per month 1.20 per month 1.30 per month 2.20 per month	\$15.00 per mo. 25.00 per mo. 30.00 per mo. 75.00 per mo.	4 months out of 12	\$12.00 14.20 15.60 26.40	\$15.00 17.75 19.50 33.00	\$ 60.00 100.00 120.00 300.00	20 14.2 13 8.8	25 17.75 16.25 11
Cologne	25 pfennigs per week	2 marks for first 20 days; 1 mark for 28 days ¹ 1 mark 20 pf. for first 20 days, 60 pf. for 28 days ²	8 weeks	13 marks		68 marks ¹ 40.8 marks ²	19.1 ¹ 31.6 ²	
Berne 1893-5	40 centimes per week	1 fr. per day ² 1½ fr. per day ¹	8 weeks	4 fr. 80 cent.		48 fr. ² 72 fr. ¹	10 ² 6.6 ¹	
Berne 1895-7	50 centimes per week	1½ fr. per day ² 2 fr. per day ¹	8 weeks	6 fr.		72 fr. ² 96 fr. ¹	8.3 ² 6.25 ¹	
St. Gall	15 cent. per w. 20 cent. per w. 30 cent. per w.	1 fr. 80 cent. per d. 2 fr. 10 cent. per d. 2 fr. 40 cent. per d.	60 days 60 days 60 days	7 fr. 80 10 fr. 40 15 fr. 60		108 fr. 126 fr. 144 fr.	7.2 8.2 10.12	
Bâle	10 cent. per w. (minimum) 60 cent. per w. (maximum)	80 cent. per day (minimum) 2 francs per day (maximum)	91 days 91 days	5 fr. 20 31 fr. 20		72 fr. 80 182 fr.	7.1 17.1	
Bologna	\$0.66 per year (minimum) \$1.00 per year (maximum)	\$0.12 per day (minimum) \$0.20 per day (maximum)	40 days 40 days	\$0.66 \$1.00		\$4.80 \$8.00	13.7 12.5	

¹ Married men.² Single men.

offers greater advantages as one is in receipt of higher salary and pays a larger premium. With the European systems the reverse is invariably true. In Berne and Cologne, to be sure, the distinction is that of being married or not, yet the premium being the same it is equivalent to a distinction in the amount of income. As might be expected there is a great divergence as to the absolute size of both premiums and benefits, in the American case both being far larger. As to the ratio of premiums to wages the relation can be determined only in three cases. In the Chicago system the ratio varies from 1.4 per cent. to 3.3 per cent.; in the St. Gall system from .8 per cent. to 1.2 per cent.; in the Bâle system from .66 per cent. to 2.5 per cent. The relative merits in this respect are quite similar to those elaborated above. And, as with the above, the American system discriminates in favor of the one with the larger income, while with the European systems the reverse is the case.

Such a comparative study is quite misleading without consideration of the sources of the funds. The commercial company, as a matter of course, has no source of support save the contributions of members, though guaranteed by private capital as an investment. The Cologne Insurance Society receives funds from four sources. First, the contributions of those insured. Second, from subscriptions of members of the society. This membership is acquired by the annual payment of five marks. Workmen not desiring insurance are allowed to become members upon the payment of three marks in twenty-five pfennig monthly installments. Third, from the subscriptions of employers, societies, clubs, etc., which may become honorary members upon the payment of any sum not less than 300 marks. Fourth, from the city of Cologne. In this way 40,000 marks were accumulated before the payments of benefits were begun. Since the first period of operation (December 15, 1896, to March 15, 1897) has not expired, no comparison of contributions of the insured with contributions from all other sources can be made.

As stated above, the Bologna system was instituted by the Bologna Savings Bank, which appropriated the interest upon

\$40,000 of government bonds. No data for further comparison are at hand. The Swiss systems all receive state aid. The contributions at Berne were as follows: for 1893-4, membership fees, 1125 francs; employers' contributions, 949 francs; donations, 1005 francs; canton Berne, 4735 francs; total, 7815 francs; or only 15 per cent. from the insured. In 1894-5, membership fees, 1366 francs; employers' contributions, 1703 francs; donations, 2970 francs; canton Berne, 5000 francs; other sources, 616 francs; or a total of 11,665 francs, of which less than 12 per cent. was contributed by the insured. Under the new plan, while the contributions from the insured were increased, so also were the benefits, necessitating a further increase of the state subsidy. This amounted to 7000 francs in 1895-6. The proportionate size of the contributions was not materially changed.

In 1895-6 (July to July) the St. Gall system received about 21,000 francs from premiums, about 28,300 francs from the state, then leaving a deficit of about 1750 francs. The premiums here amounted to 42.6 per cent. of the total contributions. The final report for the remainder of the year 1896 is not at hand. At Bâle the employers are compelled to contribute for each person insured in the first, second, and third group respectively 10, 15, and 20 centimes per week. The city bears all the expense of administration and contributes 25,000 francs in addition.

The Swiss systems thus have the guarantee of the local governments, which take the initiative and bear the burden of the financial support. The Cologne system has the partial support of the local government and is entirely guaranteed by public organization. The Bologna bank is the sole guarantor of that system and only to the extent specified. It is especially provided that the assistance is to continue forty days only in case of sufficient income from the funds appropriated. The Chicago company has the guarantee of the promoters of the enterprise based on private contract. That is, the association is a limited copartnership. The laws of incorporation in their existing form do not permit of its incorporation in any state. No better

evidence of its novelty could be adduced. The special guarantee in this case is a guarantee fund as in the case of many insurance companies.

A further comparison of advantages reveals points of interest. In the first place all of the systems make some provision for securing employment for insured members when thrown out of work. The German and Swiss systems do this by means of local government bureaus. The Chicago association will work at first through several local employment bureaus and in time will organize a special department of its own to serve this purpose. In all such cases there is no additional expense to the workman insured, though refusal of suitable employment renders void further claims. Thus an important social as well as private function is performed.

The superior advantages offered by the Chicago association in regard to sickness and accident have been mentioned. In case of death it also provides that the heirs of the insured are entitled to the total amount of monthly payments which have been paid in up to the date of the death. The only similar provision is in case of the Cologne society, where, if a person dies or becomes permanently disabled before he is entitled to draw an allowance, he or his heirs shall be entitled to the subscriptions paid during the current year—a provision of much less advantage than the previous one. In regard to permanent disability, provided for in the Cologne plan as above, the Chicago plan provides that for total disability from any cause not his own fault such beneficiary shall be entitled to the indemnity for a term of twelve months following the date of the beginning of the disability; provided further that all monthly payments due during that twelve-month period, and any sum which he may have before received as indemnity, shall be deducted therefrom. At the end of this twelve-month period the contract is to be considered dissolved.

There is a savings feature in the Chicago plan which offers great financial advantage to the insured over and above those given in the European systems. It is provided that at the end

of ten years from the date of his certificate of enrollment any beneficiary may cease payments, and after sixty days' notice to this effect may receive one-half the face value of all the money he has paid in as monthly payments, less any sum he may have received as indemnity. Upon similar conditions at the end of twenty years he is entitled to the entire sum paid in as monthly premiums. While this is less than the endowment life insurance companies agree to do, yet, considering the risks covered by the company, it is an additional feature of great attractiveness.

The stipulations in regard to payment of dues are quite similar. Delinquencies incur a forfeiture of all claims. The Chicago association provides for a system of fines as penalties for delinquencies of less than thirty days, after which all further claims are forfeited.

There are certain other conditions of eligibility not yet mentioned, such as age, previous period of employment, etc. At Berne any citizen of Switzerland, resident of Berne, was eligible to membership. At St. Gall all resident workmen receiving daily wages less than five francs, and not insured in other societies offering equivalent advantages, were compelled to join. The system at Bâle applied to resident workmen, native or foreign, over fourteen years of age, not receiving more than 2000 francs annually. Apprentices under eighteen years of age receiving less than 200 francs annually were also exempted. The law applied to all industries subject to the Federal Factory Laws, and to the building trades. At Cologne, workmen eighteen years of age, domiciled at Cologne for at least two years, and not incapacitated for work, were eligible. Any workman more than fourteen years old was eligible at Bologna. The American association insures only those who have been employed for the previous six months and are between the ages of eighteen and fifty. The arrival at this latter age is sufficient to terminate the contract. The plan thus fails to deal with one of the most potent causes of this form of invalidity. The internal organization of the systems presents many other points of interest, but further elaboration must be omitted.

As to experience, three societies alone furnish any data. Under the Berne plan 404 persons were insured during 1893-4. Fifty of these became delinquent, 216 claimed benefits. For fifty-one of these employment was provided. The remainder drew benefits to the sum of 6835 francs, an average of 41 francs. In 1894-5 there were 390 insured, 226 applying for relief. Seven of these were given work. The remainder were given aid to the sum of almost 10,000 francs, an average of 45 francs apiece. In the following winter there were (in January) 768 insured, and 248 drawing relief. The St. Gall system was more extensive in its application. In 1895-6 there were 3430 men insured, 2412 upon a wage basis of three francs a day, 920 upon a wage basis of four francs a day, and ninety-eight upon a wage basis of five francs a day. There were more than 1100 delinquencies, to the sum of 4000 francs. There were 387 applicants for relief; twenty-eight found work, and 359 drew benefits amounting to almost 20,000 francs. The average was fifty-four francs sixty centimes. The results of the experience for the portion of the current year are not at hand. At Cologne 229 applied for insurance, nine of these being rejected as ineligible; ninety-three claimed benefits, fifty-five of whom were given work. There were on February 10th thirty-eight in receipt of benefit. During the entire winter relief to the amount of \$445 was distributed among seventy-three beneficiaries.

These results are hardly sufficient to afford a basis of generalization; results of further experience will be awaited with interest. In time no doubt these organizations will have many imitators, in Europe based upon governmental aid, in America upon private enterprise. These pioneer efforts are certainly deserving of great credit and appreciative consideration.

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SOME ECONOMIC LOSSES IN THE BUILDING TRADES.

ALL who cling to the *a priori* method of economic investigation base their reasoning on the tendency of labor to seek the point of least resistance, or, as it is more frequently set forth, on the tendency of man to satisfy his desires with the least possible exertion. The "economic man," always seeking the greatest returns for the least effort, seems to control the directorate of every important industrial and commercial establishment. His influence gives assurance that in every department of trade and industry the most productive and least wasteful methods will be adopted; that with the progress of invention and discovery the direct and indirect waste of effort will be lessened; and that the results, in proportion to labor or effort, will be increased to the greatest possible extent. Every machine which inventive genius produces is carefully tested, and the relation of its cost to its efficiency in increasing the productiveness of labor is anxiously computed. Whenever a new invention, whether of a machine or a method, promises a gain, however slight, in the net products of labor, it rapidly displaces old devices. It is no exaggeration to say that in the resulting industrial revolution of recent years the productiveness of labor in some lines has been increased many fold. But in some cases these changes, though apparently increasing the results of human effort, have surrounded that effort with adverse economic conditions, thus neutralizing the supposed economic gain or even turning it into a loss. This has occurred under circumstances which render a return to the method of greatest effectiveness impossible.

These unexpected or overlooked results are chiefly noticeable in the building trades, to a few of the branches of which the following observations will be confined. In carpentry labor-saving machinery has accomplished remarkable changes during the past three decades. Only the older generation of house

carpenters, and a few younger men who learned their trade under more conservative conditions, can now make doors, shutters, sashes or frames with any fair degree of dexterity. The introduction of machinery has transferred that work to the planing mills, and the work of the house carpenter is limited to fitting the products of the mills together. When the change was first extensively introduced twenty-five or thirty years ago it effected a great reduction in the cost of building operations. The steam planer, shaper, and mortising machine began to turn out work at a cost that seemed phenomenal. The skilled carpenter, who used to test the strength of his antiquated seven-by-nine sashes by standing on the cross bars, was displaced for a great part of the year by the "machine hand," who having less knowledge and training could be secured at lower wages. The carpenter had been earning wages ranging from one to two dollars per day according to the locality. A "steady job" was the natural condition of his trade. In winter he made sashes, doors, frames and other articles, and in summer he was out on the buildings under construction. With the introduction of the new methods his winter work disappeared and the increased competition for what may be called the remainder of his trade lessened the wages obtainable during the working season. There was in consequence a great reduction in the cost of carpentry. But the carpenter showed his relationship to the "economic man." His services could not be dispensed with entirely. They were absolutely necessary during a part of the year, and to that end (in an economic sense) he must live during the idle interval. For a time that living must have been a serious problem. But the condition of the trade warned young men from learning it, and conditions for those remaining gradually improved. In time the trade adjusted itself to the new conditions, and the house carpenter became able to obtain quite as much wages for the "working months" as was previously paid for the entire year. The friction of supply and demand in the labor market now gives him pay for the idle time which results from the introduction of machinery. Estimated by the hour, his wage, while working, is from twice to three

times as much as it was three decades ago, and the consequent increase in what may be called the skilled part of his work goes a long way toward counterbalancing the cheapness secured by the more extended use of machinery.

It is impossible to make an approach toward accuracy in estimating the ratio of profit and loss. But it is evident that, even if the natural and gradual increase in time wages should change the gain from the use of machinery into a loss, it would be impossible for even the "economic man" to return to what would be really the cheaper method of production. The house carpenter will not accept the old wages during the working season on the strength of a promise of steady work at sash and door making during the otherwise idle months. He has little faith in any such promise. The condition of every trade is unstable, and an employer would be equally unwilling to substitute hand work for machinery during the period of indoor work, on the expectation of securing the services of the workman at cheaper rates during the building season.

Another obstacle is found in the fact that planing-mill work and house carpentry have become different lines of business. Waste occurs through the payment for idle time, and although the loss is not a natural necessity it is rendered unavoidable by the commercial relations of the trade.

In steam fitting a similar change has taken place within a shorter period. It was a natural condition in the seventies for a steam fitter to have steady work, and his wages varied from \$1.50 per day upward. During the latter part of winter and through the spring months he built radiating coils of iron pipe and engaged in lines of work which have since passed to the blacksmith shop and the foundry. With the introduction of the cast-iron radiator and boiler came a decided fall in the cost of steam and hot-water heating. The new radiators were found to be not only cheaper but more open and cleanly. There was no more work for the steam fitter building coils "in the shop," his service being required only for connecting boilers and radiators in buildings. For a time the working mechanics in the trade suf-

fered through the change. Work was limited to half the year, and wages were still lower. But the natural result was a drifting away from the trade, until the scarcity of men during the working season had a compensating influence. Time wages in the trade have more than doubled during the past twenty years, the workmen being now able to secure their yearly maintenance, according to recognized standards of living, by working during the shortened period of employment. The change caused by the introduction of cast-iron radiators lessened the cost of heating apparatus, but necessitated a period of idleness for steam fitters each year. Now that they are able to secure sufficient wages during the working months to compensate for the idle period the cost of fitting up a heating plant is greater than under the old conditions of steady work and lower wages. Had the progress of invention done away entirely with the work of the journeyman steam fitter the cheapening would have been permanent. But, as the changes have made a period of enforced idleness which must be paid for, the reduction of cost was merely temporary. A return to the old methods, though it would give greater product in proportion to outlay, is not at present possible. Industrial forces are prevented from reaching their natural level by the same forces that are noticeable in the carpenters' trade. Architects, too, have accepted the new conditions, and specify the new fixtures in all contracts.

The much abused plumber is not generally regarded as subject to the ordinary laws of economics, yet recent changes in his work closely resemble those which have taken place in other building trades. The change from steady to temporary employment has been perhaps less marked, owing to the "jobbing" and repairing in which he has won or lost his reputation. But innovations have caused an idle period in his yearly work, and the law of supply and demand has given him compensation in the form of higher wages during the working months. While the time between outside "jobs" was occupied in making lead traps and bends, and in work which has passed to the brass finisher, employment was steady and wages ranged low compared with

present rates. But there are now only a few plumbers of the old school who can make lead traps, and their services are never required for that work. When the old methods were in vogue the making of three four-inch traps was regarded as a fair day's work. A man sitting beside a modern machine can turn out many score in the time formerly allotted to three. Contrary to the general rule the product of the machine is superior in many ways to the handmade article. The work of connecting fixtures in buildings has also been materially lessened by more recent inventions. The slow, skillful handling of lead has been superseded to a great extent by new methods, but is still an essential part of the work. The lead trap machines and other innovations made a marked reduction in the cost of work. But a few years of partial idleness brought about conditions which enabled mechanics to secure proportionately higher time wages, thus neutralizing the economic gain temporarily secured by the labor-saving inventions.

In bricklaying and masonry the contrast between British and American conditions illustrates the change from old to new conditions in other building trades. In Great Britain employment is far more steady on account of the general use of fireplaces, grates, and other adjuncts requiring the work of the bricklayer and mason. In the United States and Canada the bricklayer leaves the ordinary building after finishing the walls and chimneys, his work being, in consequence, less steady than in Great Britain. The natural force of competition enables him to obtain proportionately higher rates for the time of actual employment, the consumers being forced virtually to remunerate him for lost time. Stoves, furnaces, and various systems of artificial heating are adopted on account of climatic conditions, and the nature of the western fuel supply, rather than through a desire for cheapness. But the effect has been similar to that of the cheapening inventions alluded to above. Employment has been rendered less continuous in certain necessary branches of the building trades, with a consequent increase in the cost of their products.

It is evident that when a labor-saving or cheapening invention dispenses to a limited extent with any particular trade or calling, and the essential work remaining is crowded into a certain season, there must be economic waste through intervals of enforced idleness. Although the result may be an immediate lessening of the cost of production, the advantage may subsequently disappear or be changed into an actual loss through the necessity of remunerating the partially displaced workers for their lost or idle time. When such a situation arises no way at present appears by which the pressure of competition can force labor back to its more productive channels.

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THE PRESENT STATUS OF SOCIOLOGY IN GERMANY. III.

IV.

A SIGN of the relation between socialism and individualism appears in the fact that wherever the former is found, the latter immediately shows itself in force. In Germany, where socialism is advancing toward victory, individualistic tendencies of every sort are more and more vigorous. Fifty years ago, when socialism was not so strong, and had less place in the consciousness of the population, Max Stirner's powerful book, *Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum* attracted little notice. On the other hand Friedrich Nietzsche has given our own time a violent electric shock. His ideas, much more subtle than Stirner's, quickly appeared in all branches of literature. Our polite letters are full of "blonde beasts," and in social thought individualism again raises its hand obstinately and with confidence of success.

Nietzsche has revived Stirner, and in him he contends with a whole series of social theorems. First anarchy. Nietzsche's own philosophy is neither socialistic nor anarchistic. He knows only the strong, sovereign, self-contained individual. The masses, for whom social philosophy is usually concerned, are for Nietzsche the "much-too-many." They are for the amusement and service of the "superior man" (*Ueberschensch*)—"beyond that let them go to the devil and statistics." His "superior men" are ends unto themselves, not for the "guidance" of the masses. He has no place for an institutionalized aristocracy. Whoever has subdued man so as to become a "superior man" is an aristocrat, and he does not trouble himself about the worm beneath.

No more does Nietzsche teach anarchism in the social sense. On the contrary, his "superior men," his "blonde beasts," are the most rigorous despots. For them alone, the select, there is no law, because they stand above the law. For the masses

"slave morals" must prevail. Stirner teaches anarchism of an individualistic sort, not the communistic anarchism so well known today. His theory is also more objective than Nietzsche's, not merely in its form of presentation, but also in its entire conception. In distinction from Nietzsche's individualism he fastens upon "egoism" as an objective psychical factor, and makes unlimited egoism an objective social postulate.

Anarchism finds Stirner a support, but both he and Nietzsche give aid and comfort to the most recent movement in social philosophy, which is turning from social democracy to social aristocracy. The bent toward aristocracy is supposed to be toward satisfaction of individualistic wishes and inclinations.

There is an anonymous writer¹ who attempts to unite his social instincts with his individualistic inclinations so as to construct an objective social system. The title of the book betrays the author's social instincts. The individual has for him no independent value. He is worth considering and entitled to existence only in so far as he is of service to the whole. Of the era of civilization which his book is to introduce, the author declares: "It recognizes the individual only as an aristocrat, *i.e.*, in so far as he is actually better than the rest by virtue of his personal qualities" (p. 109). These qualities appear only in social services, in work for the people. An aristocrat is therefore only he who performs useful and valuable labors for his nation.

The essential doctrines of this author may be condensed into a few sentences. He recognizes two forces which hold a society—primarily, a nation—together, and make it great; first, industrial force, and, second, procreative force. The latter is the more important. If natural increase of population is so great that there is overcrowding, colonization is necessary and salutary, for among other things war will cease, because national boundaries will come to include more than the territories of the fatherland.

The author's attitude toward private property further shows his way of mediation between socialistic and individualistic

¹ *Volksdienst*. Von einem Socialaristokraten. Berlin und Leipzig, 1893.

tendencies. On the one hand he urges that with private property the "joy of life" begins; on the other hand he recommends the abolition of hereditary rights. The state should be the sole heir of all decedents. Only what one has himself earned he should be allowed to retain for life.

The only possible form of government in his social-aristocratic state is thought by the author to be a republic, for under such a government the most deserving will always be placed at the head of affairs by their grateful fellows. He reduces his social-aristocratic ethics to the following code: 1) Thou shalt labor. 2) No work, no pay! 3) No duty, no right! 4) The sexual command—Thou shalt not sell thy person! We see that the decalogue is here compressed into four articles, of which 2) and 3) are identical, and are not commands but perceived facts. Thus the new ethic has but two commandments and these were in principle familiar to every philistine in the eighteenth century.

Still briefer is the ethic of the anarchist Bruno Wille,¹ for he has none at all. Wille is a *communistic* anarchist, yet he cannot free himself from Nietzsche. He cannot keep from glorifying the individual, although he has society for the most part in mind. In his essential ideas, however, he is dependent upon Eugene Dühring, although he confesses with touching modesty that he has not quite clearly comprehended this thinker's philosophy. We need only to recall a few of Dühring's sentences to show the dependence. For example: "Free socialization can never end in lordship of one over others."² "Force as such is an evil even when it serves righteousness" (p. 270). "If natural political socialization had anywhere been able to develop itself without serious interference from the robber system, the great powers with their weak supports would never have existed" (p. 279).

Bruno Wille starts with an abstract free "man of reason" (*Vernunftmensch*). This assumed being, without hindrance from

¹ *Philosophie der Befreiung durch das reine Mittel*. Beiträge zur Pädagogik des Menschengeschlechts. Berlin, 1894.

² *Cursus der Philosophie*, p. 265.

the "robber system," without "violence, which ought to be used only in behalf of righteousness," begins socialization. Wille assures us that his "man of reason" will never hit upon "a lordship of one over another."

Wille's "free man of reason" is of course one of Nietzsche's "blonde beasts." "The free man of reason is conscienceless" (p. 103). He is selfish, otherwise he would be no "lord" (*Herr*), but a "slave." But all these lordly qualities do not hinder the "free man of reason" from being a very civil member of any society. Wille thinks that in the men of today, particularly in the "free men of reason," "judgment and sympathy are sufficiently developed so that they may be told that it is possible for them to live better in agreement and order than in chaotic strife" (p. 204). If we would only leave people to themselves, after abolition of all violence and removal of all compulsion, they would get along among themselves quite well. There would no longer be any trace of Hobbes' *bellum omnium contra omnes*.

Wille pictures the society of the future somewhat after this fashion. Free competition in the most unrestricted form, and private property remain. To be sure private property amounts to an exclusion on one side, a limitation, and in anarchic society there should be no right of exclusion or limitation. Wille cannot construct a social order without private property and must consequently adopt this trivial contradiction into his system. For the guardianship of this private property a "protective alliance" (*Schutzbündnis*) will be formed which, however, as Wille assures us, will never develop into a sovereign state. It is essentially a "free union" which besides insures to the members the greatest advantages. Moreover the protection will not be secured by forcible means, but by "empirical correction." By this barbarous phrase Wille means, with T. G. Vogt, the improvement of men through public opinion and injurious reactions of their conduct upon themselves. It will thus be "a human society free from *moral* authority and lordship, free from moral demands, from duties, from servile compunctions of conscience" (p. 275).

Nietzsche wants the same, but he will have no such society. He posits all this only for the sovereign individual who is great and solitary and stands beyond all society. Here is the difference between the genial poet philosopher and his poor imitator.

Wille does not see that everything which he drives out—morality, law, force, etc.—he admits again through a rear door. There will be no morality, but in its place there will be “reason seeking and recognizing advantage.” Now the coördination of morality and reason is as old as human thought, yet Wille thinks he is teaching something entirely new. There will be no “force,” no “police,” but the individual will be thrown upon his own reason—that is, whatever opposes the reason of the large majority will undergo “empirical correction” through social indignation. How far removed is regulated punishment by flagellation?

Wille and all his anarchistic sympathizers entirely lack not only logical clearness and precision but the use of sociological methods of thought. They have not grasped the central thought of our science, viz., evolution. If they possessed this thought they could never arrive at the absurd conceit of dissolving society in order to enable men, without any bond of union or regulation of their relations, to pursue their several ways alongside of each other. They would then know that our social order has developed itself on the basis of eternal physical and psychical laws, and that wherever men live together some form of authority and therewith of “force” must be developed.

It cannot be inferred from this thought, to be sure, that our social order neither needs nor is susceptible of improvement, nor that a social reform is equivalent to an assault upon eternal natural laws. By the idea of evolution we are by no means forced to that stupid satisfaction at which Otto Ammon¹ has arrived, who counts himself happy to have been born into “this best of all worlds.”

¹ *Die Gesellschaftsordnung und ihre natürlichen Grundlagen*. Entwurf einer sozialen Anthropologie zum Gebrauche für alle Gebildete, die sich mit sozialen Fragen befassen. Jena, 1895.

When Ammon speaks of the "natural basis" of social order, he thinks he has found that unalterable law of nature which neither may nor can be shaken. In his social-aristocratic loftiness he misunderstands the socialistic theory when he attributes to it the view that our present social order is "unnatural," or when he makes it disregard the law of evolution. Theoretical socialism stands, foremost of all social theories, on the ground of evolutionary conceptions. To that extent—*i. e.*, in respect of the theory of evolution—Darwinism is no recourse against social-democratic conceptions. Only when it comes to the discussion whether the Darwinian doctrine of selection is compatible with the socialistic doctrine of equality can Ammon assert that the theory of selection points clearly to an aristocracy. If only those individuals survive that are strong and best fitted for the conditions of life, while the weak are destroyed in the struggle for existence, there is little room for the idea that equality is to be attributed to all individuals. Nature does not treat all alike; she makes strict and severe selections.

But the consequence that Ammon draws by no means follows, *viz.*, that the social system of today with its abrupt class distinctions is essentially without need of improvement, and that improvements in the sense of social reform are impossible. Ammon repeats the old blunder, which social theorists have frequently committed, of taking a natural law—not to say a mere hypothesis—bodily over into social theory. We may think what we please about the metaphysical question of the freedom of the will; a certain conscious teleology, in the individual and social psychological sense, cannot be denied. It at least constitutes a recourse, which must not be undervalued, against the decisive application of a blind natural law to social life. Moreover, the whole of practical physics is nothing but the conquest of natural laws by natural laws. Why shall it not be possible in social life, assuming the validity of the law of selection here also, to modify its operation by the force of other laws?

Ammon constructs, after the model of Galton, a so-called "curve of intelligence," and hereupon a "curve of welfare," both

according to the same scheme, and he is highly gratified to find that they correspond. The conclusion is—the higher classes are also of higher intelligence. And now he wishes—out of pure pity for the lower classes—that they should remain at their present level, without offering to the more capable among them opportunity and help to work themselves up to a higher level. “For,” says he, “if the best talents are constantly withdrawn from the lower class and added to the higher, the lower class will represent only the *soil* from which the most valuable components are drained away” (p. 65).

A consistent Darwinist must arrive at the conclusion that separation of classes is an evil. Since the lower classes are actually on a lower intellectual level—to show this the elaborate apparatus which Ammon employs is surely superfluous—it is a demand of social interest that there should be a crossing of classes, in order that somehow a better sort of men should result. Ammon, on the other hand, is enamored of class divisions because they prevent intermixture.

Again he finds another justification of class barriers in the superior opportunities thus secured to the higher classes for the nurture and education of their children, a condition of things conducive to the development of highly talented individuals. For the lower classes it has the advantage that it rouses and encourages their emulation. Ammon calculates with mathematical exactness the probability that a man will find a wife who is his intellectual equal. The wider the room for choice the smaller the probability, and therewith the diminished probability, of mentally well-endowed descendants. He comes to this conclusion: “There is a provision of nature by which it comes about that two individuals who are adapted to each other are oftener united than would occur according to the law of probability. The provision in question is the *separation of the higher classes from the great mass of the population*” (p. 89). I imagine that an experienced anthropologist would oppose to this theory the fact that degeneracy in the higher, and especially in the highest, classes is today alarmingly advanced, and is still progressing. He

might also assign as the cause constant intermarriage within restricted groups.

Ammon might have learned from Galton that the intellectual aristocracy does not perpetuate itself through many generations. That the social aristocracy remains so long in control is perhaps due rather to the slowness of social development than to a "fortunate" natural law. At all events it is impossible to join in the naïve optimism of Ammon: "We have found reason for the assumption that in most cases the right man comes to the fitting place, and to the right place comes the fitting man" (p. 179). The world is as yet far from such harmony and will doubtless long remain so.

In one respect I fully agree with Ammon, namely, in the demand that chairs of ethnology, anthropology, and sociology should be founded in the German universities (*Hochschulen*). These disciplines are in point of fact sadly neglected. There are no special chairs of sociology, and in only a few universities are there even docents who treat this discipline more or less exclusively. So far as I know there are, in Berlin, Georg Simmel, in Freiburg, E. Grosse, and in Leipsic, Paul Barth.

Simmel has an audience that is increasing in numbers each semester. For several years he has read in the summer semester on social psychology, and in the winter semester a special course on sociology. Everyone who knows his *Einleitung in die Morawissenschaften* will guess that in his lectures on ethics he introduces and suggests many sociological ideas and points of view. Besides this he conducts a seminar for sociological practice. Here reports are made on sociological books and independent dissertations are read. Simmel himself usually conducts the discussions. This is for the moment very agreeable to the listeners, but it is pedagogically by no means advantageous. A seminar is solely for the purpose of accustoming the members to independent work through their own elaborations of subjects, and especially through active participation in

discussion. If the members only hear the words of the teacher the seminar fails to fulfill its mission.

In Freiburg, as I am privately informed, Herr Grosse reads partly on sociology in general, and partly on special sociological problems, such as "The Origin of the Family," "The Sociology of Art," "The Forms of Ethical Conception," etc. In addition he conducts seminar studies in ethnology. The attendance is considerable, in proportion to the total number at the University.

Herr Barth, in Leipsic, understands by sociology, as he kindly informs me in a private letter, the philosophy of history. This is the "dynamics" of which "statics" is only a special case. He reads there before a moderate number of hearers, on the philosophy of history, but conducts no seminar.

How the case may be in the two last mentioned universities, I cannot say, because I am not directly acquainted with them. In Berlin, however, I have observed a continual growth of interest in sociology among the students. Three or four years ago a sociological course was attended by four or five students. Today about one hundred attend the sociological lectures. It appears, then, that it rests with the lecture and the lecturer to rouse in students an interest in any science.¹

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¹ Translated by ALBION W. SMALL.

COLLECTIVE TELESIS.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. XII.

(Concluding paper.)

THE more we study the facts, phenomena, and laws of the sentient world the more thoroughly do we find them permeated with the Idea of utility. Metaphysics asks the question, Why? pure science asks the question, How? applied science asks the question, What for? The first inquires after the causes of things, the second inquires after their laws, the third inquires after their uses. The last of these is the standpoint of all feeling beings, while the others are confined to beings endowed with high reasoning or speculative powers. The nature of utility as the term is used in both economics and sociology was considered in the fifth paper, and in the ninth paper it was shown that both these sciences are utilitarian in their character, and, indeed, that all science is necessarily so. It is true that pure science takes no account of this fact and pursues truth for its own sake, but as there shown, the chief defense of this method has always rested on the essential utility of all truth, and although the sciences differ widely in this respect, still it is true that every pure science has or may have its applied stage, and although sociology can perhaps afford to wait a long time yet before it attempts to justify its existence by showing what it exists for, still, sooner or later, this attempt will be made. In view of the fact that its claim to the qualities of a true science has been widely disputed, there is the more reason for it to justify that claim as early as possible, and the true test of a science is the application of its principles to some useful purpose.

The subdivision of systematic knowledge into a plurality of sciences is based on the existence of as many so-called forces,

i. e., so many somewhat distinct modes of manifestation of the universal force. Each science deals with a particular one of these forces, or, at least, with a group or class of more or less similar ones. Sociology, as I understand it, differs in no essential respect from other sciences except that it deals with the social forces. The telic progress of society, as reviewed in the last paper, does not to any marked extent involve the control of the social forces. In so far as it does relate to them it is only from the standpoint of the individual who seeks to subject everything to his purposes. It was seen that the progress thus attained resulted from the intelligent direction by man of the various natural forces. This does not exclude the social forces, but the efforts described were chiefly expended upon physical, biotic, and psychic forces, the last mainly in relation to animal domestication. The phenomena were all social in the sense of their mutual utility to the members of society, but the acts were mainly individual, each member or small group seeking personal satisfaction. They were only in a limited degree collective.

Now while, in so far as even individual action really utilizes the social forces, this constitutes an application of sociological principles, still this is not what I have intended to include under the head of collective teleosis. I propose to restrict that term to the collective action of society in the direction of restraining, controlling, directing, and utilizing in any manner the natural forces of society. It is obvious, therefore, that, however much we may dislike the term (and it is a very offensive one to me), we are essentially dealing with the phenomena of *government*, since this word in a philosophical sense simply implies the organization through which society expresses and enforces its collective will. It is true that, owing to the great differences that exist among human races, due to differences of language and the vicissitudes of human history, the population of the world is now, and is long destined to remain, divided into a great number of distinct nations (not to speak of savage and barbaric tribes), each with a government of its own, so that collective social action cannot generally extend beyond the territorial limits

of each national autonomy. Still, international action of certain kinds is already becoming quite extensive and is destined to increase with the progress of civilization. Hence, when I speak of collective social action it is to be taken in the sense of national action, or at least of action on the part of nations, although a considerable number may have taken the same action. Thus defined and restricted, there remains no other essential difference between individual and social action. It also includes, however, the action of subordinate governing bodies, states, municipalities, towns, etc., deriving their powers from the general government.

It was seen that telic progress consists essentially in the process called invention, which presupposes the perception of the relations of objects and a knowledge of their properties, *i. e.*, of the uniform laws of the phenomena they present. Invention materializes itself immediately in art, and art is the basis of civilization. It is customary to say, and most people believe, that art precedes science, but this is because altogether too narrow and special a meaning is given to the word science. Science is simply a *knowing*, and this is all that the word etymologically implies. Art is exclusively the product of the knowing faculty. It is wholly telic. As I have shown, the simplest of all arts, that of wielding a stick, is impossible without a knowledge of the physical principle which makes it effective. To judge from some of the discussions of this question it might be supposed that most of the simpler arts were the result of pure accident; that they had merely been blundered upon without any thought or knowledge. If this were so we should find animals in the possession of arts. But this is not the case. Every art is the product of thinking, knowing, reasoning, no matter how feeble these powers may be. Between empiricism and science there is only a difference of degree. The faintest exercise of the telic or intellectual faculty is, in so far, science.

The exactly intermediate step between individual telesis and social telesis is an organization of individuals into a limited body. Such organizations are always for some specific purpose,

and the word *purpose* sufficiently indicates their telic character. It shows that there may be a thought common to a number of persons, and that several individuals can, as well as a single one, act teleologically towards a desired end. In modern society there is scarcely any limit to the variety in such organizations. These bodies may in a very just sense be regarded as conscious and intelligent, and they conduct their operations in all essential respects in the same way that individuals conduct theirs. Even if we were to suppose such an organization to embrace all the individuals of a nation and no others, it would still differ from the government of that nation in its specific object. The supposition is, however, inadmissible, since a limited organization must be voluntary, and the inhabitants of a country include minors and infants who have no intelligent ideas of the purposes of association. If a very large and powerful limited organization were to coerce its members or other persons to perform certain acts, it would be usurping the sphere of government, and if this were acquiesced in it would become, in so far, *the* government. Such was the case when the Church of Rome assumed such powers.

If a small number of individuals may think and act for a common purpose a larger number may, and there is no necessary limit until the totality of a people is embraced in the number. If such a universal organization has for its sole object the good of its members in general it thereby virtually becomes the government. To justify this title, however, and accomplish its purpose it must assume full power, and this single act deprives it of the character of a purely voluntary association. No government can be such, although, so long as the right of voluntary expatriation exists, as it almost always has done, it is virtually a voluntary association.

Now there is a sense in which the very existence of government implies a consensus of intelligent purpose. Mr. Spencer, the severest critic of the acts of government that we have ever had, admits that all governments roughly represent the general sentiment and will of the people, and cites the failure of the

commonwealth under Cromwell as an illustration.¹ He also admits that intelligence conduces to association,² and says that "the chief prompter is experience of the advantages derived from coöperation."³ The same idea was also expressed much earlier by him in his *Data of Ethics*,⁴ and need not be further insisted upon. What specially concerns us here is the fact that even the rudest forms of government constitute a sort of collective intelligence devoted to the object of protecting society and advancing its interests. The mere circumstance that the personnel of government is made up of human beings, members of the same society, and possessing the imperfections of mankind in general, and the fact that these favored individuals often use the power which society has conferred upon them to further their own egoistic ends at the expense and to the injury of society, should not, as it so often does, cause us to lose sight of the principle and turn aside to combat the accident. Any other set of men would do the same thing, as our own political tergiversations have shown, and the only remedy is the general improvement of human character and the "eternal vigilance" of society.

On any "social organism" theory government must be regarded as the *brain* or organ of consciousness of society, and the small amount of "brains" shown by government is simply in confirmation of the conclusion reached in the third paper that society represents an organism of low degree. Whatever purpose government attempts to accomplish, it has to deal with the social forces, to direct and control them on the same principles that the individual applies to the other natural forces. When treating of the latter in the last paper mention was made of the distinction between the exercise of the telic faculty on animate and on inanimate objects, and of the moral quality that enters in when the feelings, especially of men, are the objects of egoistic

¹ *Westminster Review*, Vol. LXXIII (new series, Vol. XVII), January 1, 1860, p. 93. *Essays, Scientific, Political, and Speculative*, New York, 1891, p. 268.

² *Principles of Ethics*, Vol. II, New York, 1893, p. 31.

³ "The Great Political Superstition," in *Social Statics*, abridged and revised; together with *The Man versus the State*, New York, 1892, p. 401.

⁴ New York, 1879, p. 134.

exploitation. This feature was not dwelt upon, as properly belonging to the present paper, but attention was called to the fact that so great a power directed into so delicate a field became a menace to society which would become intolerable if not antagonized by the same power wielded by the collective body of society itself. This is really the strongest reason for the existence of government, and it cannot be said to have grown less with the progress of civilization. In a certain way it has grown stronger, for with the increase of intelligence the inequality in the degree to which the telic power is possessed by the individual members of society has greatly increased, and this has correspondingly augmented the ability of some to exploit others. Moreover, with this same advance in intellectual acumen the methods have changed, and open warfare, even mental, has given way to the most subtle arts of deceiving the unwary and "making the worse appear the better reason," until the less favored members of society require to be not merely "wide awake" to their interests and perpetually on their guard, but they must be keen analyzers of human motives and philosophic students of "human nature" if they would avoid being ensnared in the sophistries of the cunning leaders and makers of public opinion. The self-seeking class, which formerly feared government which they knew existed to foil their plans, is today striving with Machiavellian diplomacy, and, it must be admitted, with considerable success, to enlist government itself in its service and thus to multiply its powers.

The individual teleology hitherto considered may be regarded as unconscious. The social benefits that it achieves are not thought of. They are as much accidental and unintended as are those that result from purely genetic or spontaneous activity. On the other hand, the social teleology now under consideration—the action of the central body which society creates to look after its interests—is conscious in the sense that, as a body, it always aims to benefit society, which is a conscious good. Most such action, it is true, involves very little exercise of the higher powers of mind. The decrees of a monarch are always for some

purpose, but they rarely aim to accomplish that purpose indirectly. They are usually not only mandatory—thou shalt—but negatively so—thou shalt not. Little more can be said for the great body of laws enacted by the legislatures of representative governments. That is, legislators usually employ the direct method. This is more or less successful, but always requires a physical power behind it. It is the purely empirical stage of government. As government is an application of what society knows about the nature of the social forces, it is a true art, but the condition in which we now find this art corresponds to that in which all other arts are prior to the application to them of the wider principles of systematic science, and society may be considered to occupy the place, relatively to what it will ultimately attain, that art occupied before the era of science.

This brings us to the kernel of our subject. It may be called *the social art*. The science of society must produce the art of society. *True legislation is invention*. Government is the art that results from the science of society through the legislative application of sociological principles. In every domain of natural forces there are the four steps: First, the discovery of the laws governing phenomena; second, perception of the utilities (modes in which the phenomena can be modified to serve man); third, the necessary adjustments to secure the useful end; and, fourth, the application of all this in producing the result. The first of these steps is that of pure science; the second and third are involved in invention, and properly constitute applied science; the fourth is art in its proper sense. In taking these successive steps there has usually been considerable division of labor. Scientific discoverers are not often inventors, and inventors rarely make the products they invent. Still, two or more of the steps are often taken by the same individual.

Now, looking at society as a domain of natural forces, we may see how readily it admits of being subjected to this series of processes. Discovery of the laws of society is the natural province of the sociologist. He should also be looked to for the detection of utilities, but this work also belongs in a still

higher degree to the legislator. Adjustment is the exclusive province of legislation, and laws, when framed according to these principles, would be such adjustments and nothing else. The execution of the laws is the resultant social art. It requires no great stretch of the imagination to see how widely this scheme would differ from the corresponding features of the present régime. It is still easier to see its immense superiority. As was shown in the last paper, the essence of telic action consists at bottom in making natural forces do the desired work instead of doing it ourselves. This is exactly what is needed in society. The desires, passions, and propensities of men are bad only in the sense that fire and lightning are bad. They are perennial natural forces, and, whether good or bad, they exist, cannot be removed, and must be reckoned with. But if society only knew how, it could utilize these forces, and their very strength would be the measure of their power for good. Society is now spending vast energies and incalculable treasure in trying to check and curb these forces without receiving any benefit from them in return. The greater part of this could be saved, and a much larger amount transferred to the other side of the account.

The principle that underlies all this is what I have called "attractive legislation."¹ But it is nothing new or peculiar to society. It is nothing else than the universal method of science, invention, and art that has always been used and must be used to attain telic results. No one tries to drive back, arrest, curb, and suppress the physical forces. The discoverer tells the inventor what their laws are; the inventor sees how they may be made useful and contrives the appropriate apparatus; the man of business organizes the machinery on a gigantic scale, and what was a hostile element becomes an agent of civilization. The effort is not to diminish the force, but usually to increase it, at least to concentrate and focalize it so as to bring the maximum amount to bear on a given point. This is true direction and control of natural powers. So it should be in society. The healthy affections and emotions of men should not be curbed but should be

¹ *Dynamic Sociology* (see index); *Psychic Factors*, p. 306.

directed into useful channels. Zeal and ardor are precious gifts if only they tend in the right direction, and society may profit by every human attribute if only it has the wisdom to utilize it.

The principle involved in attraction, when applied to social affairs, is simply that of *inducing* men to act for the good of society. It is that of harmonizing the interests of the individual with those of society, of making it advantageous to the individual to do that which is socially beneficial; not merely in a negative form, as an alternative of two evils, as is done when a penalty is attached to an action, but positively, in such a manner that he will exert himself to do those things that society most needs to have done. The sociologist and the statesman should coöperate in discovering the laws of society and the methods of utilizing them so as to let the social forces flow freely and strongly, untrammelled by penal statutes, mandatory laws, irritating prohibitions, and annoying obstacles. And here it is important to draw the line sharply between sociology and ethics; between social action and social friction.

All desire is for the exercise of some function, and the objects of desire are such only by virtue of making such exercise possible. Happiness therefore can only be increased by increasing either the number or the intensity of satisfiable desires . . . The highest ideal of happiness, therefore, is the freest exercise of the greatest number and most energetic faculties. This must also be the highest ethical ideal. But it is clear that its realization would abolish moral conduct altogether and remove the very field of ethics from a scheme of philosophy. To remove the obstacles to free social activity is to abolish the so-called science of ethics. The avowed purpose of ethics is to abolish itself. The highest ethics is no ethics. Ideally moral conduct is wholly unmoral conduct. Or more correctly stated, the highest ideal of a moral state is one in which there will exist nothing that can be called moral.

Whether we look at the subject from the standpoint of social progress or from that of individual welfare the liberation of social energy is the desideratum. The sociologist demands it because it increases the progressive power of society. The moralist should demand it because it increases happiness. For activity means both, and therefore the more activity the better. True morality not less than true progress consists in the emancipation of social energy and the free exercise of power. Evil is merely the friction which is to be overcome or at least minimized . . . The tendencies that produce evil are not in themselves evil. There is no absolute evil. None of the

propensities which now cause evil are essentially bad. They are all in themselves good, must necessarily be so, since they have been developed for the sole purpose of enabling man to exist, survive, and progress. All evil is relative. Any power may do harm. The forces of nature are good or bad according to where they are permitted to expend themselves. The wind is evil when it dashes the vessel on the rocks; it is good when it fills the sail and speeds it on its way. Fire is evil when it rages through a great city and destroys life and property; it is good when it warms human dwellings or creates the wondrous power of steam. Electricity is evil when in the thunderbolt it descends from the cloud and scatters death and destruction; it is good when it transmits messages of love to distant friends. And so it is with the passions of men as they surge through society. Left to themselves, like the physical elements, they find vent in all manner of ways and constantly dash against the interests of those who chance to be in their way. But, like the elements, they readily yield to the touch of true science, which directs them into harmless, nay, useful channels, and makes them instruments for good. In fact, human desires, seeking their satisfaction through appropriate activity, constitute the only good from the standpoint of sociology.¹

Few, of course, will be satisfied with these generalities, and many will doubtless ask for some concrete illustrations of scientific legislation. Even those who accept the general conclusions that thus logically flow from the facts of genetic and telic progress will still find themselves at a loss to conceive what definite steps can be taken to accelerate the latter, or how the central ganglion of society can inaugurate a system of social machinery that will produce the required results. This is quite natural, and the only answer that can be made is that, owing to the undeveloped state of the social intellect, very few examples of true ingenuity on the part of legislators exist. Society, as I have shown, if comparable to an organism at all, must take rank among creatures of a very low order. The brain of society has scarcely reached the stage of development at which in the animal world the germs of an intellectual faculty are perceptible. Only when spurred on by the most intense egoistic impulses have nations exhibited any marked indications of the telic power. This has developed in proportion to the extent to which the national will has coincided with the will of some

¹ *Psychic Factors*, pp. 113-115.

influential individual. Great generals in war, inspired by personal ambition, have often expressed the social will of their own country by brilliant feats of strategy and generalship, and famous statesmen like Richelieu have represented a whole nation by strokes of diplomacy that called out the same class of talents in a high degree. Even monarchs like Peter the Great, Frederick the Great, and Charles XII, not to mention Cæsar and Alexander, have made their own genius in a sense the genius of their country. In fact a ruling class in times when the people were supposed to exist for them, when a king could say "I am the state," and when revenues were collected for their personal use, often devised very cunning schemes of a national application for their own aggrandizement. But as the world threw off these yokes, and nations grew more and more democratic, the telic element declined, and the most democratic governments have proved the most stupid. They have to rely upon brute force. They are shortsighted and only know how to lock the door after the horse is stolen. They are swayed by impulse. They swarm and "enthuse," and then lapse into a state of torpor, losing all that was gained, and again surge in another direction, wasting their energies. In fact they act precisely like animals devoid of intelligence.

All this is what we ought to expect if the principles I have enunciated are sound, and is, indeed, one of the clearest proofs of their soundness. And yet republics have not proved wholly devoid of a directive agent. Under exceptional circumstances they have displayed signs of collective intelligence. But most of the cases that can be cited have either concerned their national independence or the equally vital question of raising revenue. Nearly all the examples cited in *Dynamic Sociology* and *Psychic Factors* belong to these classes in which, in a literal sense, necessity has been the mother of invention. Anyone who watches the inane flounderings of a large "deliberative" (!) body like the American house of representatives, working at cross purposes and swayed by a thousand conflicting motives, can see how little reason has to do with democratic legislation.

But for the committee system by which, to a certain extent, the various public questions become the subject of scientific investigation, it is doubtful whether the business of the country could be transacted at all. And it is only by a much greater extension of this system, perhaps to the extent of dispensing entirely with the often disgraceful, and always stupid, "deliberations" of the full House, that scientific legislation can ever be realized.

The other important direction in which there is hope of similar results is the gradual assumption of legislative powers, at least advisory, by the administrative branch, which always feels the popular pulse much more sensitively than the legislature, and to which is entrusted not merely the execution of the public will (the art of government), but also in the main the devising of means to accomplish this—the strictly inventive function of government. If the legislature will enact the measures that the administrative branch recommends as the result of direct experience with the business world it will rarely go astray.¹

The examples given, in which military chieftains, diplomats, monarchs, and ruling families have employed design in national affairs, do not indicate the growth of the social intelligence or the integration of the social organism. They are merely instances of the usurpation of the powers of society by individual members. On the other hand, the tendencies in the direction of democratic government do mark progress in social integration, however feeble may be the telic power displayed. Crude and imperfect as such governments may be, they are better than the wisest of autocracies. Stupidity joined with benevolence is better than brilliancy joined with rapacity, and not only is autocracy always rapacious, but democracy is always benevolent. The first of these propositions can be disputed only by citing isolated exceptions. The second may not be so clear, yet it admits of ready demonstration. It is not necessary to

¹ The principles of scientific legislation were set forth in *Dynamic Sociology*. See especially Vol. I, pp. 36–38; Vol. II, pp. 249 ff., 395 ff., 573 ff.; and for examples of attractive legislation, see Vol. I, p. 44; Vol. II, p. 392; also, *Psychic Factors*, p. 306.

postulate a different nature for the democratic legislator from that of the autocratic ruler. However self-seeking the former may be, social service turns his egoism to the good of society. It is an example of the truth that what are called bad motives are only relatively so, and that the social forces only need to be directed to render them all good. For in seeking his own interests the representative of the people must obey their will. The will of the people must be good, at least for them. Constituencies have the same nature as representatives or kings, but whatever they will must be right from their standpoint. The good consists in the satisfaction of desire, and this can only become bad when it is secured at the expense of others. But where a constituency is in question this is not possible except in very sectional questions which cannot be discussed here. *A fortiori* must obedience to the will of a whole people be right, and therefore the representative of the people, whatever may be his personal character, is constrained by his office to do only what is right. If he fails another is put in his place. It is thus that it comes about that representative governments are essentially benevolent, *i. e.*, they always *wish well* for the people, or, as the more common phrase expresses it, they *mean well*. And anyone not prejudiced against government must see that, whatever their faults of the head, they are right at heart.

Democracy has therefore been a great step forward, and has practically solved the moral side of the question of government. Reform in the future must come from the mind side, and surely there is great need of it. How can it be brought about? This is the problem of sociology. I have wrestled with it for many years, not in the hope of doing anything in this direction myself, but with the object of discovering, if possible, a theoretical solution to propose to the world for its consideration. The result of my reflections on this subject is given in the second volume of *Dynamic Sociology*, and although I have not ceased to revolve these matters in my mind during the fourteen years that have elapsed since the first edition of that work appeared, I cannot say that my conclusions have undergone any

essential modification. I would now lay more stress upon certain parts of the general argument, and somewhat less on others, but the argument as a whole still stands as worked out in that volume. As democratic governments must be representative I see no way to increase their intellectual status except by increasing that of constituencies, and I still regard this as the one great desideratum. If the social consciousness can be so far quickened as to awake to the full realization of this truth in such vivid manner as to induce general action in the direction of devising means for the universal equalization of intelligence, all other social problems will be put in the way of gradual but certain solution.

But there are some who will say that if this little is all there is to sustain the claim that society is one day destined to take its affairs into its own hands and conduct its business like a rational being, it would be as well to abandon it. If the long period of human history has shown so little advance in the direction of a social intelligence we might better leave matters entirely to the two spontaneous methods described in the two preceding papers. The first answer to this is that the sociologist does not profess to be a reformer, and is not advocating any course of social action. All he feels called upon to do is to point out what the effect of a certain course of action would be as deduced from the fundamental principles of the science, and to state what he conceives the tendencies to be as judged from the history of development.

The second answer to this objection is that it is the one that is always raised whenever anything is mentioned which is different from that which now exists, that it is based on the natural error that things are stationary because they seem to be so, and grows out of the difficulty of conceiving a state of things widely different from the actual state. If we were to indulge in fable, a lump of inert matter would be laughed at by the other lumps if it should assert that it would one day become a graceful tree-fern, and shade the earth with its feathery foliage; a plant that should declare its intention to break away from its attachments

to the soil and move about in space on four legs, feeding on other plants instead of air, would be called a vain boaster by the surrounding vegetation; a barnacle that should insist that it would one day have a backbone would be utterly discredited by other barnacles; a bat that should fly into a dark corner of a room and escape through an opening known to be there would be called a fool by the bee that was vainly buzzing against a pane of glass in the hope of accomplishing the same object.¹ It is the "impossible" that happens. We can look backward more easily than we can look forward. Science teaches us that something has happened. Evolution proves that immense changes have taken place, and now that we can see what they were and according to what principles they were brought about there is nothing so startling in the facts. It is only when we try to imagine ourselves as present before an event and striving to forecast it that we realize the folly of raising such objections as we are considering. Yet this is our real attitude with respect to future events. It may be logical, admitting that progress is to go on and that great changes are to take place, to question whether any particular change that anyone may describe is to be the one that will actually occur. There is no probability that anyone can foretell what the real condition of society is to be in the future. But it is illogical, in the light of the past, of history, and especially of natural history, and of what we actually know of evolution, cosmic, organic, and social, to say that any condition to which this knowledge points as a normal result of the continued action of the laws of evolution is impossible.

In treating the relations of sociology to the various other sciences—cosmology, biology, anthropology, psychology—in the second, third, fourth, and fifth papers of this series, and in the more general discussion of the position and affinities of soci-

¹ This point of view was never so admirably stated as in the remarkable poem by Charlotte Perkins Stetson entitled "Similar Cases," now familiar to nearly everybody, having gone the complete rounds of the press. Also to be found in her collection of poems entitled *In This Our World and Other Poems*, San Francisco (Barry & Marble, publishers), 1895, p. 72.

ology in the first and sixth, I would have been glad to institute a thorough comparison of sociology with economics, from which to many it seems so difficult to separate it. My failure to do this was not at all due to any such difficulty in my own mind, but wholly to the fact that before a comparison could be properly made it was absolutely necessary that the principles to be set forth in later papers, and especially in the eighth and eleventh of this series, as well as in the present one, be first laid down as the basis of any real distinction. We are now fully prepared to consider this question, but the limits of space will necessarily render its treatment brief. It is therefore best to come directly to the point.

The fundamental distinction between sociology and economics is based on the difference in their respective beneficiaries. Both have utility¹ for their end, but the recipients of the utility that sociology aims to confer belong to a different class from those of the utility which economics aims to confer. Broadly stated economics may be said to benefit the producer while sociology benefits the consumer. But the term producer must here be taken in its widest and really proper sense of anyone who by any form of labor adds anything to the value, *i. e.*, to the utility, of a product. The term consumer, on the contrary, must be taken in the narrower sense of the enjoyer of a product irrespective of whether he is also a producer or not. It will add to the clearness of the distinction, and will at the same time be approximately correct, if we identify the producing class with the business world in general, or the industrial world as a whole, and the consuming class with the public in general or society as a whole. The latter class of course includes the former, but, disregarding parasites, the former includes all of the latter except the helpless, whether from age, disease, or physical and mental defectiveness. It is not the relative size or quality of these two classes that constitutes the distinction in question, but the direction given to the utility by economics and sociology respectively. In short, economics, as so many economists have

¹ As defined in the fifth paper, this JOURNAL, Vol. I, p. 627.

insisted, concerns itself with the creation of wealth irrespective of who shall receive this wealth, though this is properly assumed to be those who create it. It narrows down therefore to the question of *earnings* and *profits*. It deals with wages, salaries, dividends, receipts and expenditures as related to each other, and marginal values. The class considered is the earner in the widest sense of the term. It is the makers, those who increase the value, and the sellers or disposers of goods, with whom economics has to do. The primary question in each case is: Is the business a success? If it is not it must go down. The buyer, the user, the enjoyer, the consumer, is left out of the account. "Political economy . . . has nothing to do with the consumption of wealth, further than as the consideration of it is inseparable from that of production, or from that of distribution."¹ In sharp contrast to this, sociology is exclusively concerned with the *destination* of wealth, in so far as it deals with wealth. It is no more interested in the benefit that the producer receives than in that which it confers on any other class. If a business, no matter how "successful," is injurious, it is a *failure* from the standpoint of sociology. And in broader national affairs it is not a question whether a policy is or is not a source of revenue to the state, but whether it is a benefit to the public. Thus in the question of taxation, of whatever kind, sociology is not concerned with its "fiscal" effects, but with its "social" effects. A tariff, if defended, is so not because it proves a successful and easy way to raise revenue, but because it diversifies and elevates population.²

It is true that certain modern economists have insisted more or less that consumption should be regarded as a legitimate subject of economic study. I gave a brief history of this movement in economic thought in a former paper,³ treating it as an advance

¹ JOHN STUART MILL, *Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy*, London, 1844, p. 132, footnote.

² I once made a study of this question which appeared under the title: "The Sociological Position of Protection and Free Trade," *American Anthropologist*, Washington, Vol. II, No. 4, October 1889, pp. 289-299.

³ *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. X, No. 2, June 1895, pp. 215-217.

in economics which I called "social economics." That paper was specially addressed to economists, and no attempt was made to harmonize it with the present series of papers, which, however, were at that time for the most part written, and began to appear a month later. It is only necessary to say now that social economics as thus defined is simply sociology, and those economists who proceed from the standpoint of consumption, whether they realize it or not, whether they desire it or not, are in so far sociologists.

One or two examples of the two distinct points of view of economics and sociology will make them clearer. Prior to the year 1881, in the capacity of librarian of the United States Bureau of Statistics, I had occasion to study the statistics of railroads of various countries. Many foreign countries had commenced the assumption of their control by the state as their charters expired, and already a large number of important lines in France, Italy, Austria, Germany, and other countries on the continent had passed out of corporate management and were administered by the state either as owner or for the companies. The agitation of state ownership had begun both in Great Britain and in the United States. The railroad journals were filled with the discussion of this question, and I had it as a part of my official duty to keep abreast of the movement and to compile statistics bearing upon it. The tone of the railroad press was of course uniformly hostile to the movement, and I observed that all the arguments were directed to showing that the companies "managed" the lines with greater economy than the state "administered" them. I was required to prepare tables demonstrating this, which was an easy matter, and there really was no room for a difference of opinion. As a pastime I had devoted considerable of my unofficial time for the preceding fifteen years to writing and rewriting my *Dynamic Sociology*, which was then nearly ready for publication, and I could not avoid occasionally taking the sociological point of view as distinguished from the economic one, alone taken by the railroad press, and I took home some of the elaborate Prussian statistical reports (*Statis-*

tische Nachrichten von den preussischen Eisenbahnen), usually several years behind date, and searched carefully through their complicated columns for all possible facts bearing on the sociological side. The year 1874 was well adapted to this, the state management having then extended to about as large a number of lines as were still in the hands of the companies. I selected the columns for freight and passenger rates, happily, given and wanting in the statistics of nearly or quite all other countries. I worked these up for that year and gave the result in a footnote to page 581 of the second volume of my book. The general result, as there shown, was that "while the roads owned and worked by companies yielded 13.7 per cent. greater profits than those owned and worked by the state, the latter carried passengers 9.4 and freight 15 per cent. cheaper than the former."

One other example will be merely referred to, because its elaboration would occupy too much space. The Bulletin of the Department of Labor, No. 7, for November 1896 contains a most important study by Ethelbert Stewart on "Rates of Wages Paid under Public and Private Contract." The title, however, is misleading, because in addition to rates paid under contract it includes those paid by municipalities themselves. It is a comparison of these, where they exist, with those paid by contractors, whether public or private, that furnishes interesting matter for the sociologist. A glance at the tables given for Baltimore, Boston, New York, and Philadelphia is sufficient to show that in nearly all the leading industries the municipalities pay higher wages than either contractors or private companies. These and similar investigations are being conducted by the Bureau of Labor and by the census. In scarcely any other way could they be made, since private enterprise has no incentive to conduct strictly sociological investigations such as this one pre-eminently is. They can afford to study only the economic side to ascertain whether any enterprise is profitable to its managers. Public considerations are wholly foreign to their interests. But the state, as already remarked, is essentially benevolent, and all its operations, however shortsighted and fruitless, aim at least

to benefit the people. In the hands of wise and humane officers, such as the present head of these great bureaus, they are certain to be productive of immense public good.

It was the great Descartes who first enunciated the truth that all questions of quality are reducible to those of quantity. This mathematical axiom finds its economic expression in the corresponding truth that all questions of principle are at bottom questions of interest. The object of all science is to create art which will assist nature in furthering progress. Art has its highest expression in machinery. Art and machinery belong to economics because they are economical. They consist in the enlistment of the forces of nature in man's service. The physical forces have already been so enlisted until the power of production has become next to unlimited. This has brought about a state of things in which there is a constant tendency to what is called "overproduction." What is meant is the production of more than can, in the present state of society, be consumed. But the inability to consume is not due to incapacity for consumption itself, except in a few articles. It is due to the inability to *obtain*. The fact that there are thousands in want even of the necessities of life that are thus overproduced shows clearly enough that there is no more produced than would be eagerly consumed if it could be obtained. The problem of the age is to put what is produced into the hands of those who desire to consume it, and to do this in harmony with economic laws, and not as a gift or charity, which violates economic laws.

While no one is wise enough at the present day to formulate a plan for securing this result, the general principle underlying the problem may even now be stated. It is this: The progress made in economic art and machinery is far in advance of that made in social art and machinery. Production is essentially an individual enterprise and comparatively simple, while distribution, not in the economic but in the sociological sense, is highly complex. Production is the result of individual ingenuity applied to the physical and vital forces of nature. Distribution must be the result of collective ingenuity applied to the social

forces. There are physical forces that will secure it to a certain extent, but they are subject to the law of competition, which sets a limit to their action and soon chokes up the avenues of distribution. The kind of ingenuity needed to secure free circulation of products is social ingenuity, *i. e.*, *collective telesis*. A social machinery of free distribution must be invented and perfected by social ingenuity. The machinery of production is a product of physical science. The machinery of distribution will be a product of social science. Sociology stands in the same relation to the distribution of wealth that economics stands to its production. Most of the so-called overproduction is simply the choking of the avenues of distribution. It is the problem of social science to clear these avenues and let the products flow freely wherever they are attracted by human wants. The sociologist believes this possible through social ingenuity and social machinery.

This general social art, the scientific control of the social forces by the collective mind of society for its advantage, in strict homology with the practical arts of the industrial world, is what I have hitherto given the name *Sociocracy*. It has sometimes been confounded with *socialism*, and I cannot perhaps better conclude this series of papers than by briefly pointing out wherein, so far as I understand what socialism is, this differs from it, and also from the prevailing competitive régime or individualism. This can only be done at this stage by a few antithetical propositions whose elaboration is for the present postponed:

1. Individualism has created artificial inequalities.
2. Socialism seeks to create artificial equalities.
3. Sociocracy recognizes natural inequalities and aims to abolish artificial inequalities.
4. Individualism confers benefits on those only who have the ability to obtain them, by superior power, cunning, intelligence, or the accident of position.
5. Socialism would confer the same benefits on all alike, and aims to secure equality of fruition.

6. Sociocracy would confer benefits in strict proportion to merit, but insists upon *equality of opportunity* as the only means of determining the degree of merit.

A cycle is thus completed. Sociocracy is a return to nature from which society has departed. Individualism was the original and natural method recognizing natural inequalities and apportioning benefits according to natural ability. Individual telesis has completely abolished this method. Socialism recognizes this, and would remedy it by an equally wide departure from the natural. Collective telesis can alone remove the artificial barriers raised by individual telesis and place society once more in the free current of natural law.

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SOCIAL CONTROL.¹ VII.

ASSEMBLAGE.

I.

Two methods of molding the feelings to social conduct and endeavor have been pointed out—*religion* and *ideals*. A third way is *assemblage*.

As this series of studies goes on it becomes plain to the writer that the study of social control needs to be prefaced by a study of the spontaneous influences that socialize men. Prior to *cultivated* goodness should be considered *natural* goodness, both that which comes from inborn power of sympathy and that which springs up from men having their lives much in common. Before describing the methods of forcing or cultivation by which, in the orderly social garden, the human plant is caused to bring forth abundant fruits of righteousness, we should glance at the fruit, mean and meager though it be, which that plant can bring forth in its uncultivated state ere its nurture has become the object of social art.

So doing we should find that, just as the gardener does little else than strengthen, regulate, or apply with system, those forces and elements that cause growth in the natural state, so society makes righteousness to abound chiefly by supplying the natural conditions of goodness. Few of its instruments of control are peculiarly its own; for the most part it strengthens or adapts those fellowship forces that are found at work in any group of human beings. Thus the restraints of law, public opinion, and social suggestion have their prototypes in individual vengeance, resentment, and suggestion. Religion which society uses to call forth fellow feeling was originally the mystic interpretation of a

¹ Errata for No. VI in January issue of JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY. In note to p. 554, for "History of" read "Studies in." On p. 565, line 2, omit "not." On p. 566, line 6, for "sociology" read "sociality."

fellow feeling already existing. Ideals, I shall sometime show, begin in the propitiation between man and man.

As natural promoters of altruism we may distinguish language, likeness, presence, companionship, imitation, play, social pleasure, mutual aid, community of interests and feelings, comprehension and intelligence. Of these *presence* is not the least. There is no doubt that being together is essential to the natural development of interest in and love for others. Contact and dealings favor that power of putting one's self in another's place, that interpenetration of consciousnesses, which is the native soil of good conduct. Sociability is the forerunner of sociality. The enemy is the stranger, the friend is the housemate, and *kindness*, as the word itself hints, is the feeling that grows up among kindred. Whatever be the pitch of self-devotion that may be reached by the proud and lonely soul dwelling apart with its ideals, it is certain that early altruism was concrete, and meant regard for known people, for intimates and fellows.

When the camp or village is the social unit the natural occasions of meeting suffice. But when the conditions of getting a living scatter people, or when one society includes many bands or settlements, the meetings will be too few to keep alive the flame of interest or regard. The sense of being knit up in a common life fades when paths lie too much apart. Differentiation sets in, local peculiarities spring up, and unlikeness, rather than likeness, prevails. In time estrangement supervenes and the society falls apart into its component clusters. It is to avoid this disintegration that *institutions of assemblage* are developed and maintained in the larger societies.

The value of assemblage in the way of social control is the sense of unity it is able to inspire. In mere contact there is no virtue, for contact is quite as apt to breed antagonism as liking. Nor is social intercourse the main thing. This presupposes liking, and, moreover, cannot operate on so vast a scale as to bring a man into closer relations with some thousands of his fellows. The efficacy of assemblage lies in this: that many indi-

viduals in each other's presence are brought to have the same feeling at the same moment, *and to perceive this identity of feeling.* With this perceived convergence of sentiment the hostility, distrust, or indifference that accompanies strangeness fades away; the sense of separateness is blunted, and the consciousness of kind becomes more vivid. The self, which is not, as metaphysicians fancy, a mathematical point, but a sphere of varying diameter, is enlarged. In Professor Patten's happy phrase it becomes "synthetic." The ordinary round of feelings is broken in upon, and more of the man comes to reside outside of himself, his family, or his neighborhood.

There is needed a master emotion that shall orient the minds of all assembled in one direction. This may be love or hate, rapture or reverence, defiance or admiration. Its object may be a god, a hero, an event, or another people. *What* it is is not so important as that it be powerful and common to many. When many participate in the same emotion at the same moment, and each is aware of this participation, we get three effects: (1) The emotion spreads by contagion till the unanimity is perfect; (2) the feeling is intensified in each because shared by all; (3) the unison perceived inspires a sympathy that may survive the original emotion.

When the assembly is broken up and its members are again scattered, the disintegrating forces resume their work. Slowly the newly formed bond relaxes, the recent cement ceases to bind, antagonisms reappear, and the self contracts. Then the sense of a common life must be renewed again in the same way. Hence assemblage in order to meet the needs of society must be *periodical*.

The *raison d'être* of the periodical assemblage is its power to harmonize. But this supplies no motive to the individual. He cares nothing for spiritual enlargement. He will make no pilgrimage at heavy expense in order to have his sympathies quickened. To him, therefore, the feast wears a different aspect. It comes at a natural season of festivity—harvest or vintage. It is to him an occasion of feasting, dancing, and merrymaking,

where customary restraints are laid aside and license prevails, where caste lines are broken down and fellowship reigns. To get him to come, all manner of attractions will be provided for him. Dignitaries and rulers usually invisible to the multitude will show themselves, processions will march, pomps and pageants can be seen. If the assemblage is religious, mysteries are unveiled, wonders are promised, the blessings of the gods will descend, and benefits, both public and private, will be reaped. The private gratifications afforded will, therefore, seem fully able to account for the festival, and no other end will be thought of. The social meaning of it will be unacknowledged and unapparent.

II.

How much light can this interpretation throw on history?

It is likely that many assemblages we have looked upon as meetings for social pleasure should be regarded in this light. Among hunting peoples, when the tribe has to scatter, or when confederation takes place, the regular festivals and dances that reunite the members of the tribe on one spot probably have this function. The eating together that characterizes early assemblage, aside from the mystic bond established between commonsals, favors an expansive and fraternal frame of mind. Even to the present day eating or drinking together is everywhere the source of fellowship and the seal of amity. Hence, also, the deliberate intoxication on such occasions. Well does Professor Giddings say: "Deplorable as are the consequences of both gambling and drunkenness, the truthful scientific observer is forced to admit that in the early stages of social development these vices have served a useful function"¹

That the unit for feasting should so often be larger than the unit for coöperation may be due to the peculiar socializing power of festivity. People can get along together under festal excitement who cannot bring themselves to work together. Joint festivity, therefore, often keeps the way open for mutual

¹ *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 119, 120.

aid in conflict and pioneers the way for economic coöperation. Those who regard these festivals as spontaneous gatherings for merrymaking must be at a loss to account for their scope and regularity. Why, if they have no deeper social meaning, should they bring together people from such a distance and at such regular intervals. They seem akin rather to those formal celebrations that among primitive people mark the close of hostilities, the conclusion of a treaty, or the forming of an alliance.

But it is inevitable that assemblage directed to public and not to private ends should in time lose somewhat the aspect of spontaneity that befits gatherings for mere hilarity, and become more religious. Like all those early institutions that have in charge far-reaching common interests, they will seek to establish themselves not on the shifting inclinations but on the rooted beliefs of men. The core of assemblage, therefore, becomes *worship*.

Hitherto worship has not been accounted for as a social institution. The religious gathering before the days of faiths that had a message to deliver was certainly not educational. "The antique religions had for the most part no creed; they consisted entirely of institutions and practices."¹ Here, then, where there is no appeal to ethical feelings, no moral teaching, and no service calling up tender sentiments, what social value is there? What utility had those innumerable cults of the ages before morality, when religion was rite, not belief or conduct or aspiration? They would seem to be so much burning of flesh, so much waste of good oil and wine, so much time, trouble, and expense, all to propitiate gods that are phantoms! Sacrifices to the senseless flame, libations to the indifferent ground, and invocations to the unlistening air—how useless! And so all this segment of ancient life has no place in social development, but is mere aberration and delusion!

It would indeed be a marvel if institutions of worship so carefully perfected and so enduring have no real function in the economy of society. All things human tend to "sag" unless

¹ ROBERTSON SMITH, *Religion of the Semites*, p. 18.

they have a basis in reality. Domestic arrangements, political institutions, and professional customs last, in the long run, because of their usefulness. Is it likely that feasts and cults should prove an exception to this rule?¹

The true meaning of public worship has been well stated by Tarde: "What is a fête? It is that sovereign process by which the social logic of the sentiments overrules and resolves all partial discords, private enmities, envies, contempts, jealousies, moral oppositions of all sorts into an immense unison formed by the periodical convergence of all these secondary sentiments into a greater and stronger sentiment of collective hate or love for some great object which gives the tone to all hearts and transfigures their dissonances into a higher harmony."²

This interpretation accounts for certain peculiar features of worship. Why else should worship be so universally *public*? "The sacrificial meal had preëminently the character of the public feast."³ "The ordinary type of Hebrew worship was essentially social, for in antiquity all religion was an affair of the community rather than of the individual."⁴ "Every complete act of worship—for a mere vow was not complete till it was fulfilled by presenting a sacrifice—had a public or quasi-public character. Most sacrifices were offered on fixed occasions, at the great communal or national feasts, but even a private offering was not complete without guests."⁵ Private worship, far from being the prototype, is the parody of public worship. "All over the world these private cults are modeled on, derived from, and later than the established worship of the gods of the community."⁶ "Ancestor worship is steadily assimilated in form, in its rites and ceremonies, to the public worship of the gods."⁷

Why, if worship be mere propitiation, should *emotional stress*

¹For a striking instance of how apparently meaningless observances disclose to the sage observer the hidden utility that keeps them alive, see "Bhowani, the Cholera Goddess" in the *Nineteenth Century* for October 1896.

²*La logique sociale*, p. 325.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 236.

³*Religion of the Semites*, p. 234.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 247.

⁶JEVONS, *Introduction to the History of Religion*, p. 175.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 195.

be so marked? "The most important functions of ancient worship were reserved for public occasions, when the whole community was stirred by a common emotion."¹ "Universal hilarity prevailed; men ate, drank, and were merry together, rejoicing before their god."² Feasting, dancing, song, and music were present.³ We read of "orgiastic gladness," "intoxication of the senses," "physical excitement of religion," and "hilarious revelry" as characterizing the later religious gatherings in contrast with the natural exhilaration of the primitive feasts. In these features we see that emotional stress and mutual hypnotism which leads to mob mind, the acme of collective consciousness.

To our glib rationalism it seems childish to connect national prosperity with national worship. But look below the surface. In the early expansion of society many of the forces that unite the scattered members of a modern state are wanting. A people without letters, arts, or trade, living in scattered agricultural communities, without communication, movement, or central authority, has little to keep alive mutual interest. The ties created by education, travel, intercourse, trade, news, common literature and central administration are unknown. Were it not for the far reverberation of those periodical feasts where a common emotion lifts the people to a common consciousness, the society would surely crumble.

With the religion of doctrine and precept assemblage comes to have a value for instruction, but its old virtue does not cease. The weekly union of the Christian community in a service fitted to give a common direction to all thoughts and to call forth strong emotions must have been a precious "social filament" in the Dark Ages, and even now, when the occasions for assemblage have so multiplied, it plays no mean part in moral education.

It is perhaps an instinctive recognition of this, as much as

¹ *Religion of the Semites*, p. 243.

² *Ibid.*, p. 237.

³ DYER, *The Gods of Greece*, p. 103. See also BANCROFT, *Native Races*, Vol. II, chapters ix and xxii.

mere impatience with nonconformity, that has attached to churchgoing an unmistakable social sanction. It is vaguely felt that worship is a social tie, and that the average man cannot neglect it without loss of fraternal feeling. Though now the efficacy of private devotion is acknowledged, and though the best religious thought is no longer to be got from sermons, there seems little disposition to let religion become merely a private and home affair. No sect, however high its conception of deity, neglects frequent assemblage ostensibly for worship. May there not be here an intimation that, however much the theory of religion may change, religious association and religious gatherings will continue to play a prominent part in the life of society?¹

When religion, ceasing to be national, becomes universal, it no longer avails to preserve the special solidarity needed in the political group. Hence the institution of the patriotic festival to supplement the religious festival. It is significant that none of the modern secular states has neglected to provide national holidays giving occasion for assemblage. While the memories of national dangers, struggles, and triumphs revived at such meetings give them a peculiar value, it is not to be doubted that the spectacle of innumerable simultaneous gatherings of one's fellow citizens dominated by a single sentiment is of itself able to thrill the soul with a sense of the common life.

But while here and there we can detect society promoting assemblage for the sake of its harmonizing effect, it is certain that this form of control is on the wane. Though the diameter of societies lengthens, the means of communication and meeting grow still faster. The intellectual and emotional contacts of men are become so numerous that it is no longer lack of comprehension that threatens the permanence of the social order. The natural occasions for meeting are now so many that it is not necessary for society to supply artificial occasions. It is

¹ Ominous, however, is the increasing resort to "attractive" features in order to get people to assemble. See "Another Year of Church Entertainments," by W. B. Hale in *Forum* for December 1896.

not the estrangement that grows up between the different local groups in a society that is nowadays to be provided against, but rather a certain attitude of the individual toward the *impersonal* arrangements and institutions by which he is surrounded.

CEREMONY.

I.

To many the nature of ceremonial control will seem too well set forth by Mr. Spencer to be in need of any restatement. In truth, however, his "ceremonial government" is not a *means* of government, but a *kind* of government. With him obeisances and respects are the pale shadow of social, political, or religious subordination. They are not means of winning ascendancy, but the sign and symptom of ascendancy already won. However indebted is sociology to Mr. Spencer for tracing the derivation of ceremonies from natural acts of propitiation, it is now necessary to supplement his study of forms by a study of motives and effects. If it can be shown that a ceremony is not only a social practice but also a social institution, and that it is not simply a *control*, but that it is a *means of control* whereby society can impress the feelings of individuals advantageously to itself, the reopening of this subject will be justified.

II.

Two views may be taken of the forms observed in intercourse. From one standpoint the essence of ceremony is *propitiation*. The force impelling people to these tiresome and precise actions is *fear*. The practice is adopted by the inferior either as the instinctive expression of submission or because such signs of subordination will please and mollify the superior. These formalities, then, observed from purely private motives, mark the militant state of society with its numerous personal and class ascendancies. When the leveling influences of the industrial state cause the government of one man by another to disappear, they become rarer. Ceremony, therefore,

does not approach the dignity of a social institution playing some part in the life of society. It is a procedure generalized by imitation, but no more significant in the social economy than are those uniformities called fashion, and deemed by Mr. Spencer to be of a kind with ceremony.

Significant details, however, suggest another point of view. Often formality does not proceed from the inferior, but from the would-be superior. Ceremoniousness is, we know, well suited to curb over-familiarity and keep others at a distance. There are forms characterized by obsequiousness, but there are other forms which are, so to speak, the weapons by which one man subdues another. "Amongst a man's peers," says Bacon, "a man shall be sure of familiarity; and therefore it is good a little to keep state."¹ "In early society," says Bagehot, "a dignified manner is of essential importance" "The habitual ascendancy of grave manner was a primary force in winning and calming mankind."² Everywhere we must distinguish from the ascendancy gained by force the ascendancy gained by demeanor. The obedience due to awe was no less real than the obedience due to fear. The stately bearing no less than the strong arm was a means of control in early society.

But why should demeanor give one man the upper hand of another? It is likely that the soul of manner is to show forth a sense of confidence and power. This suggests a respect for one's own person, doings, or opinions which powerfully affects the minds of beholders. For there is no reason why this state of mind should not as readily pass from one to another in way of imitation as any other feeling or judgment. The man of impressive manner simply reiterates in gesture language his high sense of his own worth till others are irresistibly led to share it.

Formality in personal intercourse, then, can be traced down to two roots—servility and self-respect. These feelings, working in the sphere of human contacts, give rise to two contrasted efforts—the effort of the servile to control others by propitia-

¹"Of Ceremonies and Respects."

²*Physics and Politics*, p. 151.

ting them, and the effort of the self-respecting to control others by impressing them. These, if successful, inspire graciousness in the one case and deference in the other.

Undoubtedly the forms that become stereotyped are those originally used to propitiate. But it would be rash to conclude that ceremony is an endeavor at mutual propitiation. Nothing is more certain than that manners, far from growing up spontaneously, early get the social sanction behind them and are forced into vogue. Propriety gets codified as soon as morality. Society, far from letting alone, actively interferes in order to get certain forms observed by men in their intercourse. Children are taught them, art lauds them, religion endorses them, and in every way society behaves as if its interests were bound up with them.

Would it be safe to infer that society is concerned in propagating a system of mutual propitiation tending to develop graciousness? Manifestly not, for such a sentiment is of little use to it. On the other hand, nothing could more conduce to social order, with its equilibrium of interests and balance of activities, than a respect of each for others. And forms of intercourse that exert a mutual restraint, and cause each to set a value upon the personality of another, will very likely win the support of society. Of the stiff manners of the Colonials Dr. Eggleston says: "Perhaps it was the partial default of refined feeling that made stately and ceremonious manners seem so proper to the upper class of that day; such usages were a fence by which society protected itself against itself."¹ How well this tallies with the saying of Confucius: "The ceremonial usages serve as dykes to the people against bad excesses to which they are prone."

The society that has relied most on ceremony to preserve order and harmonize men in their dealings is China. Let us see what virtue is found in it by the sages who helped to frame that wonderful and enduring fabric. "They [ceremonies] are the bond that holds the multitude together; and if the bond be

¹"Social Life in the Colonies," *Century*, Vol. XXX, p. 391.

removed, those multitudes fall into confusion."¹ "For securing the repose of superiors and the good order of the people, there is nothing better than the Rules of Propriety. The Rules of Propriety are simply the development of the principle of reverence."² "The sages knew that the rules of ceremony could not be dispensed with, while the ruin of states, the destruction of families, and the perishing of individuals are always preceded by the abandonment of the Rules of Propriety."³

"Therefore the sage kings cultivated and fashioned the lever of righteousness and the ordering of ceremonial usages, in order to regulate the feelings of men. These feelings were the field to be cultivated by the sage kings. They fashioned the rules of ceremony to plow it. They set forth the principles of righteousness with which to plant it."⁴

We find men beginning with no ceremonious forms in personal intercourse, then developing them into a luxuriance so great as almost to smother social life, and finally allowing them to lapse almost to disappearance. Is this but the shadow of that personal ascendancy, which, starting at zero, rose to its zenith in the military state, and now sinks again towards zero? Or does this *crescendo* and *diminuendo* not indicate rather that society finding ceremony efficacious used it in controlling men in their dealings with one another until the coming to hand of new and finer modes of control enabled it increasingly to dispense with an instrument so clumsy? Even Mr. Spencer confesses that "established observances have the function of educating, in respect of its minor actions, the anti-social nature into a form fitted for social life."⁵

This interpretation accords with numerous facts. Prescribed forms are not used in the family or between intimates, where affection insures self-restraint. But as distance increases the sway of formality grows, till it reaches its climax in the inter-

¹ *Sacred Books of the East*, Li Ki, bk. viii, § i.

² Hsiao King, chap. xii in Vol. III, *Sacred Books of the East*.

³ Li Ki, bk. vii, § iv, par. 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, par. 8.

⁵ *Ceremonial Institutions*, § 431.

course of belligerents or the negotiations of ambassadors. It flourishes in militant societies, but not solely as suggested by the obsequiousness of inferiors. It is most observed by the members of a military class, and by those who command rather than by those who obey. In caste societies, while the lower orders may practice humble obeisances, it is in the highest caste that ceremony grows most rankly. The forms of politeness have passed from above downwards and not from below upwards. The courtesy of chivalry was for warriors, not for burghers. It is noble or courtier, not peasant, that feels most the yoke of etiquette. In other words, wherever place or pursuit has fostered excessive self-assertion, there society imposes its rules of behavior designed to check arrogance and suggest the sacredness of another's personality.

But why does society later allow this code to lapse? Is it, as Mr. Spencer asserts, due to the increase of sympathy and social feeling? Partly, but not wholly. While granting that industrialism develops a pacific temper that does not need a rigid ceremonial discipline, let us not overlook the finer type of control that has come in. What now curbs men in their intercourse is not formality, but idea. Ideas of "human dignity," "equality before God," "divine sonship," "value of the undying soul," etc., which saturate the culture we are bathed in till everyone is more or less affected by them, are the moderating influences of today. These notions, partly implicit in Christianity, partly drawn from Greek thought at the Renaissance, and partly struck out by the humanitarian idealism of the last two centuries, inspire in us that reverence for the personality of another which in Persia, Arabia, or China was bound up with ceremonial observance.

III.

Passing now from the ceremony of intercourse to the ceremony of occasions¹ new problems appear. It is a feature of

¹On this topic I am glad to acknowledge valuable help from an able paper on Ceremonies by a student of mine, Mr. B. M. Palmer.

early society that all important occasions in the life of the individual are solemnized by the public performance of rites. The great mass of these are probably intended to impress rather than to control. The formalities connected with the transfer of real estate, the contracting and paying of debts, the making of wills, marriage, adoption, disinheritance, succession, the emancipation of slaves, etc, suited as they are to make vivid and lasting impressions on the minds of witnesses, are necessary to authenticate transactions in days before document and record were possible. They call attention to the fact that something important is taking place, and by their mysterious and unusual character grave deeply on the memory of spectators that which now we trust to deed and note and register.¹

But in many cases the ceremony of occasion is something more than means of record. We find that the occasions most scrupulously accentuated by public formalities are just those which mark a change in the relations of the individual which involves the acceptance of new responsibilities. The recognition of a new-born child, the attainment of manhood or womanhood, the coming of age, the inheritance of family property, the succession to the headship, marriage, adoption, initiation, confirmation, naturalization, the promise of allegiance, enlistment, installation in office, ordination, compact and treaty—these, though they are events of very different importance, have this in common, that they bind somebody to do for others, for his family, or for the group at large, what hitherto has not been laid upon him. Sometimes, as at christening or enlistment, the obligation is one-sided; sometimes, as in marriage or adoption, it is mutual upon two parties; and again, as in baptism, ordination, or coronation, it embraces the beholding public.

On the other hand, when obligation narrows instead of widens, the event, though certainly as important, is not signal-

¹Of the Sumatran *bimbangs*, or noisy public festivals, we read: "To give authority to their contracts and other deeds, whether of a public or a private nature, they always make one of these feasts. Writing, they say, may be altered or counterfeited, but the memory of what is transacted and concluded in the presence of a thousand witnesses must remain sacred."

ized by ceremony. Thus divorce is less formal than marriage, withdrawal from association or church than initiation or confirmation, expatriation than naturalization, mustering out of service than enlistment, the adjournment of court than its opening. By the gateway of ceremony is the *entrance* to duties, not the *exit* from them. Is it not, therefore, clear that rite marks not all changes in status, but chiefly those which involve fresh obligations?

Why should this be unless ceremony promotes a performance of these obligations—is, in other words, *a means of control*? Note that it is *symbolic*. The picturesque, dramatic, or sensational would serve to impress an event upon the memory. But the ceremony that modifies the feelings is full of meaning. It calls up that which would be overlooked, reminds of that which would be forgotten, and so reveals the full significance of what is being done. Thus in marriage the carrying away of the bride, the pretended payment for her, the “giving” her away, her whipping by the groom, etc., are ways of signifying that the girl’s allegiance to her family has ceased. The *confarreatio*, the drinking together of *sakè*, the joining of hand, the exchange of bracelets, the tying together of garments symbolize the intimacy of the new relation. The service of ceremony, therefore, consists in so stimulating the imagination by appropriate gestures, actions, and words as to call up the conception of something vaster in power, life, or numbers than the here and now — God, society, the dead or the unborn.

Again, ceremony is *solemn*; this, not in order to be remembered, but in order to leave a moral impress. A coronation or a knighting is a miniature drama intended to produce an effect upon the feelings of the principals or spectators. Anything in the way of abridgment or disturbance or interruption or caprice would break the spell and destroy the value of the whole. Hence ceremonies must be guarded from distracting sights or sounds, the parts must be arranged beforehand, the details must be precise, and the minutiae must be so archaic as to be “taboo” to the inroads of a critical rationalism.

Just as proverbs lose their value because of the growing variety of judgment upon life, so ceremonies lose their impressiveness because of the growing diversity of taste. When the lines of individual development are so divergent that there is no form or rite that affects all in the same way—when that which moves one is meaningless to another and ridiculous to a third—the age of symbol is over. The building up of a complex culture and the intellectual differentiation that goes on in society ushers in the era of speech-making. As language presupposes no such agreement of taste and imagination as does the symbol, the occasion once signalized by ceremony is now marked by the oration.

But the appeal that leans so much on reason cannot be sure of sweeping away reason in a tide of sentiment. We must recognize that the age of ceremony is nearly over and we have nothing so effective to put in its place. It behooves society, therefore, to guard with care the little valuable ceremony yet remaining to it in church sacraments or public inaugurals. Ceremonies are not exposed so much to disintegration as beliefs, but still they suffer in a critical, rationalistic age like the present, that cannot divine their virtue. And what is lost is not replaced. It is as hard for a sophisticated age to make new ceremony as to make new myths or new epics. We Americans, with our detachment from the past, our reliance upon the rational, and our hypertrophied sense of the ridiculous, have little ceremony left, but that little we should keep, for it has been well winnowed by time.

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SOME DEMANDS OF SOCIOLOGY UPON PEDAGOGY.

AT the risk of seeming to reopen a closed incident of ancient history, this paper will take its departure from some passages in the report of the "Committee of Ten." The present aim is to define a point of view quite different from that of the committee. In emphasizing the ends to be gained in education, rather than the means to be employed, the writer wishes to be understood as having in mind the whole school career. Methods must of course be varied to meet the learner's needs at different stages of mental growth.

"*The principal end of all education*," says the Conference on History, Civil Government and Political Economy, "*is training*" (p. 168).

The sociologist develops this noncommittal response of the oracle into the following: *The end of all education is, first, completion of the individual; second, implied in the first, adaptation of the individual to such coöperation with the society in which his lot is cast that he works at his best with the society in perfecting its own type, and consequently in creating conditions favorable to the development of a more perfect type of individual.*

The Committee of Ten seems to have stopped at conclusions which tacitly assume that psychical processes in the individual are ends unto themselves. To be sure there are signs of a vague looking for of judgment, from the tribunal of larger life, upon the products of this pedagogy, but the standards of a real test seem to have had little effect upon the committee's point of view. We are told (p. 168) that the mind is chiefly developed in three ways: "(a) by cultivating the powers of discriminating observation; (b) by strengthening the logical faculty . . . (c) by improving the process of comparison, *i. e.*, the judgment." We are further told that "studies in language and the natural sciences are best adapted to cultivate the habits of observation;

mathematics for the training of the reasoning faculties; history and allied branches to promote the mental power which we call the judgment." The naïvely mediæval psychology behind all this would be humorous if it were not tragical. I need not label the pedagogical philosophy with which my sociology allies itself when I declare that sociology, in common with the most intelligent pedagogy of today, refuses to classify educational material along these lines. In the first place education is not an affair of perception, reflection, and judgment alone. Education connotes the evolution of the whole personality, not merely of intelligence. In the second place, if I am not mistaken, a consensus is rapidly forming, both in pedagogy and in sociology, to the effect that *action in contact with reality*, not artificial selection of abstracted phases of reality, is the normal condition of maximum rate and symmetrical form of personal development. Sociology consequently joins with pedagogy in the aim to bring persons, whether in school or out of school, into as direct contact as possible with the concrete conditions in which all the functions of personality must be applied and controlled. In these conditions alone is that balanced action possible which is the *desideratum* alike of pedagogical and of social culture.

Once more, the Committee of Ten was content to remain in the dismal shadows of the immemorial misconception that *dissecta membra* of representative knowledge are the sole available resource for educational development. I do not find among the fundamental concepts of the report any distinct recognition of the coherence of the things with which intelligent pedagogy aims to procure personal adaptation. The report presents a classified catalogue of *subjects good for study*, but there is no apparent conception of the cosmos of which these subjects are abstracted phases and elements. Nowhere in the report do I find recognition that education when it is finished is conscious conformity of individuals to the coherent cosmic reality of which they are parts. Until our pedagogy rests upon a more intelligent cosmic philosophy, and especially upon a more complete synthesis of social philosophy, we can hardly expect curricula to

correspond with the essential conditions to which human action must learn to conform. A graduate of a leading eastern university, who is now making an impression upon American pedagogy, said recently that when he took his diploma, about ten years ago, history, to his mind, was a collection of material which he had studied under Professor A; political economy, another independent body of information which he studied under Professor B; psychology, another isolated subject which he had studied under Professor C, and so on through the curriculum. Not until six or seven years after graduation did it dawn upon him that each of these details of representation is an aspect of one reality, which the pedagogy of the college had concealed in making the fragments prominent. The most serious consideration about this pedagogical perversion is not that it limits knowledge alone. It distorts the whole attitude of men toward the world. Instead of introducing men to reality it tricks them into belief that an unorganized procession of pedantic abstractions is reality.

The report of the Committee of Ten presents to the sociologist, therefore, this anomaly. It is a whole made up of parts every one of which may possibly be accepted by sociology, but the totality, as presented by the committee, sociology must peremptorily reject. It is hot on the trail of pedagogical and sociological truth, without actually coming within sight of the truth. Human personality is not doomed to struggle forever *seriatim* with a long list of detached groups of facts, in order to get its psychic and social development. The world of experience is one, not many. Pedagogy and sociology are discovering this unity by different processes, and as a consequence of their perception that educational material is essentially one, not many, pedagogy and sociology are bound to combine their demands for a complete change of front in education. The proper educator is reality, not conventionalized abstractions from reality. Hence the demand of the new pedagogy, supported heartily by the new sociology, that schooling, particularly in its earlier stages, shall be changed from an afflictive imposition upon life to rationally concentrated accomplishment of a portion of life itself. Hence

the correlated demand of the new pedagogy, also seconded by the new sociology, that so far as conscious effort is made by instructors to supplement the education of action by the education of information, the objects of knowledge shall be kept real by being viewed constantly as organic parts of the one reality. They must no longer be made unreal, through analytic segregation which leaves them standing apart as independent realities.

Having thus by negation challenged some of the implicit concessions of the Committee of Ten to the old dogmatic pedagogy, and to pre-sociological conceptions of reality, I pass to a positive definition of the outlook of sociology. I believe it to be also in line with the pedagogy that will prevail.

Human experience is concerned with three knowable elements: first, man's material environment, inanimate and animate; second, man himself as an individual, in all his characteristics, from his place in the animal kingdom through his special physiology, psychology, and technology; third, man's associations or institutions. Sociology is the systematic attempt to reduce the reactions of these three elements—nature, man, institutions—to scientific form and expression. The inclusive reality which sociology finds comprehending both the processes and the products of these reactions is society,—*i. e.*, individuals in association within the conditions imposed by the material environment and modified by human achievement. The task set for each individual, when he finds himself participant of this reality, is to accommodate himself to prevailing conditions in such manner that he may both accomplish and enjoy a maximum share of the development which his stage in social evolution is empowered to accomplish.

This life task of men consequently sets the pedagogical task of teachers. The prime problem of education, as the sociologist views it, is how to promote adaptation of the individual to the social conditions, natural and artificial, within which individuals live, and move, and have their being. It would not be in point to discuss here the relative place of action and information in progress toward this end. That belongs to pedagogical technology.

I assume that both action and information are unchallenged means of modern pedagogy. With their proportions and with their appropriate sequence at different stages of culture, sociology is not directly concerned. Sociology has no tolerance, however, for the pedantry that persists in carpentering together educational courses out of subjects which are supposed to exercise, first, the perceptive faculty, then the memory, then the language faculty, then the logical faculty, etc. On the contrary, every represented contact of a person with a portion of reality sooner or later calls into exercise every mental power of that person, probably in a more rational order and proportion than can be produced by an artificial process. Our business as teachers is primarily, therefore, not to train particular mental powers, but to select points of contact between learning minds and the reality that is to be learned. The mind's own autonomy will look out for the appropriate series of subjective mental processes. In the second place, our business as teachers is to bring these perceptive contacts of pupils' minds with points of objective reality into true association with all the remainder of objective reality, *i. e.*, we should help pupils first to see things, and, second, to see things together as they actually exist in reality. In other words, the demand of sociology upon pedagogy is that it shall stop wet-nursing orphan mental faculties and find out how to bring persons into touch with what objectively is, as it is. The mind itself will do the rest.

In pursuance of this demand, sociology necessarily becomes an active partisan upon one of the pedagogical doctrines over which educators are divided: viz., sociology denies that the rational center for the concentration of studies is any science or group of sciences. The rational center is the student himself. Personal adaptation to life means the given person's organization of his contacts with reality. In other words, pedagogy should be the science of assisting youth to organize their contacts with reality; and by this I mean to organize these contacts with reality *by* both thought and action, and *for* both thought and action. Relatively the world stands still during the school age of any

person. The pupil himself changes visibly almost every day. The reality with which the pupil can have conscious contact is defined, therefore, by the pupil's own powers and opportunities. At each stage, however, himself on the one hand, and nature, men, institutions, on the other hand, are the subject and object of adjustment. A changing self has the task of adaptation to a surrounding frame of things which daily displays new mysteries and complexities. The teacher's task is to help the individual understand this environment, of which the pupil for a long time seems to himself to be the center. It is the teacher's business to help the pupil understand this whole environment as it is related to himself. Presently, if the pupil's perceptions grow more penetrating and comprehensive, his own personal interests cease to seem the pivot on which the world of experience turns. His personality becomes extended, and at the same time his egoism gets balanced with the personal equation of others whose interests appear. The child finds the complement of his egoism in the family, the school, the group of playmates, the community, and at last, if his education is complete, in society at large. Yet, at each varying diameter of comprehension, life, of which the child is at first to himself the center and circumference, and later life as a whole, of which to the last the individual is to himself in the final resort the most interesting part—life, either individual or social, is the ever present reality which summarizes all that men can positively know. This central and inclusive reality varies, in re-presentation, from socially unrelated individual life to a conception of individual life enlarged by evolved social consciousness into a function of the more abiding reality—social life. This human career, either as pursued for himself by the socially unconscious individual, or as a mingling of the individual with others associated by force of circumstances in pursuing purposes which none perfectly comprehend; this life of men alike in nature, within conditions imposing common limitations upon nature, is the whole of man's range of positive experience and scientific observation. Sociology consequently demands of educators that they shall elaborate available aids

first, to perception by the individual of the relation of part to part in this inclusive reality—the life of men in society; second, that educators shall perfect influences to promote adjustment of individuals to their appropriate functions within this whole.

The part of the problem which I have at present in mind is the proper direction and organization of the pupil's perceptions. So far as the subject-matter of sociology is concerned, everything knowable and worth knowing is a fact or a relation helping to make up this complexity which we call society or social life. The important claim of sociology in this connection is that this reality, like poverty, we have always with us. This reality as a connected whole, related to the pupil, is always the natural and rational means of education. A sequence of studies, in the sense that the pupil is to be enjoined from intelligent contact with portions of reality until other portions have had their turn, is a monstrous perversion of the conditions of education. All reality, the whole plexus of social life, is continually confronting the pupil. No "subject" abstracted from this actual whole is veracious to the pupil unless he is permitted to see it as a part of the whole. It is a misconstruction of reality to think and accordingly to act as though one kind of knowledge belongs to one age and another to another. The whole vast mystery of life, in all its processes and conditions, confronts the child as really as it does the sage. It is the business of the educator to help the child interpret the part by the whole. Education from the beginning should be an initiation into science, language, philosophy, art and political action in the largest sense. When we shall have adopted a thoroughly rational pedagogy, the child will begin to learn everything the moment he begins to learn anything.

Am I demanding a pedagogy which presupposes one philosopher as teacher and another as pupil? Certainly. Every teacher ought to be a philosopher. Every child already is one until conventionality spoils him. More than that, he is also scientist, poet, and artist in embryo, and would mature in all these characters if we did not stunt him with our bungling. I would

revive Rousseau's cry, "Return to Nature!" but in a sense of which Rousseau never dreamed,—not nature in the burlesque of our ignorant preconceptions, but nature scientifically explored, nature, the immanent law of which is to own the sway of rational mind.

I am not asserting that grammar and geometry and geography and geology and history and economics and psychology and ethics as such should be taught in the nursery. I am asserting that in the cradle the child begins to be in contact with that nature and society of which all these are phases and products and reports. Sociology demands for the child, from the cradle to his second childhood, opportunities for such frank contact with life that its various aspects will confide to him their mystery in its real relations with the other elements of life. Sociology demands of the tutors and governors who lead the child through the formal part of education, that they shall so discreetly pilot Wilhelm Meister through his apprentice years that he may learn his world at the smallest expense, and with least cause for regret, both to others and to himself. Whether this citizen of the world shall ever learn to construe life in terms of the conventional sciences is an entirely secondary matter. The main thing is that, from the beginning, he shall learn to know himself and his world truly,—so far as he knows at all,—in all essential relations. This involves the learning of such sciences as he does acquire, in the character of excerpts from the whole book of knowledge, not as self-sufficient knowledges.

I repeat that sociology values subjects of study for reasons quite different from those traditionally alleged. Physical, biological, and social science, with the products of human thought deposited in literature, are worthy of study not because they are assorted tonics for corresponding kinds of mental impotence, but because they are, and only in so far as they are, revealers of man himself and of the life of which he is both creator and creature.

Without alluding further to other departments of knowledge, I may apply what I have said to the subject-matter of the social sciences in particular.

Sociology demands with equal confidence, first, that for everybody the study of *society* shall begin with the nursing bottle, and continue so long as social relations continue; second, that for most people the study of *sociology* shall never begin at all. If the argument thus far has provoked expectation that I shall recommend the introduction of sociology into the curriculum of the lower schools, as the needed corrective of educational defects, the inference is decidedly at fault. Only exceptional pupils should study sociology earlier than their senior year in college, and probably these few would do better to defer the study till after taking the bachelor's degree. While sociology proper is not a desirable subject for young pupils, our educational methods will be miserably inadequate to their social function till every teacher, from the kindergarten on, is sufficiently instructed in sociology to put all his teaching in the setting which the sociological view-point affords. This implies, of course, that the function of education must one day be taken so seriously that only men and women who have more than the bachelor's preparation will be entrusted with its direction.

The study of society which we may reasonably demand in our schools and colleges today must and should be chiefly in connection with the subjects physiography, political geography, anthropology, ethnology, history, civics and economics. The sociological demand with reference to these subjects is that instruction in them shall be rationalized in the same way that the teaching of geography has been reformed during my recollection. I was not the boy who discovered after several years' study of "geography" that the ground on which he walked between home and school was the "earth's surface," but my most lasting recollections of the study of geography cluster around some cabalistic representations of the plane of the ecliptic. To this day I am not perfectly clear about the meaning of those ghostly figures which lent weird interest to the earlier pages of the book. They produced in my youthful mind vague imaginings of uncanny gyrations among celestial bodies, presumed by the author to be the proper medium for introducing youth to a knowledge of the earth's

surface. This was not intelligent correlation of whole and part. It was arbitrary creation of a whole to which the pupil's experience did not correspond; or in another view it was thrusting forward a part which pupils had not differentiated from the whole, and did not need to. I presume that every parent, and every teacher who has liberty to use his own judgment, now begins the teaching of geography with that spot of *terra firma* which is next to the home or the schoolhouse. Whether the plane of the ecliptic ever gets mentioned is a matter of very slight concern. A similar change in the social sciences is well in progress, but it is not yet a prevalent policy. At my graduation from college I passed a respectable examination on the constitution and by-laws of the government at Westminster, but I knew virtually nothing, and was never told that it was worth while to know anything, about the government of the town in which the college was located. My knowledge of the British constitution has never yet found any practical application, but for a decade, as citizen and petty officeholder in that college community, I was subsequently obliged to study and use the town charter and ordinances, which were not worth the notice of my former instructors. Sociology, like charity, ought to begin at home, but, like charity, it ought not to stay at home. The rational method of observation, recognizing the real concentration of life around each member of society, explores the concentric circles of social activity from the actual standpoint of the observer. The child should begin to study economics,—literally, the law of the household,—he should learn the civics and ethics and history of the household, in the practice of normal household relations. The economy and politics and ethics and history of the school, and then of the parent's shop, and then of the neighboring factory, and later of the whole town, are the best educational material that the sociologist can recommend. In other words, the social *desideratum* is that the developing member of society shall become analytically and synthetically intelligent about the society to which he belongs.¹

¹ SMALL AND VINCENT'S *Introduction to the Study of Society* is the first attempt to furnish a laboratory guide for this sort of study. It is not a text-book in sociology, but

The precision of his social intelligence in general depends upon the exactness of his knowledge of details in the life which he most intimately shares.

Observation of the structure, functions, and forces of life in one's own community is the normal beginning of true and large social intelligence and action. Even history should begin with the present, not with the past. Just as Gibbon interpreted the tactics of the Roman legions by the knowledge he gained in the British militia, so every student of history is prepared to reconstruct the past only as he possesses correct and adequate conceptions of the present. Sociological analysis of the anatomy, physiology, and psychology of society furnishes the alphabet to spell out the lessons of history.

The only change in school methods which I am urging is the introduction of this laboratory study of the social facts, processes, and forces nearest at hand, as exhibiting typical social relations in all nations, times, and places. This not as a substitute for present subjects in the social sciences, but as a method of approaching present subjects.

One more demand is urged by sociology upon pedagogy, viz., that all direct or indirect observations of society shall be organized under at least three great categories: first, interdependence; second, order or coöperation; third, progress or continuity.¹ Unless social information can be construed in at least these three forms nothing can save it from frivolity and barren-

a path-maker in methods of observing and arranging societary facts. Variations of the method are possible to fit different needs, from the kindergarten to the seminar. The University of Chicago Press has just issued a typical study of the City of Galesburg, upon this plan, an adaptation of the method of Schäffle, by MR. A. W. DUNN. Professor C. R. Henderson's *Catechism for Social Observers* elaborates the categories of observation. *Vide* also the Le Play method explained March 1897 in this JOURNAL. Such work can neither displace nor be displaced by another kind of work upon societary material, as represented for example by two recent text-books on sociology, GIDDINGS' *Principles of Sociology* (with the syllabus, *Theory of Socialization*) and FAIRBANKS' *Introduction to Sociology*, noticed in this JOURNAL, September 1896.

¹ I hope it is superfluous to add that the use of these terms, or of any verbal substitute, is not what I am contending for, but the arrangement of ideas in conceptual form for which philosophers may find above designations convenient.

ness. The categories are not logically exclusive—the fault of the things themselves!

By the first category, interdependence, I mean the universal fact that every act or event in a human life has been made possible or necessary by other acts or events connected with other lives both past and present, and that it helps to make or mar the lives of others. Beginning with the family and extending to the compass of the race, society is a network of interdependences. One of the discoveries which pupils should be aided to make, in their study of any time or nation or human process, should be that the particular men concerned exemplified the truth “No man liveth unto himself.”

By the second category, order or coöperation, I mean the machine-like interplay of actors and actions in every minute social group as well as in large societies. The relation is so clear that Mother Goose reported it genially, yet it is so obscure that society is daily dissipating its resources because the relation is not understood. From the factory whistle that rouses the workmen at five o'clock, to the curfew bell at the close of day, the waking and the working and the resting of a town tell the truth of human welfare resting upon some form of established order. Wherever men have been associated, even in the most temporary society, the measure of stability in their relations has been preserved by an institutional order, as real while it lasted as though it were defined by the iron decrees of Medes and Persians. A mode of temporary equilibrium is one of the forms in which human association must be thought, if thought truly whether in the society of Ivan the Terrible or of Grover the Inscrutable. When the learners read of any epoch of the past, one of the forms in which they must be helped to represent it, if it is to reveal truth to them, must be the reconstructed balance of influence and action in which the lives of that past time preserved their motion.

The biographical method of teaching history frequently violates this canon. Instead of being made to appear as one of the workers among whom the labor of their generation is

divided, the great man in whom the story of his age is told seems to fill a sphere apart from ordinary men, affecting their destinies by some undetermined process of long-distance induction.

By the third category, progress or continuity, I mean the conception of men and events as always working out new individual conditions and social arrangements,—the truth on the one hand that “the roots of the present are deep in the past,” on the other hand that the present cannot escape responsibility for the future. When historical acts are recalled they should always be considered at last in this third aspect. What motives and impulses led to them? What consequences and effects did they set in motion? This is the scientific attitude of mind toward the past. It is the genuinely social attitude toward the present and the future. It is the purely intellectual condition of the constructive temper which is the last and best product to be demanded of education. Yet I have known courses in history to be conducted under the highest institutional sanction, with no discernible reference to historical cause and consequence. Search and emphasis were entirely for the facts. Specialization of that sort is falsification. Facts cannot be told truly except in their relations.

Sociology demands of educators, finally, that they shall not rate themselves as leaders of children but as makers of society. Sociology knows no means for the amelioration or reform of society more radical than those of which teachers hold the lever-age. The teacher who realizes his social function will not be satisfied with passing children to the next grade. He will read his success only in the record of men and women who go from the school eager to explore wider and deeper these social relations, and zealous to do their part in making a better future. We are the dupes of faulty analysis if we imagine that schools can do much to promote social progress until they are motivated by this insight and this temper.¹

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¹ This paper was read at the Buffalo meeting of the National Educational Association, July 10, 1896, and appears in published reports of same.

A PROGRAMME FOR SOCIAL STUDY.

THE present widespread discontent in regard to social conditions, the dawning recognition that not anybody in particular but everybody in general is to blame for them, and the growing belief that better conditions may be realized if we set about it intelligently, make the study of the actual facts of society one of the chief demands of the times. I say the actual facts of society, for the investigation by the people themselves of actual local social conditions, and the development of local civic pride, will do more toward bettering social conditions than the consideration by isolated students of theoretical social ideas. Theoretical study should not be discouraged, of course, but the formation in a few cities of study clubs to pursue local social investigations marks the beginning of a movement which also deserves the encouragement of everyone interested in social reform. With the hope of stimulating this movement by encouraging the formation and by facilitating the work of such clubs, I desire to present a few suggestions in regard to a method of social study, and to follow those suggestions with a working programme which, with slight modifications, may serve for a club in any locality. My suggestions are addressed mainly to those who have had no special training in sociology.¹

In beginning the investigation of any class of phenomena or conditions, physical or social, the first thing one stands in need of is a method of study. Without method all study is likely to be fruitless, or, to say the least, fragmentary. The student without a definite method will only lose himself in a wilderness of particulars. In all scientific study it is necessary to arrange and classify the material collected and thus avoid confusion. To the

¹ The suggestions offered are practically adapted from SMALL and VINCENT's *Introduction to the Study of Society*. No originality except in the manner of presentation is claimed by the writer.

student of society, therefore, a method of study is as necessary as an outline of what he wishes to say is needful to a writer of a composition. And not only to the scientific student of society is a method of social study necessary but also to every citizen in the land. For in these days when the spirit of humanity is moving everywhere, and the desire to be of social service is felt by persons in almost every walk of life, almost everyone is called upon at some time or other to perform some social service. It may be nothing more than to engage in charitable work, but even this kind of work should be preceded by a knowledge as exact as possible of the conditions of those who are to be served. If a family, for instance, is to be relieved, more harm than good may be done if no attempt is made to learn the causes of its dependence, and to find out the elements which exist in it or its environment which may be utilized to lift it to a higher plane of living. If indiscriminate charity is not, as some maintain, the greatest curse of our time, it has been at least a prolific source of evil. One of the first lessons which well-disposed persons must learn, is that to do good to other people requires an expenditure of thought as well as an outlay of money. "He gives nothing but worthless gold," says Lowell, "who gives from a sense of duty," and again,

"Not what we give, but what we share,
For the gift without the giver is bare."

So slight a social service, then, as the assistance of a family, to say nothing of the reform of a community, requires social knowledge. To acquire that knowledge accurately and with economy of time, a method of study is necessary.

The first step in the study of society or of any social group is to conceive it as a unit. This is not difficult if the object of study is a family, for in a family the relation of parents and children, brothers and sisters, etc., are so intimate that even to the superficial student its unity is apparent. This is not the case, however, with a larger social group. It may require some effort of observation and thought to discover the essential unity of a neighborhood, village, town or city, or of a society. Neverthe-

less the unity of these groups, though not so obvious, is as real as that of the family. Each group may, of course, be only a part of a larger unit, but the relations which its own factors sustain to each other are of such a nature that for purposes of study it also may be described as a unit. Take, for example, a city, town, or village community. In each case the people for industrial and social reasons have been brought together in one locality. They have taken advantage of the economy of division of labor, the miller grinding flour for the community, the grocer providing sundries, the merchant clothing, etc. This division of labor brought about a system of mutual dependence. They have established relationships manifested by the church, the school, the theater, etc., which have increased this dependency. They are thus held together by material bonds and by bonds of mutual self interest in a single group, a unit. If we take a society, the same relations of interdependence will be found. As members of a society we have only to consider the sources of our ideas, the influences physical and moral, by which these ideas are affected, or even so simple a matter as the various articles of food which enter into the composition of our bodies, to see how dependent we are upon each other. We can see too how the various parts of society represented by different groups, the agricultural, manufacturing, etc., coöperate in supplying our wants, and that completeness of social life varies with the degree of this coöperation. Now this interdependence and coöperation are the radical ideas in what is known as the organic conception of society, and this conception is, I take it, the initial step in all fruitful social study.

Having conceived our family, group, or society, as a unit, our first task is to analyze it into its constituent elements. This should be done in order that each part may be studied separately with a view of discovering its condition and its influence upon the whole. Let us take for the purpose of illustration a society, for by so doing we shall include the analysis of all smaller groups. A society then may be divided into three parts: first, the land, which may be conceived in its original state as a raw bit of nature ;

second, the material objects which have been provided by the members of the society for the satisfaction of their wants (wealth), and, third, the people themselves (population). Now land, the first element, which in its economic sense has come to mean all natural resources, may be divided into soil, climate, flora, and fauna, and each of these may be studied with reference to its relation to and effect upon wealth and population. Wealth, the second element, may be classified in accordance with the various purposes it serves, as wealth for sustenance and protection (food, clothing, shelter, etc.), for production (all forms of capital), and for the satisfaction of intellectual, æsthetic, and religious desires. Finally, population, the third element may be roughly divided into three great classes, first, those who engage in the various industries, extracting and transforming, such as agriculture, mining, manufacturing and the like, which support the existence of a population; second, those who are engaged in transporting persons from place to place, or in carrying commodities from the place where they are produced to the place where they are consumed, such for instance as railway employés and all other persons engaged in what we call the carrying trade, and third, those who "coördinate and render efficient the activities" of the former classes and "discipline and develop the psychical powers of individuals in society," as, for instance, the press, the school, the church, the government, etc. These three classes cannot, of course, be studied apart from their physical environment. With that environment they have been appropriately denominated the sustaining, transporting, and regulating systems, and each of them may be found more or less highly developed in any social group. Each system is composed of a number of smaller systems or groups which the sociologist describes as organs. Take, for instance, the sustaining system. It is composed of as many groups, or organs, as there are extracting and transforming industries. Organs, again, may be divided into families, since the personal factor of each organ is made up of family representatives, and families are separable into individuals, the ultimate social units. We have thus completed our

analysis, a rough one of course, but sufficient for our purpose
Arranged in schematic form it will appear as follows:

SOCIETY.

I LAND

1. Soil
2. Climate
3. Flora
4. Fauna

II WEALTH

1. For sustenance and protection
2. For production
3. For promoting sociability
4. For advancing knowledge
5. For æsthetic enjoyment
6. For religious purposes

III POPULATION

1. *Systems*

1. Sustaining

1. Organs

1. Families

1. Farmers
2. Miners
3. Lumbermen
4. Millers
5. Manufacturers, etc.

2. Transporting

1. Organs

1. Families

1. Railway employés
2. Street-car employés
3. Steamboat men
4. Sailors, etc.

3. Regulating

1. Organs

1. Families

1. Teachers
2. Lawyers
3. Ministers
4. Editors, etc.

The sole purpose of this analysis is to gain a conspectus of social relations and to systematize our study. Its value will be

more apparent perhaps if we take up now some of the chief divisions and consider the influence they exert upon each other. We will suppose that our object of study is a society.

"Every society," says Herbert Spencer, "displays phenomena that are ascribable to the character of its units and to the conditions under which they exist." Let us consider briefly the effect of these conditions.

That land, and by land I mean all natural resources, exerts a great influence upon the character and organization of a people, must be obvious to everyone who has the slightest knowledge of history and geography, for by land chiefly do we explain the difference between the inhabitants of the cold regions of the North, and those of the hot countries near the Equator. Both the physical and mental nature of men are affected by their natural environment. Criminologists have shown, for instance, that there is a close relation between crime and climate. The contour of the land affects the size and isolation of a social group, and determines the lines of its movements. Some writers go so far as to declare that physical conditions are the chief factors in social development. Buckle, for instance, lays great stress upon the effect which the general aspect of nature exerts upon the people. By the general aspect of nature, he means "those appearances which, though presented chiefly to the sight, have through the medium of that or the other senses directed the association of ideas, and hence on different occasions have given rise to different habits of national thought." Buckle enforces his proposition by great wealth of illustration. Ireland, Greece, India, Egypt, Central America, Mexico, Peru and Brazil are all cited to illustrate his principle. The aspect of nature in India, for instance, he says, stimulated the imagination of the people, which found expression in their forms of religion. "To them every object of nature was a source of awe They never dared to assimilate their own actions with the actions of their deities." It is thus, he thinks, that the hideous nature of the Hindoo gods may be explained. With Europe, however, he maintains, the case is very different. All the conditions of

existence are changed. Dangers are less numerous, the climate more healthy, earthquakes less frequent, hurricanes less disastrous, and wild beasts and noxious animals less abundant. Everything tended to exalt the dignity of man, while in India everything tended to depress it. Europeans, therefore, had more respect for human powers. "Human beings, less humble," says Mr. Buckle, "as it were less eclipsed by the external world, thought more of their own powers, and human nature did not fall into that discredit into which it elsewhere sank." It is thus that he accounts for the deification of mortals as a part of the national religion of Greece.¹

We need not, however, commit ourselves to extreme theories in regard to the influence of land on population. The fact of this influence will be shown in any group we may undertake to study. It is illustrated in the location of almost every city, town, and village. The site of a city is not often a matter of chance. Water courses, natural products, all physical conditions have something to do with its choice, and the contour of the land upon which a city is built helps to determine the direction of its streets; physical conditions locate its residence portion, its manufacturing districts, and its slums, and all these things have their effects upon the character of the population.

That land exerts an influence also on the production of wealth is no less obvious, and this fact must not be lost sight of in any social investigation. Among the causes affecting the efficiency of production Mr. Mill mentions the following: fertility of the soil, the influence of climate, the abundance of mineral productions, and the advantages of situation. "It is evident," says Buckle, "that among an entirely ignorant people the rapidity with which wealth is created will be solely regulated by the physical peculiarities of their country. At a later period, and when wealth has been capitalized, other causes come into play." As a matter of fact the character of the land practically

¹ See *History of Civilization in England*, chap. 2, *passim*. Compare also CROZIER'S *Civilization and Progress*. "The industrial and social conditions of men," he says, "are, if not the sole cause, at least the controlling factor in civilization and progress."

sets a limit to the number of people which a given area will sustain. However productive the soil may be, and however carefully cultivated, it cannot be made to yield an indefinitely increasing amount of that form of wealth which serves as food. This is due to the well-known law of diminishing returns which may be stated as follows: In certain industries, of which agriculture is perhaps the best example, a point will by and by be reached beyond which an increased expenditure of labor and capital will not bring a proportionate return. That is to say, a farmer, although by doubling the labor and capital which he applies to his land might succeed in doubling the amount of produce once, twice, or thrice, could not go on doing so indefinitely. Now, since food is derived chiefly from the soil, this fact of diminishing returns from land practically places a limit on population, and this is an important consideration in social study. For it is plain that the population can by no means increase beyond the food supply, that is, beyond the amount of that form of wealth which is used to sustain life. The effects here described of land upon population and wealth, so obvious in society at large, are always present in any social group however small, and consequently must always in every attempt at social study be a subject of investigation.

Turning now to wealth, the effects of its character and amount upon the welfare of a society are in a general way evident to all. I have already referred to the fact that wealth, in the form of food, and population bear a certain relation to each other. This relation is formulated in the following law, known the world over as the Malthusian law of population: Population tends to increase more rapidly than food is capable of being increased. The importance of this law cannot easily be overestimated. Notwithstanding all its so-called refutations, it must be taken account of in every scheme for social reform. The struggle for existence is not limited to the lower animals. Man, wherever he has been found, has been engaged in conflict. This conflict is for the means of satisfying his desires, one of the most important of which is the desire for physical comforts.

The intensity of this struggle varies with the relations of the population to the food supply. In some manner, whether by the so-called positive checks, as war, pestilence, famine, and the like, or by negative checks, like vice and prudential restraint, the equilibrium must be maintained. Among the lowest classes the checks on population are chiefly positive. It is only the intelligent, the thoughtful, the prudent, who act upon the advice of Matthew Arnold. Matthew Arnold, it is said, was upon one occasion, in company with a good man, overlooking a multitude of children in one of the most miserable parts of London, children eaten up with disease, half size, half fed, half clothed, neglected by their parents, without house, without home, without hope. "The one thing really needful," said the good man, "is to teach these little ones to succor one another, if only with a cup of cold water; but now from one end of the country to another one hears nothing but the cry for knowledge, knowledge, knowledge." But Mr. Arnold replied that so long as the multitude of these poor children is perpetually swelling, they must be charged with misery to themselves and us, whether they help one another with a cup of cold water or not. The knowledge how to prevent them accumulating is what we want.¹ "A man's children," says the same writer, in *Culture and Anarchy*, "are not really sent no more than the pictures upon his wall, or the horses in his stable are sent; and to bring people into the world when one cannot afford to keep them and one's self decently, or to bring more of them into the world than one can afford to keep, is by no means an accomplishment of the divine will, or a fulfillment of nature's simplest laws, but is contrary to reason and the will of God."²

Aside from this relation of population to food, it is clear that wealth, notwithstanding the evils connected with its production, distribution, and consumption, is essential to the gratification of all our higher desires. Without wealth society could not exist. Its accumulation is the prerequisite of all great social improvements. Railway systems, large manufacturing concerns,

¹ Quoted by JANE HUME CLAPPERTON in *Scientific Meliorism*, p. 85.

the utilization of the powers of nature, all of which themselves increase the production of wealth, are the results of previous accumulations. Wealth is also essential to all intellectual and æsthetic development. The study of a social group may reveal the fact that the chief necessity is a sufficient amount of wealth to support existence and allow leisure for self-improvement. The man or the class of men who have to work twelve hours a day are not likely to be greatly interested in literature, science, or art. It is all very well to tell such men that they must cultivate their minds and familiarize themselves with the great thoughts of the world, but such homiletic advice might well be spared. "To those who have neither time nor taste for intellectual or æsthetic culture," says Clapperton, "it is to me pure irony to tell them that they want perception, and require to know the best that has been thought and said in the world, when they know their real want is happiness; and happiness with them means more of the necessities of life, and more of life's sweet humanities; some freedom from anxiety and care, some leisure from constant and too monotonous toil." Well-meaning persons sometimes carry to the poor the thoughts of Shakespeare and the wisdom of Emerson when they would far better provide the opportunity to earn a side of bacon or a sack of flour. Above the door of one of the New York missions is the sign "Soup, Soap, and Salvation," and this to my mind expresses the rational order of reformatory effort. Much more might be said of the influences of wealth upon population, but it is beyond my purpose. I desire simply to call attention to its obvious influence, and to the fact that whatever may be our object of study—family, group or community—these influences may be discovered.

We have now the third element, population, which we may briefly consider, and for our present purpose it will be better to begin with the final elements in our analysis, namely, individuals. It needs no acute observer to discover that no two persons are exactly alike. Differences of race, temperament, age, sex, etc., must be carefully considered in any thought concerning the

improvement of a social group. By way of illustration let me refer to the question of sex. In society at large the question as to how far the fundamental distinction between man and woman affects the psychical life is an extremely important problem. Whether the chief difference lies in the realm of the feelings or in the intellect, it cannot be denied that the difference exists. Some go so far as to insist with Von Hartman that the distinction of sex separates men and women by an impassable gulf. "Man," he says, "is by nature active, woman, passive, and this difference has a profound effect on the occupation of both parties." "Hard manual labor," he declares, "consumes the feminine capacity for work much sooner than the masculine. It leads to premature old age and exhaustion. It weakens the power to resist the insidious influence of disease, and in this way considerably curtails life's duration. Immoderate mental work is often more harmful to women, for the female brain and nervous system cannot bear nearly as much strain as the male. It is on this account that the education and training of both sexes must always remain different." He is even of the opinion that in the "domain of social morality, the demand for equality and equal judgment of the sexes is not less untenable than in politics and employment." I present this view, not to agree with it, but in order to suggest the problem which arises from individual distinctions, and to make it clear that in every contemplated change of social conditions or institutions due regard must be paid to them.

But something more than a knowledge of individual differences is necessary in social study. Everyone should have a knowledge as complete as possible of the individual himself. This knowledge may be obtained from the various natural and social sciences, some acquaintance with which on the part of anyone who would enter deeply into social study is presupposed. Physiology and anatomy tell us of the structure of the individual and his physical needs. History, political economy, and political science tell us of his social nature and its results. In view of the importance of this kind of knowledge it will be profitable, I think, for me to summarize the study of the indi-

vidual which may be found in Small and Vincent's *Introduction to the Study of Society*.

In the first place, then, man is an animal. That is a fact which must never be left out of account. Many of his needs are animal needs. No new order of society or new adjustment of a social group is practicable or desirable that does not provide for these needs. Man is also a social being. He loves the companionship of his fellows. It is obvious that his socialization is not yet complete. There are even those who seem to resist the socializing tendency and demand greater liberty, apparently understanding by liberty freedom from law, but such persons might well learn from the following lines of John Stuart Blackie :

"Some men by liberty swear—not I ;
The beasts of the forest are free ;
The wild tornadoes that sweep the sky ;
The tempests that harrow the sea ;
But man is a thing more divine ;
With reasoned subjection,
He makes his election,
And bends with awe
To sovereign law,
And limits that wisely confine."

Man is also a being desiring æsthetic enjoyment. This is seen in the tattooing of the savage as well as in the adornment of the lady of fashion. He is also an intellectual being, having a desire for knowledge. This desire is manifested in every member of the human race. It is as obvious in the child, whose curiosity is proverbial, as in the aged, who are still anxious to learn something new ; in the gossip earnestly gathering bits of scandal as in the philosopher eager in his search after truth. Finally, man is a moral being, having a knowledge of right and wrong. These characteristics of man seem to justify the following classification of his desires: the desire for health, the desire for wealth, the desire for sociability, the desire for knowledge, the desire for beauty, the desire for righteousness. These desires, it is claimed, are common in latent or variously

developed forms to all men and women, their strength and the conceptions of their satisfaction varying of course in different persons. Now, in an ideal society all the desires of each individual would be proportionately developed and find appropriate satisfaction, and here is an important suggestion for social reform. If some of the desires manifested in the group we are studying are too strong while others are too weak, the obvious need is the restraint of the former and the cultivation of the latter.

The suggestion contained in this study of the individual applies not only to a study of society, but to a study of the family as well. A member of a philanthropic committee or a friendly visitor of a charity organization who undertakes the reform of a family is on the lookout, if he is wise, for manifestations of what we call the higher desires. In this way he learns what to appeal to. Sometimes he finds that the desire for beauty, manifested perhaps by a sickly flower in the window, rightly addressed will lead a family from the ugliness of vice to the beauty of holy living. It is plain then that in the study of whatever group we may choose, one set of our inquiries must be in regard to the relative development of desires, and the abundance or lack of means appropriate to their satisfaction.

In the same study of the individual it is pointed out that he has certain combining properties. These are the capacity for affection and friendship, and for coöperation, which have enabled him to accomplish such remarkable achievements in society. It is these combining qualities which enable him to unite with others to form the various social groups. The first of these groups in logical order of formation, and perhaps of importance, is the family. It may not be the first historically. That is a question which is yet to be settled. It is often said that the family, the molecule of society, is the earliest form of social organization. But if the evolutionary theory is correct, we cannot assume that society began its organization with the family, for among the lower animals we find those whose matrimonial relations do not exhibit the least permanence or organization. We find

instances, however, of economic and political association. "Wolves, for instance, pressed by hunger, form vast coöperative societies for robbery, with a division of labor remarkably far advanced, although we find no family life among them."¹ It is not necessary, however, to discuss the origin of the family. The essential thing is to see that it is a constituent element in the structure of society, and that it should be the object of careful study, and must necessarily be considered in all schemes of social reform, both with reference to its own structure and also with reference to the effect upon itself of any proposed institution.

The combinations next above the family are organs and aggregates, the organ being a combination of persons and property for the performance of some social task, illustrations of which have already been given, and an aggregate being a group of individuals or families loosely associated.²

We have already prolonged our suggestions beyond the possibility of speaking of the mutual effect and influence of organs and systems. Enough has been said perhaps to indicate the method of study, and that is all with which we are at present concerned. Each group, system or organ may be analyzed in a manner similar to our analysis of society and studied in exactly the same way.

While the design of the writer is to furnish assistance to local study clubs, it is obvious that the suggestions of this paper may be followed with profit by any person wishing to engage in social study on his own account. The writer would indeed urge everyone to try the method of study here suggested, whether he belong to a study club or not. Choose for instance a family; study its physical surroundings, the disposition and taste of its personal elements, the influence of heredity, and other causes of its inferior condition.³ Then on the basis of this knowledge seek

¹ LEON METCHNIKOFF, in *Contemporary Review*, 1886.

² As the study of aggregates, which differ but slightly from organs, is not likely to be of great importance in local study, they were omitted from the analysis on p. 856.

³ As an illustrative study of this sort, *vid.* BLACKMAR, "The Smoky Pilgrims," *AM. JOUR. OF SOCIOLOGY*, January 1897.

to develop in your chosen family the desire for knowledge, beauty, and righteousness. Many persons find pleasure in cultivating a tiny plant, in watching it put forth its tender leaves, in measuring from day to day the rapidity of its growth in order to detect the influence of their care; and finally, when they are rewarded by seeing it burst forth into blossom and fragrance they experience great delight. But there are those who will testify that this delight is far surpassed by another, and that is the joy and satisfaction which may be derived from cultivating the germs of the higher life which may often be found in an unfortunate individual or in a family of the poor and dependent; from watching the nobler desires quietly develop into activity and strength under sympathetic and intelligent care; and from discovering by and by that out of unfavorable conditions have blossomed forth the virtues necessary to usefulness and happiness.

While the suggestions thus far made are chiefly in regard to the study of the *structure* of a social group, it must be plain that they will also apply to the study of the *functions* of the agencies and institutions studied. While engaged in considering the structure of the family or group, many things in regard to function will be brought to light which will suggest methods of reform, and which unsystematic study would perhaps never reveal. The study of structure, while it cannot be complete without it, naturally precedes the study of function, and the method of study need not be different; the same analysis will apply to both.

In accordance with the analysis already given, though not closely following it, I now present, after providing a provisional constitution for a club, a programme of study with provisions for twenty-four meetings. As it may be difficult to maintain interest in a club without the discussion of general social questions, provision is made in the programme of each evening for the discussion of both general and special topics. Emphasis, however, should always be placed upon the special report, making the results of the special local investigation the basis of the discussion. Each special report should be as thorough as it can be

made, a map being used whenever it will add to clearness, and that will probably be in almost every case. Outline maps of the district studied may often be secured from real-estate agents or from the local press. In the hope that many will wish to consult the literature of the subjects discussed, a brief bibliography is subjoined to each topic :

CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL STUDY CLUB OF _____.

Name and Object.

1. This organization shall be called _____.
2. Its object shall be the actual investigation of the social conditions and institutions in _____ and the study of social questions, with a view to the improvement of local conditions and the advancement of the members of the club in the knowledge and art of true social life.

Officers.

3. The officers shall be a president, vice president, and secretary and treasurer, elected by separate ballots at each annual meeting.
4. The executive board shall be the president and four members appointed by him and confirmed by the club.
5. The secretary and treasurer shall record all proceedings and those present at each meeting of the club, have charge of its books, papers and correspondence, and notify members of election, appointments or other matters requiring personal attention, and shall have charge of and record all receipts and disbursements.

6. The executive board shall prepare the programme, provide places for meetings, assign topics to members, receive and propose the names of all candidates for membership, and act for the club in the intervals between meetings, subject to the approval of the club at the next regular meeting.

7. Such committees as are required may be appointed in the usual manner.

Members.

8. Any citizen of _____ interested in social study shall become an active member of this club when he or she has been elected and has signed the constitution and by-laws, by signing which he or she agrees to support and abide by the constitution and rules of this club, and to perform all duties assigned by the executive board, or to provide a substitute unless excused by the same. A two-thirds vote of members present is necessary for the election of an applicant for membership, which vote shall be taken by ballot.

Amendments.

9. This constitution may be amended or suspended only by a two-thirds vote of the entire membership, or a unanimous vote of those present at a legal meeting.

BY-LAWS.

1. The regular meetings of this club shall be held on _____ beginning at 7:30 P.M. during the autumn and winter, and 8:00 P.M. during the spring and summer.

2. The first regular meeting in _____ shall be a business meeting for the election of officers.

3. Order of business:

1. Call to order. 2. Roll call. 3. Reading of the minutes of preceding meeting. 4. Unfinished business. 5. New business. 6. Reports of officers and committees. 7. Balloting upon candidates for membership. 8. Regular programme. 9. Adjournment.

4. A majority of the active members shall constitute a quorum for transacting business, but the members present at any meeting duly called shall be a quorum for carrying out its programme of exercises.

5. All business shall be done in accordance with the parliamentary rules of Cushing's Manual (or Roberts' Rules of Order).

6. A by-law may be suspended or amended by a two-thirds vote of the members present.

PROGRAMME.¹

FIRST MEETING.

The first meeting should be given to the explanation and discussion of the work proposed, the election of officers, assigning of topics, etc. As it is desirable to have as many as possible present, some special feature looking to that end should be provided. The character of the first meeting will have much to do with the success of the club.

¹ For the selection of most of the references in this programme and for the characterization of all of them, the writer is indebted to Mr. C. H. Hastings, librarian in the Social Science Departments of The University of Chicago. The books selected are intended for the average reader with a fair amount of time at his disposal, and not for the specialist. They are almost all of recent date and can be obtained through any first-class bookstore. The explanatory matter, necessarily brief, is designed to furnish those who cannot read all the books some basis for a selection.

The thanks of the writer are also due to Mr. C. J. Bushnell for suggestions and for some assistance in making up references. Mr. Bushnell is the organizer and vice president of a social study club in Englewood, Ill., which is following successfully a programme similar to the one here proposed.

SECOND MEETING.

1. General topic: The Influence of Land on Population.

References:

Buckle, History of Civilization in England (N. Y., Appleton, 1892), Vol. I, ch. 2.

A brilliant attempt to found a philosophy of history on natural forces.

Draper, Civil War in America (New York, Harper, 1867), section 1.

Theory much like Buckle's.

Fairbanks, Introduction to Sociology (New York, Scribners, 1896), chap. 2.

Natural influences illustrated by historical and geographical observations.

Giddings, Principles of Sociology (New York, Macmillan, 1896), bk. ii, ch. 1.

Illustrations drawn from zoölogy, anthropology, and history.

Marshall, Principles of Economics (New York, Macmillan, 1895).

A good general discussion.

Mayo-Smith, Statistics and Sociology (New York, Macmillan, 1895), bk. iv.

Distribution of population compared with topography and climate, with statistics.

Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws (Cincinnati, Robert Clark, 1871).

An anticipation of Buckle and Draper, especially emphasizing climate.

NOTE.—On many of the topics the new edition of *Johnson's Encyclopædia* may be consulted with profit. The files of the *Review of Reviews*, easily consulted by the full index in each volume, contain a great deal of information along the line of these topics. One who has time and easy access to a public library may find unlimited literature in the periodicals by consulting *Poole's Index*. For thorough study of the topics relating to charities and corrections Henderson's *Dependents, Defectives, and Delinquents* is an invaluable guide; and for such a study the annual reports of the National Conference of Charities and Corrections are the most valuable single source.

2. Special Report on The Physical Features of the District Studied and their Effects upon the Population.

The member making this report should prepare a map showing the boundaries of the district, its natural and artificial divisions, variations of surface, location of creeks and rivers, etc., and should be prepared to point out how any of these have affected the location of homes, industries, etc., the direction of the streets, health of the inhabitants, etc. He should also study the character of the soil, noting its effects upon wells, cisterns, basements, etc., and should give attention to the climate, seasons, rainfall, changes of temperature, etc., with their effects upon the life and comfort of

the people. In the preparation of this as well as of some of the following reports assistance may be obtained from Dr. C. R. Henderson's *Catechism for Social Observation*.

3. General discussion. This may be upon the special report or upon the general topic. In either case illustrations of the main point, the effect of land on population, should and doubtless will be contributed.

THIRD MEETING.

1. General topic: Land Ownership.

References:

Cobden Club Systems of Land Tenure (London, Macmillan, 1870).

A most valuable collection of essays on land tenure and land laws in different countries.

De Coulanges, Origin of Property in Land (London, Swan, 1892).

A historical study with conclusion representing quite fairly the present aspect of the controversy as to the origin of landed property in communal ownership, or in private ownership.

Godwin, Political Justice (London, Swan, 1890), bk. viii.

A classic among writings favoring communism.

Lafargue, Evolution of Property (London, Swan, 1890).

Arguments based largely on anthropological data, with conclusion favoring communal holding.

Mill, Principles of Political Economy (New York, Appleton, 1893), bk. ii, chs. 1 and 2.

A clear, fair statement in short space of the leading aspects of the question.

Spencer, Principles of Sociology (New York, Appleton, 1892), Vol. II, ch. 15.

Conclusion regards land nationalization as a possibility.

2. Special Report on the Ownership of Land in the District Studied.

Use a map to illustrate as far as possible the distribution of land among the people. Show the relative number of the population owning land. Study the causes preventing the number from being larger. Show the values of land, the increase or decrease over former values and the causes to which it is due. Study also the method of taxing real estate, and in every way possible try to get at the actual facts in regard to the ownership of land in your own community.

3. General discussion, topic: Collective *vs.* Private Ownership of Land.

References:

Bosanquet, Aspects of the Social Problem (London, Macmillan, 1895), ch. 17.

Favorable to private ownership, but with restrictions as to inheritance.

George, *Progress and Poverty* (New York, Lovell, 1879), bk. vii.

Argues for the justice of communism and the securing of it in practice by the single tax.

Naquet, *Collectivism* (London, Swan, 1891).

Examines collective ownership in some detail and rejects it.

Wallace, *Land Nationalization* (London, Swan, 1892.)

Studies present status of the land question and declares in favor of land nationalization.

Weeden, *Social Law of Labor* (Boston, Roberts, 1882), ch. 1.

A good discussion with conclusion in favor of private property.

(See also the references under the general topic.)

FOURTH MEETING.

1. General topic : The Distribution of Wealth.

References :

Commons, *Distribution of Wealth* (New York, Macmillan, 1893).

In addition to the discussion of the economic side, has valuable statistics as to the distribution of wealth.

Hobson, *Problems of Poverty* (London, Methuen, 1896), ch. 1.

Concise statement as to inequality with emphasis on its significance.

Holmes, *Concentration of Wealth*, *Political Science Quarterly*, Dec. 1893.

Presents the facts as a statistical expert.

Mallock, *Classes and Masses* (London, Black, 1896).

Almost a direct contradiction to Hobson, Strong, and Spahr.

Marshall, *Principles of Economics*, bk. vii.

Discusses fully the economic aspects of the distribution of wealth.

Sidgwick, *Principles of Political Economy* (New York, Macmillan, 1887), ch. 7.

Favors extension of governmental control, but calls attention to the social service of the rich.

Spahr, *Distribution of Wealth* (New York, Crowell, 1896).

Finds great and increasing inequality in wealth, and favors a progressive income tax as a corrective.

Strong, *Our Country* (New York, Baker, 1885), ch. 10.

Discusses concentration of wealth and its perils.

2. Special Report on The Local Distribution of Wealth.

Get from the assessor's book statistics in regard to the subject. Note the effect of the distribution on the formation of classes. Do you find any idle rich? Note the probable causes of the condition of those who are

in poverty. Study the relation of the employing class to the employed. Give attention to the wages in different employments and the causes of their variation. Prepare a wage map. For a suggestion in regard to its preparation see *Introduction to the Study of Society*, p. 166, or the maps in *Hull House Maps and Papers*.

3. General discussion, topic: Should Fortunes be Limited by Special Legislation?

References:

Bastable, Public Finance (London, Macmillan, 1892), bk. iv, chs. 4 and 8.

Discusses from the side of taxation with no definite conclusion.

Ely, Taxation in American States and Cities (New York, Crowell, 1888), pt. iii, chs. 7 and 8.

Conclusion in favor of income tax and inheritance tax.

Gladden, Applied Christianity (Boston, Houghton, 1892), p. 1.

Favors income tax, but opposes special repressive legislation.

Hurd, Limitation of the Amount one may Take by Will (*Am. Law Register and Review*, April 1896). Paper read at World's Fair Congress of Jurisprudence.

Able discussion. Favors limitation in order to divide among as many as possible. Opposes income tax.

Pomeroy, The Concentration of Wealth (*Arena*, December 1896).

Favors a rapidly progressive income tax.

Review of Reviews, American Millionaires and their Public Gifts (*Review of Reviews*, February 1893).

Editorial based on the *New York Tribune's* list of 4047 millionaires and containing various practical suggestions.

(See also references under general topic.)

I. W. HOWERTH.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

(To be continued.)

REVIEWS.

Genius and Degeneration. A psychological study. By DR. WILLIAM HIRSCH. D. Appleton & Co., 1896.

Genius and Degeneration is the title of a book opposed to the teachings of the alarmist school. Lombroso, Nordau, and the others who form this school have startled the public by elaborating the idea that civilized communities are largely composed of degenerate individuals. With facile pens, large vocabularies, and fragmentary citations these writers have set out to stigmatize the intellectual leaders of the world as more or less degenerate.

The laity has been rather overawed by the vigor of their accusations, so that a book presenting the other side of the question was needed. Dr. Hirsch writes as a psychiatrist and is at pains to show that the argument for degeneration lacks positive evidence; that its logic is faulty and that its leading terms are employed without exact definition. Furthermore, in comparing the present with the past, the authors in question are wanting in a sense of historical perspective.

It must be kept in mind that the fraction of the community which any author calls healthy or normal depends upon the narrowness of his definition of health. This will vary with different writers, but the definition once chosen must be rigidly applied, and it is by no means fair to describe as stigmata in geniuses what would pass for mere peculiarities in individuals unknown to fame. Moreover, the term genius is used by these writers even more loosely than the difficulties of defining it would warrant. Dr. Hirsch points out that, psychologically, geniuses do not form a homogeneous group, and that the same deviations from the normal would therefore have different values in different cases. Furthermore, in properly diagnosing mental ailments, groups of symptoms are used as indices of disease, and their significance depends largely on their grouping. To take one symptom out of the group and consider it as indicative of that disturbance for which the entire group stands is a patent error, yet this has been done time after time by those seeking to prove degeneracy.

Degeneracy, too, is a term to be scrutinized. It implies a condition resulting from imperfect growth, and hence when we are asked to admit that an individual has suddenly become degenerate in his maturer years, having previously been normal, we have a right to ask whether such a fact squares with terms employed. The manner in which these authors run their fingers down the annals of history and from time to time attach uncomplimentary labels to those who have figured as the world's great men finds an historic parallel in the method of making witches once used in Salem. Before a solemn but credulous court an "afflicted girl" pointed to a person who did not please her, called her "witch," and the case was closed. Without doubt some "common scolds" and other obnoxious persons were thus eliminated from the community, but the method failed of general approval.

No one denies that pathological individuals have at times claimed the world's attention, but this does not make true the inverted statement that those who gain this attention are probably pathological. Dr. Hirsch combats in detail some things which Nordau has to say on art and literature as expressing the degeneracy of authors and artists, and there is also a special defense of Richard Wagner. By way of preface there is given an account of Wagner's artistic productions, as an expression of his mental development, which cannot fail to interest many readers apart from the bearing that it has on the main argument. This book therefore goes far towards neutralizing the influence of the alarmist school by putting the laity in a position to test critically such productions.

H. H. DONALDSON.

Rich and Poor. By MRS. BERNARD BOSANQUET. Macmillan & Co., 1896. Pp. 216. \$1.50.

THE author prepared herself for this work by living among the poor in East London. Her observations are all at first hand, fresh and vivid. We are directed by her method and attracted by her style of presentation. She insists that relief of poverty is essentially an affair of character and education far more than mere change of physical environment. Her attack on the church for its bribery of doles, its giving premiums to promote hypocrisy, the neglect of its high spiritual mission, its materialism, its want of confidence in its peculiar ministry and in the spiritual capacities of the poor, is one of the most important parts of the volume.

There is a measured sanity and balance in the descriptions which are in sharp contrast with the lurid, sensational articles which misrepresent the industrial situation and really defame the poor. The dark and discouraging facts are not hidden or toned down. The author is entirely faithful in dealing with the obstacles to progress, both in character and environment. But constant friendly relations with the struggling poor have revealed to her those remedial forces which give hope of success in all educational enterprises on behalf of the working people.

C. R. HENDERSON.

La Population et le Système Social. Par FR. S. NITTI. Avec une préface de René Worms. Paris, V. Giard et E. Brière, 1897. Pp. 276.

IN the preface M. Worms discusses the question of the relation of demography to sociology. The problem of population was first discussed by economists as a chapter in political economy. Recently it has been taken up by the statisticians as a part of their science. But statistics is not a science; it is a method of counting applied to social phenomena. There are two conditions for the existence of a state—territory and population. The study of the former is social geography; that of population is demography, one of the parts of social anatomy, and this includes social histology and even ethnography. But demography must deal with functions and growth as well as with parts and organs, and so it has intimate relations with social physiology.

The work of Nitti was published in Turin in 1894. The French translation has some important additions from the pen of the author. The dedication is addressed to Loria. The work is divided into two books, the first of which is historical, the second gives an exposition of the author's doctrine of population.

In the historical part (pp. 9-112) there is a treatment of the historical causes of the principal economic doctrines of population. The author gives a brief summary of the positions taken by various writers from the ancients down to our own day. The economic doctrines are regarded as reflections of the economical conditions of each period and of the optimistic and pessimistic *Weltanschauung* of each writer.

The second book is the argument of the author. A table is given to show the "progressive abandonment" of the teaching of Malthus, and a survey presents the central ideas of Bodin, Suessmilch, Malthus,

Darwin, Spencer, Guillard, Marx, Loria, Dumont, who are selected as types. The author concludes that nothing of value is left of the system of Malthus. The defenders of Malthus and of the form of his doctrine now taught will object to the statements of their position. There is an absence of a complete and sharply defined definition of that position.

The first argument of Nitti turns on the experience of Europe. He claims that it contradicts the "law of Malthus" who predicted that population would double itself in twenty-five years. The fact is that population has not increased at any such rate in Europe or in the United States.

The means of subsistence have grown far more rapidly than the population. Unproductive consumption and pauperism are the necessary consequences of our vicious form of distribution of wealth and do not arise from the excessive multiplication of the human race. Statistics of wealth and population are given to illustrate this idea.

The chief error of Malthus is that he sought the law of population in the world external to man, whereas he should have sought it in man himself. *Population has always an organic tendency to adapt itself to the means of subsistence.* This italicized phrase is central in the argument, but it does not seem to add anything to Malthus. It is no great discovery that population and subsistence will somehow come to equilibrium, even if, as in India, it requires the death by famine of 12,000,000 people to secure the balance.

The author shows that there is a relation between the price of grain and the number of marriages and births, which simply shows that the instincts of the people accord with the teaching of Malthus as to "moral restraints." He also shows that when there is a high birth rate there is also a high death rate, which again confirms a teaching of the Malthus school that if man will not voluntarily and intelligently balance births and food there are natural forces which will correct his error at enormous cost of life.

The author very properly shows that many famines in the past were due to a defective organization of transportation and taxation, not to excess of population, and that with international commerce these evils may be greatly diminished.

Taking up the question of "subsistence" he shows that luxury grows with the capitalist class and is copied by the poorer people who are borne on to extravagance by the necessary law of imitation.

But for this wasteful and injurious consumption the land could support a much larger population. Much is made of this "fatal law of imitation," as if a man with ten dollars a week were compelled to buy broadcloth and wines because his employer enjoys them. The budgets of workingmen, collected by Engel, Gould, and the Le Play people, are cited in proof of this terrible law which is declared to be a decree of fate in stronger terms than Malthus ever applied to his law.

Levasseur's analysis is employed (p. 143) to illustrate the flexibility of the average density of population which can be supported at various stages of civilization. In the period of barbarism this average is very low, at most only two or three to the square kilometer. In the pastoral state the rate remains low,—as in Turkestan 0.5—2.7 to the square kilometer. In an agricultural community 40; in an industrial community 160; in a commercial nation there is no limit. As only a few races have reached this last stage the earth seems far from full. Provisions of a future rate of population depend on too many unforeseen elements to be of any value.

Births vary between 20 and 50 to the thousand of inhabitants, and the oscillations between these points are not due to mere biological causes but to an economical and social law which varies with the civilization and the economic system. Then follows (p. 147) a discussion of these causes which deserves attention. They are classified under these categories: psychical and moral, religion, morality and æsthetic influences; social causes,—political organization, social classes; economic causes, chiefly the mode of dividing wealth. Many points in the discussion of pessimism, the French literature of lubricity, and of the degenerates generally remind one of Max Nordau. Pessimism itself is explained by the psychological influence of an industrial system which leaves the workingman no hope of rising by individual effort.

The excessive birth rate of India is ascribed to "political" oppression; by which is meant the hopeless wall of caste. Nothing is said of the religious beliefs connected with ancestor-worship as a cause of early marriages in India, although this is noticed in relation to the Chinese family. From the preceding discussion and induction a "law of capillarity" is formulated. A high birth rate is possible only when the phenomenon of social capillarity does not exist or exists in a feeble degree. Countries which have an absolute government, and which eliminate or restrict this phenomenon, have, other things being equal, a birth rate much higher than countries under a democratic rule.

The economic causes of excessive population are regarded as most important. Loria is followed closely at this point. So long as there was unoccupied land population and subsistence was in equilibrium, either because the earth yielded plenty or because its infertility determined a low rate of procreation. The author does not mention the balancing weights of famine, hardship, infanticide and war which figure so greatly in savage life. The emphasis is laid on the assertion that capitalists urge on the production of children in order to have a surplus of laborers, thus keeping up the rate of profit and depressing the rate of wages. Whatever criticism may do with Loria's subtle argument it will always seem entirely superfluous to offer inducements to the proletariat to produce more children. What should be said of this sentence (p. 185)? "Nothing is neglected by the capitalist class—counsels, incitements, relaxation of morals—to push the poor to bear more children."

The misfortunes of the poor are not due to their improvidence and to the excess of the birth rate among them, but the excessive production of children is caused by the demand of manufacturers for more hands (p. 189). The employment of women and children (p. 200) is spoken of as a necessary consequence of capitalism. The man who receives a low salary is compelled to have more children to work for the family support (p. 208). English trades unions and legislation have proved that the employment of children is by no means a fatal necessity.

Two corollaries are drawn from the economic argument (p. 222): (1) The lower the economic situation and the moral sentiments of the working classes, the more surely are they impelled to seek purely sensual enjoyments, and thus an excessive fecundity follows. (2) Every amelioration in the general diffusion of wealth acts favorably on fecundity, that is, reduces it to reasonable limits. His explanation is that people who have higher pleasures are not so sensual. Then he cites the United States and the small landowners of France as illustrious examples of the virtue of moral restraint, the very people whom he seems to charge elsewhere with using detestable means of preventing births. In the corollaries he admits low moral sentiments as causes of fecundity, whereas his argument seems to require him to ascribe the low morality to low wages. He inclines to accept Spencer's theory of high individuation as a check on fertility, but does not adequately and clearly show how it can be of any service within that part of the future which is of any practical interest to living men.

The final formulation of the law of population Nitti states as follows: "In every society where individuality is highly developed, and where the process of socialization has not destroyed all individual activity; in every society where wealth is highly subdivided, and where the social causes of inequality are eliminated by an elevated form of coöperation; fecundity will be kept in equilibrium with subsistence, and the rhythmic variations of demographic evolution will give no cause of terror to humanity."

After saying that this "scientific law of population" gives the mortal stroke to Malthus' treatise and to the theory of the classical economists, he writes: "But we hasten to add that, even when Malthusianism has been completely abandoned; when his principles, which appear to be as solid as granite, have been destroyed and reduced to powder under the dissolving action of the truth; when the doctrine we have just described shall be recognized by all as true; and when society shall have accepted the principle of coöperation, even then the work of Malthus will appear worthy of the highest admiration." The grounds for this admiration of an empty bubble are not stated.

Fr. Nitti's book is very learned and clearly written, and reading it is rendered a pleasant task on account of its interesting style.

Nitti makes a valuable contribution to the discussion of causes of extreme poverty. Proletarian excesses are by no means the only causes of distress. Parasitic children of extravagance and luxury must bear their share of the responsibility, and the unequal distribution of the product of industry is admitted by all economic writers who advocate coöperation. In placing emphasis on the defects of the economic system, and in calling attention to the vices of luxury Nitti has brought a neglected and unwelcome truth into strong light.

C. R. HENDERSON.

The New Obedience. A plea for social submission to Christ.
By WILLIAM BAYARD HALE, Mission Priest of the Church
of Our Savior, Middleboro, Massachusetts. New York:
Longmans, Green & Co., 1897. Pp. 191.

A FASCINATING, trenchant, searching volume. The ideals and modes of reasoning are mediæval, monastic, and scholastic; the illustrations have the freshness, vividness, and force which keen observation and a sympathetic heart give to the author's style. The chapters will

evoke, as the preface suggests, interest, doubt, distress, and enthusiasm. The interpretations of Tolstoi are followed; the words of Jesus are taken quite literally in respect to non-resistance, the sin of accumulating wealth, living from day to day without care for the morrow, refusal to receive interest on loans, the approval of poverty as itself a good. This peculiar method of interpretation furnishes the basis of his social theory.

By some mental dialectic not easily followed Henry George's doctrine of the iniquity of ownership in land is deduced from a conception of theology.

Interest and usury are identified; the Fathers are quoted, but Ashley's account of the later church teaching and the historical reasons for the change are not noticed.

We might be disposed to ask what substitutes for royalties, rents, interest and profits are possible; whether a few self-denying ascetics could achieve any modification by accepting his counsels; what mode of selecting competent leaders of industry and government could, even under socialism (p. 148), be devised without competition; but all this questioning is useless in this case, since "Christians are not bound by considerations of practicability."

The statement (p. 84) that "Christianity is not an individual matter," but is entirely social, is but one side of an important truth. The representation (p. 54) that self-sacrifice is the sum of morality needs to be corrected by the consideration that self-regard is a duty: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself; a saying which Harris' *Moral Evolution* wisely applies to social ethics. Herbert Spencer's familiar vindication of self-preservation is required to give real contents to altruism. The attempt to be more generous than the Golden Rule virtually implies suicide. We read this book, as we read all strong poetic and sermonic appeals to altruism, with profound respect when, as in this case, the author is sincere. We feel that selfishness may be partly corrected by eloquent portraiture of heroic virtue and martyr zeal. But if we are seeking a reasonable method of interpreting the New Testament, or a healthy and sane view of life, or a rule by which men in our century can ordinarily best further character and welfare, we shall receive but little practical help in this volume. It presents an economic method immediately practicable in a monastery supported by a competitive society outside, but not a guidebook for men who are to promote progress.

C. R. HENDERSON.

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

CONDUCTED BY J. D. FORREST, A. T. FREEMAN, AND H. A. MILLIS.

Social Christianity.—Social Christianity differs from Christian socialism in its point of view. Its end is not merely amelioration of the material condition of men, but especially their moral and religious progress. The practice of morality is an essential factor of religion. Neither individualism nor socialism can attain this end—the *moralization* of the individual and of society through religion. The two principles, individual liberty and the superior influence of society upon the individual, taken separately, are destructive to each other. Only their simultaneous application permits rational action toward social progress. They are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. Christians employ both methods of action. The exclusively individual method of religious propaganda is to be criticised as attaining results not in proportion to the effort expended. It saves some souls, but does not touch the social classes. A rational method of evangelization ought to take its departure also from the scientific fact of the influence of environment and heredity on the individual. It is necessary to modify the environment as well as to preach the gospel. The active Christian must be an active politician. The social Christian movement must adapt itself to the new economic and social ideas, must impregnate them with a high ideal, must transform them.—W. VIOLLIER, *Revue du Christianisme Social*, March 1897. Fr.

How to Attain the Eight-Hour Day.—The eight-hour day is the greatest benefaction which can now be bestowed upon the wage worker. An adequate method is a vital necessity to the shortening of the working day. This adequate method must be such that in its nature and working every interest shall be protected. This suggestion is offered to meet this demand, namely, that all organized bodies of capitalists engaged in manufacturing industries form an agreement that on the Monday following the first Thanksgiving day after the agreement is made they will all take off permanently one-quarter of an hour from the working day, and that each year thereafter on the corresponding day they will take off another quarter of an hour until the eight-hour day is reached. The eight-hour day in itself gives no occasion for anxiety on the part of the capitalist. The proposed scheme meets the practical difficulties, because of the regularity and small amount of the change and because of the favorable time in the year when the change is made.—REV. JESSE H. JONES, *Gunton's Magazine*, March 1897. Fr.

Workers' Insurance Legislation in Germany.—Germany was the pioneer in that part of social legislation which has to do with obligatory insurance for workers, and the experiment has proved a marvelous success. This Workers' Insurance Legislation falls under three heads, each fund being under separate administration but with growing coöperation between them. I. The Sick Fund embraces in its operation all workers in factories, workshops, mines, salt works, on railways, in navigation, in the building trades, as well as clerical workers in general, of both sexes, with an income not exceeding 2000 marks. It is legally bound to provide the following benefits at least: (1) medical attendance; (2) medicine and other remedies; (3) if unable to work, a weekly payment of not less than 50 per cent. of the member's wages for at least thirteen weeks; (4) in case of death a funeral benefit of not less than twenty days' wages. In 1894 there were 21,552 legal sick funds in Germany with 7¼ millions of members, an income of 136 million marks, an expenditure of 128 millions and reserve funds of 94¼ millions. II. Accident Insurance embraces agricultural as well

as industrial workers. The liability for accidents is borne solely by the employer, but as he also has the administration of this insurance, it has suffered from one-sidedness. Its most valuable result has been in furnishing employers an efficacious material motive for humane actions preventive of accidents. III. Old Age and Invalid Insurance is administered exclusively by the government. It embraces 11 millions of persons, including two more classes than the preceding, namely, home workers and domestic servants. Employer and employé make equal weekly deposits to this fund through the purchase of stamps. This insurance attempts to provide only a substantial addition to the means of support in old age. The Old Age pension is intended for every member over seventy years old. The Invalid pension is to be granted to every member who, during the period of one year, is disabled from earning more than one-third of his or her average wages. Imperfect as the German insurance legislation is, in the short time of its operation it has already had a far-reaching beneficial influence on the domestic, social, moral and intellectual conditions of the working population. It is deeply connected with the great labor movement in Germany. It has decreased pauperism and is developing a spirit and system of coöperation.—HENRIETTE JASTROW, *Fortnightly Review*, March 1897. Fr.

Juvenile Criminals—the School and the Press.—(1) Criminality in France has tripled in fifty years, with but slight increase in population. Criminality among the young between six and twenty-one years quadrupled from 1826 to 1880, while that of adults tripled. Since 1880 the former has increased even more rapidly proportionally, increasing by one-fourth in ten years to an adult increase of one-ninth. A similar growth has taken place in the number of juvenile prostitutes and suicides. (2) The more societies are raised in civilization, the more are they subject to the law of variation. Civilization produces more numerous human varieties, and, with more occasions for wrongdoing, it provokes an increasing number of certain delinquents. But variability does not necessarily imply immorality. The normal laws of evolution for criminality do not sufficiently explain the actual state, especially juvenile criminality. (3) In the case of 80 per cent. of young criminals the moral condition on the side of the parents is deplorable. Vice, debauchery, drunkenness, in parents, becomes criminality in the child. Obligatory instruction is not *directly* responsible for increasing juvenile criminality. But it has failed to prevent this, owing to defective organization of the school. The general defect of our system of instruction has been the predominance of the rationalistic conception, which attributes to knowledge, especially scientific, an exaggerated rôle in moral conduct. It is not general enough in its great principles, not practical enough in its details. Education is a moral and social mission. (4) With ability to read almost universal among the young, the press becomes the great primary school. Its rôle, in our democracy, is the moral and political education of a people. It has not filled this rôle. The complete political, scientific, and religious liberty of the press has degenerated into defamation, excitation to crime, and obscene publications. A portion of the press having become the principal agent of demoralization and one of the sources of juvenile criminality, it is time to suppress it with severe punishment under the common laws of justice. (5) Criminal sociology should reach the social causes of crime and insist on preventive more than on curative measures. Thus the principal points to be attacked are: drunkenness in parents, leading to crime in offspring; lack of assistance for the young in securing opportunity for normal activity, leading to professional criminality; diminution of marriage, leading to license and illegitimate births. As for criminals from passion, besides better education and indefatigable repression of the provocative press, nothing is more efficacious than the sanction of rigorous laws, unweakened by exaggerated indulgence of judges or the public.—ALFRED FOUILLEE, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, January 15, 1897. Fr.

An Economic and Social Programme.—(1) Moral reform and change of heart must be put in the first rank of influences toward a social state conformable to the will of God. (2) Faithful to protestantism, liberty is the basis of the solution of the social question. But individual initiative alone cannot be counted upon to secure the

reign of justice, and in the economic order the intervention of the law appears to be an indispensable factor. (3) The final end is coöperative association—association in consumption, freeing from the yoke of middlemen; association in credit, from that of usurers; association in production, from that of entrepreneurs. (4) Individual property is to be defended because it is an element of good which it would be imprudent to remove as a human motive. But individual property is not irreconcilable with a large development of collective property in public institutions for the common good. (5) Interest and rent on the one side, and wages on the other, with their contracts of forfeiture by one party of share in profits, should be progressively displaced by association, which would insure solidarity of interests and remove the prevailing sentiment of hostility between the two factors in production.—CH. GIDE, *Revue du Christianisme Social*, January 1897. Fr.

Professional Risk.—The laws on this subject are always insufficient. It takes years to get one passed, and by that time it is useless, conditions having changed. Some general principles of law should be settled, upon the justice of which most citizens would agree. Then the judges should be left to apply these principles to the facts in any case. Article 1382 of the civil code says: "Any act whatever which causes damage to other persons obliges the man by whose fault it happened to repair the damage." This would be sufficient as a general principle, but by restricting the word fault to a narrow sense, the employer has been held free, when he could claim that the act was due to chance, or to even a momentary forgetfulness of the workman. The modern industries, so powerful are the chemical, physical and mechanical forces used that the danger is far greater than of old. The profit in them is for the employer, the workman is no better off than of old. The employer then should bear the cost of the risk. Some industries by the nature of the chemical agents involved bring an early death to the workmen. Such industries should be forbidden by law. Were this done, invention would probably devise ways to make them safe. Now there is not sufficient motive, for employers profit as things are and do not have to compensate the workers for the injury to them. Other industries are dangerous, because of the engines, machinery, etc. Accident is not certain, but possible. If accident comes through a moment's hesitation of the workman, or a misstep, or through chance, the manufacturer is not held responsible. In railways, however, the company is held responsible. All employers should be. Even if the accident is due to a moment's imprudence or weariness, or to pure chance, to a defect in the machinery which could not be known, or to some combination of circumstances which could not be foreseen, still the workman should be compensated; for in placing him in abnormal and dangerous conditions and in exacting from him constant skill and attention one commits a primordial fault. To exact compensation would not put an end to manufacture. One accident might ruin an employer if he stood alone. But as the risk would threaten all manufacturers, they would combine by a system of insurance pro rata to the number of workmen employed. Thus the cost would be small to each and would enter into the general expenses and be no more prohibitive of business than fire insurance is. Law should render such insurance on the employer's part obligatory.—PIERRE DENIS in *Revue Socialiste* for October 1896. Fr.

The Political Structure of Society.—Social law is the end; political law the means, not the foundation of law, but its procedure. In the social-political organization there are two extreme points, equally necessary. On the one side is society, on the other the individual. The extreme expression of the former is collectivism, of the latter anarchy. The two forces are enfeebled each by the other, when they ought to be utilized in their full vigor. The following order of change from one extreme to the other is possible: (1) Political individualism; (2) mixture of individualism and collectivism, (a) empirical mixture and confusion, (b) rational coördination without waste, (c) subordination of individual to the group; (3) political collectivism. The political elements are primarily, like cells, undifferentiated and amorphous. Gradually the elements are differentiated to discharge different functions. The division of labor carries each part to the highest perfection. So we have: (1) the amorphous

state; (2) the differentiated, polarized, or organic state. Or, from another point of view, (1) the chaotic state; (2) the state of coördination; (3) the state of subordination or of hierarchization. It is rarely the case that one of the elements which constitutes a social function does not predominate over others. So, another order of change is: (1) Absorption of one of the elements by another; (2) equilibrium of the elements; (3) predominance of the contrary element. The functions of society correspond to the physiological functions of an animal. The functions of nutrition and reproduction pertain not to political but to economic government. Those of the relations of society correspond to the cerebral operations. The social functions are the legislative, the judicial and the administrative. The one who is best qualified to discharge these is not the savant: for his science is wholly theoretical, and he loses himself in his speculations. Nor the practical man; for his interests may conflict with the general interest, and he is incapable of taking the widest view. Under universal suffrage, the most illiterate is the equal of the most intelligent. But the most illiterate is not able to frame wise laws in all their details, corresponding to the point of evolution. This is the rôle not of interest, nor of capacity, but of *action*. During long periods, it is the force of *movement* which rules. The absence of will, of intention, has been most disastrous in sociology. Sociology is the reflex of psychology, the social functions corresponding to the cerebral functions. The cerebral functions of sensibility, intelligence, and will correspond to the social functions of good sense, science and action. Collective groups in the order of complexity are — commune, province, state, confederated states, allied states, universal federation. Individual groups in the same order are — individuals, family, forced groups, voluntary groups. A synthesis will follow this analysis of the social structure.—*RAOUL DE LA GRASSERIE*. "De la structure politique de la société," *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, November, 1896. F.

The Political Structure of Society.—(Part II). I. Political structure of the collective society. It is not alone society as a whole which can have a social structure but also the individual. Race characteristics influence the choice between different modes of government. With certain peoples, *e. g.*, Germans, the independence of character is strongly marked. In nations of such a temperament, the family life is strongly developed. Besides the race influence there is the influence of climate, soil, religion, etc.

The collective government alone constitutes the society of the state apart from the individual. The distinct existence of this society has been questioned, that is, it is held that it is simply a collection of individuals. But society is distinct from the individuals which compose it, as the human individual is something more than the atoms and molecules of which he is composed.

The bond of union between the different concentric societies is the federal bond, the absence of which means warfare.

A. The State. (a) The direct exercise of political functions by the assembly. But direct government does not exist solely where the power is exercised by the whole nation by virtue of the sovereignty of the people, but also under an absolute monarchy. (b) Indirect exercise of political functions. This is more complex in that it establishes an equilibrium and reaches a differentiation which did not before exist. The governmental function may be divided into legislative, judicial, and executive. (c) The combination of direct and indirect government. This secures the most perfect system; for all interests and capacities thus best find their satisfaction. (d) The evolution to this form of government. The direct government approaches most nearly the purely individualistic form. Then comes the transition to the social state in which the functions are differentiated.

B. Submultiples of the State. (a) The province or department is a reduction of the state, and as such has the same organs. (b) The commune is an inferior unit and governs through the three functions.

C. The Multiples of the State. (a) Confederation. (b) Alliance. (c) Universal federation.

D. The Federal Bond.

II. Social Structure of Individual Government. *A. Absence of Groups.* (a) The direct, individualistic government has as its national function solely the declaration of

war. (b) Mixed individual government is a step towards collective government. (c) Indirect individual government.

B. Family Group. This is not a social but an individualistic group. It is the continuation of the individual.

C. Extra-family Groups, *e. g.*, professional groups.

D. Voluntary Groups. These develop industry, commerce, etc.

E. International Groups. These represent the unity between nations, and have legislative, judicial, and executive functions.

In the midst of collective governments there is found the débris of individualistic governments. Individualistic rights are found as (a) the genesis of new rights; (b) survivals; (c) results of the deficiency of collective governments; (d) a defense of the individual against the collective rights; and (e) as the evolution of individualistic and collective rights. Three great principles are found in the movement. (a) The individualistic right represents rarefaction; the collective represents condensation. (b) The functions, at first in an amorphous state, differentiate. (c) Some social forces are subordinated to others.—*RAOUL DE LA GRASSERIE*, "La Structure de la Société" (suite et fin), *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, December 1896. F.

The Criminal in the Open.—The criminal has usually been studied behind the prison bars. A decade's experience with tramps and "professional criminals" "in the open" may tell us something more about them. Are "professional criminals" (not instinctive criminals," of which there are very few) peculiar physically, intellectually, or morally? No, they are not naturally so, but may become so from long imprisonment. There is no such thing as a "criminal cranium." Many in later life do have a peculiar "countenance," which is the result of long imprisonment. Naturally they are far shrewder than ordinary men, and would be able to win their way in the natural course of life if they tried. They see an easier way of living and choose it. Morally they are not obtuse. They are not unmindful of duties, and are subject to remorse. The "professional criminal" is not deficient in physique, intellect, morals, or will, and so is perfectly responsible for what he does. His treatment should be such as to make him feel that such a life is hard and costly.—*JOSIAH FLYNT* in the *Forum*, February 1897. M.

The Relation of the Liquor Traffic to Pauperism, Crime, and Insanity.—(Taken from an investigation made by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of Massachusetts.) (1) Pauperism.—Of 3230 paupers examined, 2108, or 65.26 per cent., were addicted to the use of liquor; 866, or 26.81 per cent., were total abstainers; while in regard to the other 256, or 7.93 per cent., no information could be secured. Of the total abstainers 41 per cent. were minors. Out of 2701 cases, 1274, or 47.17 per cent., attributed their pauperism to their own intemperate habits. In 1542, or 64.82 per cent., out of 2379 cases, one or both parents were addicted to drink.

(2) Crime.—Of 26,672 convictions for crime during twelve months, 17,575, or 65.89 per cent., of them were for drunkenness, and 657, or 2.46 per cent., for drunkenness in combination with other offenses. Intemperate habits were said to have led to 22,514 out of 26,656 crimes, while in the other 4142 cases such influence was denied; 94.24 per cent. of the criminals used intoxicating liquors; 5.76 per cent. were total abstainers, almost one-half the latter being minors. Of the parents 57.89 per cent. of the fathers and 20.49 per cent. of the mothers drank.

(3) Insanity.—Of 1836 insane, 671, or 36.55 per cent., were intemperate; 677, or 36.87 per cent., were abstainers; while in the other cases the facts could not be secured. Of the 1281 adults concerning whom definite information could be secured, 659, or 51.44 per cent., were intemperate, and 622, or 48.56 per cent., abstainers.—In *Bulletin of the Department of Labor*, January 1897. M.

Railway Relief Departments.—Railway men belonging to associations and brotherhoods have the benefit of the relief and insurance there afforded. Many railroads furnish medical attendance, hospital service, and some temporary relief to their employés. Six have established "relief departments," by which is meant provision

for "systematic and comprehensive relief, covering sickness, accident, old age, and death." These are the Baltimore & Ohio, the Pennsylvania Railroad, the Pennsylvania Company, the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, the Philadelphia & Reading, and the Plant System. The Pennsylvania Railroad established its "department" in 1886, the Plant System, in 1896, the other four established theirs in 1889. Membership on the part of the employes of the Baltimore & Ohio, the Philadelphia & Reading, and the Plant System is compulsory; of the others voluntary. These six systems include one-seventh of the railway mileage of the United States, and employ one-fifth of the railway men. The membership of these "departments" in 1895 (before the Plant System established its "department") was something over 100,000. In 1895, 18,382 injured received benefits of from (averages for different roads) \$12.30 to \$24.91, while 33,228 sick received from \$9.73 to \$28.65. Death benefits averaging from \$427 to \$1125 were paid in 799 cases. The benefits are graded according to classes based upon wages received. The funds are created partly from membership dues, varying with wages received, and partly by contributions from the companies. In 1895, the "dues" amounted to \$1,745,114.36, while the contributions from the railroads (including some interest paid by them on funds in trust) were \$346,259.88. This work is directed by a manager appointed by the directors of the railroad company, who is advised by a board composed of an equal number of representatives appointed by them and of representatives elected by the employes from among themselves. Through these "departments," the Baltimore & Ohio has given in benefits almost five million dollars, the Pennsylvania Railroad, \$5,170,000, the Burlington, \$1,760,000, the Philadelphia & Reading, \$1,448,000, and the Pennsylvania Company (the Pittsburg & Erie), \$1,917,000.

The railroads established these departments partly to furnish safe insurance to their employes, but chiefly to secure for themselves better employes, and to bind the interests of the employes more closely to the interests of the railroads.—DR. EMORY R. JOHNSON in the *Bulletin of the Department of Labor*, January 1897. M.

Condemnation of Criminals not Punishment.—A bitter spirit will continue to dominate the people as long as the notion prevails that our courts of justice are to mete out retribution. Society has not the right to inflict pain. The spirit of vengeance must be eliminated from our courts. When the idea of punishment is abolished, then the emotional attitude toward the criminal will disappear. As organized society we have the right to protect ourselves against the criminal as against the person afflicted with a contagious disease, but this right should not be deemed the right to punish. The simple term justice or condemnation will convey the idea that the good of society is the consideration of the court, while the term punishment conveys the idea that the individual alone is the factor, and, as long as it remains on our statute books, the criminal cannot be blamed for imagining that the whole force of our courts is to cause him bodily pain.—EDWARD F. BRUSH, M.D., *Appleton's Popular Science Monthly*, February 1897. Fr.

Evidences of Health throughout the Industrial World.—In 1870 the property of the United States was valued at 24 billion dollars in gold; in 1890 at 65 billion dollars. In 1870 the population was 38 millions; in 1890, 62 millions. Thus, during these twenty years there was saved, on an average, over forty dollars per annum for every person in the nation. The distribution was as follows: The census of 1850 showed 6.47 per cent. of the population and 35.95 per cent. of the families in the country possessed of real estate; that of 1890, 47.90 per cent. of the families and 9.69 per cent. of the population—a gain of 33 and 50 per cent. respectively. In 1890 on an average only 5.01 per cent. of the total number engaged in gainful occupation were unemployed. In 1891 the purchasing power of wages was about 40 per cent. more than in 1873. The saving and spending power of the masses was improved to that extent. These are the best possible evidences of health in the economic and social life of the nation. The general prosperity, interrupted by the panic of 1893, is being recovered. The needed employment of labor in constructing railroads or in other enterprises hinges upon the profitable return for labor on the farm

and in the workshop. The outlook in these two domains is favorable, as shown by the recent advance in the prices of agricultural staples and by the great increase in value of the domestic manufactures exported in 1896 over those exported in 1895.—L. G. POWERS, *Engineering Magazine*, January 1897. Fr.

In Praise of Charity.—We often wonder why so much money and charitable effort do not regenerate the world. The reason is that they are so often unwisely and ignorantly applied. "The great mass of distress is due to moral defects of some kind." Most of our effort does harm because we disregard this fact. Individual responsibility is weakened and the problem is made more serious. What we need first in charity work is a clear understanding of the facts in the particular case. Then every effort must be made to induce self-help, for in self-help alone is the solution to be found. "Material relief," "friendly visiting," everything must be carefully used to make character, to make a man feel "responsible for maintaining himself and his family," for "the end of charity is to civilize," and "civilization implies a certain regularity and foresight in life."—C. S. LOCH, in *Charity Organization Review*, October 1896.

The Relation of Sociology to Philosophy.—Sociology assumes that natural laws of social progress can be ascertained. Philosophy has entered upon the study of man in society with the assumption that it is possible to read in society the larger expression of what individual man has in him to become. The philosopher investigates the social whole, as he investigates other expressions of the human mind in order to learn what the mind really is. Sociology deals with the laws of aggregation and the behavior of aggregates as such, and has no primary reason for regarding one society as of greater interest than another. According to Bernès, sociology is not an art devoted to immediate action, but a philosophy which divines the impulse and the indications of a partially unrealized unity in the world which demands realization. If this is the case, the line which separates sociology from philosophy is in all essentials done away. Sociology may be compared with psychology in its relation to philosophy proper. The laws of association, with which modern psychology began, might serve for a designation of the general problem of abstract sociology. Psychology, in dealing with the mere course of psychical events, makes abstraction from the relations of reality which constitute the essence of logic, ethics, etc. As sociology acquires command over its material and its conceptions, it will recognize a gradation and a tendency, and find means to distinguish on its own grounds the social forms in which development is fullest from those in which it is most meager. In as far as it succeeds in this, it will assume towards the philosophy of society the same general attitude which psychology holds towards logic, ethics, and aesthetics. The force of facts appears to be determining sociology to the position of a psychological science. The psychology of crowds, the idea of imitation, and the conception of consciousness of kind bring us into contact with ideas with which political or social philosophy has long been accustomed to work. Such conceptions as the unity of science and the influence of sociology on scientific method are not new in principle. For Plato politics was a science, and the political forms corresponded to types of mind.—B. BOSANQUET, *Mind*, January 1897. F.

Public Employment Offices in Belgium.—During September 1404 persons asked employment, and places were found for 420.—*Revue du Travail*, October 1896.

Public Assistance (Paris).—Indigents receiving regular relief—July, 47,490; August, 47,299. Necessitous persons receiving irregular relief—July, 19,547; August, 16,723.—*Bulletin de L'Office du Travail*, October 1896. F.

Insurance against Unemployment in St. Gallen.—In November 1896 St. Gallen repealed her law of 1894 providing for compulsory insurance against unemployment. The opposition to it seems to have become quite general, including not a few laborers. The law provided that all persons receiving not more than five francs

per day and who did not avail themselves of the insurance afforded by organizations and associations must become insured. The dues varied according to the wages received. Under the law, 4220 men had insured, most of them being the less skilled workmen. The compulsory feature of the law was distasteful to many. But the real trouble was that very few except of the lowest class of laborers were ever out of work, and so the lower classes were insured largely at the expense of the higher. To this, very naturally, the latter objected.—THEODOR CURTI, *Regierungsrat in St. Gallen, in Archiv für Soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik*, December 1897. M.

The Old Generation of Economists and the New.—Thirty years ago economic science in England was more confident than it is today. Few of its general propositions flourished in France, and almost none in America. It is now patent that no practical problems can be settled offhand by an appeal to general doctrines. Nature's facts are more diverse than used to be thought. We cannot predict results from a mere knowledge of fundamental forces, without making a full investigation of the particular circumstances under which they act. A small change in those circumstances may alter the action of the fundamental forces beyond recognition. The pursuit of particulars has become more eager, but there is little tendency to dissociate it from the study of general principles. A further advance is the recognition that in economics we deal with the whole of man's nature. Social science, or the reasoned history of man, is working its way towards a fundamental unity, which is to be found in the forces of human character. Our first duty as economists is to make a reasoned catalogue of the world as it is, and never to allow our estimates as to what forces will prove the strongest in any social contingency to be biased by our opinion as to what forms ought to prove the strongest. Economists must admit instances of social discord. They are the result of natural laws which it is their business to help to counteract. They must dare to oppose the multitude for the good of the multitude, taking an attitude of reserve towards movements that are already popular. The coming economists will have no more urgent task than to inquire how far social approbation and sympathy may take the place of the cruder force of the pursuit of private material gain, which is being weakened by the growth of large businesses, and especially those under public control.—ALFRED MARSHALL, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, January 1897. F.

Economic Morality.—The great question which divides thinkers is the possibility of an economic science independent of the general study of social facts.

The Manchester school believes that it is possible to found practical conclusions upon an analysis of economic phenomena. The sociological school declares that no solid edifice can be constructed on such a narrow basis. Wuarin says social problems do not arise from political economy, but from a more general science.

Gide, who is an economic specialist, also contends for the possibility of an independent economic science. Again, Pareto holds that it is a natural science, as psychology, or physiology. He claims the independence of political economy as a pure science, and denies it the office of giving practical precepts, this being reserved to the social sciences.

The question then seems to be, Is economics a moral science? To this I say No. Economics is the science of the laws of development and decay. As all sciences of laws, economics has two usages. The first is to serve as an explanation of passing events, *e. g.*, Spain is today poorer than many other European nations.

Sciences of laws are composed of abstract formulas. These ought to receive the uniform name of theorems. Economics would be an example of these theorems; *e. g.*, Gresham's law. This law has assuredly no moral tone. Good and bad money are here used with a purely economic consideration. If one argues that the depreciation is due to acts which are blameworthy, that is a very important question, but has no concern for the economist.

The second usage of the science of laws is to furnish a solid basis in a theory of means for future activity. Every practical programme ought to be moral. But to apply morality successfully one has to know the natural laws. In other words, eco-

nomics ought to furnish the answer to such questions as this: Given such a situation, such a combination of circumstances, such psychical habits of the agent, what will be the economic results of such an enterprise?

Unless all such questions as these are discussed, such a science is impossible. For pure economics, the terms moral and immoral have no more meaning than the term beauty to mathematics. It is a psychological science, and not a moral one. Moral sciences can give categorical precepts. Morality, however, is not the science of conduct, or of the rules of conduct. A good practical programme cannot be established on a double basis—the one a good theory of the value of ends, the other an exact knowledge of the means. The general knowledge of means is furnished by the sciences of the natural laws; morality does not deal directly with the ends, but with the hierarchy of their values.—A. NAVILLE, "Economique et Morale," *Revue Philosophique*, January 1897. F.

The Restoration of Economics to Ethics.—At one time economics was recognized as a part of moral philosophy. There is now a movement, as seen in Marshall, Hadley, Smart, and the Austrian economists, back toward this old view, and regardless of the fact that many economists assert that there is a system of "positive economics" independent of any system of ethics, the close relation of ethics to economics is being more and more recognized.

Moral philosophy, or ethics, may be divided into "general ethics," "unfolding the general theory of moral action, the notions and principles of the entire moral order," and "particular ethics," "applying the general theory to the concrete relations of men, and from the general notions and principles drawing conclusions for the actions of men in the various conditions of life." "Particular ethics" may be divided into "natural theology" and "the social and political sciences," the latter including "economics" and "politics." Is this not the true place of economics? An examination will show that it is.

It is asserted that economics in the "stricter sense" "does not seek to determine ideals, but is a positive science, concerned exclusively with the investigation of uniformities; being, like all such sciences, a body of systematized knowledge concerning what is." It is asserted "that it is possible and desirable to discuss economic uniformities independently of economic ideals, and without formulating economic precepts." This is true of statistics and the "prolegomena" of economics, but it is not true of economics as a science. The truth of this statement is attested by the fact that those who believe in the "positive science" cannot write without using ethical terms, implying "duty," "responsibility," "ideals." In these unsuccessful attempts to avoid ethical terms and ethical ideals, economists set up an "imaginary man" in an "imaginary world" "and reason about what is not"—and this may be good exercise, but it is not *fact*, it is not *science*.—CHARLES S. DEVAS, Royal University of Ireland, in the *International Journal of Ethics*, January 1897. M.

Representative Institutions in British Trade-Unionism.—Representative institutions are most highly developed in the associations of coal miners and cotton operatives, who now comprise one-quarter of the total trade-union membership and have developed the best expert civil service. In the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton Spinners the legislative power is vested in a meeting comprising representatives from the various provinces and districts included in the association. This body is elected annually in strict proportion to membership, and consists of about 100 representatives. The actual government is conducted by an executive council of fourteen, of whom seven at least must be working spinners. The actual executive work is performed by the general secretary, who is elected by the representatives. There is no provision for the referendum or initiative, and rotation in office is discontinued. The delegate idea is completely abandoned. The Miners' Federation of Great Britain, established in 1887, adopted from the outset a completely representative constitution. The supreme authority is vested in a conference, summoned as often as necessary, which consists of representatives elected by each country or district association. This conference appoints the executive officers. Rotation in office is

not observed. The actual carrying out of policies is left unreservedly to the executive committee. The discredit into which such expedients as the mass meeting, rotation of office, referendum and initiative, and restriction of delegates by imperative mandate have fallen is leading to the gradual adoption of the representative form of government throughout the trade-union world. A representative body having its own cabinet can sufficiently check the executive, but a representative executive affords no such advantages. The cotton operatives and miners enjoy special advantages in having their membership within a small radius; but a union extending throughout the kingdom cannot have a large representative body which can meet frequently. But with the increasing uniformity of working conditions throughout the country, the growing facilities of travel, and the steady multiplication of salaried local officials, the geographical difficulty is not insuperable. The function of the representative is still to express the mind of the average member, but unlike the delegate he is not a mechanical vehicle of votes on particular subjects. The representative acts as an interpreter between the people, who have little facility in expressing their desires and no conception as to how they can be satisfied, and the expert officials who tend to grow away from the unions. To secure representatives adequate to the task is much more difficult than it would be among bankers or merchants; for as the labor representative becomes equipped for his duties he gets out of touch with the manual workers. Failure on the part of a union to specialize the executive function leads to extinction; and failure to specialize the legislature leads to the domination of an irresponsible executive. The referendum fails because of the inability of the ordinary man to estimate what will be the effect of a proposal. For example, many unions have persistently voted themselves into bankruptcy. The referendum may be valuable, not as a legislative act, but as an index of the probability that all members will do what is required of them, as when a decision to strike is made. Any effective participation of the wage-earning class in the national legislature involves the establishment of the professional representative; for the facts that confront a representative in parliament are foreign to his whole experience and training. The tendency will be to exalt the real power of the representative, and to differentiate his functions from those of the ordinary citizen on the one side and of the expert administrator on the other.—SIDNEY and BEATRICE WEBB, *Political Science Quarterly*, December 1896. F.

On Changes in Trade Organization.—The effect of trade combinations upon prices is twofold: direct, so far as the primary object of the combination is to obtain higher prices; indirect, inasmuch as they affect the cost of production. A distinction must be observed between the effect of trades unions and of syndicates or capitalistic organizations. The direct object of the former has been to raise wages or shorten hours, or improve conditions; the general effect is increase of cost, though not always of price. No trades union has ever professed to concern itself with reduction of cost, though this has sometimes resulted from the discipline and corporate feeling fostered in the best unions. The direct object of syndicates is to make a profit. This desire tends to reduction of cost; while the desire for a large trade frequently tends to reduction of prices. Not only is the organization of a syndicate less expensive than the sum of the organizations of small firms of the same aggregate potentiality, but it is more effective and tends to economy in production. The larger quantities of raw materials used by a syndicate induce sellers to compete more keenly to supply them. The statistical experience in a very large business leads to further economy. In a small firm there is no standard of comparison except such as is gathered by hearsay from competitors. The small manufacturer attempts to be an expert in everything, whereas the syndicate can employ an expert in each department. There is also economy in labor when production attains a certain magnitude, both in the better organization of labor and in the lower average of inspection and control required. The advantages of large organizations also appear in distribution. They tend to place themselves in more direct contact with their markets. The cost of transportation is lessened, especially when ships are employed. There are also advantages in advertisement and commercial traveling. No small firm can afford to

travel even the whole of one country; hence its markets are very limited. A large syndicate can travel the whole world. The small manufacturer must receive information as to the views of consumers from merchants who may often be interested in misrepresenting. A syndicate comes in immediate contact with all of its markets, and receives illumination from markets using similar products from other sources. In fine, the syndicate in the world of business is a new and larger organism with larger eyes, more complex brain, wider knowledge, and greater powers. Upon these forces which tend to economies in production and distribution depend the permanence of syndicates and the chance of avoiding the evil tendency to make profit by raising prices. Great advances of price, except under extraordinary circumstances, are suicidal to an industry. But the inclination to raise prices moderately is more insidious. Hitherto the commercial world has not consciously considered price in relation to cost; for the price both from maker and to consumer has been ruled as much by the ingenuity and caprice of the middleman as by the cost of production. With syndicates a larger knowledge of cost in the productive department, of prices in the distributive department, and of foreign cost of production, synthesized in the governing brains, brings finer accuracy in estimation of profit, and creates more steady and moderate prices. The average number of governing minds over a period will be more powerful in consideration and more moderate in action than the average individual. Large organizations also afford opportunity of creating and treating large and trustworthy bodies of statistics. One of the chief evils of large organizations is the greater opportunity given for manipulation of the stock on exchange. Syndicates can raise prices only temporarily; for the average of price over some period is dependent upon factors which control syndicates as much as individuals. There are four stages in the evolution of syndicates; first, complete tentative monopoly; second, competition, but with some tacit combination of all competitors; third, thorough competition; fourth, a death struggle and survival of the fittest by ultimate economy.—H. J. FALK, *The Economic Journal*, December 1896. F.

Proposed Belgian Law Governing Labor Contracts.—The law concerns only laborers who are engaged to labor under the direction of a superior. A married woman is allowed to engage her labor without the consent of her husband. The amount and nature of payments shall in all cases be determined by agreement. The workingman is obliged to execute his work at the time, place, and under the conditions determined by agreement or custom; to work conformably to rules and orders given to him by the head of the company or his representatives; and to observe good manners during the execution of his contract. He is obliged to return in good condition tools and materials belonging to his employer, but shall not be liable for deterioration due to normal wear and tear. The employer must have labor performed under conditions determined by contract or custom; see that it is performed under conditions suitable to security and health; and maintain decency during the execution of work. He must pay wages in the manner determined by contract or custom. He cannot hold tools belonging to workmen. When the engagement is for an indefinite time, it may be ended by either party notifying the other. If the laborer breaks his engagement without previous notice or before the expiration of his contract, for certain causes, his rights and interests are not to be prejudiced. Under other circumstances the party breaking the contract is liable for damages, proportioned to the wages.—*Revue du Travail*, December 1896. F.

Crime and the Census.—The number of prisoners per one million population is given by the census as 290 in 1850, 607 in 1860, 853 in 1870, 1169 in 1880, and 1315 in 1890. It is assumed that the number of prisoners at a given epoch is indicative of the amount of crime at the same period. In 1880 and 1890 the enumeration included all prisoners, while in 1870 those in houses of correction were not reported. Omitting those in houses of correction in 1880 and 1890, we have, per one million population, 853 in 1870, 1012 in 1880, 1155 in 1890. The return to civil life after the war, and the making of three million negroes citizens capable of committing crime, inevitably disturbed social relations. Omitting prisoners in houses of correction and

those in the southern states, we have, per one million, 913 prisoners in 1870, 962 in 1880, and 1072 in 1890. The statement of the populations of penal institutions on a single day is sufficiently near to the average populations at the period in question. But it is clear that the number of prisoners at any time depends not only upon the number that has been sent to prison, but also on the length of the sentences imposed; for if in a given prison 100 convicts are received annually, with a uniform sentence of two years each, there will be in two years after opening the prison and in subsequent years 200 individuals in prison; while, if in another prison 100 are received annually, with a uniform sentence of three years, there will be at the end of the third year and subsequently 300 individuals in that prison. Therefore the reported population does not represent the crimes of a year. In 1890 the average sentence of those sentenced for definite terms was 3.88 years; in 1880 it was 4.14 years. As the census gives the sentences in detail a calculation may be made showing that whereas the prisoners reported in 1890 as committed for terms of one year and over were 45,115, the actual number committed was probably 15,295; and whereas 18,538 were reported as committed for less than one year, the actual number so committed was probably 181,134. The former represent the serious offenders. The number of long-term prisoners, according to the census reports, increased 48.84 per cent. from 1880 to 1890, while, according to our calculation, the increase was 64.20 per cent. In 1890 there were relatively more short sentences given. If in one section long sentences prevail, prisoners will be relatively more numerous than in another where short sentences prevail. The census reports 6405 female prisoners, or 7.78 per cent. of the total number; but since the average sentence for males was 4.07 years, and for females 1.59 years, the estimated percentage of female commitments would be 16.07. This accords with the experience of foreign countries. By elements of population, according to the census of 1890, 50.41 per cent. of the prison population was native white, 19.53 per cent. foreign-born white, 28.78 per cent. negroes, 1.28 per cent. other elements. The estimate of commitments would be 49.96 per cent. native white, 29.42 per cent. foreign-born white, 19.12 per cent. negroes, 1.50 per cent. other elements. If ratios to the population are calculated, they should be with the adult population, not with the general population. The census gives an altogether incorrect idea of the relative frequency of different classes of crime. Homicide, which brings a long, usually life sentence, is represented by a large number of persons whose crimes were committed oftentimes many years before the date of the census. As a picture of crime at a given time the census report paints the situation too darkly. Crimes against the person and against property are not in any given year nearly so numerous as the census would lead us to infer, while crimes against society, receiving sentences averaging one-fifth as long as the former, are much more numerous than the census indicates.—R. P. FALKNER, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January 1897. F.

An Unemployed Census.—The German government has taken advantage of the opportunity afforded by its "Industrial Census" of June and its "Population Census" of December 1895, to make a census of the unemployed. The results of this investigation are to be found in the *Vierteljahrshefte zur Statistik des deutschen Reichs*, 1896. The term "unemployed" was intended to include those dependent upon wages who were out of work for other cause than sickness. The number of such work-people found engaged in agriculture, industry, commerce, transport and domestic and other service was 15,497,632. Of these on June 14, 1895, 118,605, or 77 per cent., were not in work because of sickness, while 174,073, or 1.12 per cent., were not in work for causes other than sickness,—that is were "unemployed." This shows that in June the unemployed were 77 per cent. of the wage-earners, while in December it was 3.5 per cent. An examination of the problem in different industries shows that the most of this increase came from the building trades and so was clearly due to seasonal unemployment. The report says that if the statistics given are in error, they are in being an overstatement of the number of the unemployed.—In the *Labour Gazette*, March 1897. M.

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[A selection of the more important works dealing with various lines of social work which have appeared since the March issue of the JOURNAL.]

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[A selection mainly from the American periodicals for March and April and the foreign periodicals for February and March.]

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
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A.	Arena.	JHS.	Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science.
AA.	American Anthropologist.	JMS.	Journal of Mental Science.
AAC.	Archives d'Anthropologie Criminelle.	JNS.	Jahrbücher für National-Oekonomie und Statistik.
AAE.	Archivio per l'Antropologia e la Etnologia.	JPE.	Journal of Political Economy.
AAF.	Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.	LG.	Labor Gazette.
AC.	L'Association Catholique.	LH.	Lend a Hand.
ACQ.	American Catholic Quarterly Review.	LoQR.	London Quarterly Review.
AE.	Archiv für Eisenbahwesen.	LQR.	Law Quarterly Review.
AGP.	Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.	M.	Monist.
AH.	Archive für Hygiene.	MHM.	Mansfield House Magazine.
AHR.	American Historical Review.	Mi.	Mind.
AIS.	Annals de l'Institut de Science Sociale.	MIM.	Monatsschrift für innere Mission.
AJM.	American Journal of Medical Sciences.	NA.	Nuova Antologia.
AJP.	American Journal of Psychology.	NAR.	North American Review.
AJS.	American Journal of Sociology.	NC.	Nineteenth Century.
AK.	Arbeiter-Kolonie.	NS.	Natural Science.
ALR.	American Law Review.	Nt.	Nature.
ALRR.	American Law Register and Review.	NW.	New World.
AMC.	American Magazine of Civics.	NZ.	Neue Zeit.
AMP.	Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, Séances.	PhR.	Philosophical Review.
AN.	American Naturalist.	PSM.	Popular Science Monthly.
Ant.	L'Anthropologie.	PSQ.	Political Science Quarterly.
AOR.	Archiv für öffentliches Recht.	PsR.	Psychological Review.
Ar.	Arbeiterfreund.	QJE.	Quarterly Journal of Economics.
ASA.	American Statistical Association, Publications.	QR.	Quarterly Review.
ASAr.	Allgemeine Statistisches Archiv.	RCS.	Revue Christianisme sociale.
ASG.	Archive für Sociale Gesetzgebung und Statistik.	RDI.	Revue de Droit internationale.
ASP.	Archiv für Systematische Philosophie.	RDM.	Revue des deux Mondes.
BDL.	Bulletin of the Department of Labor.	REA.	Revue mensuelle l'Ecole d'Anthropologie de Paris.
BG.	Blätter für Gefängnissskunde.	Ref.S.	Réforme sociale.
BML.	Banker's Magazine, London.	ReS.	Revue Socialiste.
BMN.	Banker's Magazine, New York.	RH.	Revue historique.
BOT.	Bulletin de l'Office du Travail.	RHD.	Revue d'Histoire diplomatique.
BR.	Bond Record.	RIF.	Rivista italiana di Filosofia.
BS.	Bibliotheca Sacra.	RiS.	Rivista di Sociologia.
BSt.	Bulletin de Statistique et de Legislation Comparée.	RIS.	Revue internationale de Sociologie.
BUI.	Bulletin de l'Union Internationale de Droit Penale.	RISS.	Rivista internazionale di Scienze Sociali.
ChOR.	Charity Organisation Review.	RMM.	Revue Metaphysique et de Morale.
ChR.	Charities Review.	RP.	Revue de Paris.
CoR.	Contemporary Review.	RPe.	Revue pénitentiaire.
DR.	Deutsche Revue.	RPh.	Revue philosophique.
DRU.	Deutsche Rundschau.	RPP.	Revue politique et parlementaire.
DZG.	Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft.	RRL.	Review of Reviews, London.
EcJ.	Economic Journal.	RKN.	Review of Reviews, New York.
EcR.	Economic Review.	RSI.	Revisita Storica italiana.
Ed.	Education.	RSP.	Revue sociale et politique.
Ed.R.	Educational Review.	RT.	Revue du Travail.
EHR.	English Historical Review.	S.	Sanitarian.
EM.	Engineering Magazine.	Sc.	Science.
EMo.	La España Moderna.	SP.	Science Progress.
F.	Forum.	SR.	School Review.
FR.	Fortnightly Review.	SS.	Science Sociale.
GEC.	Giornale degli Economisti.	VSV.	Vierteljahrsschrift für Staats- und Volkswirtschaft.
GM.	Guntton's Magazine.	VWP.	Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie.
HLR.	Harvard Law Review.	VR.	Yale Review.
HR.	Hygienische Rundschau.	ZE.	Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.
HZ.	Historische Zeitschrift.	ZGS.	Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaften.
IAE.	Internationales Archiv für Ethnographie.	ZPK.	Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik.
IIE.	International Journal of Ethics.	ZPO.	Zeitschrift für das private und öffentliche Recht.
IR.	Investor's Review.	ZPP.	Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane.
JAI.	Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland.	ZVR.	Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.
JEc.	Journal des Economistes.	ZVS.	Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Socialpolitik und Verwaltung.
JFI.	Journal of the Franklin Institute.		
JGV.	Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft.		

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